Ethiopia's ancient Thanksgiving is for forgiveness and unit

Ethiopia's ancient Thanksgiving is for forgiveness and unit We have a very interesting topic here! There is an important nuance: there is no uniform, "nationwide" thanksgiving in Ethiopia, but it actually exists an outstanding example, which is often described exactly. The speech is from the irreecha festival of the oromo people. The Oromo (natural name OROMOO) are the largest ethnic group of Ethiopia and one of the largest peoples of Africa. They live mainly in the Oromia region in Ethiopia, but also in parts of Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. Around 33-40 million people; In Ethiopia, they provide about a third to 40% of the total population. Their language is the Afaan Oromoo (also called OroIfIs), an East Cuditant Language of the Afroasian Language Family; After talking numbers one of the most important languages of Africa. It is often referred to as "old Ethiopian Thanksgiving", and its core is actually characterized by the thoughts of reconciliation and unity.

Irreecha is celebrated at the end of the rainy season - about in October. For the Oromo, this is a time of the renewal of nature, because the rainfall ends, and the time of the rich harvest begins. People gather to thank the deity Waaqa for fertility, peace, health and a good harvest. But the meaning of the festival goes beyond the mere thanks for the gave earth. Before the actual celebration, the participants strive for reconciliation; They leave the risks, anger and mistrust behind. Here is the idea of forgiveness: the festival becomes a moment of spiritual cleaning and the restoration of human bonds. The great gathering as well as the common rituals, songs and dances also strengthen the feeling of unity. People from different clans and with different backgrounds feel on this day as part of a large whole. The celebrations often take place on holy lakes - for example at the Hora Finfinne in Addis Ababa or at the Hora Arsadi in Bishoftu. The participants wear colorful traditional clothes and bring fresh grasses and flowers. One of the symbolic rituals is dipping these herbs and flowers in water: this is a sign of the bondage of human, nature and a higher power as well as a symbol of life and renewal. Oldest and traditional fees (such as "Abba Gadaa") speak prayers. Irreeecha is closely linked to the Gadaa system - an old self-governmental system and cultural traditional work of the Oromo-Volkes, which is even recognized by UNESCO. The Ethiopian authorities see in the feast of great potential: his values - unity, national consensus and reconciliation - can benefit all the country. Therefore, special forums are held in which this ideas can be further developed in which these ideas can be discussed. In addition, there are initiatives to record IRREECHA in the list of UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage. The Oromo commit numerous holidays and memorial days that have been divided into three categories: traditional rites of Waaqeffanna religion, secular events and holidays of religions that the Oromo belongs today (Christianity and Islam). Here are the most important of this. Irreeecha - more than just a party The already mentioned Thanksgiving actually takes place twice a year: in autumn as "Irreecha Birraa" (in October, on the water) and in the spring as "Irreecha Arfaasaa" or "Irreeecha Malkaa" (in April). There is also a variant that is celebrated on hillcases: "irreeecha tulluu". In all these occasions, the same core content is the focus: Waaq (God) to thank as well as to ask peace and reconciliation. Ateetee - the "singing" festival of women, ... is a central institution in the traditional oromo society that a female deity or a female spirit, a ritual practice and a women led system for dispute resolution, for Prayers and social security. An independent and very characteristic tradition is "Ateetee", a ritual festival of Oromo women (especially with the Arsi). It is committed from different occasions: In order to ask for drought to prove rain to protect diseases, protect the right pregnant women and young mothers, to seek a good harvest or simply express pleasure. The women gather on the riverbank or under a sacred tree, sing "atteetee" songs and keep the ritual rod "sink" in their hands - a symbol of female strength and the right to respect. It is not only a feast, but also an instrument of justice: If someone was wrong, the women look up the house of the causer and sing there until a reconciliation and a reparation are achieved. In the region Shoa "Ateetee" is sometimes celebrated together with the Orthodox "Meschel" - firmly. Pilgrimage to Abbaa Mudaa, is considered a mediator between Waaqaa (the Creator) and the Oromo-People and as guardian and the Waaqaa Laws Guardians (Seera Waaqaa). Every eight years a large pilgrimage to Abbaa Mudaa takes place - the top priest of Waaqffanna. Pilgrims from all areas of Oromo are facing this holy site to receive blessing and anointing. Once this was both a religious as well as an event incidental event; Today, the festival "Irreecha" on the Arsadi Lake has largely taken over this role. Civil memorial days After the oromo calendar (where the day begins with sunset), secular memorial days are also committed: Ayyana Amajjii - January 1, New Year; More often than Ayyaana Amajjii is an annual cultural and political commemoration of the Oromo, which takes place on January 1 and symbolizes the freedom fight and resistance of the Oromo against oppression. Ayyaana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa (sometimes written Gabrummaa) is the Oromo Day of the Revolt against the submission, which committed annually on November 9th (Sadaasa 9 in the Oromo Calendar) becomes. The date marks the beginning of the fincila Diddaa Gabrummaa (FDG) - the "revolt against submission" - a mass protest movement, which started all oromia on November 9, 2005, after the Oromo Liberation Front (ABO / OLF) had called. On this day students, young people (organized later than Qeerroo organized), farmers and other social groups coordinated demonstrations against the rule of the Ethiopian Government, which denote Oromo nationalists as colonial rule (Gabrummaa). The FDG is regarded as a turning point in the nationalist discourse of the Oromo, which: Large parts of the Oromo Society were mobilized at continued protest. Put the organizational and emotional foundation for the later, even larger fincila Xumura Gabrummaa (FXG) protests from 2015. How is it observed? Name: Ayyaana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa means literally "Fest / Day of the Revolt against submission". It must first be clarified that there is no consistent proof that the Ethiopian government "all" oromo has been systematically and even thundered over centuries. But there are quite serious and repeated allegations and evidence that certain regime periods and political decisions have led to a marginalized, oppressive situation for many oromo. Here are some aspects that justify this criticism: Already under Kaiser Haile Selassie (1930-1974) there was strong centralization: the semi-autonomous status of many Oromo states was repealed. At the same time, the own language AFAAN OROMOO was officially limited - on the radio, at school, in dishes. Later, until about 1991, one was not allowed to write in Ethiopia in Oromo or produce literature. When Oromo protested for their rights - for example against land opinion without adequate compensation (as in the controversial "Addis Ababa Master Plan", the parts of Oromia in the capital inclusion) - these demonstrations were often laid in force. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch reported several times over excessive violence through security forces, arbitrary arrests, arrests without charge and even extrajudicial killings. The government used laws such as anti-terrorism proclamation to silence independent voices, journalists, activists or members of opposition parties (such as OFDM or OPC). Sometimes the existence of movements such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was taken as a reason to put the entire population under pressure. Many Oromo live in rural regions and are dependent on traditional ways of life (grain economy, agriculture). These were under pressure by state policy (eg by ignoring traditional rights of use in connection with development projects). However, it is important to emphasize that the situation has changed across different regimes. Following the introduction of ethnic federalism in 1992, Oromo had the opportunity to manage themselves in Oromia and develop their language and culture actively. The criticism comes not only from the outside, but also within the Oromo community that fights about its own rights and identity. More recently, other factors are added that exacerbate the situation - such as severe drought perdings that further burden the agricultural basis. There are quite serious evidence for oppression, but it would be simplifying to paint the whole picture only black and white. The reality is a complex network of historical, political and economic factors. In Oromo activist and diaspora travel, the day is marked with explanations, events and social media campaigns that remind of the history of the FDG and connect them with current struggles to land, language, political representation and self-determination. Ayyaana means "festival", "celebration" or "spirit / essence" on Afaan oromoo. Amajjii is the name of the first month in the traditional oromo calendar, which corresponds approximately to January. Ayyaana Amajjii means literally "Feast of Amajjii" or "New Year / Januarfest". Ayyaana Amajjii has been celebrating for more than 40 years than more than just a New Year. In the nationalist discourse of the Oromo it marks: One day in honor of the freedom fighters of the Oromo, who left their lives in the fight for liberation and self-determination. A symbol of strength, resilience and hope, formulated as "light over dark" and "freedom over suppression". A ritual reduction of a decisive act of resistance in the Oromo-liberation movement, which remains in memory of a much stronger opponent as a victory of some less bolds against a much stronger opponent In practice, the day of political and civil society groups of the Oromo (especially in the Diaspora) is used for: Commemorative events, speeches and cultural programs. Lighting amajjii torches or candles on hills or heights as a symbol of fight. Renewal of the confession to the rights, identity and political objectives of the Oromo. In addition to his political importance, Ayyaana Amajjii also acts as: An oromo New Year celebration marked the beginning of Amajjii in the Oromo Calendar. A moment of cultural expression: music, dance, poetry and storytelling, which strengthen the identity and history of Oromo Ayyana Guyyaa Gootaaa - April 15, Day of Oromo Martyr; This remembrance day goes back to a concrete event: On April 15, 1980, ten high-ranking leaders of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) - including the Secretary General Magarsaa Barii - in the Shinniigaa Desert (on the way to a diplomatic meeting in Somalia) captured and executed by Somali bandits. Her kidnappers had demanded Muslims and Christians should separate, with only the Muslims spared. The ten Oromo leaders rejected this, explained "We are first oromo" and died together. Since then, 15 April is celebrated as Guyyaa Gootata Oromoo (Day of Oromo Heroes) or Guyyaa Yaadannoo Goota Oromoo (Oromo-Martyr Train Day). The OLF National Council (Gumii Sabaa) officially sets the day in 1984 as a martyr remembrance day. The day is for several goals: Reminder of those oromo heroines and heroes who have sacrificed their lives for the restoration of oromo culture, identity and human dignity that were suppressed under Ethiopian colonialism. Recognition of the relationship between martyrium, bravery, patriotism and oromummaa (Oromo identity). Obligation to continue the struggle started by the martyrs to victory. Solidarity with the activists who are fighting today in Oromia. Awareness that oromo liberation requires heavy victims and serve the fallen as revolutionary role models. In the Oromo calendar begins a "day" at sunset, so all holidays start in the evening before the specified date. The remembrance day is committed by Oromo communities worldwide with commemoria, cultural events and political speeches. There is also a state guyyaa Gootaaa (HeroDag) in Ethiopia, which was originally laid on the 28th Bitootessa (March) and later on the 27th EBLA (April). This is a national Ethiopian holiday, while Ayyaana Guyyaa Gototaa specifically honors the Oromo martyrs and is monitored primarily by Oromo organizations and diasporage facilities. Ayyana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa - November 9, Day of uprising against the subjugation; The date marks the beginning of the fincila Diddaa Gabrummaa (FDG) - the "revolt against submission" - a mass protest movement, which started all oromia on November 9, 2005, after the Oromo Liberation Front (ABO / OLF) had called. On this day students, young people (organized later than Qeerroo organized), farmers and other social groups coordinated demonstrations against the rule of the Ethiopian Government, which denote Oromo nationalists as colonial rule (Gabrummaa). The FDG is regarded as a turning point in the nationalist discourse of the Oromo, which: Large parts of the Oromo Society were mobilized at continued protest. Put the organizational and emotional foundation for the later, even larger fincila Xumura Gabrummaa (FXG) protests from 2015. Ayyaana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa means literally "Fest / Day of the Revolt against submission". In Oromo activist and diaspora travel, the day is marked with explanations, events and social media campaigns that remind of the history of the FDG and connect them with current struggles to land, language, political representation and self-determination. Irreecha - end of September or early October; The date depends on astronomical observations. Religious holidays Since there are under the Oromo Christians, Muslims and supporters of traditional faith, they also celebrate the common festivals of their respective faiths - about Christmas, Easter, Eid Al-Fitr, Eid Al-Adha and others. The followers of the Waaqeffanna also commit their own, special day: Ekeraa in December. It is a commemoration of deceased relatives where bread, cheese with butter, beer and honey are served. Ceremonies of the GADAA system, is the traditional, democratically organized company and government system of the Oromo in the Horn of Africa, especially in Ethiopia. It regulates political, legal, social, economic and ritual affairs and was recognized by UNESCO in 2016 as an intangible cultural heritage of humanity. Finally, the Gadaa system itself determines the life rhythm: Every eight years, the power transfer takes place from an age group to the next, accompanied by large rites and celebrations. The fixed calendar of the Oromo is thus largely "integrated" in this old system. Swell https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/ethnic-and-cultural-studies/oromo-people https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/oromo_people https://advocacy4oromia.org/2021/11/04/genocidal-conquest-plunder-of-resources-and-dehumanization-of-the-oromo-in-ethiopia/ https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/ethiopia-civil-society-calls-upon-human-rights-council-investigate-government https://www.dw.com/en/hrw-scale-of-crackdown-on-ethiopias-oromo-unprecedented/a-19335562 https://minorityrights.org/communities/oromo https://ollaa.org/ethiopias-forgotten-crisis/ https://minorityrights.org/communities/oromo

The Oyo Kingdom and the Oyo Empire

The Oyo Kingdom and the Oyo Empire Often these terms are used synonym, but there is a fine difference, because that Oyo Kingdom (Kingdom Oyo) stands for the beginnings and the early phase, while the Oyo Empire (Reich Oyo) the time of bloom and massive Expansion designated. Oyo Kingdom, this is about the emergence of the state. According to the hearing of Yoruba, Oranmiyan (also oranyan) - a prince from the Kingdom of Ile-IFE and son of Oduduwas (he is the legendary founder and first divine king (Ooni) by Ile-IFE and the father of the people of the Yoruba in today's southwest Nigeria and in parts of Benin. He is worshiped both as a historical ruler, which is the classic IFE period (about 800-1100 AD) Initiated, as well as oriṣa (deity), which is associated with the creation and the kingship in the religion of Yoruba) - as a founder. The legend after the brothers was in dispute during a campaign against northern neighbors in dispute, and Oranmiyan's army proved to be too weak for an attack. A local chief in Bussa gave him a snake with a magical amulet and pointed him to follow her until she stopped and blown in the ground - there he should start the city. The place got the name Ajaka. Oranmiyan made Oyo to his kingdom and became the first OBA (ruler of Yoruba) titled Alaafin ("owner of the palace"). According to Oduduwa, various rulers followed on the throne of Ile-IFE; The traditional royal lists count today 51 Ooni (kings) of IFE, starting with Oduduwa as the first Ooni. 1. Oduduwa (founder) 2. Osangangan Obamakin 3. Ogun 4. Obalufon Gbogbodirin 5. Obalufon Alayemore 6.; oranmiyan 7. Ayetise 8. Lajamisan ... and on to the present 51. Ooni. Some sources emphasize that Oranmiyan, a son Oduduwas, as a fourth or sixth Ooni (depending on the count), returned the dynastic line to Oduduwa's bloodline; About his son Lajamisan, the later rulers resulted from the successor to the successor. The official count leads from Oduduwa to today's monarch Ooni Adeyye Eneritan Ogunwusi (Ojaja II), which has been governed since December 2015 and as 51. Ooni as well as "Arole Oduduwa" (Erbe of Oduduwas spiritual throne). Succession is traditionally reflected between several rulers (eg Giesi, Osinkola, Lafogido, OGBoru, Lisabi). Ajaka was overthrown - twice, which makes him the only Alaafin (king) of Oyo, who ruled twice. The first deduction took place after the death of his father Oranmiyan (Oranyan), the first OBA of Oyo, followed by Ajaka as Alaafin. His brother Shango, who was later worshiped as God of Thunder and Lightning, followed him. Ajaka was considered to be mild, he made his subcoats too many freedom and neglected the empected military assertiveness for the empire. That's why he was discontinued and replaced by his warrior brother Shango (Sango). According to Shango's end - there are no credible documents here, so in some versions its end by suicide / departure, but in others told by banishment - Ajaka was recalled. In his second government period, he is described as much harder, authoritarian and "warful". Ajaka's destiny illustrates a central principle of the early Oyo Empire, because the Alaafin had to demonstrate military strength and control over the provincial protectors, otherwise he was considered too weak, Easkonnten otherwise the royal monasteries (Oyo Mesi) for resignation or - in later practice - forcing the ritual suicide. Ajaka remains particularly memory because after a deduction, he climbed the throne again. Nothing stays as it is. The collapse was more of a creeping process than a sudden blow - a mixture of internal political decomposition and external invasion, which hovered over about 80 years. Here are the most important events in chronological order. Palace poster and a disturbed succession (1754-1796) The decay used early. In 1754, Gaha began to intrigue the Prime Minister of Oyo, together with the Oyo Mesi (the Council of State) to force successive Alaafins to the ritual suicide - between June and October 1754 alone met this Two rulers in a row. Alaafin Awonbioju sat 130 days on the throne, Labisi Just 17. Gaha's machinations were stopped in 1774 when Alaafin Abiodun finally let him. Abiodun then worsened the situation in other ways: he focused on economic development and coastal trade with Europeans, but neglected the army - that instrument with which the central government kept the provinces under control. In addition, he led unsuccessful campaigns against Borgu (1783) and Nupe (1789), where he lost numerous generals and soldiers. Awole, Afonja and the cleavage of Ilorin (1793-1817) The decisive turning joined Alaafin Awole, who murdered his father Abiodun and clarified the throne. He ordered his supreme military commander to attack the Aare-Ona-Kakanfo Afonja of Ilorin, ICEE-ILE - a place that Afonja was never allowed to attack under Eid - and then the market town Apomu, which belonged to Ile-IFE; This was taboo too. Afonja refused the first command; After plundering ApoMu - the execution of the second command - he marched on the capital and demanded Awoles Abdaktion. Awole then committed ritual suicide. This was followed by the chaos, a struggle for the throne, rulers who only had a few months in power, and an unoccupied throne from about 1797 to 1802. This power vacuum made it possible to have regional commands - everyone ahead of Afonja - to act as independent powers. Afonja then closed an alliance with Shehu Alimi, a Muslim scholars of the Fulani, as well as with the growing Muslim community of the region. In 1817 he released Ilorin from Oyo. The Sokoto Jihad and the cleavage of ILORIN (1804-1823) Here was struck from the outside. In 1804, Uzman initiated the Fodio of Sokoto from the Jihad of the Fulani; The movement spread south into the areas of Nupe and Ilorin, where the fines of the Fulani were already resident. A Sokoto-Jihad Inspired Uprising of Muslim Slaves in Ilorin in 1817 triggered a constitutional crisis and weakened the control of Oyo's over the region. In 1823, Afonja was killed by his former allies, and Ilorin fell to the caliphate of Sokoto. The loss of Ilorin was devastating: It was the northern Garrison Oyos, the checkpoint on the trade routes to Niger and - which was crucial - the source of supply for the cavalry horses from Nupe and Bariba on which the Military supremacy Oyos was based. The final military collapse (1823-1836) Ilorin then developed a base for robberies south. This was followed by a series of wars - the Ogele War (1823-24), the Mugbamugga War (1824) and the Wars of Kanla and Eleduwe (1825-26) - where the cavalry of Ilorin the armed forces Oyos repeatedly hit the escape and utilizing the fragmented command structure of the empire. Alaafin Oluewu came to live with these campaigns, and tributary chiefs began to subjugate Ilorin instead. Meanwhile, Dahomey claimed his independence in the West, and Oyo lost control of his trade routes to the coast. Around 1836 Fulani troops destroyed the capital Oyo-Ile, whereupon this was abandoned - the last alaafin died in the fight against the Armed Forces of Sokoto. The consequences The downfall triggered a massive resettlement wave of the Yoruba. Refugees moved south and founded a new capital in Ago Oja - today's New Oyo - as well as centers such as Ibadan and Ijaye; The EGBA in turn were pushed further to the south and founded 1830 AbeaKuta. The power vacuum unleashed a series of Yoruba civil wars that lasted up to about 1886. It is noteworthy that the sources date these events different. The cleavage of ilorin (1817) whose integration into the Sokoto caliphate (1823) and the destruction of oyo-ile (optionally 1835 or 1836) are the usual corner points; Depending on the view, however, the collapse as a whole is classified in the period between 1817 and 1836. The Oyo Empire Thus, the epoch is called the small kingdom developed into a mighty state. The heyday fell into the 17th and 18th centuries (about 1650-1750). What benefited this growth? For the trade advantageous geographical location was responsible for this; As well as the development of the cavalry - straight powerful riding troops formed the military main power, which allowed it to subdue neighbors. Structure of a multi-stage administration system, the core area (the metropolis OYO), the immediate dependent cities, the Egbado corridor (for connection to the coast) and Ajaland. During the time of the empire, Oyo subdued numerous other Yoruba states and expanded his influence on neighboring areas. For example, Oyo subdued the Kingdom of Dahomey after a series of campaigns (1724-1730, 1738-1748). Later, Oyo gained direct access to the sea over the dependent coastal state of Ajase (today's Porto Novo). The trade played an important role. Oyo acted as a mediator: It transported goods (including slaves) from the African hinterland to the coast, where they were taken over by European dealers. Due to the extent of this trade, the region even received the term "slave coast". To the major rulers of the Reich season counted Abiodun (about 1770-1789). He emerged victorious from a civil war, in which he crashed the powerful minister Gaha, who had actually ruled the land. Abiodun focused on the development of the economy and coastal trade. His focus on the economy of the military ultimately weakened the military potential of the center. Decline Over time, the empire was hollowed out by internal problems: dynastic disputes, palace stripes and failed military campus. Individual provinces began to split off. The neighbors also expressed pressure on foreign policy: in particular the expanding Islamic states in the north (especially the caliphate of Sokoto). As a result, the northern areas (for example, Ilorin) were conquered by the fulbe. The last Alaafin fell in 1836 in the fight against the armed forces of Sokoto, whereupon the old capital was abandoned. Later, the kingdom was recognized in a highly reduced form, with a new capital: ọyọ-ütìbà (Neu-Oyo). CITATIONS: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_rulers_of_the_yoruba_state_of_oyo adeyemi. - New Dawn Nigeria https://www.newdawnngr.com/2022/04/23/alafin-oyo-from-oranmiyan-to-lamidi-adyemi/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/oyo_empire https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ajaka https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/832945 https://www.nelocnews.com.ng/2026/07/history-of-alafin-of-oyo-empire-1210.html https://theafricanhistory.com/1549 https://www.wikiawand.com/en/articles/oyo_empire https://thinkafrica.net/oyo-empire/ https://human.libretexts.org/bookshelves/history/world_history/early_world d_civilizations_ (lumen) /11:_african_civilizations/11.16:_the_yoruba_states https://www.scribd.com/document/815393454/book-of-sango https://www.scribd.com/document/789479461/oyo-empire-wikipedia-1 https://encyclopedia.litcaf.com/culture/social-tradition/ajaka/ https://johnsonokunade.com/2020/03/the-history-of-old-oyo-empire-oyo-ile-and-past-alafin.html https://lasujournalofafricanstudies.org.ng/storage/publications/kuponu-1679244714.pdf

Freedom fighters never give up until they achieve their goal.

Tundu Lissu is a Tanzanian politician, lawyer, and activist who has become a prominent figure in the country's opposition. Here are the key facts about him—his biography is exceptionally eventful and dramatic.

He served as a Member of Parliament for the Singida East constituency (2010–2020). In January 2025, he was elected chairman of the CHADEMA party (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo—"Party for Democracy and Progress"), one of Tanzania's leading opposition forces. Previously, he headed the Tanganyika Law Society, the bar association for the country's mainland. He is known as a campaigner against corruption and an advocate for democracy and human rights. He frequently criticized the actions of the ruling party and demanded transparency and accountability from those in power. On September 7, 2017, unidentified individuals opened fire on Lissu’s vehicle in a parking lot near his parliamentary residence in Dodoma (Tanzania's capital). He sustained multiple gunshot wounds (to his abdomen, arm, and leg). Many opposition figures and international observers viewed the attack as politically motivated, given his confrontational stance toward the government. After receiving initial treatment at a local hospital, Lissu was transferred to Nairobi, Kenya; he subsequently underwent a lengthy rehabilitation process in Belgium. He spent around three years in Belgium receiving medical treatment. In July 2020, Lissu returned to Tanzania to run in the presidential election as the CHADEMA candidate. However, the election was marred by allegations of irregularities, and he was defeated. He later left the country temporarily once more but returned to his homeland for good in 2023. His political career was marked by further events, including renewed arrests—such as in 2024 on charges of incitement and high treason following a rally in Mbinga—and his exclusion from the 2025 election. While in detention, Lissu went on a hunger strike, demanding the right to attend court hearings in person rather than participating via video link. He also faced difficulties accessing his lawyers. Why Lissu matters Lissu became a symbol of resistance in Tanzania, particularly in light of the country's increasingly authoritarian political trends. He advocated for constitutional and political reforms, believing the nation needed a new order to prevent the repetition of past mistakes. When viewing the situation specifically through the lens of Lissu’s role, the key manifestations of this authoritarian trend and his response to them can be summarized as follows: - Restrictions on freedom of assembly and demonstration. Authorities repeatedly banned opposition rallies and arrested organizers. Lissu openly condemned this as the suppression of democracy and called for the repeal of restrictive laws. - Pressure on the media and control of information. Tanzania enforces strict media laws that hinder the work of independent publications; social media platforms and messaging services have been blocked. Lissu publicly criticized such measures as tools of censorship. - Legal and administrative pressure on the opposition. This includes arrests, charges of incitement and high treason, the disqualification of candidates, and difficulties in accessing legal counsel and court hearings. - Control over the electoral process. The opposition complained of electoral manipulation, A decisive turning point is associated with the presidency of John Magufuli (2015–2021): under his leadership, media laws were tightened, arrests of opposition figures increased, and public debate effectively ground to a halt. Some of these practices have continued under the current leadership, even though the tone has softened somewhat. For Lissu, this meant an ongoing confrontation with the state—ranging from parliamentary criticism to public advocacy for human rights.

Praise Aloikin Opoloje in Uganda arrested

Praise Aloikin Opoloje in Uganda arrested The police have confirmed the arrest of human rights activist Praise Aloikin Opoloje. Praise Aloikin Opoloje is a young Ugandan human rights defender, law student, and anti‑corruption activist who has become widely known for organizing peaceful protests—including a high‑profile “nude protest”—and for facing repeated arrests and detention as a result of her activism. Her full name is Aloikin Praise Opoloje (often styled “Praise Aloikin Opoloje”). She was born in 1999 in Pallisa district, eastern Uganda, into a peasant family; she has spoken about growing up seeing how corruption harms rural communities. She is a final‑year law student at Makerere University in Kampala; previously interned at Chapter Four Uganda as a legal trainee. She leads youth civic engagement through initiatives such as the "WeThePeople movement**, serves as Student Engagements Lead" at "OpenParly UG" (a youth parliamentary monitoring initiative), and volunteers with the "Dwona Initiative" on period poverty and misinformation. She is prominent because Opoloje rose to national and international attention in 2024–2025 through: - “March to Parliament” (July 2024). This is a youth‑led anti‑corruption demonstration demanding accountability over alleged misuse of public funds; she was among those arrested and later charged. - Kiteezi landfill protests in September 2024. After a landfill collapse killed dozens, she helped organize protests over government negligence; this led to further arrests and remand to Luzira Prison. - during the “Nude protest” in September 2024, she and two other women staged a topless/near‑nude street protest with “No Corruption” painted on their bodies, a tactic meant to shock authorities and the public into confronting systemic abuse. She reported experiencing physical and sexual violence during her arrests—including groping and strangulation by police officers, which is bad enough—and stated that she feared being killed or raped while in custody. She won the European Union’s annual award in Uganda for her courageous work on civil liberties, accountability, social justice, and anti‑corruption. She was named a finalist for this prestigious global human rights prize, recognized for mobilizing youth in peaceful protest against corruption and rights abuses. In late September 2026, Ugandan media reported that Opoloje was "taken into custody" after appearing at Namungoona Police Station; civil society groups initially alleged she was “abducted” by armed officers linked to military intelligence after she criticized the defence forces leadership online. Uganda Police later "confirmed she was in their custody" over allegations related to “social media misuse” and said she would be produced in court. Praise Aloikin Opoloje is a symbol of Uganda’s youth‑led, digitally amplified activism: a law student from a rural background who uses protests, social media, and civic education to challenge corruption and rights abuses—and who has paid a personal price through arrests, imprisonment, and ongoing legal cases, while gaining significant international recognition. Ihr Verschwinden vom Polizeirevier Namungoona hatte wenige Tage zuvor Besorgnis unter Aktivisten, Anwälten und Freunden ausgelöst. Polizeisprecher Kituuma Rusoke erklärte, Opoloje sei nicht entführt, sondern rechtmäßig festgenommen worden und befinde sich weiterhin in Polizeigewahrsam. Sie werde zu gegebener Zeit dem Gericht vorgeführt. Diese Klarstellung erfolgte im Anschluss an Berichte, wonach Opoloje auf das Polizeirevier vorgeladen und anschließend angeblich von bewaffneten Männern, die sich nicht auswiesen, abgeführt worden war. Polizei und Verteidigung hatten ihren Aufenthaltsort und ihren rechtlichen Status zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht öffentlich bestätigt. Ihre jüngste Festnahme erfolgte nach der Veröffentlichung eines Videos, in dem sie die Patriotische Liga Ugandas (PLU) und deren Vorsitzenden, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, kritisierte. Die Umstände des Videos und dessen Verbindung zu ihrer Festnahme wurden von Aktivisten diskutiert, die Polizei hat jedoch nicht öffentlich bestätigt, dass dies der direkte Grund für ihre Festnahme war. Die ugandische Anwaltskammer forderte unabhängig davon die sofortige Freilassung von Opoloje, während Anwälte und Menschenrechtsaktivisten Bedenken hinsichtlich der Umstände ihrer Inhaftierung äußerten und die Behörden aufforderten, über ihren Rechtsstatus und ihren Aufenthaltsort Rechenschaft abzulegen. Es gibt einige markante Beispiele, die zusammengenommen zeigen, wie die Jugend in Uganda Kreativität, Protest und digitale Werkzeuge miteinander verbindet. Das rote Barett. Dies ist wohl eines der bekanntesten Symbole. Es ist mit der „People Power“-Bewegung verknüpft, die von dem Politiker und ehemaligen Musiker Bobi Wine (Robert Kyagulanyi) angeführt wird. Für seine Anhänger wurde das Barett zu einem Zeichen des Widerstands und des Kampfes für Veränderungen. Die Behörden reagierten hart: Sie erklärten das rote Barett kurzerhand zur Militäruniform und verboten Zivilisten das Tragen unter Androhung von Verhaftung. Wine selbst kommentierte dies so: „Das ist ein Trick, um die Bedrohung für den autoritären Status quo im Keim zu ersticken. Aber ‚People Power‘ ist mehr als nur ein rotes Barett; wir kämpfen für die Zukunft Ugandas.“ Gelbe Schweine. Ein weiteres prägnantes Beispiel ist eine Aktion der Gruppe „Jobless Brotherhood“. Im Jahr 2014 brachten Aktivisten zwei gelb angemalte Ferkel ins Parlament – ​​Gelb ist die Farbe der Regierungspartei „National Resistance Movement“. Die Schweine symbolisierten die Gier und Korruption der Politiker, die öffentliche Gelder „verschlingen“. Später führte die Gruppe weitere ähnliche Aktionen durch – sie ließ beispielsweise Schweine frei, die in den Farben von Oppositionsparteien angemalt waren. Dieser visuelle, bisweilen schockierende Protest trug dazu bei, schnell die Aufmerksamkeit der Medien und der sozialen Netzwerke auf sich zu ziehen. Digitale Werkzeuge. Symbole an sich sind visuelle Elemente, doch ein wesentliches Merkmal des modernen ugandischen Jugendaktivismus ist die Art und Weise, wie digitale Plattformen ihn verstärken. Soziale Netzwerke (Facebook, Twitter) sind zu Instrumenten der schnellen Mobilisierung geworden: Über sie werden Proteste organisiert, politische Themen diskutiert sowie Online-Petitionen und Hashtag-Kampagnen gestartet. Das digitale Umfeld hat es den Bewegungen ermöglicht, über die lokale Ebene hinauszugehen, Unterstützung im In- und Ausland zu finden und alternative Informationskanäle abseits der staatlichen Medien zu schaffen. Zu den Initiativen, die den Schwerpunkt auf die Verbindung von Innovation und digitaler Kompetenz legen, gehört DOT Uganda (Digital Opportunity Trust Uganda) – eine Bewegung, die junge Menschen dabei unterstützt, digitale Fähigkeiten zur Lösung gesellschaftlicher Probleme zu entwickeln. Auch der „National Youth Innovation Day“ (NML Day), der am 5. Dezember begangen wird, ist eine Jugendinitiative, die darauf abzielt, Innovationen, digitale Kompetenzen und zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement zu fördern. Die politische Situation in Uganda Der Präsident Yoweri Museveni und seine Partei, die National Resistance Movement (NRM), sind seit Langem an der Macht. Die Opposition ist oft zersplittert, und es fällt ihr schwer, eine geschlossene Front zu bilden. Es gibt Einschränkungen für Zivilgesellschaft und Opposition. Die Behörden verabschieden Gesetze, die öffentliche politische Aktivitäten erschweren. So wurden beispielsweise Gesetzesentwürfe diskutiert, die eine strenge Kontrolle der ausländischen Finanzierung von Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) vorsehen und die Befugnisse von Beamten für Überprüfungen ohne richterlichen Beschluss erweitern. Zudem kommen weitere Instrumente zum Einsatz: das Wahlrecht, die Kontrolle über die Wahlkommissionen sowie der Einsatz von Sicherheitskräften zur Unterdrückung von Protesten. Dann gibt es Repressionen gegen einzelne Persönlichkeiten. Oppositionsführer, darunter Bobi Wine, sahen sich mit Strafverfahren, Festnahmen und anderen Formen von Druck konfrontiert. Der soziale Auslöser für Aktivismus war vor dem Hintergrund dieser politischen Realitäten reagieren junge Menschen besonders sensibel auf konkrete Probleme: hohe Jugendarbeitslosigkeit, Korruption und mangelnde Perspektiven. Daraus ergibt sich ein Paradoxon: Einerseits bieten digitale Instrumente der Jugend ein wirksames Mittel zur Selbstorganisation und um Aufmerksamkeit zu erregen; andererseits schaffen staatliche Kontrolle und repressive Gesetze ernsthafte Hürden für eine nachhaltige politische Arbeit. https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/three-outstanding-human-rights-defenders-recognised-with-the-2025-martin-ennals-award/ https://observer.ug/news/why-human-rights-defenders-chose-activist-aloikin-for-2025-eu-award/ https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/fear-outrage-as-human-rights-activist-praise-aloikin-abducted-from-police-station-5611178 https://observer.ug/news/aloikin-praise-opoloje-the-nude-protestor-what-drives-her/ https://www.pulse.ug/story/uganda-police-confirm-custody-praise-aloikin-2026092807440259070 https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/street-protests-return-to-wheel-amplify-social-media-activism-4750886 https://iwpr.net/global-voices/how-uganda-tried-silence-protest https://news-decoder.com/human-rights-are-not-just-for-those-in-power/ https://www.martinennalsaward.org/hrd/aloikin-praise-opoloje/ Remarks About President Museveni's Son https://saharareporters.com/2026/09/27/world-liberty-congress-seeks-answers-over-reported-detention-ugandan-activist-after

Zambia has announced that a transition from economic stabilization to growth for 2027-2029 is planned

The Ministry of Finance of Zambia has announced that a transition from economic stabilization to growth for 2027-2029 is planned.

According to the medium-term budget of the Ministry of Finance, Real GDP growth will increase to 6% in 2027, 7.5% in 2028 and 7.1% in 2029 in 2027 and 7.1% in 2029. Important economic vertices of this budget are: 1. Copper production: The flow rate is to exceed 2027 the trademark of 1 million tonnes and increase to 1.4 million tonnes by 2029. Zambia is one of the most important copper producers of Africa and is one of the top group worldwide. Production increased from about 825,513 tons in 2024 to 890,346 tonnes 2025 - an increase of around 8%. However, the country missed its goal of one million tonnes. In the first half of 2026, according to the Zambian mining ministry, 447,181.93 tons of copper were produced. These were only 0.45% more than in the first half of 2025; The development was thus well behind the political expectations. The different information for 2024 is apparently related to the statistics used and the reporting date: The Zambian EITI calls 822,824 tonnes, while later government information shows around 825,000 tonnes. There are several production sites that are operated by different companies. There is the First Quantum Minerals and Zccm-IH the Kansanshi operate. First Quantum Minerals Tribes the Sentinel alone. Barrick Gold operates the Lumwana. Copper Mines (KCM) operates the Konkola Miene. Mopani Copper Mines. Then there is still Lubambe and other medium-sized producers. Production growth 2025 was borne by KCM, Mopani, Kansanshi and Lubambe. In the first half of 2026, production at KCM rose significantly, while decays at NFCA, Chibuluma and Mopani slowed down the overall effect. As already reported, the government will initially strive for annual production to increase over a million tonnes and in the long term to three million tonnes up to 2031. This objective would be almost a tripling compared to the current level. Important projects are: - Kansanshi S3: Enlargement went to commercial production at the end of 2025; For 2026, about 175,000 to 205,000 tonnes are expected there. - Lumwana Super Pit: Barrick invests about 2 billion US dollars; The extended production is expected to start at the end of the first quarter 2028. - Mingomba: Kobold Metals and ZCCM-IH have started developing the project 2026. - Konkola: A new plant for processing residues should create additional capacities; In the long term, the company aims to increase to about 300,000 tonnes annually. There are also obstacles. The expansion is limited by several factors: - power supply; - sulfuric acid deficiency; - Investment needs; - fluctuating mining performance; Dependence on copper export. According to the US Geological Survey, 2024 accounted for about 3.6% of worldwide mining copper production on Zambia; The country was in place worldwide. Economic stability: progress in rescheduling, inflation control, exchange rate stability and foreign exchange reserve formation has strengthened the economic basis. Zambia is 2026 macreconomically much more stable than during the debt crisis, but not really crisis-proof. Growth, inflation, currency reserves and debt services have improved; At the same time, government debt, dependence on copper, electricity bottlenecks and climate risk remain significant weaknesses. Economic growth has recovered. For 2026, the forecasts are between about 4.3 and 5.8% depending on the source; The differences are explained by various assumptions about mining, agriculture and energy supply. Inflation has declined sharply. According to IMF, it was 6.8% in April 2026 and thus within the target corridor of the Zambian central bank of 6-8%. International reserves have improved and, in June 2026, were approximately $ 6.5 billion, compared to about $ 3 billion in 2021. Reduction of public debt has significantly reduced the annual debt service: from 2026, it should be approximately $ 900 million, instead of around $ 2.6 billion without rescheduling. Fiscal policy has been consolidated. According to Zambian information, the budget deficit sank from around 9% of GDP 2021 to about 3.8% 2025. The greatest risks for Zambia are further the high debt. The debt situation has improved, but remains tense. The World Bank estimates public debt for 2025 to about 93.4% of GDP; At the same time Zambia continues to be considered as a high degree of debt service and refinancing risks. Although the IMF assesses public debt as a fundamentally sustainable, the country continues to expand as a high risk of a renewed debt note. A permanent improvement depends on further budgetary discipline and compliance with the rescheduling agreements. In another factor of the risks is the dependence on copper. Copper is the most important export and foreign exchange bringer. A high copper price and rising production strengthen the economy; However, a decline in price or production losses would quickly be struggled to exchange rate, government revenue and investment. The government therefore sets an expansion of copper support, but this strategy alone makes the economy not sufficiently resistant. A broader development of agriculture, manufacturing industry, tourism and services remains necessary. The power supply is a big problem and the drought of recent years. Hydropower plays a central role in Zambia. Low water levels have burdened electricity production and thus mining, industry and households. The recovery of the economy is therefore strongly dependent on whether Zambia can diversify its energy supply and make it more reliable. The World Bank calls climate shocks, in particular drought, in addition to commodity prices and limited access to electricity than significant risks for growth. Finally, it can be said that Zambia is in a stabilization and recovery phase, but not in a completely secured prosperity development. Results, falling inflation and higher reserves are important progress. However, the country remains economically vulnerable because of the high residual debt, the strong copper dependency, the uncertain power supply and possible drought. The stability will therefore depend above all on whether the government preserves the budgetary discipline and transforms the revenue from the copper sector into a broader economic development. Investments: New mining projects, the exploration of mineral resources and increased investment should support growth. The World Bank identifies especially mining, solar energy, agribusiness and tourism as areas with high private investment potential. With appropriate reforms, there could be mobilized between 2025 and 2030 up to $ 21 billion to additional investments. The energy sector is strategically important for Zambia. The copper industry can only grow when sufficiently reliable electricity is available. Therefore, there are opportunities for solar parks, battery storage, mini grids, hybrid power plants and private power supply for mines. The World Bank explicitly recommends a diversification away from the strong dependence on hydropower and a stronger involvement of private investors. In agriculture, the chances are less only in the cultivation itself, but especially throughout the value chain: Irrigation and climate-resistant cultivation. Corn, soy, wheat and cotton processing. Cooling chains and warehouses. Animal husbandry, fishing and feed. Packaging and regional food marketing. The drought and climate risks make irrigation, water management and resistant cultivation methods to important investment fields. Further growth drivers: Agriculture, tourism, electricity generation and economic reforms should also promote growth. Long-term financing: The Government plans to introduce a 20-year-old termination to extend the interest rate curve to diversify financing and reduce refinancing risks. Citations: https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2026/zambia-says-zom25-copper-production-up-8-from-Previous-year https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-industry/2801-52339-zambi AS-2025-Copper Output Rises 8-Misses-1-million Ton Target https://news.metal.com/newscontent/104134711-sulphuric-acid-shortage-emersges-as-a-constraint-one-zambias-copper-growth https://news.metal.com/newscontent/104076089-zambia-copper-output-ri SES-Just-045-in-H1-2026-Despite-Stronger-KCM-AND-Kansanshi-Production https://zambiaeiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/zambia-eiti-2023-and-2024-report.pdf https://african-miningweek.com/news/zambias-3mt-annual-copper-target-hinges-power-infrastructure-bankable-projects-moore https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-industry/1809-59030-zambia---- Concola Signs 498-million-Plant Deal-To Support Copper Expansion https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/zambia https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2026-08/zambia-country-profile.pdf https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-27/zambia-restates-copper-ambition-after-posting-Record-Output https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/01/27/pr-26024-zambia-imf-ex Ecutive Board Completes Sixth Review Under-the-Extended Credit Facility https://www.lusakatimes.com/2026/06/30/imf-says-zambias-fiscal-pr Essures-Have Intensity Despite Gains-in Reserves-and Inflation / https://www.openzambia.com/economics/2026/8/28/zambias-annual-external-debt-service-to-Chall-To-us900m https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/zambia https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/c43b728b-7a60-42e2-8405-f9c00243aae1 https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2026/01/31/zambia-sixth-review Under-The-Extended Credit Facility Arrangement Request-For-A-Waiver-of-573534 https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099022026112 017141 / PDF / BOSIB-610FCDF7-3B98-4558-87D5-4D305A5FDF9A.pdf

Sergei Lavrov has called on the US to immediately release Maduro and his wife

Sergei Lavrov has called on the US to immediately release Maduro and his wife On September 26, 2026, during the General Debate at the 81st UN General Assembly in New York, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly demanded that the United States immediately free Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro*1) and his wife, Cilia Flores. Lavrov coolly stated that the US invasion of Venezuela earlier this year—which he said violated all norms, including basic moral principles—ended with the arrest of President Maduro and his wife, and their extrajudicial detention in a US prison. He added, We insist on the speediest possible release of the Venezuelan head of state and his wife, and that such incidents must not happen again in the future. Several media outlets reported that he called for their immediate or prompt release and stressed that similar incidents shouldn't be allowed to repeat. Reports summarizing Lavrov's speech add that, according to his account, Maduro and Flores were arrested on January 3, 2026, following a large-scale US attack on Venezuela. They were taken by a US Army special unit and transported to the States, where they are being held without trial. Other summaries note that they face charges in the US including conspiracy for narcoterrorism, cocaine smuggling, and possession of weapons and explosives. These points reflect Lavrov's public demands and his version of events presented at the UN; they aren't an independent confirmation of the underlying allegations. *1) Nicolás Maduro (born November 23, 1962) is a Venezuelan politician who has been president since 2013, succeeding Hugo Chávez. Maduro started out as a union activist and bus driver in Caracas. In the 90s, he joined Chávez's movement and was one of the founders of the Movement for the Fifth Republic. His political career moved quickly. Between 2000 and 2006, he was a member of the National Assembly and then its president. He served as Foreign Minister from 2006 to 2013, then as Vice President from 2012 to 2013. Since 2013, following Chávez's death, he has been President of Venezuela. Maduro positioned himself as continuing Chávez's course—the Bolivarian Revolution—focusing on social policy, anti-imperialism, and a stronger state role in the economy. During his time in office, Venezuela has faced deep economic collapse, hyperinflation, and shortages of goods. The situation was influenced by falling oil prices, structural economic problems, and international sanctions, especially from the US. The conflict between the government and the opposition intensified within the country. In 2019, there was an acute institutional crisis when Juan Guaidó declared himself interim president. This led to a situation of dual power, recognized differently by various groups of nations. Maduro built partnerships with states opposed to US influence, like Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. At the same time, relations with Western countries and some neighboring Latin American states remained tense. Regarding interest in political models, post-colonial processes, and the influence of external powers on national development (similar to discussions on Africa and neocolonialism), a similar logic can be seen in Venezuela's case. It involves the role of the resource economy (oil), the effects of sanctions and external pressure, and attempts to establish an alternative development model outside the Western mainstream. In early January 2026, American special forces, including Delta Force operators, conducted an operation on Venezuelan territory. On the early morning of January 3rd, they entered the residence in Caracas where Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were staying and forcibly removed them from the country. The couple was later transferred to the US. The operation took place on the sovereign territory of another state without its consent, which in itself raised questions about its legality under international law. During a court hearing in New York, Maduro explicitly stated he had been kidnapped and insisted on his immunity as a foreign head of state. His defense planned to challenge the legality of the arrest itself. Both in Venezuela and internationally, it was emphasized that kidnapping a sitting head of state sets a dangerous precedent that undermines international norms protecting the inviolability of leaders. The American side, however, interpreted the events differently. US authorities declared they acted within their powers based on intelligence information; they claimed it was an arrest, not a kidnapping. In the US, federal charges were filed against Maduro and his wife for conspiracy to commit narcoterrorism, conspiracy to import cocaine, and offenses related to weapons and explosive devices. Both pleaded not guilty. Sources: https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-s-lavrov-lays-out-demands-to-us-over-1790443184.html https://tass.com/politics/2193373 https://ground.news/article/russias-lavrov-calls-for-the-release-of-maduro https://ground.news/article/russian-foreign-minister-lavrov-urges-us-to-lift-blockade-of-cuba_31f885 https://m.vz.ru/news/2026/9/26/1455767.html published https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8987876 https://www.osnmedia.ru/politika/lavrov-s-tribuny-v-oon-potreboval-osvobozhdeniya-maduro-iz-pod-strazhi-v-ssha/amp/ https://x.com/telesurenglish/status/2103948984934965312 https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/lavrov-visunuv-ssha-vimogi-shchodo-maduro-1790440567.html

Why the expansion of the raw material industry can intensify poverty in Africa

Why the expansion of the raw material industry can intensify poverty in Africa This is actually one of the big questions. You can often expect that a boom in the raw materials sector automatically brings fast growth and pushes the poverty back. But the practice in Africa often shows the opposite often. I've gathered the most important reasons for this. That is not supposed to be a flat-rate conviction of the industry, but rather an overview of the risks that you simply have on the screen and must actively tackle. A big problem is the so-called "Dutch disease". If suddenly a lot of money flows through raw materials into the country, the own currency often gains great value. That sounds good first, but makes other economic sectors - such as agriculture or smaller industries - to expensive on the world market. The native producers can no longer keep up, must close, and jobs are lost. Exactly in these areas, poverty increases. As almost everywhere in capitalism, the profits are also unevenly distributed. Sure, the mining creates jobs, but often the require high qualifications that many locals do not even have. Ultimately, foreign companies, a small local elite or tensioner specialists benefit from the income, but not the broad community. This leaves the scissors between the arm and rich further. Then there are the problems with administration and corruption. Unfortunately, raw material revenues are often a goal for abuse. Gelder seize in the pockets of officials or managers rather than the expansion of infrastructure, schools or health care. Weak institutions, opaque contracts and missing controls make things worse. Especially in Africa, the environmental damage is enormous, and their consequences must be considered. The degradation often leads to the pollution of water, soil and air. This directly affects the livelihoods of people: fields become worse, fish, and the population becomes ill. It creates a kind of "poverty trap": Who is sick, can work less, but has rising healthcare costs and slips even deeper into misery. All this results in social vibrations. For raw material projects people are often relocated and lose land they have traditionally managed. The destroys of grown lifestyles and takes them the source of income. If there are still many foreign workers to move, the local infrastructure as housing or schools burdenes and ensures social tensions. In addition, the price volatility comes. The revenue from the raw material sector are extremely unstable; They drastically break when the world market prices fall. If a country depends heavily on, it immediately meets the state trunk and exactly the social programs that should actually protect the weakest. And where the quick money flows, the diversification is often forgotten. If the focus is only on raw materials, other economic sectors are underdeveloped. If the boom ends, the land is precarious because it lacks alternative jobs. To clarify that: that does not mean that the raw material sector can not help to fight poverty. There are cases as diamond promotion in Botswana, where a prudent management has really advanced development. But it is crucial to create mechanisms for risk minimization: transparency, investment in other branches and education, the involvement of the local population and clear environmental standards. So what would have to be done to relieve or prevent this possible poverty? In fact, the expansion of the raw material industry in Africa can bring profits, but also intensify poverty if you are not targeted. I have summarized the most important steps to help prevent this risk. At the top, transparency and control stands. You have to make sure that the revenue is managed openly. Initiatives such as EITI help to prevent mouse and corruption. When payments and revenue is disclosed, public attention creates and increases the responsibility of governments and companies. We need strong institutions and legal framework. Weak institutions invite to abuse. Effective laws and control mechanisms are needed - for example, to write off concessions fairly, to drive taxes correctly and to tackle illegal cash flows. Also important is to create the value creation locally. Instead of just exporting raw materials, one should try to process them on site. This creates new, better paid jobs, and more value remains in the country. Examples are oil refineries in Nigeria or the processing of cobalt in the Congo. The economic policy must be inclusive. The advantages may not only benefit a small elite. Governments can start programs for the qualification of the population so that more people can take the new jobs. It also needs measures such as social security systems to reduce inequalities. Environmental protection and social responsibility are essential. Harmful practices directly destroy the livelihoods of many people, especially in the country. Therefore, strict environmental regulations and the obligation to recultivate are necessary. Projects must be designed to protect the rights of local communities. A country can not only rely on a pillar, the economy needs to be diversified. Strategies should be geared towards promoting other sectors such as agriculture, craft or services. The African Free Trade Agreement is an important step for regional growth opportunities. At short notice, social protection programs can protect the most affected groups for price shocks while building education and infrastructure long-term. Some challenges can only be solved through international cooperation based on fair conditions. Another important note to the conclusion: It is not just a question of single steps, but you need a systemic approach. The measures should act in a total context - with strong institutions, clear objectives against inequality and an active involvement of the population. Sources: https://borgenproject.org/historical-resource-extraction/ https://www.academia.edu/31511225/regulating_extraction_in_africa_towards_a_framework_for_accountability_in_the_global https://www.rudn.ru/storage/media/science_dissertation/be4507bf-8b49-453d-9246-f45a5a8ae3e4/cj9c2ib25z7l6rgq2oa8n3qahawrpeopl8gvgd3z.pdf https://borgenproject.org/historical-resource-extraction/ https://belta.by/world/view/afrika-bolshe-ne-poterpit-kolonialnuju-model-ispolzovanija-svoih-prirodnyh-resursov-prezident-gany-802786-2026/ https://www.uncclearn.org/wp-content/uploads/library/eca18072016_sustainable_development_report_on_africa.pdf https://www.uneca.org/eca-events/sites/default/files/resources/documents/com2023/e_eca_coe_41_4_e-e_eca_cm_54_4_e.pdf https://mirec.mgimo.ru/upload/ckeditor/files/the-transition-of-africa-on-rails-of-sustainable-development-hurdles-and-prospects.pdf