The USA has launched a project to expand the runway at a military base in Kenya

The United States has launched a $70 million project to expand the runway at a military base in Kenya

near the Somali border. The goal is to strengthen counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa. Manda Bay Air Base, owned by the Kenyan Armed Forces in Lamu County, is used by U.S. troops and has long served as a strategic hub in the fight against the al-Qaeda-affiliated extremist group al-Shabaab. The base comprises Magagoni Airfield (a multi-purpose runway), Camp Simba (a U.S. facility within the base), and the adjacent Kenyan naval base, Manda Bay. It supports air operations such as surveillance drones, ISR missions, logistics, and airstrikes. Recent expansions have increased runway capacity and fuel storage capacity. The base is primarily used by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) for training Kenyan forces, maritime security, and regional counterterrorism operations, including those in Somalia. Kenya hosts the base as a key non-NATO ally. U.S. personnel provide support through units such as the 475th Air Base Expeditionary Squadron. The base evolved from a small training base in 2004 into a regional hub for reconnaissance missions and rapid reaction forces. In January 2020, al-Shabaab militants attacked the airbase, killing three Americans, destroying six aircraft (including advanced reconnaissance aircraft worth over $20 million), and exposing security gaps. U.S. AFRICOM's post-attack investigation identified problems such as inadequate training, leadership failures, and base expansion without adequate defenses, leading to reinforcements such as the East Africa Response Force and increased patrols. The US maintains a presence to train Kenyan armed forces with approximately 350 soldiers at various locations in Kenya; security measures were strengthened after 2020, highlighting its continued strategic value despite existing vulnerabilities. In 2024, during the state visit of Kenyan President William Ruto, former US President Joe Biden announced plans to make Kenya the first major non-NATO ally in sub-Saharan Africa and to strengthen military and diplomatic relations—though without a formal security pact. Kenya is currently undergoing expansion as a military facility, particularly the runway and associated infrastructure. The official groundbreaking ceremony for the 10,000-foot (approximately 3.5 km) runway extension took place on January 29, 2026, with representatives from Kenya and the US. The project includes new airfield facilities, accommodations, and fuel depots and is expected to be completed in 18 months. This runway can accommodate jets such as the Boeing 737 or Airbus A320; Jet such as the Boeing 777 or Airbus A330; Jets like the Boeing 747. There are limitations, as the actual landing capability depends on the landing distance (not the takeoff distance), altitude, temperature, wind, and weight – for example, the requirement increases at high altitudes or with a full load. At sea level and under standard conditions, 10,000 feet is sufficient for "virtually any aircraft." Smaller propeller planes and business jets also utilize it, of course. There are opponents of US interests in Kenya, primarily terrorist groups and geopolitical rivals. Political criticism of US policy remains limited and rarely targets the US directly. Al-Shabaab from Somalia is the primary adversary of the US in Kenya. The militia attacks US targets and Kenyan facilities to avenge Kenya's military presence in Somalia and its cooperation with the US, as seen in attacks on Westgate (2013) and Manda Bay. Russia and China are considered indirect adversaries due to their growing influence in Kenya, for example through economic deals and infrastructure, which undermines US dominance in East Africa. Russia uses this to weaken US security positions, including through propaganda and diplomacy. Anti-US sentiment emerged during the 2024/2025 protests against tax reforms, where demonstrators blamed the US for IMF pressure, as Ruto had previously been celebrated in Washington. The "United Opposition" criticizes government actions, not primarily the US; no explicit US opponents have been identified. How strong is al-Shabab really? Estimates of the number of active fighters vary widely, but typically range from 7,000 to 12,000, with reports of up to 15,000–18,000 in 2022. The exact number remains uncertain due to recruitment, losses, and forced recruitment by clans. What weapons does al-Shabab have at its disposal? SVD sniper rifles, RPGs, mortars (60–120 mm), IEDs, and SVBIEDs. Al-Shabaab acquires weapons through black markets, corruption, Yemen, and captured stockpiles; annual expenditures: approximately USD 24 million plus USD 1.8 million for its own explosives production. Given this armament, one might ask why this US base is being expanded. With weapons production of approximately USD 26 million, the threat can't be all that great. And then there are the roughly 12,000 soldiers... a small army, hardly a serious threat. Here's a comparison to Kenya. Kenya has approximately 24,000 to 50,000 active soldiers in the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF). Estimates vary depending on the source: Global Firepower projects approximately 50,000 active-duty personnel for 2026 (45,000 Army, 6,500 Air Force, 2,500 Navy), plus 25,000 paramilitaries, for a total of 75,000 military personnel. Global Firepower (2026 estimate): 50,000 active-duty personnel. DefenceWeb (current): Approximately 24,100 active-duty personnel (20,000 Army, 2,500 Air Force, 1,600 Navy), plus 5,000 paramilitaries. Older sources (e.g., World Bank 2020): Around 24,000–29,000. https://mjengohub.co.ke/articles/news/kenya-and-us-break-ground-on-sh1-billion-manda-bay-airfield-expansion https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/120315-kenya-us-launch-10000-foot-runway-project-strategic-manda-bay-base

Ethiopia publicly accused Eritrea of committing mass killings

Ethiopia publicly accused Eritrea for the first time of committing mass killings

during the two-year war in the Tigray region, which ended in 2022. The Ethiopian government has publicly accused Eritrean forces of carrying out massacres of civilians in the Tigray region during the conflict from 2020 to 2022. These accusations were part of a broader allegation of atrocities, extrajudicial killings, and human rights violations during the war. The Tigray War began in November 2020, when the Ethiopian federal government, together with Eritrean troops and the regional Amhara forces, launched a military offensive against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Eritrea's involvement was initially denied by both Ethiopia and Eritrea, but later confirmed. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed told Parliament that Eritrean troops participated in massacres in Axum and other locations. Throughout the conflict, there have been numerous reports of massacres, sexual violence, and ethnic attacks perpetrated by various parties, including Eritrean forces. High-profile incidents such as the Axum massacre (November 2020) and the Mai Kadra massacre have been extensively documented by international human rights organizations. On November 28 and 29, 2020, Eritrean soldiers carried out a multi-day massacre in the historic city of Axum. They systematically killed hundreds of unarmed civilians in the streets, homes, and churches, often through indiscriminate shelling or executions. Eyewitnesses reported at least 240 to 800 deaths, including many men and youths; bodies were buried in mass graves near churches such as Axum Tsion St. Mariam. Amnesty International verified this through interviews with 41 survivors and satellite imagery; looting and further violence ensued. The offensive aimed to recapture Axum from Tigray militias as part of the war between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Amnesty International classifies the killings as a suspected crime against humanity. The Mai Kadra massacre took place on November 9 and 10, 2020, in the town of Mai Kadra in Ethiopia's Tigray region during the early stages of the Tigray War. It was a massacre of civilians, primarily ethnic Amhara seasonal workers, by a Tigrayan youth militia known as "Samri," supported by local police and other forces allied with Tigray. The attackers raided homes and beat, stabbed, strangled, and killed non-Tigrayans with machetes, knives, axes, and ropes after verifying their ethnicity based on identification documents or appearance. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) described it as a “widespread and systematic attack” on civilians, with the killings beginning before the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) entered the town. The EHRC reported at least 600 dead, but the actual number could be higher. 1,100; Amnesty International, based on verified photos and videos of stabbing injuries, confirmed “likely hundreds.” After the ENDF and Amhara forces captured Mai Kadra on November 10, at least five Tigrayans were killed in retaliatory killings. The massacre occurred before the ENDF advance amid a conflict between the regional government, led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Ethiopian federal forces. Many perpetrators fled to Sudan; investigations by the EHRC, the OHCHR, and Amnesty International were hampered by communication breakdowns. The EHRC classified the act as an atrocity. Eritrea rejected the accusations, calling them false and "despicable." In a significant reversal, the Ethiopian government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed finally recognized Eritrea's presence and condemned its actions. In March/April 2021, the Ethiopian federal government explicitly accused the Eritrean armed forces of committing atrocities and demanded their withdrawal from Tigray. Investigations by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and later a joint report by the UN Human Rights Commission of Ethiopia documented systematic human rights violations and implicated the Eritrean armed forces in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ethiopia's public accusation against Eritrea marked a turning point in the conflict and underscored the serious human rights violations and the difficulty of holding perpetrators accountable in a complex geopolitical environment.

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi has been assassinated in Libya

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi has been assassinated in Libya

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, was recently assassinated. He was reportedly shot dead by four unidentified masked gunmen who stormed his home in Zintan, in western Libya, where he had lived for about ten years. The attackers had disabled security cameras beforehand, and his lawyer and political advisors confirmed the murder in statements. Saif al-Islam was once considered a potential successor to his father and had faced multiple trials, including a death sentence handed down in absentia in 2015 and an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes during the 2011 uprising. Libyan authorities have launched an investigation, but no group has yet claimed responsibility. Given the ongoing instability in Libya, the circumstances remain unclear. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the second son of the slain Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, was a prominent political figure before the 2011 civil war and was often considered a potential successor and reformer. Saif al-Islam was born in 1972 to Muammar Gaddafi and his second wife, Safia. He studied architecture in Libya and later earned a doctorate from the London School of Economics. He acted as an unofficial advisor and mediator in international conflicts, for example, in peace talks between the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and in the negotiations for the release of the Lockerbie bomber. During the Libyan civil war, he threatened demonstrators with "rivers of blood" and was accused by the government. The International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted him for crimes against humanity in connection with the regime's actions. He was captured in November 2011 and sentenced to death in absentia in 2015, but was later pardoned. After 2011, he lived in seclusion in Zintan. In 2022, he proposed solutions to the Libyan crisis and attempted to run for president in 2021, but his bid was postponed. In 2023, he criticized rival factions in connection with events such as the floods in Derna. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/3/saif-al-islam-gaddafi-son-of-former-leader-killed-in-libya https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/muammar-gaddafi-s-son-saif-al-islam-killed-in-libya-s-zintan-city-lawyer/3819390

Stakeholders Demand SHA Payment List

Stakeholders Demand SHA Payment List

SHA stands for Social Health Authority in Kenya. It is a government corporation that replaced the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) on October 1, 2024, under the Social Health Insurance Act of November 2023. SHA administers public health insurance to ensure accessible, affordable, and high-quality healthcare as part of Kenya's Universal Health Coverage (UHC) agenda. It oversees three main funds: the Primary Health Fund (government-funded for basic services), the Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF, income-based contributions), and the Emergency, Serious, and Chronic Illness Fund (ECCIF). Permanent employees pay 2.75% of their gross salary (e.g., 1,375 KSh for 50,000 KSh), which is deducted like income tax. Self-employed individuals pay monthly contributions starting at 300 KSh, subject to means-testing, with subsidies available for those in need. The most significant difference compared to the NHIF is that, unlike the NHIF, which relied on a single fund, the SHA extends benefits to public and approved private providers and aims for broader coverage despite initial challenges such as funding gaps. Stakeholders in the Kenyan healthcare system, including medical professionals and hospitals, are calling for the full publication of the Social Health Administration's (SHA) payment list to ensure greater transparency and accountability. This push follows the government's recent disbursement of 91.4 billion Kenyan shillings out of a total of 130.4 billion Kenyan shillings, while concerns about delays and rejected applications persist. Medical professionals are urging the Ministry of Health to immediately publish the SHA payments to allow for verification. They are also calling for predictable budgets to support those in need, rather than relying on members of parliament. Hospitals point to inconsistent reimbursements. Some facilities receive no payments at all. Health Minister Aden Duale announced that 91.4 billion Kenyan shillings had been paid out to hospitals by the end of January 2026. In early August 2025, the ministry denied the removal of the SHA payment list from sha.go.ke/resources and confirmed its availability. A parliamentary committee demanded the settlement of outstanding NHIF invoices totaling 10 billion Kenyan shillings (which had been transferred to the SHA) within three months and the enforcement of a 90-day damages settlement deadline. The official SHA payment list remains available online at sha.go.ke/resources. Public analyses, such as a PDF summary of payments to hospitals like Kenyatta National Hospital (totaling 345 million Kenyan shillings), are also available. Stakeholder groups like RUPHA – the Rural & Urban Private Hospitals Association of Kenya, a non-profit organization representing private healthcare facilities in rural areas and urban centers that serve medically underserved populations – continue to advocate for transparency despite ongoing disputes. The Health Authority (SHA) faces widespread operational and systemic problems. These problems have led to delays in healthcare provision, financial strain on facilities, and public frustration. Frequent outages of the digital platform affect 92% of facilities, resulting in delays in processing benefit claims and requiring manual intervention. Delayed reimbursements and funding gaps mean that 89% of facilities cannot cover their costs and receive only partial payments from premiums collected. Access barriers exist for vulnerable groups such as cancer patients, teenage mothers, and the needy due to gaps in insurance policies and registration hurdles. And, as is often the case, there is fraud and corruption. High-ranking SHA executives have been arrested on fraud charges, including forgery and conspiracy to defraud millions. Systemic errors have reactivated suspended fraudulent entities, and scandals involve fictitious patients and 11 billion Kenyan shillings in missing funds. A parliamentary report lists 19 shortcomings, with 75% of Kenyans citing corruption as a major problem. Recent developments include demands from interest groups for transparent payment lists. Despite 91.4 billion Kenyan shillings being disbursed, disputes persist. According to polls, 70% consider the Public Health Insurance (SHA) inferior to the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), even though changes in leadership are intended to improve stability. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/health-science/article/2001539934/stakeholders-want-sha-payment-list-made-public-for-transparency https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/health-science/article/2001539934/stakeholders-want-sha-payment-list-made-public-for-transparency https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/health/249399/mps-demand-sha-clears-sh10-billion-in-pending-nhif-bills-within-three-months [

Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara – a violation of international law

Western Sahara, a former Spanish colonial territory, has been the subject of a territorial conflict since 1975 between Morocco, which claims the region as its "southern provinces," and the Polisario Front (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro), which is fighting for the region's independence as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Morocco controls approximately 80% of the territory, including all major cities and resources, while the Polisario Front controls the remainder, including the refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. The United Nations considers Western Sahara a non-self-governing territory whose final status must be determined by an independence referendum. Shortly after the UN's expert opinion, King Hassan II of Morocco organized the "Green March." Approximately 350,000 unarmed Moroccan civilians marched into Western Sahara to support Morocco's claims. Spain, under pressure, withdrew and signed a secret agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, dividing Western Sahara between these two states. The Polisario Front and the UN did not recognize this agreement, as it violated the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination. Morocco has de facto annexed Western Sahara. The UN is demanding a referendum to determine the territory's status. However, the EU supports Morocco's plan to annex the territory without a referendum. This is a clear violation of international law. With its announced support for Morocco's proposed autonomy plan for Western Sahara, the EU is undermining binding UN resolutions and de facto legitimizing Morocco's annexation of this territory, which has been disputed for decades. At the recent EU-Morocco Association Council meeting, the European Commission signaled its willingness to actively support future negotiations based on the Moroccan proposal, reports the foreign policy blog German-Foreign-Policy. Critics see this as a breach of international law: Western Sahara is still considered a "non-self-governing territory" under the UN definition, which has an inalienable right to decolonization and self-determination. The International Court of Justice and more than one hundred UN resolutions have repeatedly confirmed this status – but the autonomy plan supported by the EU would effectively enshrine Moroccan control. The EU explicitly refers to UN Resolution 2797 (2025), which names Morocco's autonomy plan as the basis for negotiations without preconditions to find a "politically sustainable and mutually acceptable solution." In January 2026, the EU declared in Brussels its readiness to support UN consultations and welcomed Morocco's openness to clarifying the issue of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. This marked an agreement among the EU-27 member states without formal recognition of Moroccan sovereignty. Western Sahara is considered a "non-self-governing territory" with the right to self-determination, as established by the International Court of Justice (1975) and over 100 UN resolutions. In 2024, the European Court of Justice ruled that Morocco does not possess sovereignty and that EU agreements concerning Western Sahara are illegal because the Sahrawi people were not consulted. Proponents argue that the plan enables genuine autonomy as a "workable" UN solution; opponents consider it a legalization of the occupation, comparable to the annexation of Crimea. Western Sahara is recognized as a "non-self-governing territory" with the right to self-determination, as established by the International Court of Justice (1975) and over 100 UN resolutions. While the UNSC views the plan as a "viable outcome," it lacks a referendum on independence, which the Polisario Front demands. Criticism comes from NGOs and left-wing groups. The EU is accused of ignoring European Court of Justice rulings in favor of economic interests (e.g., raw materials, energy). Morocco benefits diplomatically, while Algeria and the Polisario Front reject the plan.

The Battle of Adwa 1896

Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) successfully defended its sovereignty, particularly during the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895–1896, which culminated in the decisive Ethiopian victory at the Battle of Adwa. The victory at Adwa made Ethiopia a symbol of African resistance and led to its recognition (along with Liberia) as the only uncolonized country on the continent. This victory secured its independence until the 1930s. Ethiopia was the only African nation to successfully resist European colonization and maintain its sovereignty while almost the entire continent fell under foreign rule. This historic resistance reached its climax at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, where Ethiopians united across regions, classes, and cultures to defend their homeland against invasion. The battle was one of the origins of the First Italo-Ethiopian War (1895–1896), which was fueled by Italy's expansionist ambitions from Eritrea into Ethiopia following the disputes over the Treaty of Wuchale. Emperor Menelik II mobilized a massive army and used modern rifles from Russia and France, while the Italian General Oreste Baratieri struggled with supply shortages and pressure from Rome. The Ethiopian army under Emperor Menelik II comprised approximately 100,000 combatants, including thousands of civilians such as women, children, and artisans who accompanied and supported the army. Many women actively participated in the fighting, carrying weapons and fighting as equals against the Italian invaders, contributing to Ethiopia's victory. Ethiopian sources and accounts describe how women acted as combatants, supply carriers, and even on the front lines, often equipped with spears and rifles. This participation was typical of traditional Ethiopian campaigns and underscored the collective mobilization of society. The victory at Adwa is considered a symbol of African resistance, with the presence of women emphasizing national unity. Crucially, women marched alongside men onto the battlefield. Ethiopian women were active participants in the struggle for freedom. They carried food, water, and ammunition across treacherous terrain, cared for the wounded, delivered messages, and, when necessary, took up arms themselves. Like their male comrades, they were prepared to sacrifice their lives to prevent colonial powers from encroaching on their land and condemning future generations to foreign rule and servitude. Their resistance was fueled by a clear understanding of what was at stake. Colonization meant the loss of land, autonomy, culture, freedom and dignity. The victory at Adwa ensured that Ethiopian children would grow up in freedom in their own homeland, governed by their own people. The triumph was not only a military success but also a powerful affirmation of African self-determination, shattering the myth of European invincibility. The Battle of Adwa became a symbol of hope throughout Africa and the African diaspora, inspiring future generations to resist oppression and fight for independence. Ethiopia's victory—and the indispensable role of its women—serves as a lasting reminder that freedom is not defended by armies alone, but by the collective will of an entire people determined to remain free at all costs. Ethiopia achieved a decisive victory. Italian losses amounted to over 6,000 dead and 3,000 captured, while Ethiopian losses, out of 100,000 troops, were approximately 15,000. The Italians withdrew to Eritrea, thus ending their invasion. The Battle of Adwa halted Italian colonization, strengthened Pan-African pride, and inspired anti-colonial movements. Ethiopia celebrates it annually as a symbol of its sovereignty. Italy recognized Ethiopian independence in the Treaty of Addis Ababa of 1896. https://web.facebook.com/AfricanArchives/posts/1307747174723350?_rdc=1&_rdr#

The Epstein Documents Reach Kenya

The Epstein Documents Reach Kenya

. The recent release of documents related to Jeffrey Epstein (by the US Department of Justice, including millions of pages in early 2026) contained references to Kenya, generating significant interest and media coverage there. These references appear in emails, travel itineraries, and correspondence, but are described as brief and not central to the core allegations of human trafficking and sexual abuse. There are mentions of travel and business. Epstein or his associates discussed trips to Kenya, including a planned visit to Nairobi, a safari in the Maasai Mara, and stays in places like Lamu and Mombasa. One email allegedly mentioned a meeting with former President Uhuru Kenyatta regarding a logistics park project involving regional countries. Of course, references to "girls" and financing are also present. It all fits together. Emails from 2009 mention girls under the subject line "Kenya." Epstein apparently agreed to finance trips (approximately $13,000 each) to Nairobi, described as "safaris and internships." This has raised concerns in local media due to Epstein's history of abusing underage girls, although the documents present this in the context of travel and not explicit criminal activity in Kenya. Efforts were also made to establish further connections. The communications included figures such as Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem (chairman of DP World), who mentioned connections to Kenyan officials (e.g., attending Uhuru Kenyatta's inauguration in 2013). There are also casual mentions of Kenyan hotels or politicians in broader business discussions. There's a disturbing email anecdote: an email that surfaced during a trip to Kenya contained an apparent "joke" about baby trafficking. This was casually included in travel conversations (flights, safaris, celebrities), but some reports highlighted it as alarming. These mentions related to Kenya have garnered local attention because they touch on current issues like child abuse and vulnerability to international networks. However, reports emphasize that the mentions are mostly peripheral—travel itineraries, casual correspondence—without evidence that Epstein was directly involved in any major activities in Kenya or that prominent Kenyans were directly implicated in his crimes. Names publicly discussed in the latest Epstein Files and mentioned in Kenyan media outlets like Nation Africa include: Uhuru Kenyatta (former President of Kenya). He is mentioned in emails and correspondence, particularly in the context of planned or actual meetings with Epstein or his associates. There are references to a potential meeting or contact shortly before certain dates. Amina Mohamed (former Foreign Minister and WTO Director-General) appears in an email in which someone informs Epstein about a meeting with her (at the time, she was a cabinet member). The context appears to be diplomatic or business-related, approximately 13 days before another mention of Kenyatta. These names are primarily taken from the extensive article by Nation Africa ("Deals, trips and girls: How Kenyan politicians, hotels feature in new Jeffrey Epstein files"), published on February 2, 2026. Examples include: For example, NTV Kenya reported on Kenya's involvement in the files, mentioning brief references but connecting them to broader concerns regarding child protection. And Nation Africa reported in detail on politicians, hotels, business dealings, travel, and the email relating to the “girls,” highlighting Epstein’s proven pattern of abusing underage girls. These publications do not raise any new, serious allegations directly linking Kenyan figures to Epstein’s criminal activities. The documents essentially confirm known patterns of his international travel and his connections to influential circles elsewhere.

Ethiopia's Awi community proudly celebrates the 86th Agew Horse Festival

Ethiopia's Awi community proudly celebrates the 86th Agew Horse Festival

The Awi are an ethnic group in Ethiopia belonging to the Agew Awi peoples. They primarily live in the Agew Awi Zone west of Mirab Gojjam in the Amhara Region, as well as in smaller communities in the Metekel Zone of the Benishangul-Gumuz Region. The Awi are divided into seven subgroups: Ankäša, Azäna, Chara, Qʷaqura, Banʤa, Zigän, and Mätäkal. According to the 2007 census, the Awi population is approximately 631,565, representing about 0.85% of Ethiopia's total population; around 63,415 live in urban areas. The Awi Zone had a population of approximately 990,000 in 2005, with Amhara people forming the majority. The Agew Equestrian Festival, also known as the Agew Riding Festival or Agew Equestrian Sports Festival, is a vibrant, annual cultural event of the Agew (Agaw) people in the Awi Zone of the Amhara Region of Ethiopia, primarily in the city of Injibara. The festival features spectacular equestrian displays. Riders adorn their horses with colorful decorations and stage parades, competitions, and shows that commemorate historical resistance, such as against the Italian invaders. Promoting unity, conflict resolution, and cultural pride, the festival attracts thousands of participants and spectators. Horses hold great symbolic value in Agew society. The association boasts over 40,000 riders, and the event boosts local tourism. The 86th Agew Equestrian Festival in Injibara, the capital of the Awi Zone in the Amhara Region, was a resounding success. Deputy Prime Minister Temesgen Tiruneh was also in attendance, according to local media reports. This popular annual festival honors the brave patriots of the Awi people and the central role of horses in daily life, warfare, agriculture, and cultural heritage. Riders of all ages (adults, youths, women, and children) delighted the audience at the Injibara multi-purpose stadium with skillful, graceful, and traditional equestrian displays. A creative exhibition entitled "From Mofer to Tractor" illustrated the evolution of Ethiopian agriculture—from traditional wooden plows (mofer) pulled by oxen or horses to modern tractors and agricultural machinery. Exquisite traditional Agew horses were presented as heartfelt gifts to distinguished guests: Deputy Prime Minister Temesgen Tiruneh, the President of the Awi Zone, and the Prime Minister's Advisor, Abiy Ahmed.

Election violence threatens Kenya.

Election violence threatens Kenya.

Conditions in Kenya are ideal for the use of violence in the presidential election. It is now up to Kenyans to prevent this. Elections in Kenya, particularly in 2007/08, 2013, and 2017, have often been marred by clashes, resulting in hundreds of thousands of displaced people and dozens of deaths due to police violence and ethnic tensions. Opposition strongholds like Kibera and Kisumu regularly saw barricades, tear gas, and gunfire. A recent analysis warns that conditions could be favorable for state-orchestrated election violence, fueled by a lack of trust in the electoral commission and the president's reelection ambitions. Experts such as the International Crisis Group point to persistent institutional discord and low thresholds for protest. Countermeasures: Since 2022, elections have been considered free and fair, with international monitoring and a stronger police presence. Political elites bear a responsibility to prevent escalation, but socio-economic disparities remain a factor. These general elections in 2027 include presidential, parliamentary, and other elections. Watchdog organizations such as the Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee are developing oversight tools and conducting audits to address constitutional loopholes. As Kenya prepares for its next parliamentary elections in February 2027, 2026 will be a pivotal year, given the increasing erosion of local and global constraints on political violence. Trust in the credibility of the electoral system is at a historic low, and serious problems loom unless urgent action is taken. Violent violence in Kenyan elections is rarely attributable to the pervasive tribalism. It is almost exclusively a state-sponsored phenomenon that requires specific circumstances. Two factors are of paramount importance: first, the credibility of the election itself; and second, whether the incumbent is seeking re-election. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) is being urged to complete border checks by August 2026 at the latest, as the law requires 12 months' notice. Parties and coalitions are forming early, focusing on regions like Mount Kenya for crucial voter numbers. Political retreats, such as those of the Democratic Congress Party (DCP), are being held to develop election strategies. Alongside preparations, there are concerns about unrest, as protests from 2024 could spill over into 2027. Experts emphasize the need for heightened constitutional vigilance and parliamentary oversight. Conclusion: There are significant risks of violence in the 2027 Kenyan elections, based on historical patterns and current analyses. Kenya experienced severe unrest during the 2007/08, 2013, and 2017 elections, resulting in hundreds of deaths, ethnic clashes, and displacement, often triggered by allegations of election fraud. Experts warn of a repeat of the situation, given persistent distrust in the IEBC Election Commission, the controversial nature of President Ruto, and the potential for protests that began in 2024 (e.g., against tax reforms) to continue into 2027. Polarization in regions like Mount Kenya and Kibera, coupled with socioeconomic tensions, fuels the potential for escalation. Government retreats and international observers are working toward de-escalation, but a lack of reform in the police and judiciary remains a risk. https://aje.news/bx3iac