Afrika
Mittwoch, 18. November 2026
COP31 and Africa
Somewhere in Africa, a mother builds her at home this week after a flood. She does not suspect that 4,000 kilometers away, in Antalya, her future was already on the first day of the COP31 to the debate.
Even before the negotiations had started correctly, the dispute escaped. Would the world be offered room for a triplication of funds for adaptation measures, the financing of losses and damage and the new climate finance goal? For this woman, these are not purely technical questions. It is about whether the help is granted as a grant - or as another credit you have to repay for years.
The African group led this fight. Africa did not come to Antalya to ask. Africa has come to join.
This sentence underlines the determined and not prudent attitude of Africa at the climate summit (COP31 in Antalya) - the continent acts as a subject that wants to drive its positions rather than just looking for support.
Africa bears the slightest share of historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions, but suffers more among the consequences of climate change than others. Therefore, the focus is on a fair distribution of resources and obligations.
The focus is on its own solutions and technologies. It is about promoting African models of adaptation, green energy to accept sustainable land use rather than just accept external recipes.
Often there is an application for affordable financing, technology transfer, debt reduction, so that climate protection measures do not increase poverty.
To emphasize the right of Africa to form a global agenda instead of being the goal of help.
Given the previous articles on Africa, business, resources and international politics (including the IMF, inflation in sub-sahara countries, the control of their own history), this rhetoric fits well in the logic of "return" But already in the climate measurement.
The negotiation positions of the African Unterstlervergruppe (AGN)
AGN is a single block of all African countries of the UNFCCC flag - has developed a common position in a strategic meeting in ACCRA. Priorities of the chairman of Dr. med. Nana Group of Anti-Boasieko Amoa (Ghana):
- Adaptation as "central and non-discussed" priority - and no victims in favor of co-use emissions; In seven AGN priorities, the results of agriculture and food security, climate financing, loss and damage as well as the same involvement of women, adolescents and indigenous peoples;
- Climate and trade - against one-sided measures such as EU-CBAM, contact the expense of the transition to exporters from the global south;
- "Green Minerals" and added value - not just a supplier of raw materials for the green energy of another. The wording of the Amo itself: "The transition must create a value in Africa, building industry in Africa, strengthening skills in Africa and create jobs for Africans";
- Fair reducing fossil fuels - AGN insists that the power switch does not limit the development of the continent without getting offset.
Referring the Green Climate Fund (its needs have not been assessed since 2013), a transparent mechanism of expenditure promised $ 300 billion, simplifying access to means for developing countries (Egypt Initiative) and direct grants for Local communities, and not by a chain of intermediaries.
Mission 300, World Bank + ADB, ~ 35 billion USD by electrification: semi-solar minigra, semi-extension of networks; Preference betting instead of the usual "African risk mat".
Africa Minigrids program, UNDP, GE, AFBR, RMI, technical consumption for solar minigias in 21 countries; Rating: Minigride are the cheapest option for 265 million people, investment potential 65 billion US dollars
Clean kitchen - on the agenda "35-by-35", Kenya (President Roto), Ruto tries the initiative of the COP31 presidency to increase the power component to 35% to 2035, the electrification of food kitchens - "Kitchen is the place where the power drive is in the life of almost a billion people"
Clean Kitchen - Money, African Development Bank $ 2 billion US dollars for a decade (20% of energy loans) with the need for continent ~ 4 billion US dollars / year; 1.2 billion Africans are now prepared for firewood and coal assembly.
Only energy transition investment plan, South Africa Package \ 8.5 billion US dollars at 2023-2027: electric transport, electric vehicles, green hydrogen.
Thermal protection, African horn, cool coalition / unp. COP31 COP31 gave $ 20 million to the national cold plans and heat resistance in the horns
A separate line is green hydrogen. Morocco (mega project in the wind and the sun, the start 2027) and South Africa positions itself south as future exporters with the existing infrastructure of gas pipes.
Where the African positions lose positions. At the opening COP31 AGN offer, to a number of adaptive funding with a separate agenda article did not exist: compromise is a general climatic financing work program that has become adaptation discussion and the dialogue About the trade and the CBAM measures were removed at all. The status remains and the problem of replenishing GCF. At the same time, the European Union representatives realized it in advance that the new promises are not expected to be expected at the summit, and the Kenyan Climatezilambassador summarized: the scaling of customization projects can not "depend on voluntary contributions".
Against this background, the NGO position of the continent is particularly acute. Greenpeace Africa not only requires grants and progressive tax on the oil industry, but also the compulsory protection of forests of the Congo-Beckens, plus up to 2035 to 75%, but also the renewal protection of 75% - this However, it is the position of NGO, not, it does not say.
Irony of the situation: COP32 takes place in Addis Ababa, and AMO has already warned that the summit on the African Earth himself does not exist - the agenda is still pushing.
Turkey is committed to connecting other countries of the "Electrification Pledge) and their" 35% x 35% "target. Since the initiative in June, only 30 countries have signed - from Africa, it's just four: Ethiopia, Eswatini, Togo and Zimbabwe.
About 600 million people in Africa still live without electricity. A political commitment is worthless if the energy never reaches people. Therefore, our message was clear: clean energy must be funded by non-refundable grants, not by loans. In addition, she has to go hand in hand with a fair and fair transition. And the most disadvantaged population groups have to come first - not last.
https://www.gbcghanaonline.com/general/africa-group-accra/2026/
https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2026/09/09/africa-must-secure-climate-finance-food-systems-action-at-cop31-agn-chair/
https://www.gbcghanaonline.com/general/africa-group-accra/2026/
https://iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/2026-11-13-climate-justice-remains-a-distant-promise-che-africa/
https://www.gbcghanaonline.com/general/africa-group-accra/2026/
https://iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/2026-11-13-climate-justice-remains-a-distant-promise-che-africa/
https://tvbrics.com/news/braziliya-yuar-q/our-insights/green-energy-in-frikanische-presents-significant-investment-opportunitäten
https://www.downtoearth.org.in/climate-change/cop31-adopts-climate-finan CE-Work-Program proposals proposals-for customization fund commercial measures - dropped
https://phys.org/news/2026-11-cop31-leader-pressure-tackle-climate.html https://www.semafonor.com/article/11/12/2026/AFricat-to-press-for-more-adaption-finance-at-cop31
https://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/press/61886/greenpeace-africa-urges-lo omsing-1-5c-Bowhoe-Must-Spark-Urgang-action-to -end-Fossil-Förmms-AT-COC31 /
https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2026/09/09/africa-must-secure-climate-finance-food-systems-action-at-cop31-agn-chair/
Dienstag, 17. November 2026
Kimpa Vita was burned by Catholic missionaries - with her son on her back.
More than 320 years ago, on July 2, 1706, Kimpa Vita was burned by Catholic missionaries in a lively body - with her son on her back.
Kimpa Vita (Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita, approx. 1684-1706) was a prophetess and reformer from the Kongo Congo, whose movement at the same time represented a religious and a political answer to a deep state crisis. It is often referred to as the "Congolese Jeanne d'Arc".
At the end of the 17th century, the Kingdom of Congo was a heavy decline.
It was hit by a civil war. This civil war is the key to understand why the movement of Kimpa Vita could occur at all. A short demolition:
The starting point is the battle of Mbwila (1665).
The collapse began with a devastating defeat. In the Battle of Mbwila (also Battle of Ambuila), the army of King António I undertook the Portuguese. The king himself, many noble and the designated throne flee fell. As a result, the kingdom lost his military and political leadership.
The result was that a kingdom exists without a king and that had his consequences, because after 1665 the headquarters failed:
Two enemy dynasties fought for the throne: the Kimpanzu and the Kinlaza (the "Haus Kisila"), supported by changing coalitions inside and foreign powers - the Portuguese, but also the Dutchman And later the Counts of Soyo mixed up again and again in the successor fights.
The capital was abandoned and at 1678 São Salvador (Mbanza Congo) was so destroyed and impoverished that the kings laid their residence in the mountainous regions. For about three decades (up to 1709) the historic capital remained practically abandoned.
Contemporary sources speak of a period in which there were several throne candidates at the same time, "kings inland", which have ever been used by various fractions and were discontinued, sometimes several on the same day.
Only Pedro IV., The ruler of Kibangu from the Kinlaza line, brought off about 1700/1709. He conquered São Salvador, united both lines through a double marriage and established a rotation system of succession. Exactly in this phase, Kimpa Vita appeared - their demand, the destroyed people should return to the abandoned capital and finish his disputes, was therefore no abstract preaching, but a concrete plan in the middle of the restoration process. And that made them dangerous for Pedro IV. Himself dangerous: their movement threatened to undermine the authority of the reinsing king.
The European powers were anything but passive viewers: Each of them has heated the conflict, financed or renewed militarily.
Portugal was the direct trigger and beneficiary, because Portugal was originally Condo's oldest European partner - Alliance, trade, baptism of the kingship since 1491. But from the 17th century it became the opponent. The Portuguese possession of Luanda (since 1622/1648) controlled both the trade and the Nzimbu shells, the money condos. Congo tried to urge the Portuguese from Angola - that ended in the disaster of Mbwila (1665).
Portugal did not just reach once, it defeated Congo at Mbwila 1665, supported on the poor King Rafael I on request for Soyo (battles at the Mbidizi River 1670 and at Kitombo, October 1670, Where the Portuguese army was disrupted). Then Portugal retreated for about two centuries of direct campaigns against Congo.
Portuguese dealers provided both sides firearms against trading privileges - so the war was extended, which the political groups could not have been able to lead. More important: Portugal retained Luanda, and the whole stream of prisoners of war and abducted flow into the Atlantic slavery to Brazil. The historian Linda Heywood calls the warfare (1665-1709) the turning point where the old institutions shredded, which should protect the free-born congoles before the enslavement - a whole generation of nobles and Free was sold to slavery.
In the alliance against Portugal (1620-1640s), Congo was looking for the Dutch as a covenant partner. Pedro II planned a common attack on Luanda, Garcia II. Castle 1642 officially an alliance, Congolese troops fought at the side of the Dutch against Portuguese bases at the Bengo. The Dutchman then lost the interest in the conquest Angolas and closed his own peace with Portugal in 1644 - for Congo a whoop of disappointment.
The direct Dutch presence was past 1648, but the importance remained: Soyo, the most powerful anti-central group, bought rifles and cannons for Dutch traders and received a diplomatic wire to the pope. Exactly this connection was a reason why Portugal agreed to attack Soyo in 1670 - they wanted to close "Dutch door" in the region. According to the British Dutch war, Amsterdam was too busy to help.
Against this background, Kimpa Vita suggested a way to unify: a reinterpretation of Christianity in the African context.
Around 1704, Kimpa Vita began to preach a baptized Catholic, based on visions. Among the central elements of their teaching, e.g. a syncretism of Christianity and traditions of Bakongo. They linked Catholic ideas with local belief systems and stressed that saints - and even Jesus could self - Congolese could be.
Kimpa Vita claimed that Saint Anthony (the patron saint of the Congo) had adopted into their shape and that God through them the people to restore the kingdom.
It insisted that recovery of the Congo with a return to Mbanza Congo and the termination of internal conflicts must begin.
It was a political program in religious robe. Her sermons practiced direct criticism of the inactivity of rulers and missionaries and called for unity and independence.
Her followers were referred to as "small Antoniusse"; They spread their message in different parts of the kingdom.
The doctrine of Kimpa Vita proved to be uncomfortable for equal actors. That were the
Competing Thrown Challengers - As she tried to reconcile the enemy parties and recover the capital as a symbol of the unit, which undermines its legitimacy.
Ne was for the Catholic missionaries - as their version of Christianity questioned the authority of the European priests and an "African" interpretation of faith offered a threat.
As a result, Kimpa Vita was captured by the Troops King Pedros IV. - with the support of the missionaries - captured and executed on 2 July 1706 as a heretic.
Agents, chronicler - and judge, that is the most ambivalent role, and it concerns Kimpa Vita directly.
Important is the finding of the historian John Thornton: Congo remained loyal to Rome despite Portuguese diocese control, but persistently refused to start his own African church. Christianity in the country was up to 1700 a largely local, Congolese Christianity - the Capuchin were not the actual "teachers", but sacramental donors for a long-established people's church.
Capuchin as Francesco da Pavia tried in the 1690 years, between Pedro IV. And João II. To convey peace concerts - with the support of the old Queen Ana Afonso de Leoo. The efforts failed at the old animosities between the camps.
The Capuchin Bernardo da Gallo in Pedros services was the one who urgently told their arrest of Kimpa Vita as a heretin, and he played a major role in the interrogation and conviction - on July 2, 1706 Beatriz and her partner João Barro on the operation of Pedros Hof and burned with the consent of the Capuchin. Her teaching (Christ was congolese, the sacraments of the Capuchin are unnecessary) threatened exactly the authority monopoly that the missionaries had built up.
Just as well, Thornton turns out that the Capuchin in contrast to the Jesuits in Angola rejected slavery and criticized slave ownership and did not want to wrote much of what we know about Congo today - You are the main source. So they were at the same time chronists, critical observers and actors in the persecution.
However, it is noticeable, the role distribution, Portugal worked with military and economic power, the Netherlands was a variable lever, whose support came and went, and the church operated with cultural and moral authority - which ends up as the most lithost and Deadful influence proved. None of these powers was simply "colonial": Congo was formally independent and served themselves of the Europeans (Congo help at Dutch 1642, Alliance with Portugal against Soyo 1670). The real problem was that the internal factions - Kinlaza, Kimpanzu, Soyo, later even the Antonians - used any available foreign power as a resource in their own power fights. Thus, regional power struggles turned into a forty-year-old deputy war with European resources.
The legacy of Kimpa Vita, it is a symbol of resistance and unit. In today's Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo and Angola, Kimpa Vita is worshiped as heroine who fought for independence and dignity of their people.
A precursor of African religious movements. Their movement is considered one of the early examples of African Messianism; Historians see a connection between Antonianism and later movements, such as Kimbanguism. An example of female leadership in African history. Their role underlines the significant contribution of women to religious and political processes in pre-colonial Africa.
Kimpa Vita was killed because they raised to return to their own roots and the African traditions of the Congo Empire - especially to the return to Mbanza Congo, the land of their ancestors. This had been abandoned after the death of the ruler Vita-A-Nkanga in the famous Battle of Mbwila (Ambuila, 1665).
Kimpa Vita was killed because they encouraged the Congo's people to store foreign beliefs (Catholicism), and because they led a spiritual fight against the Portuguese.
As a child she had been baptized on the name Ana Beatriz. But when she started her fight, she dropped off this baptismal name and accepted the name "Kimpa Vita" (or "Kimpa Kya Nvita"), which means "a new way to lead war" - a war that she as a spiritual Mind of mind.
Kimpa Vita was burned by Catholic missionaries with a lively body - with her son on his back.
She was truly our heroin! She died to free us as african. She died to show us the way as Africans. Today we betrayed her dream - one looks at only the flood of foreign religions in Africa. One looks like African Christians fight against African Muslims. You see what the religion did us. Today, many Africans dream of getting into an imaginary sky while forgetting that Africa himself is the sky that was talked about.
May the story of Kimpa Vita stimulate you to wake up as Africans! It live Kimpa Vita and her son!
The influence of Antonian movement is more symbolic and ideal as institutional nature: there are no direct organizations that have survived since 1706 to the present. But the footsteps of Kimpa Vita are visible in today's Africa and in the diaspora at several levels.
Historians consider Antonianism as direct forerunners of the most important Afro-Christian movements of the 20th century. In 1921, the Congolese preacher Simon Kimbangu founded the Kimbangist Church (* Église Kimbanguiste *) - one of the first independent African churches, which are the missionary Potrormal. Today, it is one of the most influential religious organizations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. Their trailers expressly refer to Kimpa Vita as a precursor of their teacher: in Mbanza Congo, traditions are still passed on to today, which link to Kimbangism with their descent and their legacy.
The idea that "this Christianity is our own, African Christianity" - with Christ and the saints to be thought of Congolese and the events of the gospel are located in the Congo -, the foundation formed for a whole flow of the African Messianism. Gabriel Gampiot describes Kimpa Vita as a "historical precursor of African Messianism and Millenarism".
The territory of the former Kongo Congo is now divided between the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) and Angola - and in all three countries Kimpa Vita is revered as a national hero:
To finish its central call - internal conflicts and restore the unit - corresponds to the challenges facing these countries both in the 20th and 21st century. The Congolese writer Petelu Nginamau described them as "Mother of African independence, heroine of the dignity and freedom of black".
The historian John K. Thornton notes that Antonianism is often described as one of the foundations of modern African nationalism - although he himself gives himself careful that a direct resistance against colonization would be an anachronism: The Kingdom of Congo was still independent at that time. This means that their shape of contemporaries is more likely to be used as a crystallization point for a national identity, as historically proven "model" for independence.
In 1966 there was a campaign for her canonization, but of Pope Paul VI. was rejected. In the diaspora - for example in Paris, where to take place in 2026 on the occasion of their death day memorial events - however, their worship is alive and continues to bear a nearly religious character.
The idea of a divine liberation of the Congolese spread also in the course of the slave trade: Congolese Christians played a significant role in the Stono uprising in South Carolina (1739) and the Haitian Revolution; The historian Sylvia Frey combined these events with the ideas of Antonians. The researcher Benjamin Hendricks writes that her ideas have inspired "uprisements in America" as well as new Christian teachings - until today's time.
It is documented that their motion was the first mass test to avoid Christianity and unite a fragmented kingdom under a religious banner; It represents a direct precursor of later Afro-Christian churches and national movements.
Legendary, on the other hand, is much of what you are attributed to you today. A direct connection to Kimbanguism or to specific movements of the 19th and 20th centuries is more reliable on traditions and oral memories than archive-based evidence. Thornton expressly points out that the allegations of today's religious groups, they are the founder of their respective movement, "not supported by the evidence of evidence".
Conclusion is that the main function of Kimpa Vita in today's democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) is a symbolic. She has become a African religious-political heroine archetype - a woman who opposed the idea of self-esteem, unity and "own" belief in the collapse of the state and the forced foreign religious dictation. Especially this role - which is more cultural than in the narrower sense of political nature - ensures that your figure will remain important to this day.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/battle_of_mbwila
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kongo_civil_war
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kimpa_vita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/battle_of_mbidizi_river
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/heywood2009jah.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/angolan_wars
https://www.kiala-inkisi.com/kongo-history/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/battle_of_mbidizi_river
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273599067_the_kingdom_of_kongo_and_the_counter_reformation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/pedro_iv_of_kongo
https://www.africanhistoryextra.com/p/one-womans-mission-to-unite-a-divided
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273599067_the_kingdom_of_kongo_and_the_counter_reformation
#kvamuvavarirwa #kimpavita #kongo #Missionaries #colonialism
The Monroe -Doctrin and Africa
It must be clearly and clearly stated that Africa does not belong to the Monroe doctrine.
The Monroe doctrine of 1823 was an instrument for the Western hemisphere right from the start. She explained America to the zone in which European powers were not allowed to establish new colonies and were not allowed to intervene - in return, the US promised to hold out from European affairs. Africa does not appear in the original text; The Doctrine for Latin America and the Caribbean (Roosevelt-Corollary 1904, Cubra Crise 1962, Reagan in Central America) was valid for Latin America and the Caribbean. A historical, doctrinary connection to Africa is simply not.
Why are the two topics discussed together: the "Donroe" turning since 2025
Since November / December 2025, the topic has a new topicality. Trump's National Security Strategy (NSS) officially explains the Monroe doctrine back to the guiding principle: the US wants to "restore" predominance in the western hemispheria room and non-hemispheric competitors - is above all China - Keep away from strategically important objects there ("Trump Corollary"). The new National Defense Strategy of 2026 calls priority No. 1 the western hemispheria room, from Arctic to South America, and China only second. After use in Venezuela in January 2026 Trump baptized the thing itself on "Donroe Doctrine".
This has a direct consequence for Africa - as a "blank space":
Africa is the lowest regional priority of the Second Trump Government, according to analyzes - the strategic weight is clearly at the hemisphere, Indo-Pacific and domestic policy.
The US has closed the USAd and propagates a "trade instead of help" course; China's trade in Africa was 2024 at almost $ 300 billion and the EU and China now offer duty-free market access.
Critics warn exactly that's what's back to the hemisphere, leaving Europe Russia, the Golf Iran - "and the rest of China. The Monroe logic was originally defensive-demarcating ("You stay out there, we mix ourselves here in it"); Trump's version is read from observers as a preliminary stage to division of the world in spheres of influence.
What makes Washington actually in Africa
Africa policy is not equal to zero, but "selectively and transactionally": only those countries with critical minerals (copper, cobalt, lithium, rare earth), raw material access and power demonstration include - for example a selection Summit in July 2025 with Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania and Senegal, or the US-mediated peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, coupled to Western Billions investments. Everywhere the same driver lurks: the competition with Beijing about minerals and influence.
The conclusion looks like this.
Historically, there is no connection. At present, the Monroe doctrine is revived as a symbol of the US strategic self-restriction on its own hemisphere - and that's exactly where the Africa problem is. The real question is not whether the doctrine includes Africa (does not do it), but whether the retreat from the rest of the world leaves a vacuum that fill China and Russia. Representatives of the strategy call honestly "flexible realism"; Critics call it a historical mistake, the former Monroe supporters would never intend.
Here we want to get in one aspect about the role of Africoms and the competition to China.
And that's actually the core if you want to understand the current situation. Africom is only the visible military peak, while the real competition with China has long been held in other fields.
What Africom is and how it works
Africom (United States Africa Command) is one of the Eleven integrated Fights Commands of the Ministry of Defense, has its headquarters in Stuttgart (Kelley Barracks) and has been active since October 2008. His area of responsibility includes the whole continent except Egypt (which is at CENTCOM) and includes military relations with 53 African states.
Interesting is the self-description, because the commander calls Africom a "3D organization" - "Diplomacy, Development, Defense". So the command consciously coordinates with Foreign Ministry and USAID, not only with the military. In Practice, the scissors still depend on, because every civil servant working on Africa policy will come several military members, and in many embassies, the defenseattachés exceed the number of diplomats.
The actual operational work runs over three channels:
- Counterrorism, especially drone inserts and special operations: Against Al-Shabaab and Isis-Somalia at the Horn of Africa, against Boko Haram / Isis-Westselahel on Chadsee. In Somalia alone, it was up to 2023 more than 315 confirmed drone strokes; The Legal Cover for this is the AUMF authorization of 2001.
- Training and equipment of local armed forces ("African LED, US enabled"), including secret "127e" programs that involved US troops in direct fighting.
- a network of bases with two qualities: permanent locations ("enduring footprint") like Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and half-permanent "Lily Pads" in Niger, Tunisia, Uganda, Kenya.
Camp Lemonnier is the strategic anchor, here around 4,000 US staff, starting platform for operations at the Horn of Africa and outpost on the BAB Al Mandab, is one of the closest straits in the world.
The turning under Trump is less presence, more "Burden Sharing"
Since 2025, the impact direction is another. Secretary-General Langley (until mid-2025 commander, then Dagvin Anderson took over) announced public, African states should take more responsibility for their own safety - the retreat fits in Trump's priority for domestic safety and A slimmer US military appearance abroad. In addition, a deep cut - 2025 there were plans for reorganization that Africom was factory down and integrating Africa into a command with America - explicitly as part of the shift to the Indo-Pacific. Critics warn that creates a strategic vacuum that could fill China and Russia in the Sahel.
Anderson but is pursued in parallel two lines: counter-radicalism via training and equipment programs continues, and China is explicitly named as the subject of the curb - at the same time the command "innovative mechanisms" of cooperation wants to use and cooperate Pragmatic with cut slip rules.
In such a situation, China usually pursues a pragmatic approach. While Western States (US, EU, France) often publicly condemn and impose sanctions, China consistently focuses on maintaining industrial relations with new military regimes - in the service of its own economic and strategic interests.
A crucial factor is the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, which officially proclaims China as a guideline of its Africa policy. Beijing does not depend on cooperation from compliance with democratic standards; Rather, it is ready to work with any reigning government to implement joint projects - such as the expansion of infrastructure, raw material production or promoting trade. For military regimes, this is an important support. Western partners return their relationships, China fills the resulting vacuum through financial and technical support.
Praxisbeispiele:
After the overturnation in Niger (2023), China did not break the relationships. On the contrary, the State Group China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) granted the Junta a loan (totaling approximately $ 400 million) to help financing - among other things in exchange for oil supplies. This was factually a support of the regime, at a time in which regional organizations (Ecowas, African Union) imposed sanctions against the country.
In Mali and Burkina Faso, Chinese companies have strengthened their activities: investment agreements were signed, for example in the areas of solar energy or raw material reduction (gold, copper, nickel).
However, the situation should not be idealized. Such a pragmatism has its price:
Political risks arise: In African countries, part of the company feels close relations with China as a reinforcement foreign influence. This can undermine the legitimacy of both the respective regime and the Chinese presence.
The model is often based on preferred loans, which the recipient country can not always repay. This carries the risk of "debt traps" and leads to assets (approximately ports or raw materials) under the control of Chinese companies.
Occasionally it comes to conflicts in the implementation. Thus, the military Junta in Niger in 2025 temporarily exhibited Chinese executives - the reason was disputes on salary distribution and compliance with local work design.
And what about other actors?
Sometimes other actors - such as Russia or some Gulf States - also pursue - a similar pragmatic course. However, compared to the West, the Chinese approach is particularly characterized by its systematic readiness to work together with unstable regimes.
In short, China rather relies on the principle of "business as usual" in such situations, while western partners tend to focus on political conditions and the impact on democracy.
The China competition includes three levels
Here it will be exciting because the competition logic differs per level.
1. Military. China opened his first foreign base in 2017 - just in Djibouti, just a few kilometers from Camp Lemonnier. Formally, the basis for logistics, anti-piracy and UN mandates; Satellite pictures show that ships could dock on the pier ships to the size of aircraft carriers. When the dispute over the Doraleeh container terminal to a nationalization in favor of the Doraleeh container terminal, the then Africom boss Waldhauser warned against "significant consequences": China could be the US Controlling post-schollinies at the port. Since 2008, Chinese naval flotflops and training programs for thousands of African officers have come since 2008.
2. Economical and infrastructural. This is the actual battlefield - and here Africom is largely the wrong instrument. China has joined the Focac Summit 2024 a package of around € 51 billion (loans, investments, development aid, predominantly in Yuan) and offered 53 African states duty-free access to the Chinese market. Trading China Africa was around € 283 billion in 2023 and has risen more than twenty times since 2000. The US answer to China's "Belt and Road" is called Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment - the most prominent project is the "Lobito Corridor", the railway connection from the copper belt (DR Congo, Zambia) to the Angolan Atlantic Hafen Lobito, funded by USA, EU and G7.
The paradox is that the railroad helps less against China's dominance than it sounds. Around 80 percent of the Copper Mines in the Congo include Chinese companies, and the refinement runs anyway almost completely in China - 72 percent of the world-renowned lithium and 68 percent of the cobalt come from there. The first test freight through the Lobito corridor did not go to Europe 2023, but to China. The USA has therefore set up our own "Task Force" for strategic minerals, in which diplomats, financiers and military work together - the TschiSekedi meeting with Africom boss Anderson in Kinshasa was a part of this Mineral strategy.
3. Normative and diplomatic. China connects with Focac and the "Global Initiative" (Security, Development, Civilization) has its own standards corridor and organized with African states common positions in multilateral forums - this is a direct challenge to the US role as a preferred diplomatic partner.
The quality "We can never beat China in the money", by the way, does not come from critics, but literally from an Africom officer.
The central asymmetry is in the heart, because here is often overlooked: Africom can not always lead to economic competition with China, because his mandate and budget come from defense logic. The US offer security as Public Good - which use African governments, but do not want to pay for it. China offers trade, train stations, ports, loans and jobs - which urgently need African governments. This explains why even in the US-funded Lobito corridor benefit Chinese operator, and why the Sahel realignment, such as the excerpt from Niger, China and Russia find a simple connection.
At the same time, the Chinese-friendly narrative is not uncritical, China's trade in Africa is strong asymmetrical (exports to Africa outweighing clearly), raw material dependence remains, and African governments are required to provide more value added Place and more balanced trading structures - such as President Ramaphosa compared to Xi Jinping directly. African states are increasingly seeing themselves as actors with their own power of action, not as objects of block confrontation - US official stresses themselves, you do not force anyone to the page choice.
The conclusion is that Africom remains the most important military instrument of the US in Africa - especially as a counter-terror and drone platform - but the actual power competition with China plays on rails, ports and refineries. The 2025 downgrading of Africom has tightened the paradox. It is drawn militarily back, at the same time tries to counter China's mineral berration with economic projects, but has neither the budget nor the processing capacity.
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https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-strategy-document-revivest-19th-century-monroe-doctrine_n_69348cd4e4b03cea5ab470da
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https://www.brookings.edu/articles/prosperity-and-power-trumps-selective-us-africa-summit-and-the-race-with-china/
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/12/donald-trump-revives-the-monroe-doctrine-and-gets-it-dangerously-wrong/
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https://2021-2025.state.gov/digital-press-briefing-on-the-new-africom-strategy-and-u-s-military-cooperation-in-africa/
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-https: //www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-military-general-china-djibouti-port-africa-command-a8244976.html
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https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2021/11/30/the-us-does-not-have-an-africa-strategy-but-china-does/
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https://www.miningmagazine.com/africa/news-analysis/4345771/most-lobito-minerals-china-heres
Sonntag, 15. November 2026
Sex trade with children in Africa
Sex trade with children in Africa: A serious problem for the continent
Introduction
The African continent, which is rich in culture and potential, is tragically overshadowed by a widespread and insidious problem: sex trade with children. This devastating reality robs children their innocence, cemented circuits from poverty and exploitation and represents a serious threat to the future well-being and the development of African nations. Sex trade with children is by no means an isolated Phenomenon; Rather, it is a complex crisis that is fired through a cooperation of socio-economic factors, weak state structures and demand - both inside and outside the continent. The effects rich deep into the communities, left destroyed life and undermine the social structure. In order to combat this vile practice, it requires a complex approach that concerns the deeper causes, strengthening legal framework conditions and promotes global cooperation.
The scourge of exploitation
Children's trade in Africa is characterized by the systematic exploitation of vulnerable children, many of which are lured or forced to sexual slavery. Poverty is a main reason for this. Families who fight for survival can often not supply their children, which will prone to promise from a better life or financial possibilities that ultimately lure them into the catches of the trafficking. Expulsion due to conflicts and natural disasters, this patronage is exacerbated and allows children back without any support. For example, children are often kidnapped and made, children are often abducted, their innocence is destroyed by the horrors of sexual violence and exploitation. The temptation of economic migration also plays a significant role. Young people looking for work in urban centers or abroad can fall victims to the victim, which spend as employers or intermediaries. Once in your trap, you are exposed to brutal exploitation, often without escape and in constant fear of violence.
The problem of trafficking and sex tourism with children on the Kenyan coast is real and well documented. According to journalists, in Mombasa, until every tenth child in the city in the city in the sale of sexual services are involved. The main causes are poverty, tourism and a weak prosecution. The police regularly declines minors that pursue the prostitution at night raids.
What about the church?
Scattered cases of abuse by clergy. For example, in 2011, it was determined against a Dutch bishop in Kenya because of suspicion of sexual abuse of a minor - the church released him. This is a crime of individuals.
But there are documented cases of abuse by spiritual, pastors, religious or church employees in Kenya, similar to the world. Examples include:
Charges and convictions of priests and pastors (eg a Catholic priest whose punishment was partially converted in a controversial decision in "preaching about sexual credits"; Pastors with long prison sentences for abuse minors).
There are reports on abuse in church-funded facilities or orphanages, including cases with foreign helpers.
Studies and investigations (u. A. To Protestant churches such as the Africa domestic Church) show that abuse is known and perpetrators often sit in leadership positions; Victims and families report to hesitation in the ad from fear of stigmatization or church reputation.
The institutional attitude is clearly negative: sexual abuse is considered a serious crime and violation of Christian principles. There are SafeGuarding guidelines (eg in the Anglican Church of Kenya and Catholic Institutions), training, reporting obligations and cooperation with State Authorities (Sexual Offices ACT). Orderwomen and church facilities actively operate protection and auxiliary centers, eg. For example, the "Pope Francis Rescue Center" in Malindi, which is supervised and sensitized children affected by abuse, child prostitution and sex tourism.
Problems remain due to insufficient training of some employees, internal cover attempts in individual cases, cultural and institutional hurdles in the notification as well as the general high violence burden against children in Kenya (not only church). The churches are increasingly reacting with prevention and victim protection, including under the influence of international standards and papers
Contributive factors and systemic weaknesses
Several systemic weaknesses in African states contribute to the continuation of the children's sign. Inadequate legal framework and weak law enforcement agencies lead to perpetrators often expelled. Corruption can additionally hinder the fight against trafficking, as civil servants can be brought to ignore or promote illegal trade. The limited access to education and health care also contributes to the problem. Children who refuses to deny these fundamental rights are less well prepared to understand the dangers they are exposed and become more likely to be victims. In addition, social attitudes and cultural standards in some areas may normalize or resolve serious sexual exploitation and thus create an environment in which such abuses remain largely unnoticed. The demand side is also crucial. Tourists, business travelers and even individuals from local communities contribute to the market for commercial sexual services with minors and thus maintain the circulation of demand and offer.
Effects on individuals and society
The consequences of sexual child trade are catastrophic for the victims and long duration. Survivors often suffer from severe physical and mental trauma - these include sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies as well as profound emotional stress such as depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorders. The stigmatization associated with sexual exploitation can lead to social exclusion, which makes it difficult to integrate back into its community or to find a meaningful professional activity. In addition to individual suffering, sexual child trading affects African societies. He undermines confidence, erodes moral values and eludes resources that could be used for meaningful social development. The continuation of sexual violence against children has also cross-generational consequences: affected people often have difficulty building healthy relationships, and in some cases can even be able to perpetrate themselves. In addition, health crises - such as the spread of HIV / AIDS - are further intensified by the high rate of unprotected intercourse within the networks of trafficking.
Combating the crisis
The elimination of sexual human trafficking with children requires comprehensive and community efforts. Governments must strengthen their legal and judicial systems to ensure that traders will be effectively prosecuted and punished. These include the adoption of severe laws against trafficking, the training of law enforcement authorities and the establishment of specialized units for the investigation and criminal pursuit of these crimes. Prevention strategies are equally important. Investing in education, creating economic prospects for families and reconnaissance campaigns can help protect children from becoming victims of Human Traders. Support offers for survivors are crucial; They enable physical and mental recovery and provide the necessary resources for long-term rehabilitation and reintegration. International cooperation is indispensable. The exchange of information, cooperation with cross-border investigations and the accountability of countries where there is a demand - for example by citizens involved in sexual abuse of children abroad - are essential steps. Civil society organizations and local initiatives play a key role in identifying victims, providing secure detection varieties and use for political changes.
Let us now turn to the exploitation of the children in Africa. Here is a more comprehensive look at the commercial sexual exploitation of children in Africa - which is known where this is done and why.
The overall picture
In Africa, children make up most of the identified victims of trafficking in trafficking as adults, so the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime Control (UNODC). Accordingly, children are forced to forced labor, begging, forced marriage and sexual exploitation. Worldwide, the number of identified minor victims increased by 31% compared to 2019 compared to 2019; The increase in Subsahara Africa is significantly contributing to this increase. Most African victims will be trailed within the continent - a consequence of conflicts, expulsions and climatic crises.
According to ILO estimates, about 200,000-300,000 children per year are traded in Western and Central Africa, and around 99% of it remain within Africa. The patterns are quite clear: from poorer countries into richer oil states and tourism strokes, from the village to the city. The main corridors are:
The situation in West Africa.
Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea → Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire.
Gabon is considered "Eldorado" - a main cell country, the children attracted to work, but also for sexual exploitation.
The typical routes are for Togolese girls are Gabon, Benin, Nigeria, Niger; Children from Benin → Nigeria, Ghana, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire; From Nordnigeria over Benin and Niger direction Senegal, Ghana etc. Girls from the Benin province are forced into Cotonou, Porto-Novo and other cities for sexual exploitation.
Gambia and Senegal as a target of sex tourism: border workers from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Benin are trailed there, partly targeted for the needs of European sex tourists.
The situation in East Africa and Horn of Africa.
Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Kenya. Kenya is the regional turnstile, which victims come across Moyale-Isiolo-Nairobi or Mandera-Garissa into the country; Ethiopian children are also headed by Kenya towards Tanzania and continue to South Africa.
Girls from the northeastern province of Kenya and Somalia will be trailed to Nairobi - in massage salons and bars, where operators of hotels and tourist organizers select them for "transactionsex".
Uganda picks up girls and women from the Dr Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania and forces them to prostitution. Children from refugee camps in Rwanda are traded to Kigali, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.
Kenya itself is source, transit and destination country: It takes up children from Congo, Somalia, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Tanzania.
The situation in Central Africa.
DR Congo mainly internally, the girls are forced into brothel-like tents in mining areas and camps for prostitution; Smaller numbers go to Angola, the Republic of Congo and South Africa.
The movements of poorer countries (Cameroon, Congo, Dr Congo) into the oil-rich states of Gabon and Equatorialguinea, where the petroleum industry demand for cheaper work and commercial sexual exploitation.
The southern Africa.
The largest single corridor for Eastern and South Africa countries are Uganda, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia u. A. Also South Africa. Concretely, it's about girls and women from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi; Street children from Lesotho are brought over the border into private houses in the east of the free state and sexually mistreated over days.
Target cities are especially Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban - registered centers of child insurism with children from about 10 years. Within South Africa, there is also massive internal trade between the provinces of Western Cape, Gauteng and Kwazulu-Natal.
The pattern behind it
In short, the liquid follows the money and demand. Act as destination countries (1) rich oil cities (Gabon, Equatorialguinea, Angola), (2) tourist centers (Kenya coast, Gambia, South Africa's big cities, Morocco, Madagascar) and (3) relative stable economies with a large informal sex market (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda). As country of origin, on the one hand, the poorest states (Benin, Togo, Mali, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, Malawi), on the other, War and Crisis Regions (Dr Congo, South Sudan, Somalia), where armed groups hold children directly as sex slaves.
An important reservation: The numbers are based almost only on estimates and final reports; ECPAT emphasizes that in most African countries, there are virtually non-existent official data on the sexual exploitation of children. The routes are therefore well documented, but the real extent but largely unknown.
There are hardly any durable, verifiable statistics on commercial sexual exploitation of children, which means that the victims often stay "invisible" in official data.
The most important manifestations of sex tourism.
Sexual kid tourism (SECTT). ECPAT names the main target regions on the continent: Senegal and Gambia in West Africa (Gambia is particularly well known to attract both male and female sex tourists, with so-called "bumster" as Intermediaries act and the customers are primarily from Europe, China and India); Morocco (Marrakech, Casablanca), Egypt and Tunisia in the north; As well as Kenya, South Africa, Madagascar and Ethiopia in the south and east. The growth of tourism - the number of arrivals is expected to reach 134 million by 2030 - as well as the increasing distribution of the mobile Internet as a driving factor.
Trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation in South Africa, here are girls - both from their own country and from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi - to the commercial sexual exploitation or in domestic bondage. Organized networks, including foreign criminal groups as well as corrupt officers, enable this trade. Sexual tourism with children is documented in Johannesburg and Cape Town; There, street children - partly only eight years old - lured by locals and foreign tourists in the prostitution.
In Uganda, the expulsion through the LRA conflict led to the fact that unaccompanied children in refugee camps in organized commercial sexual exploitation did. In Juba (South Sudan), an estimated 500 of the 3,000 street children living there were involved in prostitution - a situation that was tightened by the presence of soldiers.
Child trial as a camouflaged commercial exploitation is particularly bad and condemning. The ECPAT organization brings the practice of the "Bride Prize" spread in parts of Africa with that girls "under the pretext of a marriage" are brought from their communities and exploited for commercial purposes.
A widespread exploitation is the housework. The exploitation in the home work - a phenomenon that can hardly be grasped in numbers, but relates to millions of girls worldwide - often serves as a guise for sexual exploitation.
An important aspect of research is that a large part of the sexual abuse of children in Subsahara Africa has no commercial background. The perpetrators are in the overwhelming majority from the environment of the child (family, neighborhood, community); Strangers make only a small part. The commercial aspect is merely the visible tip of a much larger problem.
The causes are - as always - known and always the same.
Poverty - is the most commonly mentioned factor. This ranges from tourism areas in Gambia to Guinea-Bissau, where more than half of the children between the ages of 5 and 14 must already work.
The conflicts and the expulsion Africa worldwide has the highest number of conflict-related expulsions, which is exploited by Human Traders.
The relocation of the destinations - as Asian countries have aggravated their laws, perpetrators are fed to Africa; The Kenyan Tourism Ministry has granted this development itself.
The statement can even be occupied several times. There are several documented recognitions by Kenyan government agencies.
The official admissions
1. The first public confession (2003).
In 2003, the Kenyan Government - on the Ministry of Tourism and Information - reported for the first time on a child protection workshop for the first time on the sexual exploitation of children in tourism (CSET). According to a study, this was the very first official recognition of the problem by the Kenyan government.
2. The report of the Ministry of Tourism for the shift from Asia.
A report of the Ministry said that pedorcisiminals from the Asian Centers of Child Measuring Existory Migrate - because of there tightened laws - and African countries such as Kenya with lafer laws and weak enforcement than new ones Select goals.
3. The confession of the coverup. According to the same source, tourism officials admit that Kenya's role was played down as a target for child showxtourism - for fear of damage to the tourism industry suffered from negative travelers and through competing countries Like South Africa and Tanzania under pressure. The Ministry also realized that some tour operators act as intermediaries on the coast itself and lead offenders to children.
4. The Tourism Minister Najib Bala declared to Irin / Plusnews, one must liberate the coast of her reputation as a haven for child showxtourism: "This embarrassed label must be addressed at the Community level." He announced to escape licenses of companies that tourists with minor girls get involved.
5. To publish the UNICEF study 2006, Vice President Moody Aweri named the sexual exploitation of children a vice that grows "in a frightening extent".
The recording side of the confession
Noteworthy is the tension: the same authorities who named the problem renounced, according to research for a long time - NGOS reported, Kenyan authorities hesitated with charges against foreign perpetrators to the profitable Tourism not to endanger, and extrajudicial comparisons with monetary payments to the families were the norm.
In short, the Kenyan government officially granted the problem in 2003, the shift of perpetrators from Asia to Africa even documented itself in a Ministry of Ministry - the implementation of the laws and the attack against perpetrators remained behind the confession.
A major challenge is the poor enforcement, the laws are present (most countries have ratified the UN protocols), but "the commitments are not effective measures", and only a small part of the victims receives help.
What is done?
The UN Report of 2024 devoted its own chapter Africa for the first time, based on data from 40 African states - a sign that the data gap is finally addressed.
The report UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Person 2024 was posted on 11 December 2024 - the UN drug and crime fighting office has no own report alone about sexual abuse of children in Africa, but the issue 2024 has first A separate focus chapter on Africa (Chapter 2), in which trading with children for sexual exploitation occurs centrally. The most important statements are that it is the most detailed image of trafficking in Africa. For the first time, UNODC has compiled data from all regions of the continent, with the support of its own field offices and together with IOM, the statistics institute of the African Union (Statafric), ECOWAS, SADC and national authorities.
The core findings on children are depressed.
Children are often affected in most parts of Africa as adults. Captures above all in forced labor, sexual exploitation and forced beds.
The increase in childfalls in Subsahara Africa is a major factor for the worldwide increase of discovered children's victims.
Subsahara Africa and North Africa have the highest proportion of children at all discovered victims worldwide - around 60 percent.
Worldwide, the number of discovered children's victims increased by 31% (2022 compared to 2019), in girls by 38%; Girls now make 22% of all discovered victims, boys 16%.
Sexual exploitation in the report
The number of sacrifices discovered because of sexual exploitation increased by 41% compared to 2020 and is again above the preliminary pandemic level.
Over 90% of the victims of sexual exploitation are women and girls (64% women, 28% girls); 60% of female children's victims were traded for sexual exploitation.
In North Africa and the Middle East, around 15% of the discovered victims were exploited in begging - almost without exception children.
The origin and target routes.
African victims achieve more destination countries, according to the report as a victim of any other region: 2022 at least 162 nationalities were discovered in 128 target countries; 31% of all cross-border trading streams concerned Citizens of African states.
Most of the victims are traded within the continent - the patterns from the previous conversation remain.
UNODC provides a connection between climate-related expulsion in Africa and the number of African victims discovered in Europe; In addition, there were about 2,000 victims from war-affected African countries - especially adults for forced labor and sexual exploitation.
Causes and recommendations
As the main driver, UNODC identifies poverty, conflicts and climatic catastrophes that increase vulnerability; UNODC Chef's Ghada Waly demanded the leaders at the forefront of criminal chains to account for better identifying victims and support survivors.
Important restriction
The report only measures discovered and reported cases (2020-2023, 156 countries) - not the real extent. Especially with sexual exploitation of children, the dark figures remain large in most African countries, as well as ECPAT confirmed. The numbers are more like a lower limit than an overall picture.
The Declaration of Dakar (2003) committed African governments to introduce extraterritorial laws against sex tourism with children - so that perpetrators can be prosecuted in their homeland.
The annual "Trafficking in Person's Report" (report on trafficking in human beings) of the US State Department classifies all African countries into different categories; This generates diplomatic pressure and influences the funds.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as ECPAT, ANPPCAN and local groups offer support for victims in the five destined destinations (Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, South Africa) and operate message systems.
The child trade for sexual purposes or sexual exploitation of children in Kenya - a real and documented problem.
Extent of the problem
The estimates vary depending on the source; Studies and NGOs, however, usually expect from about 10,000 to 20,000 children affected in Kenya of commercial sexual exploitation. The coastal region (Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi, Diani) is considered a priority area for children's expertism.
A study supported by UNICEF revealed that in some coastal areas, up to 30% of all 12- to 18-year-olds are involved in occasional sexual yields. The problem is also not limited to the coast, as children from other parts of the country will be trapped there.
Kenya is a source of origin, transit and destination for trafficking. Children are sexually exploited both from foreign tourists and native perpetrators - often under using intermediaries (so-called "Beach Boys", hotel staff or sometimes even relatives or parents).
Hauptursachen
Poverty - about 40% of the coastal residents of less than $ 2 per day; The lack of alternative livelihoods increases the susceptibility of exploitation.
Orphan status and lack of familiar protection orphans are considered the most vulnerable group.
Online exploitation - by cheap smartphones and social media, the problem has received a growing online dimension. These include about live abuse and the initiation of trafficking through platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram.
Legal framework
The law to combat human trafficking ("Counter-Trafficking in Person's Act", 2010) sees a penalty of at least 30 years at a conviction, a fine of at least 30 million KES (Kenyan Schilling) or a lifelong Freedom penalty.
The Law against Sexual Offices ("Sexual Offices Act", 2006) provides children's prostitution, children's expertism as well as child pornography and sees imprisonment between 6 and 20 years.
The largest gap in law enforcement lies in practical implementation: restraint on the part of law enforcement agencies, corruption and the use of private villas and guest houses, which make it difficult to uncover such cases.
Who goes out on mind
The International Justice Mission (IJM) carries out a project in cooperation with the Kenyan government in the districts of Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale and works with the "Anti-Human Trafficking and Child Protection Unit" (unit to combat trafficking in trafficking and protecting children).
Organizations such as Hart Kenya (Awareness Against Human Trafficking), Childline Kenya and other NGOs provide support for those affected and provide Messagewege.
Conclusion
The African Children Sex Trade is at Urgent and Multifaceted Crisis ThatT Demands Immediate and Sustained Attention. It Is A Stain On The Continent's Conscience, Robbing Countless Young Lives of the Future and Pervy Cycles of Trauma and Poverty. The Complex Interplay of Socio Economic Vulnerabilities, Systemic Weaknesses, and External Demand Creates a Fertile Ground for Exploitation. However, by Strengthening Legal Protections, Investing In Prevention, Providing Robust Support for Survivors, And Fostering Greater International Cooperation, Africa Can Begin to Dismantle The Infrastructure of this depend Trade. The Fight Against Child Sex Trafficking is a Fight for the Dignity, Safety, and Future of Africa's Most Vulnerable Citizens, And Its Success Is Paramount for the Continent's Overall Progress And Well Being.
United Nations
GeneralAssembly Seventy-ninth session
Official Records
A/C.3/79/SR.52
Distr.: General 20 February 2025
Original: English
Third Committee
Summary record of the 52nd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 18 November 2024, at 10 a.m.
Chair: Mr. Maniratanga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Burundi)
Contents
Agenda item 107: Crime prevention and criminal justice (continued) Agenda item 27: Advancement of women (continued)
Agenda item 67: Promotion and protection of the rights of children (continued) (a) Promotion and protection of the rights of children (continued)
Agenda item 70: Right of peoples to self-determination (continued)
This record is subject to correction.
Corrections should be sent as soon as possible, under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, to the Chief of the Documents Management Section (dms@un.org), and incorporated in a copy of the record.
Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org/).
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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.
Agenda item 107: Crime prevention and criminal justice (continued) (A/C.3/79/L.10/Rev.1, A/C.3/79/L.66 and A/C.3/79/L.68)
Draft resolution A/C.3/79/L.10/Rev.1: United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
1. The Chair drew attention to the statement of programme budget implications contained in document A/C.3/79/L.66 for the draft resolution. The amendment to the draft resolution contained in A/C.3/79/L.68 had no programme budget implications.
2. Ms. Gurhan (Uganda), introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the Group of African States, said that the text recognized that combating crime was a collective endeavour and investing the necessary resources in crime prevention was vital. Such investment contributed to sustainable development. Existing criminal justice systems in most African countries did not have sufficiently skilled personnel or adequate infrastructure to deal with crime crises. The text underscored the need to strengthen social defence and crime prevention policies globally, and particularly inAfrica. Such policies were in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals.
3. The African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders was at a critical juncture and required attention. The draft resolution was based on the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/79/247, which presented the Institute’s appeal to increase its grant from the United Nations. The adoption of the draft resolution would mark a turning point for the Institute, relieving it from the dire financial situation it had been facing since its creation in 1989. Her delegation noted with regret the last-minute presentation of a hostile amendment to the draft resolution, which had historically been adopted by consensus.
4. Mr. Mahmassani (Secretary of the Committee) said that the following delegations had become sponsors of the draft resolution: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Nicaragua, Vanuatu and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
5. Mr. Young (United Kingdom), introducing the draft amendment contained in document A/C.3/79/L.68, said that the United Kingdom supported the work of the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders to promote intergovernmental cooperation on crime prevention and criminal justice and valued its important role in promoting sustainable development while addressing the threat posed by crime. His delegation’s objection concerned the reference in the draft resolution to resources. It was the long-held view of the United Kingdom and many other Member States that the Third Committee was able to adopt language proposing new activity but specifying how funding of staffing costs should be met went beyond its remit. It was more appropriate for such matters to be considered by the Fifth Committee. It was regrettable that his delegation’s concern had not been addressed and that the document containing the programme budget implications of the draft resolution had not been made available during the negotiation process. It was for that reason that his delegation had presented an amendment to paragraph 26 of the draft resolution. The amendment was not hostile; it was intended to ensure respect for the different roles of the GeneralAssembly’s Main Committees. His delegation supported the other elements of the draft resolution, including the broader purpose, objectives and outcomes of the Institute.
6. The Chair said that a recorded vote on the amendment contained in document A/C.3/79/L.68 had been requested.
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7. Ms. Banaken Elel (Cameroon), speaking in explanation of vote before the voting on behalf of the Group of African States, said that it was regrettable to see the tireless work of the facilitator of the draft resolution being challenged by a hostile amendment. Had the amendment been presented in a timely manner, perhaps consensus could have been achieved. Her delegation called on all delegations to reject the amendment.
8. A recorded vote was taken on the amendment contained in document A/C.3/79/L.68.
In favour:
Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands (Kingdom of the), North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
Against:
Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zambia.
Abstaining:
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Georgia, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liechtenstein, Myanmar, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Switzerland, Türkiye, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Viet Nam.
9. The amendment contained in document A/C.3/79/L.68 was rejected by 98 votes to 42, with 31 abstentions.
10. The Chair said that a recorded vote had been requested on paragraph 26 of draft resolution A/C.3/79/L.10/Rev.1.
11. Mr. Young (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom supported the work of the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders and recognized its important role in crime prevention. His delegation was disappointed by the rejection of its amendment, which, he wished to stress, was not a hostile one. His delegation remained firm in its objection to the reference to resources in the draft resolution: specifying how funding of staffing costs should be met was beyond the remit of the Third Committee and would be more appropriate for the Fifth Committee. As a matter of principle, and to protect the different roles and work of the General
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Assembly’s Main Committees, the United Kingdom called for a vote on paragraph 26 of the draft resolution and encouraged Member States to vote against.
12. Mr. Pilipenko (Belarus), speaking on a point of order, asked what would it mean to vote in favour or against paragraph 26 of the draft resolution and what the consequences of either outcome would be for the draft resolution’s programme budget implications. Would the deletion of paragraph 26 mean that no resources at all were allocated to the implementation of the draft resolution?
13. Mr. Mahmassani (Secretary of the Committee) said that a vote in favour meant voting to retain paragraph 26 of the draft resolution and a vote against meant voting to delete the paragraph from the draft resolution. If paragraph 26 were deleted, the draft resolution would no longer have any programme budget implications.
14. Ms. Banaken Elel (Cameroon), speaking in explanation of vote before the voting on behalf of the Group of African States, said that the Group was surprised by the request for a recorded vote on whether to retain paragraph 26 of the draft resolution. The Third Committee was not specifying how funding should be met, but rather giving a mandate to the Fifth Committee, which would then consider the matter in detail. The purpose of paragraph 26 was, first, to state that the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders did not have sufficient resources and, second, to put forward a request for an increase in those resources. The Group continued to regard the amendment as a hostile one and called on all delegations to vote in favour of retaining paragraph 26 of the draft resolution in order to give the Institute the resources necessary to fulfil its mandate.
15. Mr. Rojas (Peru), speaking in explanation of vote before the voting, said that his delegation was surprised by the request to hold a recorded vote on the retention of paragraph 26 of the draft resolution as any financial matters contained in the draft resolution would be considered by the Fifth Committee in any case. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of retaining paragraph 26.
16. Mr. Issa (Nigeria), speaking on a point of order, said that his delegation was surprised by the request to hold a recorded vote on the retention of paragraph 26 and wondered whether, following the rejection of an amendment of that same paragraph, such a vote was necessary or even allowed under the rules of procedure.
17. The Chair said that any request by a Member State to hold a vote must be met.
18. At the request of the representative of the United Kingdom, a recorded vote was taken on paragraph 26 of draft resolution A/C.3/79/L.10/Rev.1.
In favour:
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan,
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Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, SyrianArab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, UnitedArab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Against:
Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands (Kingdom of the), North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
Abstaining:
Australia, Bahamas, Canada, Fiji, Georgia, Honduras, Iceland, Japan, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Türkiye, Uruguay.
19. Paragraph 26 of draft resolution A/C.3/79/L.10/Rev.1 was retained by 120 votes to 40, with 19 abstentions.
20. Mr. Hamer (Australia), speaking also on behalf of Canada and New Zealand, said that their delegations were concerned about the draft resolution and its budgetary implications. The statute of the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders stipulated that the Institute must derive its financial resources from annual contributions by member States. It was primarily their responsibility to provide the funds necessary for its activities. The outstanding balance of $17.1 million identified in the report of the Secretary-General was concerning and should be appropriately addressed before additional financial burdens were initiated. The request in the draft resolution to compensate for member State’s arrears by increasing contributions from the United Nations resources amid a liquidity crisis was concerning and should not set a precedent. It was important for the Institute’s members to provide their contributions in full and on time.
21. Despite their concerns, however, Australia, Canada and New Zealand had abstained from voting on the amendment contained in document A/C.3/79/L.68 in recognition of the Institute’s work. The Institute was a key body that promoted joint action on crime prevention and criminal justice in Africa, including transborder and transnational crime, which were issues affecting all Member States.
22. Mr. Moussa (Djibouti) said that it was only through international cooperation that substantial progress would be made in the implementation of social defence and crime prevention policies, which were in line with the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals. A persistent lack of financial resources was a crippling challenge that the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders had been facing for years, one that paragraph 26 of the draft resolution addressed. Support for the retention of paragraph 26 of the draft resolution was what Africa and the wider world needed and was greatly appreciated.
23. Ms. Tambwe (United Republic of Tanzania), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, said that the retention of paragraph 26 of the draft resolution was a proud achievement, one that would be remembered as an important step taken by the Committee. However, support of the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders should not stop there. Her delegation urged Member States to seize further opportunities to support the Institute, particularly given the need to strengthen its capacity in advancing social defence and the prevention of crime.
24. Draft resolution A/C.3/79/L.10/Rev.1, as a whole, was adopted.
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25. Mr. Ivanyi (Hungary), speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member States and the candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that the European Union had outstanding concerns about the negotiation process and the final text of the draft resolution. The facilitators had not taken into consideration the concerns of the European Union about the inclusion of a request to increase the United Nations grant for the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, or its suggested alternative language. The facilitators had instead rejected them without reasonable explanation or comprehensive discussion. As a result, the European Union disassociated itself from paragraph 26 of the draft resolution.
26. As the Institute derived its financial resources from the annual contributions of its member States, it was primarily their responsibility to provide the funds necessary for the Institute’s activities. However, the report of the Secretary-General highlighted the substantial arrears on those contributions. A request to make up the difference by increasing the grant from the United Nations budget, introduced into the text without proper discussion, was not an appropriate way to address that challenge. More generally, it was worth emphasizing that the Third Committee was not the right forum to discuss administrative and budgetary matters; those were the responsibility of the Fifth Committee. Nevertheless, the European Union sincerely hoped that strengthening the capacity of the Institute would enable it to achieve greater results.
27. Mr. Bulgaru (Russian Federation) said that, as the establishment of the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders had been supported by a General Assembly decision adopted by consensus in 1989, all Member States of the United Nations were responsible for supporting the Institute’s efforts. It was unacceptable that a long-overdue payment of funds to the Institute had been postponed year after year because of the objections of certain delegations. His delegation welcomed the fact that the Institute would finally receive much-needed support. Support from Member States was critically important, particularly in view of the challenges and threats faced by African States.
28. Mr. Escobar (Argentina) said that his delegation’s previously stated position regarding the 2030 Agenda applied to draft resolution A/C.3/79/L.10/Rev.1.
29. Ms. Jabou Bessadok (Tunisia) said that the inclusion of paragraph 26 in the draft resolution highlighted the vital role of the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders in fostering research, capacity-building and collaborative strategies to address issues including organized crime and violence against women and children. Her delegation called on Member States to strengthen their support for the Institute, which remained a cornerstone for advancing justice and sustainable peace in Africa.
30. Ms. Banaken Elel (Cameroon), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, said that the draft resolution placed special emphasis on the impact of insufficient funds on the African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders through the request in paragraph 26 to increase of the United Nations grant. The Institute was a beacon of light promoting and advancing social defence and crime prevention policies in Africa. The Group would endeavour to safeguard its hard-won achievement, using the Institute as an example for future draft resolutions, if necessary.
Agenda item 27: Advancement of women (continued) (A/C.3/79/L.16/Rev.1 and A/C.3/79/L.20/Rev.1)
Draft resolution A/C.3/79/L.16/Rev.1: Trafficking in women and girls
31. The Chair said that the draft resolution had no programme budget implications.
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Sorces
https://documentation.lastradainternational.org/lsidocs/418%20extent_n_efect_1007.pdf
https://www.aqcommunication.com/coastwomen/reports/apsa_presentation.pdf
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/92603/kenya-fight-against-child-sex-tourism-needs-boost
https://web.archive.org/web/20180805111946/https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/kenya_37817.html
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/92603/kenya-fight-against-child-sex-tourism-needs-boost
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/bilateral-cooperation-a-promising-solution-to-the-child-sex-tourism-crisis/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/prostitution_in_kenya
https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158036
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ress/releases/2024/december/unodc-global-human-trafficking-report_ -detected-victims-up-25-per cent-as-a-forced-site-compliant-and-forced-labour-packs-spike.html https://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/en/news/unodc-global-human-trafficking-report-2024-an-increase-of-25-of-victims
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2024/december/unodc-global-human-trafficking-report_-detected-victims-up-25-per-cent-as-more-children-are-exploited-and-forced-labour-cases-spike.html
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-report-trafficking-persons-2024
https://www.law.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/women-and-justice/glotip2024-compressed.pdf
https://www.dawn.com/news/1878305/number-of-global-human-trafficking-victims-rose-to-25pc-in-2022-un-report
https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158036
children.worldea
32.
Samstag, 14. November 2026
Lake Victoria is under serious threat
Lake Victoria is under serious threat. Lake Victoria is located in East Africa and spans the countries of Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. It is named after Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom and is both the third-largest lake and the second-largest freshwater lake in the world by surface area. (Wikipedia)
The primary factors contributing to this threat are outlined here. It is a complex issue; the lake is exposed to several stressors, which often exacerbate one another.
Untreated sewage from cities (Kisumu in Kenya, Kampala in Uganda, and Mwanza in Tanzania), industrial waste, and agricultural runoff—containing fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides—all enter the lake. This leads to eutrophication—an overabundance of nutrients that triggers massive algal growth. Some of these algae are toxic; for instance, cyanobacteria can accumulate in the tissues of fish, rendering them dangerous for human consumption. Furthermore, the decomposition of dead algae consumes oxygen, creating "dead zones" where fish perish. Another specific problem is mercury, which enters the lake as a result of gold mining.
The water hyacinth (*Eichhornia crassipes*) has spread throughout the lake. It grows rapidly, forming dense mats on the water's surface. This blocks sunlight, reduces oxygen levels, and disrupts the habitats of other organisms. Additionally, these mats of vegetation hinder navigation and the use of fishing nets; they can even destroy fish-farming installations. Attempts to remove the plant mechanically or through biological control methods have yet to yield any lasting success.
Driven by population growth, the demand for fish has risen sharply. Unsustainable fishing practices, the use of prohibited gear, and overfishing have led to a decline in the populations of many species. The endemic cichlid fish are particularly affected. In 2018, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) reported that approximately 76% of the fish and crustacean species in the lake were threatened with extinction. The situation is further exacerbated by the introduction of the Nile perch, which has disrupted the ecosystem's natural balance.
Rising temperatures lead to increased evaporation, and shifts in precipitation patterns can result in a falling water level in the lake. This has direct consequences for the ecosystem as well as for the people who depend on the lake.
Other anthropogenic factors include deforestation in the catchment area, which intensifies soil erosion; this causes more sediment to enter the lake, clouding the water and further disrupting the ecological balance. The destruction of papyrus swamps removes a natural filtration system and a source of oxygen from the water body. Another issue is the illegal extraction of sand from the shorelines for construction purposes, which alters water flow patterns and worsens erosion.
These threats are often compounded by poor regulatory compliance, a lack of data for informed decision-making, and difficulties in coordination among the three riparian states (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), given that the lake is a transboundary body of water.
Swimming in Lake Victoria is generally not recommended, as the lake is a known habitat for the parasites that cause bilharzia (schistosomiasis). The larvae of these parasites can penetrate the skin, particularly during activities such as swimming, wading, or coming into contact with water along the shoreline.
Lake Victoria is a known endemic area for bilharzia: the pathogens develop within freshwater snails and enter the water as free-swimming larvae. Even brief skin contact with the lake can be enough.
Taken together, these factors pose a serious risk to the lake’s ecosystem. Furthermore, since more than 40 million people depend on Lake Victoria—for their food, income, and daily lives—this threat also affects food security, human health, and the economy of the entire region.
Scientists and environmental organizations are calling for urgent action: improving wastewater treatment systems, adopting sustainable practices in agriculture and fishing, preserving wetlands, and strengthening regional cooperation.
Mittwoch, 11. November 2026
EU changes its attitude to the military agreement between Niger and Algeria.
EU changes its attitude to the military agreement between Niger and Algeria.
On October 21, 2026, Niger and Algeria signed a protocol on military cooperation in Algiers. It is noteworthy that the complete text has not been published so far - content, troop strength and duration of use remained unnecessary.
Five days later, on 25./26. October, approved the Algerian Parliament with almost two-thirds majority in both chambers the posting of troops - the first foreign assignment of Algeria since 1973 (Jom Kippur War). Officially limited to the protection of Algerian investments, especially the energy projects of the state group Sonatrach (Oilfeld Kafra, about 85 km from the Algerian border).
At the end of October, a first military convoy was already observed towards the Nigrische border; As a stationation goal, the former French base Madama is in the north of Niger. Madama is located in the northeast Niger, in the Ténéré area on the edge of the Djado Plateau, directly on the border with Libya. It is little more than a border station, a small settlement point that controls traffic between Niger and Libya.
The Fort de Madama built the French 1930/31 as a colonial fortress - allegedly to stop the Italian expansion from Libya. It is now surrounded by barbed wire and a minefield.
The fort serves the Nigrische Army as a garrison of around 100 soldiers, which belong to the 24th Interarmes battalion from Dirkou.
Until recently, relations were more frosty: 2025 Algeria shot a drone that was penetrated from Mali in his airspace; Niamey then moved off the ambassador.
In August 2026, a coup attempt was prevented in Niger and that was the turning point. Algiers sent demonstratively helicopter and four SU-30 combat jets to Niamey.
President TebBouns accused "unnamed states" in October of the conspiracy against Niger and announced that the land "to protect at any price". Niger's Defense Minister then traveled to Algiers twice - the protocol fell there.
What does Algeria drives is identical to what the EU is driving. It is mainly the energy, there is still the influence against Morocco. Algiers want to fill the vacuum in the Sahel before it does Rabat - Morocco sets its own counterproach with the Nigeria Morocco gas pipeline and the Atlantic initiative.
It is also about a change of course, because decades of non-intervention were fixed; Analysts see a strategic reorientation in this because diplomacy and international law have lost as instruments.
The agreement thus marks a double change, Algeria dissolves from his previous restraint on foreign assignments, and Niger (like Mali and Burkina Faso in the AES) wins a new security partner beyond Russia. It remains open how much sovereignty Niamey really wins - or whether it is only a new dependence, this time to Algiers.
"The decision of Algeria to deploy troops in the Niger area of bilateral relations between Algeria and the Niger," said EU spokesman Anouar El Anouni surprisingly on Tuesday.
Previously, on October 30, he had demanded a "clarification over the scope, goal and basis" of the military and economic agreement concluded between the Niger and Algeria. The EU then saw itself exposed, in particular, suspended by the Nigrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs - sharp criticism for interference in the internal affairs of two sovereign states.
The EU is not a contracting partner of this Agreement - but it has critically expressed itself and had to rest for violent reactions from Algiers and Niaamey.
The process was the following. The Algerian Parliament approved the posting of army units in the Niger in October 2026 - the first foreign assignment of the country since 1973. The basis is a military cooperation agreement with Niamey; Officially, it is about the protection of joint energy and economic interests, especially the planned 4,000 km long transsahara gas pipeline.
On October 30, a EU Commission spokesman declared in Brussels, the EU "take note" of the decision and search clarity about the scope, goal and legal basis of the use.
Niamey responded immediately. The government felt the interference, referred to the statements as "condescending and unacceptable" and ordered the EU representative. Argument: One is not a member of the EU and do not need permission from Brussels. The Algerian news agency APs also had European news agency Demands as a mixture.
On November 10, the EU then completed the turnaround, the foreign policy spokesman Anouar El Anouni realized, the EU has "not" intended to comment on bilateral obligations of the two states, respect their sovereignty and Wool a "respectful dialogue" lead. From Algiers and Niamey, Nevertheless, Kritik - Algeria's Senate spoke of an "immature speaker" and stressed, they do not let himself be pressed.
Formally, the EU has no say in this matter - it is a purely bilateral thing between two sovereign states. Brussels looks exactly for several reasons:
Algeria is the second largest pipeline gas supplier of the EU to Norway and provides around 85% of its gas exports to Europe. The transshara gas pipeline would bring Nigerian gas to Europe over Niger and Algeria - a project at which Brussels is strategically interested.
The EU had in Niger's own military and civil missions, but the junta announced these already in December 2023, looking near to Russia instead. European influence in the region has since been swept strongly.
The retreat of France and the US from the Sahel and the strengthening of new partners (Russia, now Algeria) change the balance of power - that is why Brussels registered every new military cooperation there with suspicion.
The withdrawal of the EU statement is above all a one: Without binding lever in Niamey and Algiers, Brussels remains only the status of a worried observer - and both capitals have marked the border clearly, where they can no longer be considered European inquiries.
https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/article/niger-eu-algerien-truppen-einbestellung-bruessel-10583926
https://iz.ru/2192700/2026-10-30/alzhir-napravliaet-voiska-v-niger-i-vstupaet-v-gonku-za-bogatstva-afriki-chto-nuzhno-znat
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7ptpyl_mjy
https://rtde.agency/der-nahe-osten/217281-algerien-hat-hand-am-gashahn/
https://iz.ru/2192700/2026-10-30/alzhir-napravliaet-voiska-v-niger-i-vstupaet-v-gonku-za-bogatstva-afriki-chto-nuzhno-znat
https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231204-niger-s-junta-ends-key-security-agreements-with-eu-turns-to-russia-for-defence-deal
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eumpm-niger_en?s=410280
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7ptpyl_mjy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfd5_tjcwh4
https://www.telepolis.de/article/mali-niger-burkina-faso-der-sahel-buendelt-seine-kraefte-11517620.html
https://www.telepolis.de/article/mali-niger-burkina-faso-der-sahel-buendelt-seine-kraefte-11517620.html
Dienstag, 10. November 2026
Without Dignity, There Is No Liberty': A Vision for True Freedom
Patrice Lumumba articulated this sentiment on June 30, 1960, during the celebrations marking the independence of the Congo. The statement is as follows:
“Without dignity, there is no freedom. Without justice, there is no dignity. Without independence, there are no free people.”
This brief statement encapsulates his worldview. Lumumba presents a clear sequence: independence alone does not guarantee freedom if justice is lacking within society—and freedom is meaningless if human dignity is trampled upon. He reminded his people that political freedom is merely a starting point. True liberation begins only when the state ensures fair treatment for every individual and respects their dignity.
Lumumba did not speak these words in a vacuum. He was addressing people who had just emerged from a long and arduous struggle against colonial oppression. In his speech, he offered a sharp counter-narrative: independence was not a gift from the colonial power, but the result of a persistent—and at times bloody—struggle waged by the people themselves. He urged them not to forget the suffering they had endured—forced labor, racial discrimination, the theft of their land—in order to reclaim the right to determine their own destiny.
In the same speech, Lumumba also outlined specific tasks: the new state had to eradicate all forms of discrimination, secure a dignified place in society for everyone, and guarantee fundamental freedoms as well as fair compensation for labor. Furthermore, he looked at the bigger picture: the independence of the Congo was a decisive step toward the liberation of the entire African continent.
Thus, when Lumumba spoke of independence, he meant far more than just a change of flags. He reminded his audience that true freedom emerges from the bottom up—through respect for every single individual, through justice, and through a genuine, rather than merely formal, sovereignty.
Independence was won through struggle, not granted as a gift!
Lumumba presented his own interpretation of history, standing in direct opposition to the official narrative. While independence was proclaimed "in agreement with Belgium—a friendly country, which we now face as equals," no Congolese person "will ever forget that this independence was won by us through struggle"—a persistent struggle marked by "tears, fire, and blood." This served as an indirect response to King Baudouin, who, in his own speech, had portrayed the end of colonialism as the culmination of Belgium’s "civilizing mission." Lumumba’s speech had not been part of the original plan; he took the floor unexpectedly, immediately following the monarch’s address.
The second and most emotional part of the speech addresses the suffering endured by the people during "eighty years of colonial rule": forced labor for starvation wages; humiliations and mistreatment "because we were 'Negroes'"; a dual system of justice—"lenient toward some, cruel toward others"—; the theft of land; exile for holding one’s own convictions; and the strict segregation of living spaces, cafés, and even the decks of ships, separating white people from Black people. The core message is this: "The wounds are still too fresh and painful for us to forget them"—the act of remembering, therefore, is not intended for the sake of revenge, but rather serves as a guarantee that such things will never happen again. Lumumba called upon the Congolese people to “stand together” and warned against internal conflicts—recognizing that the colonial rulers had deliberately stoked ethnic and regional tensions, and that the fledgling state could not survive without internal unity. His words unfortunately proved prophetic: just one week later, the army mutinied, and the province of Katanga declared its secession.
Moving beyond his retrospective assessment, Lumumba set forth a series of promises that essentially constituted his government’s political agenda:
social justice and fair remuneration for labor;
a revision of all existing laws, “to ensure they are just and noble”;
an end to the suppression of free thought, and the full guarantee of fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Declaration of Human Rights;
the elimination of all forms of discrimination;
a peace that is “founded not on rifles and bayonets, but on sincere understanding and good will.”
It is noteworthy that Lumumba spoke not only of a break with the former colonial power but also of cooperation: the Congo would accept aid from other nations, "provided it is of a friendly nature and not aimed at imposing a foreign policy upon us." The principle of equality—"equals among equals"—runs like a common thread throughout the entire speech.
In his conclusion, he emphasized: "The attainment of the Congo's independence is a decisive milestone on the path toward the liberation of the entire African continent"; furthermore, he envisioned the Congo becoming the "pride of all Africa." Lumumba viewed his country not merely as an independent state, but as a model and a focal point for the entire continent.
The speech sparked a scandal: while it was received with enthusiasm in the Congo, it was condemned in the West as "excessively confrontational." Some Congolese politicians even accused Lumumba of ingratitude—diplomatic relations with Belgium were on the verge of collapse. As for the famous quote, "We are no longer your monkeys"—often associated with this speech—it is a fabrication; it appears neither in the transcript nor in the audio recording.
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