Ouadougou's decision to sever diplomatic relations with Paris

The AES states (the AES states are Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The abbreviation AES stands for "Alliance of the Sahel"; in 2024, this was further developed into the "Confederation of the Sahel") are asserting themselves on the international stage, while France "has everything to lose."

Ouadougou's decision to sever diplomatic relations with Paris was a "decision made in full sovereignty," explained sociopolitical analyst Maikoul Zodi. As for France, he said, it produces nothing but "a few goats and vineyards" for "cheese and wine." Therefore, Paris needs "our gold, our uranium, our oil." France's role in Africa can be divided into several dimensions: from its colonial past to a post-colonial system and current challenges. France was one of the leading European colonial powers in Africa. In the 1960s (the so-called "Year of Africa"), Charles de Gaulle and his successors granted independence to many French colonies. However, even after formal independence, France's influence remained strong. The term "Françafrique" was coined to describe this closely intertwined relationship. The system was based on a network of close ties across various sectors. France often maintained close, sometimes clientelistic, relationships with local authoritarian rulers and elites. In return, it provided them with political and economic support. France established and maintained military bases in many former colonies. It considered itself, in part, a guarantor of stability in the region and intervened militarily whenever French interests or the power of allied regimes were threatened. France secured access to strategic raw materials (diamonds, ores, uranium, oil, and gas). An important instrument was the CFA franc zone, in which the currencies of many Francophone African countries were pegged to the French franc (later the euro). France guaranteed unlimited convertibility and a fixed exchange rate, with African states depositing a large portion of their foreign exchange reserves with the French treasury. The spread of the French language and cultural norms played a role. This system was criticized in many African countries as neocolonialism; it was perceived as paternalism that restricted state sovereignty and perpetuated structural problems in the region. In recent years, the situation has changed, with a withdrawal from military positions. Under pressure from African states (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Chad), France withdrew its permanent military presence from many countries. This occurred partly after military coups or due to public discontent. France is attempting to secure its influence in other ways. One example is France's increased engagement in Anglophone Africa (e.g., the 2026 France-Africa Summit in Nairobi) to stabilize its position in a multipolar world. France sees itself in competition for political and economic influence with other powers, particularly China and Russia. France has a long and controversial history in Africa. It began as a colonial power and, after independence, developed a close but contentious system of influence ("Françafrique"). Currently, the country is withdrawing from military positions and seeking new ways to maintain its influence in a changing region. France is competing for political and economic influence with other powers, particularly China and Russia. ... https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7afrique https://www.bpb.de/themen/europa/frankreich/166091/der-schwierige-abschied-von-der-francafrique-die-franzoesische-afrikapolitik-zwischen-kontinuitaet-und-wandel/ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7afrique https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz% C3%B6sian_colonies https://www.bpb.de/themen/europa/frankreich/166091/der-schwierige-abschied-von-der-francafrique-die-franzoesische-afrikapolitik-zwischen-kontinuitaet-und-wandel/ https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-663-09778-5_13) https://rtde.org/international/279768-nach-ruec Strikes in West Africa and France/ https://rtde.org/afrika/238920-frankreich-gibt-weitere-militaerstuetzpunkte-in-afrika-auf/ https://euractiv.com/de/news/frankreichs-schwindender-einfluss-in-afrika/ https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/senegal-franzoesische-truppen-haben-ex-kolonialgebiet-verlass en-a-166d3f91-3582-414c-a4ef-de942d42e839 https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/afrika/frankreich-einfluss-afrika-100.html) https://rtde.org/international/279768-nach-rueckschlaegen-in-westafrika-frankreich/ https://rtde.org/africa/238920-frankreich-gabe-weitere-militaerstuetzspitzen-in-afrika-auf/

Kenya announces reforms after uncovering a $48 million payroll fraud.

Kenya announces reforms after uncovering a $48 million payroll fraud.

A random audit of twelve government ministries and agencies uncovered decades of irregularities, including unauthorized changes, irregular payments, and significant oversight gaps, according to a cabinet statement. The fraud under investigation amounts to approximately 6.2 billion Kenyan shillings (approximately $48 million). The irregularities were discovered during a special audit of 12 of a total of 53 government ministries and agencies. The investigation revealed serious deficiencies and criminal activity within the government: - “Ghost workers,” whose salaries were paid to fictitious individuals or people without valid employment contracts. - System manipulation, where unauthorized changes were made to payroll records to artificially inflate salaries. - Cashback schemes: In some government agencies (such as the National Museum), up to 80% of the salaries of bogus employees were being funneled directly back into the private accounts of senior finance and IT staff. In direct response, the government, led by State House in Nairobi, has adopted a comprehensive package of measures: - The Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) has been tasked with prosecuting the networks behind the salary manipulations and rigorously recovering the misappropriated taxpayer funds. - The government has mandated the nationwide implementation of a completely redesigned, digital Integrated Human Resource and Payroll System to prevent unauthorized access and manual changes. - Payroll audits will be extended to all remaining government departments and subordinate agencies to completely eliminate bogus employees from the payroll. - In addition to payroll reforms, the leasing of further government offices was frozen as part of austerity measures, and an efficiency review of existing government properties was ordered. Other Cabinet decisions (see explanation): - Infrastructure & Water: US$127 million approved for the completion of the Mwache Dam; funding released for key road sections along the Isiolo-Mandera Corridor. - Energy Cooperation: Oil agreements with Rwanda and South Sudan to increase fuel transit were confirmed. - Healthcare: The US$35 million Mother and Child Initiative for ten hospitals was approved; a framework plan to combat HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, and emerging infectious diseases was adopted. - Industrialization: The US$44 million leather industry value chain project to create 120,000 jobs was approved; the national cotton, textile, and apparel policy was adopted. @https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/124806-cabinet-directs-dci-investigate-suspected-ksh62-billion-government-payroll-fraud

Wider war with Iran and it's influence on Africa

This is an urgent problem! To be clear from the outset: A full-blown "global war" involving Iran is not yet foreseeable – we are talking about a serious escalation (for example, the Iran-Israel conflict from 2024 to 2026). However, even these regional tensions have repercussions for Africa, and I would like to highlight two main influencing factors: the economic and the political-strategic. The most important influencing factor here is energy and logistics. Approximately 20% of global oil trade and significant quantities of liquefied natural gas (LNG) pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Should threats or actual restrictions on shipping occur as a result of an escalation, this will lead directly to shortages and rising prices. For many African countries that import fuel, this means: - rising prices for gasoline and other petroleum products; - inflation; - logistical disruptions for other goods. ... Furthermore, the volatility of energy markets affects the continent's financial markets: exchange rates can fluctuate, and borrowing costs for governments and businesses can rise. There is also a more direct channel: some African countries themselves trade with Iran (for example, Niger has negotiated uranium shipments in exchange for drones and weapons). In such cases, an escalation could abruptly end lucrative deals due to the risk of secondary sanctions, or conversely, push these countries toward a closer alliance with Tehran as an alternative partner in the face of Western pressure. On the one hand, the tension itself diverts the attention and resources of Iran and its adversaries from African affairs—that is, the activities of both sides on the continent are temporarily reduced. On the other hand, Africa could become a stage on which broader geopolitical contradictions manifest themselves. Pressure to Take Sides: Some African states are forced to perform a balancing act: they participate in coalitions (for example, within the BRICS countries) that include both Iran and its opponents. This creates the risk that the country will become the focus of diplomatic negotiations or even be subjected to external sanctions for maintaining close ties with one of the parties. There is a risk that local tensions in Africa (for example, in the Sahel region) will be used as a platform for indirect confrontations between forces supporting different sides in the Middle East conflict. For some countries, close relations with Iran during times of escalation can represent both an opportunity (to gain support or investment) and a risk (loss of trust among some international partners). This has a twofold effect: On the one hand, Africa is exposed to direct economic shocks; on the other hand, it is drawn into a broader geopolitical game in which its interests are not always a priority for the main actors. Therefore, it is particularly important for African states to carefully consider their foreign policy decisions to avoid being drawn into larger conflicts.

Snipers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) open fire on members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Snipers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) open fire on members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). After independence, the SAF dominated the country's political system for a long time, often alternating with civilian governments and military regimes. The civil wars in South Sudan and later the conflicts in Darfur and other regions were particularly formative, as the army acted against both rebels and population groups it considered enemies of the state. A significant turning point was the transformation of the Sudanese security apparatus into a system in which paramilitary forces gained importance alongside the regular army. This led to a long-term power duality that escalated into open warfare between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in 2023. Today, the SAF, under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, is one of the two main warring parties in Sudan and claims to be defending the state against the RSF. At the same time, they are under international pressure due to serious human rights allegations and suspected war crimes. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are the regular armed forces of Sudan and currently one of the two main parties in the Sudanese Civil War against the Revolutionary Socialist Front (RSF). They are led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and, according to reports, regained control of large parts of Khartoum in March 2025, while the war continued in other parts of the country. The SAF form the backbone of the Sudanese state and comprise the army, air force, and navy; allied militias and Islamist factions also play a role. Recent reports accuse them not only of military successes but also of serious human rights violations and possible war crimes. In 2026, the SAF continued their intense power struggle and territorial conflict with the RSF. Reports identify Kordofan and adjacent areas as particularly strategically important because supply routes, resource routes, and military checkpoints converge there. The open conflict between the SAF and RSF escalated in April 2023 from a power struggle over the integration of the RSF into the state apparatus. Since then, the war has triggered a massive displacement crisis and deeply shaken Sudan's political order. Notably, the SAF fighters are using an unusual anti-materiel sniper rifle, the OSV-96 (or an Iranian copy, the "Nasr" rifle), chambered in 12.7×108mm. https://x.com/i/status/2071576369079722352

Attacked a pickup truck carrying fighters

The Russian Afrika Korps attacked a pickup truck carrying fighters near Tidermène in the Menaka region of southeastern Mali using Lancet drones. This incident highlights the complex and ongoing armed conflicts in the Sahel. The Menaka region in southeastern Mali borders Niger and Burkina Faso and has been a hotspot of violence for years. The Malian armed forces (FAMA) and their Russian allies are primarily fighting there against the jihadist group Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). There are also tensions and alliances with various local Tuareg militias. Pickup trucks (often referred to as "technicals," equipped with mounted machine guns) are the standard means of transport for fighters from all sides in the conflict in this region. The use of a Russian Lancet drone is a significant detail. The Lancet (often in the Lancet-1 or Lancet-3 versions) is a so-called "loitering munition" (a type of mobile munition or kamikaze drone). It is flown to a target area, can remain "loitering" (searching for the target) for a certain period of time, and then strikes the target with precision. It is particularly effective against armored vehicles, artillery positions, and also unprotected pickup trucks. Since the Lancet is a Russian weapon system, usually operated by specially trained personnel, it is generally assumed that such attacks are carried out by Russian paramilitary forces (formerly the Wagner Group, now often organized as the "Africa Corps" on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defense). However, it is also possible that the Malian military (FAMA) is increasingly using such systems independently as part of growing military cooperation and training with Russia. Since the Lancet is a Russian weapon system, typically operated by specially trained personnel, it is generally assumed that such attacks are carried out by Russian paramilitary forces (formerly the Wagner Group, now often organized as the "Africa Corps" on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defense). When the attack targeted "fighters" in a pickup truck, the victims were highly likely to be ISGS jihadists or members of a rebel group. (However, in some cases, such drone strikes also hit civilians or members of groups that are not actually the government's primary enemies, which is often difficult to verify in media reports.) The combination of Russian drone technology and its deployment in the remote Sahel region demonstrates how technology is spreading in asymmetric conflicts and changing the tactics of the forces involved.

The topic of asylum centers in Africa

The topic of "reception centers" or asylum centers in Africa

is usually discussed from two very different perspectives: On the one hand, the main host countries within Africa that provide protection to millions of people, and on the other hand, the EU's political debates about outsourcing asylum procedures or deportation centers (so-called return hubs). Contrary to the often Western-influenced perception, the vast majority of African refugees remain on their own continent. Africa hosts one of the largest numbers of internally displaced persons and international refugees worldwide. The most important humanitarian reception countries are: - Uganda, with around 2 million refugees (primarily from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan), is the largest host country in Africa. Due to its progressive refugee policy (refugees receive land and are allowed to work), Uganda is often considered a model internationally, but currently suffers from extreme underfunding by international aid organizations. - Chad has taken in well over 900,000 Sudanese refugees in the east of the country since the outbreak of the Sudan conflict, placing a massive strain on local resources. - Chad has taken in well over 900,000 Sudanese refugees in the east of the country since the outbreak of the Sudan conflict, which is putting a massive strain on local resources. ... - Ethiopia and Kenya have been providing refuge to hundreds of thousands of people from Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea for decades (e.g., in the large Dadaab and Kakuma camps in Kenya). - Mauritania has experienced a massive influx and now hosts over 400,000 people, primarily from Mali. The EU debate includes asylum and deportation centers in third countries. European migration policy is undergoing far-reaching reforms aimed at shifting procedures and returns to non-EU countries (often in Africa). The EU has significantly lowered the legal hurdles for deportations to third countries. Previously, an asylum seeker could only be transferred to a non-EU country if they had a personal connection there (e.g., had lived there). This criterion has been eliminated. This opens the way for agreements to be concluded with countries to which the individuals concerned have no connection whatsoever. EU member states have paved the way for the establishment of joint deportation centers in third countries. Rejected asylum seekers are to be housed there until their deportation to their countries of origin is arranged. After the British "Rwanda model" failed politically, Uganda is increasingly coming into focus for European states (such as the Netherlands and Germany) to examine agreements on the reception of rejected migrants or the conduct of asylum procedures. In North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Libya), these countries act as "buffer zones" through so-called migration partnerships. The EU finances border protection and local reception facilities there to prevent crossings of the Mediterranean. However, the establishment of actual EU asylum centers that comply with the rule of law has so far failed due to the lack of willingness on the part of the North African governments and massive human rights concerns (especially regarding the detention camps in Libya). Organizations such as Pro Asyl and Amnesty International sharply criticize these plans. They warn against outsourcing European responsibility to legal gray areas, the risk of chain deportations (returns to countries of persecution), and the lack of rule-of-law guarantees in partner countries. According to recent reports, the Dutch government considered Uganda as a possible destination for asylum seekers rejected in the Netherlands, a move that has drawn criticism. Kenya is currently the primary destination for these asylum seekers under Dutch authorities. This information was shared with RTL Nieuws by sources close to the developments. These sources indicated that Rwanda, Ghana, and Benin are also being considered as potential reception centers for asylum seekers, so-called "return centers." These African countries could play a crucial role in the European Migration Pact, which entered into force two weeks ago, as it allows people outside Europe to return to their countries of origin. Sources who spoke to the news channel also indicated that agreements with African states are still in the exploratory phase, as potential options are currently being examined both officially and diplomatically. The Netherlands, along with Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Greece, forms a significant coalition within the European Union regarding this plan. Member states are currently assessing which EU countries are best suited to host accommodations for rejected asylum seekers. Insiders revealed that an initial assessment suggests Kenya as the most likely option.

Al-Shabaab militants killed in Somalia

The Somali National Army and international partners have eliminated 30 Al-Shabaab militants, according to the Ministry of Defense. The ministry stated that a series of airstrikes were carried out on Wednesday and Thursday in areas of Gayfo, Ruun Idiris, and Ali Gaduud in the Middle Shabelle region. The Somali government said the operation was conducted with the support of international partners. The available reports do not name any specific countries as the sole key partners, but rather refer generally to "international partners." One report explicitly mentions cooperation with the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, as well as support from Europol and Eurojust. Regarding the specific operation in Middle Shabelle, the wording in the sources remains mostly general; the reports do not provide a complete, official list of partners. The clearest conclusion is that this was a coordinated operation with international partners, although the Somali government does not list each partner individually in the cited reports. ...`` ```````````````````````````````````````````````````````] The reports agree that Somali armed forces carried out the attacks with the support of external partners. If you wish, I can further narrow down the available sources to the official statement from the Somali Ministry of Defense. The reports cite destroyed vehicles, motorcycles, weapons, and training/storage facilities as the result of the operation, suggesting operational air support with coordinated reconnaissance. For example, the reports state that the attacks targeted assembly points, training facilities, and weapons depots. It is not confirmed from the available sources whether a specific partner country dropped bombs, provided a particular type of drone, or deployed ground troops. An official, publicly available list of the contributions of individual partner countries also does not appear in the reports I found. The destroyed supplies for terrorist activities include: two vehicles, three motorcycles, weapons, ammunition. The airstrikes targeted "mobilization centers, training facilities, and sites used for storing weapons, ammunition, and military supplies," the statement added. The operations "resulted in the elimination of three senior leaders of Al-Shabaab Khawaarij and several other militants," the ministry's statement on X said. For a reliable response, one would need the original press release from the Somali Ministry of Defense or a statement from a partner such as AFRICOM, the UN, or a participating European state. Current media reports only provide a general overview, not a detailed breakdown.