The Priscilla Wangui Case - Woman Human Rights Defender (WHRD)

Kenol Magistrate's Court has this morning sentenced Woman Human Rights Defender Priscilla Wangui to serve six months in jail or pay a fine of Ksh 50,000 . This follows a judgment on March 17, 2026, finding her guilty of assault (Case No. MCCR/E2301/2023).Wangui is appealing the verdict, supported by the Defenders Coalition. Priscilla is not just a name, she is the voice of the Mithiini Community. For years, she has led over 600 landless community members in Makuyu-Kirimeri Ward to reclaim ancestral land and legally challenge the legacy of colonial land alienation. Pricilla’s conviction is not isolated. Several frontline defenders remain in the corridors of justice facing trumped up charges for their advocacy by laying claim to their ancestral land. The National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders in Kenya (Defenders Coalition) has expressed solidarity with her, respecting the judiciary’s independence while voicing concern that the case forms part of a broader pattern of criminalizing human rights defenders engaged in land justice advocacy. They describe her conviction as a blow to the Mithiini community, as it removes key grassroots leadership and risks silencing legitimate claims to ancestral land. The coalition has committed to supporting her through the appeal process. While they accept the Court's decision, they are deeply concerned by this verdict which they believe is part of a disturbing and broader pattern of criminalizing human rights defenders. Wangui is appealing the verdict, supported by the Defenders Coalition. When grassroots leaders who stand up for the marginalized are targeted with legal battles, it sends a chilling message to anyone fighting for land justice in Kenya. This pattern is worrying and all human rights defenders and friends of human rights defenders must stay vigilant, and stand tall against all forms of targeting and intimidation. Priscilla Wangui is a Woman Human Rights Defender (WHRD)

and land rights activist from the Mithiini community in Makuyu-Kirimeri Ward, Murang’a County, Kenya. For approximately 10 years, she has led advocacy efforts on behalf of over 600 landless community members, many of them peasant farmers, who have cultivated ancestral lands in the Mithiini area for more than 50 years but lack legal titles and remain classified as “squatters.” Her work challenges the legacy of colonial-era land alienation and systemic dispossession by petitioning government institutions for recognition and legitimate land titles. Priscilla Wangui’s advocacy has reportedly involved community organizing, legal challenges, and public campaigns for land rights. Like many grassroots defenders in Kenya working on historical land injustices, she and her community have faced challenges including violence, property destruction, physical attacks, and legal proceedings. Her case highlights ongoing tensions around land in rural Kenya, where communities seek redress for dispossession while authorities and other actors sometimes respond with criminal charges. Human rights organizations have noted that such cases can have a chilling effect on local activism, particularly for women defenders who often play prominent roles in community-based struggles. Challenges Faced by Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRDs) Activists often face charges aimed at silencing their work. WHRDs are vulnerable to harassment, both legal and physical. Women defenders face gender-specific challenges, including discrimination and marginalization. Despite these challenges, WHRDs like Wangui continue to fight for justice and community rights. Historical data shows patterns, such as 132 HRDs illegally detained by police from 2020-2022, and group arrests like 27 HRDs in May 2024 or 3-6 in 2025 protests, often leading to court proceedings. The Defenders Coalition tracks HRD interventions via their "Latest Interventions" section but lists cases like Wangui's without a running court tally. KNCHR's 2025 "Right to Defend Rights" report assesses HRD environments nationwide but focuses on indicators, not current court numbers. Note: Information about Priscilla Wangui primarily comes from recent statements by the Defenders Coalition and related social media posts in March 2026. Details of the specific assault charge and court proceedings are limited in public summaries, as they focus on the human rights implications. https://x.com/DefendersKE/status/2038915082571190655 https://x.com/DefendersKE/status/2038915082571190655/photo/1

Building a house in Ethiopia

In Gurage, communal house construction (“Debo”) is a highly valued practice, ensuring not only rapid and high-quality completion but also demonstrating community cohesion and solidarity. The Gurage are a Semitic-speaking ethnic group primarily residing in the Gurage Zone of the Central Ethiopian Regional State, approximately 125 km southwest of Addis Ababa. They inhabit a fertile, hilly region bordered by the Awash River, the Gibe River, and Lake Zway. Significant Gurage populations also reside in Addis Ababa and other areas. The 2007 census recorded over 1.28 million people in the zone, with the Gurage comprising 82% of the population, alongside minority groups such as the Libido, Amhara, and Kebena. Building a house in Ethiopia requires adherence to regulations, obtaining permits, and cost control in light of rising material prices. The most important steps include obtaining the building permit and the construction permit from the local authorities. The procedures vary depending on the city (e.g., Addis Ababa) or rural area. First, you need the building permit from the city administration. To obtain it, submit your title deed, the planned building height, and the type of use. This is followed by the building application, which includes information about the applicant, the location, the footprint, the plans (architectural, structural, and electrical for Category A/B/C buildings), and the consent of the neighbors. Processing times are limited: 5 days for Category A, 7 days for Category B, and 21 days for Category C. Approved plans must be posted on-site during the construction phase. The relevant building authority must be notified 5 days before major construction phases, such as foundation or concrete work. For Category C buildings, an occupancy permit must be obtained upon completion. Compliance with regulations must be verified by authorized professionals. The average cost of standard to luxury apartments in 2026 is projected to be between 35,000 and 60,000 ETB per square meter. This trend is driven by inflation and imports of materials such as cement (2,000 ETB/100 kg) and steel (130 ETB/kg). A 120-square-meter single-family home will cost approximately 4.2–5 million ETB in total (including permits and ancillary costs); a 200-square-meter mid-range house will cost approximately 9–11 million ETB. In urban areas like Addis Ababa, labor and transportation costs add another 10–20%; an additional 5–10% should be budgeted for unforeseen expenses. Common building materials include locally sourced cement, concrete blocks, steel reinforcement, wood, and roofing tiles. Traditional rural construction methods use clay/straw/sticks for inexpensive huts (lifespan approximately 10 years), while concrete is preferred in urban areas due to its durability. High costs arise from imports/foreign exchange shortages, financing restrictions, and disparities between urban and rural areas (70% of houses need to be replaced). Rural projects may be eligible for government utility subsidy programs. Simplifying the planning process, purchasing local materials in bulk, and scheduling inspections can reduce costs by 10–20%. https://www.business.gov.et/assets/files/construction-permit/Ethiopian-Building-Regulation-No-2432011.pdf https://livingethio.com/site/blog/how-much-does-it-cost-to-build-a-house-in-ethiopia-2026-full-guide https://www.scribd.com/document/788191162/Exemplary-Permitting-Process-in-Addis-Ababa

Iran laughs at Muhoozi, who claims he can desecrate Tehran in 14 days: “Africa has talent.”

Iran laughs at Muhoozi, who claims he can desecrate Tehran in 14 days: “Africa has talent.”

The army chief has made it clear in recent days that he has taken sides in the ongoing Middle East conflict between Iran, the US, and Israel. Muhoozi has already announced that the Ugandan People's Defense Forces are ready to be mobilized and support Israel in the war. He said it was Israel's duty to request help from its “Ugandan brother,” who is ready to fight. He declared that “any talk of destroying Israel will drag us into war.” This led to tensions with Iran, including alleged cyberattacks on Uganda following these statements. The relationship began in the 1950s with Israeli military training and development aid for Uganda, but culminated in Operation Entebbe in 1976: Israeli commandos freed hostages from a plane hijacked by terrorists and supported by Idi Amin – Yonatan Netanyahu, brother of the future Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, was killed in the operation. Muhoozi's far-reaching statements have attracted Iran's attention. In a now-deleted post on X, the army chief suggested that Uganda could militarily defeat Iran within a few weeks. According to Muhoozi, the UPDF would only need 14 days to assert its authority over Tehran. "We don't need more than two weeks to take Tehran. The UPDF brigade is sufficient for that," Muhoozi wrote. In a brief response, Iran dismissed Muhoozi's claims, calling him a new entertainment attraction in Africa. Current Relations Today, relations include agricultural cooperation, scholarships, and a Chabad center in Kampala; Netanyahu visited Uganda in 2016, and Uganda accepts refugees under Israeli agreements. 2026-03-31 “Ladies and gentlemen, here is the newest star on ‘Africa’s Got Talent,’” Iran wrote. 2026-03-31 https://www.operanewsapp.com/ke/sw/share/detail?news_id=c50d9912f79be89bf572105c977e68d9&news_entry_id=22a848f0260328sw_ke&open_type=transcoded&from=ex_global&request_id=share_request&share_from 2026-03-31 https://www.bbc.com/news/live/ce35wke27ynt

"Stop begging!"

"Stop begging!"

This statement, attributed to Ibrahim Traoré, the president of Burkina Faso, reflects a growing sentiment in parts of Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. It underscores the desire for radical sovereignty – economic, political, and military – independent of former colonial powers and international financial institutions. The following explains the context of this statement, its meaning, and the counterarguments. Ibrahim Traoré came to power in Burkina Faso in a coup in September 2022. He represents a new generation of young military leaders (along with Assimi Goïta in Mali and Abdourahamane Tchiani in Niger) who have turned away from traditional Western allies. For Traoré, “begging” refers to the historical dynamics in which African nations: Military aid from France or the USA in the fight against insurgents, often under certain conditions. Accepted structural adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank, which dictated domestic policy. It relied on foreign capital for infrastructure development, while extracting raw materials without any significant benefit to the local population. What “Stop begging” means in practice Under Traoré, Burkina Faso took drastic steps to implement this philosophy: Diversification of alliances. Burkina Faso has turned to Russia for military support (Wagner/Africa Corps) and strengthened relations with Türkiye, Iran and other non-Western powers. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Burkina Faso forms a confederation together with Mali and Niger. The country has withdrawn from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which it considers a puppet of French interests. Resource nationalism. There is a growing movement to renegotiate mining contracts (gold, manganese) to ensure that a larger share of the wealth remains in the country, even if this means upsetting foreign mining companies. Doctrine of "Total War". Traoré has mobilized the population and formed thousands of local “Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland” (VDP) to combat jihadist uprisings, instead of relying solely on foreign mercenaries or troops. Is this strategy sustainable? Although the rhetoric of ending begging is politically popular, critics argue that the current strategy faces significant structural obstacles: Safety vacuum. The deployment of French and US special forces (who provided reconnaissance, logistics, and air support) has led to an increase in jihadist attacks in Burkina Faso. The country currently controls approximately 60–70% of its territory; the remainder is contested or besieged by armed groups. The number of violent incidents linked to Islamist groups has increased by 20% compared to the previous two years. In 2024, the country experienced some of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Africa. Humanitarian crisis. Burkina Faso is experiencing one of the fastest-growing displacement crises in the world. Over two million people are internally displaced. Critics argue that “sovereignty” is meaningless if it cannot guarantee basic security or food security. Economic strangulation. Burkina Faso's withdrawal from ECOWAS and strained relations with neighboring countries like Benin and Ivory Coast (which control key ports) threaten supply chains. The landlocked country relies on these neighbors for fuel and imports. New forms of addiction. However, military coups occurred in the Sahel countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The new rulers subsequently demanded the withdrawal of French troops and accused Paris of ineffectiveness and interference in internal affairs. By 2025, France had significantly reduced its military presence in the region. In 2023, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced $150 million in humanitarian aid for the Sahel countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Sahel refugees in Libya. At the same time, scientific studies have identified the ineffectiveness of the US strategy for combating terrorism in the Sahel region. According to some experts, this strategy has exacerbated the situation in the region and increased the risk of coups. France and the United States therefore acted in the Sahel region within the framework of the fight against terrorism and not as supporters of insurgency or rebel groups. Their policy aimed at stabilizing the region, even if the results of these efforts are viewed differently. The replacement of French military aid by Russian contractors is seen by some not as an end to dependency, but merely as a change of creditor and security guarantor. A broader African transformation Traoré's stance is not an isolated case. It reflects a continental frustration that is also articulated by other heads of state and government: Senegal's Bassirou Diomaye Faye. He was elected on a promise to break with the CFA franc (a currency dating back to the colonial era) and renegotiate oil, gas and fishing contracts. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has long advocated for “African solutions to African problems”, but his approach is based more on technocratic efficiency and foreign investment than on Traoré’s revolutionary rhetoric. Conclusion Traoré's declaration that Africa must stop begging is a sharp indictment of neocolonial dependency. It expresses a genuine desire for dignity and self-determination over resources. The challenge for his government – and others that follow this model – is whether they can replace the dependency structures with functioning alternatives. The success of this philosophy will likely not be measured by the rhetoric of sovereignty, but by its ability to provide citizens with physical security, economic opportunities, and political stability. It is impossible to definitively judge whether Traoré's chosen path was right or wrong. On the one hand, his actions reflected a desire for sovereignty and a rethinking of the country's role in the global economy. On the other hand, they led to increased violence, repression, and economic risks. The assessment of the chosen path's correctness depends on which criteria are prioritized: short-term political goals or long-term stability and prosperity. The situation in Burkina Faso remains complex and ambivalent, and its development will depend on many factors, including the authorities' ability to address security threats and socioeconomic challenges.

The Albert Ojwang MurderTrial

The trial concerning the death of Kenyan blogger and teacher Albert Ojwang is still ongoing. The Supreme Court in Kibera has scheduled a crucial hearing for the end of March 2026 to conclude the case. Current status of the proceedings (March 2026): Judge Diana Kavedza has set a tight schedule for the conclusion of the proceedings this month. The court-scheduled hearing dates are: * March 17th, 23rd and 24th (Completed/Ongoing) * March 30th and 31st (Ongoing) The court aims for a decision before April 2026, justifying this with the great public interest and the need to avoid further delays. Important details about the case: The six defendants comprise three police officers and three civilians: Samson Talaam (former OCS of the Central Police Station), James Mukhwana (or Alaam Mukhwana), Peter Kimani, John Gitau, Gin Ammitou (alias Gilbeys or Gin Abwao), and Brian Mwaniki (or Njue). They were charged at Kibera Law Court on June 23, 2025, and pleaded not guilty. All six defendants have been in pretrial detention since 2025. Bail was denied due to the risk of witness tampering and the seriousness of the offense. The detention has been extended several times, each time citing the risk of flight, evidence loss, or undue influence. A magistrate and a high court judge have since upheld the refusal of bail, meaning the defendants have been continuously in pretrial detention since their arrest in June 2025. The prosecution's case rests primarily on video footage from the Central Police Station's surveillance cameras and witness statements. This video footage from the Central Police Station's surveillance cameras is not being used as the main piece of evidence for the prosecution; rather, it is being criticized as being manipulated or missing. The Independent Police Office (IPOA) determined that CCTV footage from the station chief's office had been manipulated or was missing, hindering the investigation. Available footage, such as that from Mbagathi Hospital, showed police officers with Ojwang's body, but only confirmed cover-up attempts, not the death itself. Incident (June 2025): Albert Ojwang was arrested in Homa Bay on June 6, 2025, following a complaint about posts on X (formerly Twitter) concerning alleged corruption within the police force. After being transferred to Nairobi, he was found dead in his cell on June 8, 2025. Albert Ojwang, a teacher and blogger, died in police custody in June 2025. Six people, including former Central Police Station chief Samson Talaam, were charged with his murder. They deny the charges. Eliud Lagat voluntarily and temporarily resigned from his post to allow an investigation by the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA). He denied direct involvement and pledged his cooperation. In the meantime, he has been restored to his position of power and dignity.Two officers were arrested, and Police Chief Douglas Kanja apologized for initial misinformation. Earlier reports indicated that surveillance cameras had been tampered with and footage deleted, leading to the arrest of a technician suspected of carrying out the deletion. The autopsy revealed causes of death such as blunt force trauma to the head, neck compression, and contusions, ruling out suicide and suggesting homicide. Testimonies from police officers (e.g., PC James Mukhwana) and family members implicated officers like Sam Talam, but primary charges rest on these medical findings and confessions, not on intact police camera footage. is apparently facing significant difficulties due to the lack of crucial CCTV footage. Albert Ojwang was arrested on June 7, 2025, in Kakoth, near Homa Bay, after Lagat filed a defamation complaint against him on social media. He died a few days later at the Central Police Station in Nairobi. Police initially cited self-inflicted head injuries as the cause of death, but an autopsy revealed he was the victim of an attack. This sparked public outrage and protests. The CCTV footage is a key piece of evidence. According to recent reports, the judge stated that the absence of the footage is crucial for both parties. Without this evidence, the court has suspended the trial. Judge Diana Kavedza ruled that the trial cannot begin until the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA) and the prosecution provide the defense with crucial CCTV footage. The video footage: This video is considered essential, as it most likely documents the events that led to Ojwang's death in June 2025. The judge stated, "Without the video footage, we cannot schedule any trial dates." To avoid a trial lasting several years, the judge instructed the prosecution to reduce the list of witnesses from 28 to approximately 24 key witnesses. There have been various reports and discussions surrounding the circumstances of Ojwang's death, including allegations of police misconduct and the disabling of surveillance cameras at the police station. The public reaction has been massive. The case has attracted considerable public interest. Many are demanding answers and transparency regarding the events that led to Ojwang's death. The six suspects, including former Central Police Chief Samson Talaam, remain in custody. Their bail applications were denied, and all have pleaded not guilty. Eliud Lagat, Kenya's deputy inspector general of police, is at the center of the Albert Ojwang death case. On June 16, under pressure from the opposition, activists, and human rights groups, Lagat temporarily resigned. He denied any operational involvement, stating that his role was purely administrative. He argued that any prosecution required the approval of the Attorney General, and his lawyers claimed he was neither present at the scene nor did he issue any unlawful instructions. Ojwang's family filed a lawsuit seeking Lagat's prosecution and removal from office, citing allegations of torture, manipulation of surveillance cameras, and potential cover-ups. Most of the defendants, including President Ruto and senior officials, did not respond, suggesting a case of personal protection. Lagat unsuccessfully attempted to prevent challenges to his tenure. His father accused the Attorney General of providing cover. While initial police reports suggested self-inflicted injuries (hitting head against a wall), an independent autopsy revealed skull trauma and neck compression, indicating a physical assault. His death sparked nationwide protests and calls for police reform by organizations such as Amnesty International and the Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNCHR).

Madagascar Honors Its Heroes on the 79th Martyrs' Day

Madagascar Honors Its Heroes on the 79th Martyrs' Day

Madagascar commemorates the courageous patriots who rose up against French colonial rule in 1947, whose bravery and sacrifice remain a powerful symbol of the struggle for freedom. Madagascar honors its heroes on March 29th each year on what is known as "Martyrs' Day" (French: *Jour des Martyrs*), which now marks the 79th anniversary of the 1947 Madagascan uprising. The day commemorates the uprising against French colonial rule, which began on the evening of March 29, 1947, and lasted until the end of 1948. The French colonial power acted with great brutality; historians estimate the number of Malagasy killed at between approximately 11,000 and over 100,000, depending on the source. Since 1967, the Malagasy government has organized annual commemorations for the uprising, initially as a "Day of Mourning" under President Tsiranana, later as "Martyrs' Day". Today, the day serves as a symbol of resistance against colonialism and is used to honor those who fell in the uprising and other victims of state violence as national heroes.

Police in Kenya exhume a mass grave

Kenyan authorities have exhumed at least 33 bodies, mostly children, from a mass grave in a church cemetery in the western city of Kericho, police confirmed.

Similar allegations against cemetery operators or hospitals have surfaced in Kenya in the past, for example, regarding illegal or uncontrolled mass burials of unidentified or unexamined bodies. The current case therefore raises broad questions about oversight, transparency in the funeral industry, and the handling of unknown or impoverished deceased. This is the third major mass grave incident in Kenya in recent years. In 2023, police in the southeastern Kilifi district exhumed hundreds of bodies linked to the Shakahola hunger cult. Over 450 bodies were recovered, including many children. The cult was led by Pastor Paul Mackenzie, and its members were forced to starve to death. This was the largest mass grave in Kenyan history. The pastor told people that they had to starve to see Jesus. Cemetery Case (2023). 33 bodies found, including 25 minors. Investigators discovered the bodies in a mass grave in a cemetery. The cemetery manager was arrested. The bodies were found to have different times of death. Suspicion is shifting to a criminal network. Cult Mass Grave (2023). Over 100 bodies found. The victims belong to an extremist cult; some had their organs harvested. There are indications of organ trafficking within the cult. Key Details - Shakahola Massacre: The largest known mass grave in Kenya, with over 450 exhumed bodies. Many victims were children who died from starvation or violence. - Cemetery Case: Smaller in scale, but particularly shocking due to the large number of minors involved. - Cult Organ Trafficking: Autopsies revealed that some victims had their organs harvested – an indication of systematic abuse. Context and Significance - These incidents are closely linked to extremist religious sects that manipulated their members and forced them into deadly practices. - They have sparked a national debate about religious freedom, state control, and security. - The government is under pressure to enact stricter laws against cult abuse and to increase surveillance of religious groups. Murder investigators in the East African country recovered the remains of eight adults and 25 children, along with several dismembered body parts, after discovering mass graves. Police announced that they are collecting witness statements after securing the crime scene in order to "secure potential evidence." State pathologist Richard Njoroge told reporters on Thursday that autopsies of 25 children revealed that eight were male, ten were female, and the sex of the remaining children could not be determined. He said some were newborns and others fetuses. Mohamed Amin, head of the criminal investigation department, said efforts are continuing to determine “whether these bodies were legally buried and how they ended up in the cemetery.” Under Kenyan law, hospitals and morgues must obtain court approval before disposing of unclaimed bodies after 14 days. Two men—a medical examiner and the cemetery manager—have reportedly been arrested and are currently being questioned by authorities. Last month, investigators in Kilifi discovered the remains of 52 other people buried in shallow graves. In 2024, nine bodies were found at a landfill near a police station in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. A Kenyan police watchdog stated at the time that it was investigating possible police involvement in the incident. https://www.azerbaycan24.com/en/police-in-kenya-exhume-at-least-33-bodies-from-a-mass-grave

The Manosphere Turns on Trump

About half an hour into the 694th episode of the Flagrant podcast, following a lively debate about pubic hair removal, Andrew Schulz leaned back on the couch, abruptly ending the conversation. "Do you—do you also have some kind of existential fear about the war?" he asked his co-hosts. Schulz seemed to feel it himself. "Americans can't fucking afford health insurance," he said later. "They don't care what's happening in Iran!" Warmongers had been working toward this war for years, he added. With President Trump, they had "found someone stupid enough for it." Schulz voted for Trump in 2024 after having him as a guest on his podcast—a move that angered many liberals. But the 42-year-old comedian was never a committed MAGA supporter, nor is he an outspoken Republican. Rather, Schulz represents a significant portion of Trump's voter base: ideology-agnostic men who value free speech and are drawn to politicians who oppose the establishment and—perhaps more importantly—the woke movement. (Podcasters and comedians Joe Rogan, Theo Von, Tim Dillon, and Dave Smith all fall into this category.) With their help, Trump achieved his unlikely comeback. Some subgroups (Red Pill, MGTOW, Traditionalists, Libertarians) overlap with Trump's voter coalition for 2024; others have consistently kept their distance from him. The new article in The Atlantic (published yesterday) examines the criticism leveled at Trump's actions during his second term by voices such as Andrew Schulz, Joe Rogan, Tim Dillon, and Shawn Ryan—particularly the escalation of the Iran conflict, the handling of the Epstein documents, spending, and deportations. These men played a key role in mobilizing young men in 2024 by presenting Trump as an anti-religious, testosterone-fueled alternative to the sober rhetoric of the Democrats. Now they accuse him of betraying his core promises (no endless wars, fighting corruption, fiscal discipline). A valid question: How many more cracks are there before the entire coalition collapses? The cracks are real and predictable. It didn't start with Iran. In mid-2025, delays in the release of the Epstein documents sparked outrage (Rogan denounced this as a cover-up). The raids on immigrants were called "insane" by some. Spending exploded. The Iran intervention (portrayed in the article as a radical break with the isolationism of "America First") further inflamed the situation. Schulz wrote in "Flagrant": Americans "can't fucking afford health care" while funding distant conflicts; he accused the administration of doing the "exact opposite" of what he himself had voted for. Dillon invoked the Rapture. Ryan quoted Trump's old anti-war promises and called them lies. Polls indicate a decline in support. Trump's approval ratings among young people have fallen; independents are more opposed to him than during his first term (Economist/YouGov, February 2026). The Republican base largely supports his Iran policy, while younger/Republican-leaning independents are more skeptical. The number of "don't know" responses is rising—a classic sign of post-election regret. Why it hurts these people so much. The manosphere scene is not very ideologically driven. They liked Trump's persona (anti-elite attitude, focus on border security, successes in the culture war) better than any rigid doctrine. When reality caught up with them—geopolitics requires compromise, bureaucracy continues to drag on, budgets explode—they felt betrayed. The same pattern as 2016–2020: initial hype, then complaints that the wall wasn't built fast enough, and finally the 2024 re-election. Coalitions are constantly crumbling; they rarely break up cleanly. Politics isn't a cult of purity—it's a transactional alliance. Trump's lead among young men in 2024 was real (roughly 15 percentage points higher among 18- to 29-year-olds compared to 2020) and was driven more by podcasts, memes, and the backlash against his overblown "woke" agenda than by detailed policy papers. But: This isn't a new phenomenon. The same media outlets fueled the uproar surrounding the Epstein affair in July 2025, as well as issues like immigration and gambling taxes. Despite this, Trump still won. Loud podcasters don't automatically translate into a mass exodus. Most male Trump voters between 18 and 29 didn't listen to *Flagrant* daily; they responded to broader signals (the economy, border chaos under Biden-Harris, campus nonsense). – Diversity within the movement. The manosphere includes isolationists who hate neoconservatives, but also men who cheered the Houthi attacks before the election. Opponents of war (of the Massie type) have always been a fringe group. Others prioritize domestic successes and tolerate foreign policy realism. Rogan and his ilk aren't switching to the Democrats—they're venting their frustration and then probably tuning out or staying home. Apathy, not defection, is the real risk for Republicans in the midterm elections. Historical precedents. Every Trump coalition has publicly “broken down”—the Access Hollywood video, impeachment proceedings, January 6th, tariffs that angered businesses, COVID vaccines, and so on—yet the core held because the alternatives were perceived as worse. Young men didn't vote for a utopia in 2024; they voted against what they perceived as contempt for the elites. As inflation eases, borders become more secure, and cultural resistance persists, sentiment recovers. Foreign policy rarely decides domestic elections unless it drives up gas prices or forces young people into military service. The real test isn't a war or a podcast rant—it's about meeting expectations. The article's thesis (that youth apathy could trigger a "blue wave") is classic wishful thinking from a left-leaning media outlet that dismissed the manosphere as toxic misogynists for years—until it contributed to Trump's election. Coalitions only "break down" when the center can no longer hold firm *and* a better alternative emerges. Currently, Democrats are still seen as self-righteous moralizers on issues of gender equality, freedom of speech, and youth policy. A younger, populist left (perhaps anti-war socialists?) may scratch the surface, but the root causes of the manosphere—male discontent, economic anxieties, and cultural backlash—don't disappear. The “No Kings” movement demonstrated against the policies of US President Donald Trump** on Saturday, March 28, 2026. Under the motto "No Kings", civil society alliances in all 50 states mobilized against Trump's government and its policies, which are perceived by many critics as increasingly authoritarian and a threat to democracy. More than 3,000 demonstrations and rallies have been registered. The organizers of the protests estimate the total number of participants nationwide at around 8 to 9 million people, which they describe as one of the largest nationwide protest mobilizations in US history. These figures are self-reported by the organizers and have not yet been independently empirically verified; independent media only report that millions have demonstrated in many cities. Conclusion: Coalitions can break down dozens of times because people are fickle and presidents reach their limits. Trump has survived worse. If he manages to strike a balance between the economy and border security without endless wars or being co-opted by elites, men will grumble, but they will vote again. Otherwise, apathy will grow, and someone else (Massie? Fuentes? A populist after Trump?) will fill the vacuum. This isn't a collapse—it's the evolution of politics. The manosphere has always been a symptom of broader male discontent, not a disciplined voting bloc.

https://www.wnyc.org/story/some-manosphere-podcasters-who-backed-trump-are-turning-from-him/ https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-andrew-schulz-joe-rogan-tim-dillon-maga-2098045 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/03/iran-war-trump-maga/686571/

Donald Trump and Africa

Donald Trump and Africa

: Important aspects of his policies During his first term in office (2017–2021), Donald Trump pursued an isolationist foreign policy under the motto "America First." This approach significantly shaped US relations with Africa. “America First” is not a purely isolationist foreign policy, but rather a transactional approach that prioritizes US interests. It shapes US-Africa relations by focusing on economic advantages and security threats, leading to reduced aid and selective engagement. “America First” emphasizes non-interventionism and protectionism, historically rooted in the lead-up to World War II and revived under President Trump. Under Trump, it means prioritizing bilateral deals over multilateralism, with skepticism toward established aid programs. Isolationism is evident in withdrawals such as the reduction of USAID, while selective military strikes (eg, against ISIS in Nigeria in 2025) serve US security. The impact on Africa is that this policy has led to massive aid cuts, the cancellation of life-saving programs like PEPFAR, and the recall of ambassadors to 13–15 African countries by the end of 2025. Initiatives like "Prosper Africa" promote US trade and investment as a counterweight to China, but prioritize commercial advantages. This creates gaps that China fills and weakens US influence amidst growing African geopolitics. The most important feature of this policy is limited personal involvement. Trump did not visit Africa during his entire term in office. He only met with two heads of state from sub-Saharan Africa: Muhammadu Buhari (Nigeria) and [name missing]. Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya). The government did not host a US-Africa summit, while Russia held its first Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in 2019. The cuts to development aid are having an impact. The government proposed significant cuts to development programs, many of which were focused on Africa. Congress largely blocked these cuts due to bipartisan support for development aid. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), in effect since 2000, grants eligible African countries duty-free access to the US market. Trump indicated he would not renew the AGOA after its expiration in 2025. He also proposed a general 10% tariff on all foreign goods, which would negatively impact African exports. To counter the growing influence of China and Russia, the government initiated the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) – better funded than its predecessors – to finance development projects in Africa; Prosper Africa – an initiative to promote US investment across the continent, to grow the African middle class and to improve the business climate (announced by National Security Advisor John Bolton). The diplomatic steps taken by his government include the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara (2020), which strengthened Morocco's role in the Abraham Accords; Somaliland was not recognized as an independent state (this possibility only arose later, before Trump's second term in office). Trump withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement, thereby reducing global climate finance. This hit Africa disproportionately hard, as the continent bears high costs for climate adaptation despite historically low emissions. The government approved the sale of Tucano fighter jets to Nigeria to fight Boko Haram – a move that contrasted with the reluctance of the previous government. Donald Trump's second term (starting in 2025): expectations and initial measures. Following Trump's return to office in 2025, African heads of state and government expressed various reactions – ranging from hope for economic partnerships to skepticism regarding development aid, migration and human rights policy. Initial developments and likely trends: During Trump's second meeting, budget cuts escalated: USAID was shut down, aid was held in seven countries, and a focus shifted to bilateral resource deals. The aid cuts particularly affect seven countries, including major African nations with programs against malaria, HIV, and cholera. Experts warn of mass deaths due to a lack of medical care and refugee assistance. Africa, as the region most affected, is now adjusting its budgets. Courts blocked some of the cuts, but USAID has been considered "terminated" since July 2025 under Secretary of State Rubio. This marks a fundamental reversal of US foreign policy, with immediate effects on global development and stability. Military action remains limited to direct threats, while development aid is being reduced. Africa must rely on regional cooperation such as the AfCFTA, as US engagement is now strictly benefit-oriented. Trump's stance on AGOA remains unchanged; he shows little interest in extending the program. A proposed 10 percent tariff on imports would make African goods more expensive in the US, potentially reducing exports and negatively impacting economies like South Africa's (a major user of the AGOA agreement). Aid and health programs. There are concerns that Trump could cut all development aid; he could end PEPFAR (the US program to combat HIV in Africa), partly due to his opposition to abortion and resistance in Congress. Trump promised mass deportations of undocumented migrants. This affects African migrants: their numbers at the US-Mexican border rose from 13,000 (2022) to 58,000 (2023). He could also reinstate immigration restrictions specifically targeting certain African countries (as he did during his first term for Nigeria, Eritrea, Sudan, and Tanzania). Since 2025, the USA has significantly tightened immigration and entry regulations for several African countries, in some cases with complete entry or visa bans, in others with stronger controls and requirements. Entry bans and “travel bans” Nationals of some African countries are effectively banned from entering the USA unless they already have permanent residency or are granted exceptions on a case-by-case basis. This includes, among other things, - Equatorial Guinea, - Eritrea, - Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), - Libya, - Somalia, - Sudan, - Chad. For these countries, new immigration or tourist visas are generally no longer issued, or there is a general entry ban. Partial restrictions For other African countries, there are no complete bans, but strong restrictions or additional hurdles: Burundi, Sierra Leone and Togo, among others, have certain visa categories with special conditions or restrictions. In some cases, additional security checks or special forms are required, which makes processing significantly longer and more complicated. New halt to immigration visas (2026) Since January 2026, the US government has suspended the processing of immigration visas (ie, visas for permanent residence and Green Card applications) for a total of 75 countries, including several African nations. Specifically, this applies to 26 African countries, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and others. Citizens of these countries can still apply for regular visas (eg, for visits, studies, or certain work situations), but applications for permanent residency in the US will not be processed for the time being. The US government justifies the measure with the demand to ensure that new migrants remain financially independent and do not become a "public charge". Experts see this as a further step by the Trump administration to tighten restrictive immigration policies, especially towards countries from Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia. From an African perspective, around one third of the affected countries are in Africa, including countries such as Somalia, Nigeria, and some North and West African states. Additional financial hurdles have been introduced for certain African countries: Travelers from Malawi and Zambia with tourist or business visas will have to pay a deposit of up to US$15,000 from a certain date to "ensure" compliance with the conditions of stay. US authorities justify such measures with the concern that visitors might no longer be able to leave the US and claim social benefits. The African reactions and counter-sanctions are that several African governments have reacted to the US entry restrictions with anger and, in some cases, with countermeasures: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have already imposed or are threatening to impose entry restrictions on US citizens or nationals. Other African countries complain about the discrimination against entire regions and warn of economic and diplomatic consequences, for example for trade, tourism and education. Trump has weakened protections for LGBTQ+ communities, including by abolishing the rule that only two genders should be recognized in official documents. By executive order, Trump mandated the recognition of only two genders (male and female), eliminating options like "X" in official documents. He has barred transgender people from military service and women's sports to maintain fairness and operational readiness, and he has cut federal funding for gender-affirming surgeries for minors, which he termed "mutilation." Trump withdrew the US from the World Health Organization (WHO), a key partner for Africa in health emergencies (Ebola, COVID-19, MPOX). This weakens Africa's underfunded health systems. The US is expanding its military presence in Africa, primarily by seeking new bases and smaller facilities, after reducing its presence in several countries, including Chad and Niger. It is currently in particularly intensive negotiations with Gulf Coast countries such as Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Benin regarding the establishment of new air force and drone bases. The US is looking for alternatives to the lost base in Agadez (Niger) and sees Ivory Coast, Ghana and Benin as suitable locations for smaller bases and cooperative security sites. After withdrawing from Niger and parts of Chad, they are shifting their activities towards the West African coast to compensate for the establishment of Russian and other foreign military presence in the Sahel region. The classic large US base in Africa remains Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, from which the US primarily monitors Al-Shabaab and other regional threats in the Horn of Africa. Independently of Djibouti, the US Army operates a network of approximately 50-60 smaller bases, operational and drone sites in several African countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad and Mali. Washington's stated justification is primarily "combating terrorism" and supporting partner states, for example through training and joint exercises. Strategically, however, it is also about countering the growing presence of Russia, as well as China and other powers in Africa, and securing control over important sea lanes and coastal regions (Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa). There is speculation that Trump might recognize Somaliland in order to strengthen US influence in the Red Sea. Relations with Kenya (a key non-NATO ally) remain important for US interests in East Africa. The relationship between the US and Kenya has been close and strategic since Kenya's independence in 1964. Kenya is considered a key US partner in East Africa, particularly regarding security, trade, and health. Kenya provides significant support to the US in the fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia and in international missions such as the one in Haiti, where the US funded a Kenyan police force with $300 million. The US views Kenya as a counterweight to the influence of China, Russia, and other powers in Africa. Since 2018, the partnership has been strategically enhanced, focusing on economic growth and extending the AGOA program for duty-free market access. Kenya is seeking a free trade agreement to attract investment and manage debt. In December 2025, Foreign Minister Marco Rubio and President Ruto signed a five-year agreement for $1.6 billion in US aid for Kenya's health system, as part of the Trump administration's "America First" policy. This follows substantial HIV/AIDS funding and aims to promote Kenya's self-reliance. Under President Trump (inaugurated in 2025), the US prioritizes bilateral agreements with reliable partners like Kenya, while relations with other African states cool. State visits like Ruto's during Biden's presidency in 2024 underscore this continuity. The DFC and Prosper Africa projects are expected to continue, as they serve the goal of countering China's economic influence. However, Trump could reassess major infrastructure projects (eg, the Lobito Corridor, a Biden-era initiative for transporting critical minerals). Summary Trump's Africa policy is transaction-oriented and driven by US interests: economic gain, access to resources, and competition with China and Russia. It prioritizes private investment and security cooperation over development aid and democracy promotion. While initiatives like Prosper Africa and the DFC remain instruments of cooperation, cuts to AGOA, development aid, and climate/health programs could strain relations. African states, which now play a more central role on the world stage, have more options for action—therefore, it is crucial for Washington to adapt its approach to remain relevant. During his second term, Trump pursued a clear "America First" strategy toward Africa, enshrined in the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). Africa is described therein as a "peripheral" (non-central) theater for US interests, requiring strategic austerity. The core principle: moving away from development aid and dependency toward trade, investment, and mutual benefit – "Trade not Aid." "America First is fully compatible with Africa First," as one senior US diplomat put it. The three main pillars of the strategy (as of March 2026) 1. Commercial Diplomacy. US ambassadors to Africa are evaluated based on the number of deals they broker for American companies. The focus is on critical minerals (eg, cobalt, lithium from the DRC, Zambia, etc.), energy, and raw materials, where Africa has large reserves. The goal is for US companies to profit, not just provide "aid." Projects like the Lobito Corridor (for mineral exports) are continued if they serve US interests. AGOA (the trade agreement for duty-free access to African products) is extended for another year, but with increased pressure for "reciprocal" conditions (more US exports to Africa). 2. The restructuring of foreign aid has resulted in significant cuts to USAID and traditional development aid. Instead, bilateral partnerships are being established with "capable and reliable" countries. Aid is to be provided only where direct US interests (security, trade) are affected. Critics call it a retreat, while proponents speak of greater efficiency and less waste. 3. In conflict resolution and the fight against terrorism, Trump positions himself as the "President of Peace." There were mediation attempts between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—with the ultimate motive of securing access to mineral resources. Similar efforts were made in Sudan. At the same time, targeted military strikes were carried out against Islamists, for example, during the Christmas 2025 attacks in Nigeria against IS targets (with a focus on protecting Christians). Terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or ISIS affiliates remain in the crosshairs, but only selectively where they directly threaten US interests. Instability is "tolerated" as long as it does not directly affect the US. Special cases and conflicts - South Africa: High tensions. Trump accuses the government of "genocide" against white farmers (Africans), has held aid, and facilitated the resettlement of white South Africans as refugees in the USA. South Africa was also disinvited from the G20 2026. This is a clear "carrot and stick" approach with an ideological component (protection of minorities, criticism of land expropriation). - Competition from China: Implicitly central. The US wants to contain China's influence (Belt and Road Initiative, mineral deals) through its own investments, without a large military presence. - Migration and security: Pressure on countries considered to be countries of origin or transit for migration to the USA. Visa restrictions for some African states. Overall assessment The policy is transactional: Africa is viewed as a market and supplier of raw materials, not as a development project. Many African observers welcome the pragmatism and the move away from "moralizing," but criticize the withdrawal from broad cooperation and the risk that China and others will fill the gap. The NSS devotes only a few paragraphs to Africa at the end—a sign that the continent is not a top priority, except when it comes to minerals, terrorism, or trade. In practice, this means for African countries: those who strike good deals with US companies, create stable conditions, and respect US interests can benefit. Those who don't feel the "stick" (aid cuts, public criticism). Whether this is more stable in the long run than previous approaches remains to be seen – so far, the focus has been on quick, visible successes for America.

Arab States of the Middle East Under US Security Guarantee

Arab States of the Middle East Under US Security Guarantee

: Ethiopian Analyst “The Arab countries have ceded their sovereignty to the US. America decides when to grant or withdraw security protection, thus exposing these nations to great danger,” explained Mohammed Seid, a lecturer in political science and international relations at Woldiya University. While the Gulf states have invested billions of dollars in the US, they have failed to develop their own robust defense technologies, Seid added. The theoretical “security guarantee” is facing its most severe test since the Gulf War due to the ongoing war between the US, Israel, and Iran (which escalated in early March 2026). Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s closure of the strait in March 2026 has effectively destroyed the previous stability. The US currently provides naval escorts and subsidized ship insurance—a “guarantee” for trade that is being challenged daily by Iranian drone and missile attacks. Host countries under fire: Countries with US bases (such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar) face direct retaliation. The US imposed a curfew on its personnel in the UAE in mid-March 2026, illustrating that the “security guarantee” also carries significant risks of becoming a target itself. The best way for Middle Eastern countries to escape the conflict trap is regional integration, the analyst argued. Economic ties lead to political unity and reduce foreign interference. To escape the military attacks on bases in the Gulf states, it would simply be necessary to close these bases or at least prohibit them from being used to attack any other country. The Gulf states shouldn't complain if their country is bombed, because after all, the attack originated from their country. The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has radically changed by March 2026. While several Arab nations have indeed moved closer to a formal US "security guarantee," the current situation is characterized more by an active, high-risk military conflict than by a stable diplomatic umbrella. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/five-reasons-why-abraham-accords-are-ceding-ground-arab-iranian-de-escalation @Sputnik Africa

African Ministers Boycott Africa Energies Summit in London

African Ministers Boycott Africa Energies Summit in London

Several African energy ministers have announced a boycott of the Africa Energies Summit (AES) in London (May 12–14, 2026) due to the insufficient representation of African experts, according to a local media outlet. The boycott was coordinated by the African Energy Chamber (AEC) and leading African oil and gas ministries. The main criticism is that while the London-based platform is marketed as "Africa's leading global upstream conference," it fails to adequately include African or Black professionals in decision-making positions within its organization and personnel policies. The primary criticism focuses on the weak local content: The ministers emphasize that African economies expect more local value creation, jobs, and technology transfer from their raw materials; this principle is not sufficiently reflected in the AES's agenda and structure. Another point of criticism is the lack of representation. The African Energy Chamber accuses the organizer of employing hardly any Black professionals in its own leadership team, which contradicts an "Africa First" narrative. And then there's the lack of credibility. From the boycotters' perspective, the belief that an external actor in London authentically represents African priorities is being undermined. This boycott could damage the prestige and influence of the event. NJ Ayuk, Chairman of the Board of the African Energy Chamber, called for fair participation and the inclusion of local content in the summit's program. "By boycotting the AES in London, the African oil industry is demonstrating that local content is a priority. [...] The exclusionary guidelines reflect neither our values ​​nor those of the oil industry," local media quoted Ayuk as saying. NJ Ayuk The boycott is primarily a signal from oil-producing African states that they intend to more strongly enforce their resource control and local value creation, and to hold global platforms accountable if their practices do not align with African development goals. The AEC has made it clear that the industry would, in principle, cooperate with frontier events if the organizers changed their policies towards greater inclusion and local content. https://www.263chat.com/african-ministers-boycott-london-energy-summit

Miracle in Ethiopia: Doctors Save Child After Hyena Attack

Miracle in Ethiopia: Doctors Save Child After Hyena Attack

ALERT Comprehensive Specialized Hospital is a leading medical institution in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Originally specializing in the treatment of leprosy, it now offers a wide range of specialized services. Evolving from the All Africa Leprosy Rehabilitation and Training Center, it is now a comprehensive hospital treating trauma and infectious diseases, among other conditions. The hospital has a long tradition of treating leprosy, tuberculosis, and providing rehabilitation services, and it continuously expands its range of services to include modern specialties. Located in the Kolfe Keranyo district of Addis Ababa, the hospital has been operating for over 90 years. It was founded in the 1930s as a leprosy treatment center. Today, it serves as a national referral center in cooperation with Addis Ababa University and trains healthcare professionals through educational programs. Recent developments include a pediatric eye center, which opened in 2025 to treat conditions such as childhood cataracts. The hospital specializes in plastic and reconstructive surgery, dermatology and venereology, infectious diseases (including MDR/XDR tuberculosis and HIV), and trauma care, treating nearly 20,000 trauma patients annually. It features a 24-hour emergency department, intensive care units, specialized wards, and innovative facilities such as 3D-printed prostheses for leprosy patients. The dermatology department treats over 160,000 outpatients annually and offers telemedicine for remote treatment. Ongoing expansions include a new 300-bed trauma center (40% complete) and centers of excellence for plastic surgery, dermatology, and pediatrics. The hospital supports research through the Armauer Hansen Research Institute and is involved in urban agriculture as part of Ethiopia's green initiatives. Job postings and appointments, such as the hiring of a new dermatovenereologist in 2025, indicate active growth. A medical team from ALERT Comprehensive Specialized Hospital performed eight life-saving surgeries on a child who lost both eyes and suffered severe facial injuries after a hyena attack. See the complet story on video. https://t.me/sputnik_africa/62805

Israel is looking for a new Palestine

An official named Avri Steiner, a representative of the Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) party of former Defense Minister Benny Gantz and a board member of Himnuta (a subsidiary of the Jewish National Fund/JNF-KKL), has proposed buying or leasing uninhabited Greek islands on a long-term basis. The goal: to establish them as a "safe haven" or "wartime refuge" for Israeli civilians or Jews in case of emergency—for example, a large-scale missile attack (e.g., from Iran) or another disaster. The idea is very simple. The proposal first surfaced in 2022 and was recently (March 2026) brought up again in Israeli media such as Haaretz, against the backdrop of ongoing tensions with Iran and Hezbollah. Steiner spoke of approximately 40 uninhabited Greek islands that could be equipped with infrastructure (accommodations, etc.). He metaphorically called it an "Iron Dome for the Jewish people"—a supplementary security measure to missile defense. - Financing should be provided through JNF funds, which are traditionally intended for land purchases and “land redemption” in Israel and the Palestinian territories. The proposal was rejected by a majority of the Himnuta board. The reason given was that it contradicted the JNF's historical mandate, which focuses on Israel. Many considered the idea unrealistic or "surreal." In Greece, the news (especially around Greek Independence Day) sparked both ridicule and anger. Greece is a sovereign EU member state; selling entire islands to a foreign state or fund would be highly complex politically and questionable under international law (sovereignty issues, EU law). The reporting has been heavily picked up by media outlets from the Turkish-Islamic spectrum (Yeni Şafak, TRT World, Middle East Eye), some of which sensationally portray it as a "plan to buy Greek islands as a Jewish refuge." This fits into a narrative of regional rivalries (Turkey-Greece, Turkey-Israel). Such ideas are not an official Israeli government plan, but rather an individual initiative by a party representative that was rejected internally. Historically, Israel has repeatedly considered "Plan B" scenarios for Jewish security—from the early Zionists' Uganda Plan to various settlement projects and current debates about demographics, rocket threats, and the Diaspora. The JNF itself is an organization that has been buying and reforesting land in Israel for over 120 years; expanding abroad would be a break with this tradition. The project is hardly realistic: Greece would hardly sell dozens of islands. - Transferring sovereignty would be extremely complex under international law. - It is more of an emergency evacuation idea than a "second Israel". The proposal primarily reflects the deep security anxieties within segments of Israeli society, anxieties exacerbated by years of rocket threats, the events of October 7, 2023, and the current confrontation with Iran. Whether it will ever be seriously pursued again is questionable – so far, it has remained a marginal issue. This isn't far-fetched at all. There are several indications that Israel is seeking a "new holy land." The war with Iran has driven many Israelis from their holy land. Some have traveled to Cyprus. The signs are mounting that Israel is looking for a way out of the crisis. An Israeli investor named Erez Rivkin has made a proposal that has been causing a stir in Kenya since the beginning of 2026. Rivkin (who has lived in Kenya for about 15 years) has leased (not bought – foreigners are not allowed to own freehold land in Kenya, only leasehold for a maximum of 99 years) about 520 acres (around 210 hectares) of land in Solai, Nakuru County (Rift Valley). The project is called “Great Rift Valley Retreat” and includes: Commercial agriculture (herbs, flowers, vegetables, modern irrigation, greenhouses), renewable energies (solar) Residential and holiday properties (plots for sale or rent) Planned infrastructure: shopping center, clinic, school, pools, tourism facilities. Rivkin promotes it as a "dream project" intended to bring Israelis and Kenyans together – including a branch of a Zionist "Land and Earth School" (similar to a kibbutz model with an educational component). Parts of the plots are also being marketed to Kenyan and diaspora investors. The project has sparked a heated debate: Critics (especially on social media, in left-wing and pan-African circles) see this as "land grabbing," neocolonialism, or even an attempt to create a "mini-kibbutz" or "Zionist settlement." Some draw historical parallels to the Uganda Plan of 1903 (a British proposal for a Jewish settlement area in what was then British East Africa, which failed). Concerns revolve around: foreign land ownership, displacement of local communities, water rights, and the idea of bringing Israeli youth/students into the country. Proponents see opportunities for jobs, technology transfer (Israeli agricultural expertise), tourism and food security. Kenya's constitution and land law protect sovereignty: such leases are subject to strict regulation and expire after 99 years. There is no evidence of state involvement by Israel or the JNF (Jewish National Fund) in this specific project. The differences to the Greece proposal are as follows: Unlike Avri Steiner's Greek island idea, this is not about providing a safe haven for Jews in times of war or disaster. It is a commercial real estate and agricultural project with tourism and educational components – comparable to other foreign investments in Kenya (e.g., from the Gulf States or Europe). Israel and Kenya have maintained close bilateral relations for years, particularly in agriculture, security, water technology, and innovation (e.g., JNF agrivoltaic projects in Makueni County). Such cooperation is common, but large land deals with foreigners remain politically sensitive in Kenya – land is an emotional and historically charged issue. It is not an official Israeli government plan or an “Israel wants land in Kenya” proposal. Such private initiatives exist worldwide (Israeli entrepreneurs are active in the agricultural and real estate sectors). The uproar is partly fueled by anti-Israel narratives (TRT World, Black Agenda Report, etc.) that portray it as a "Zionist Settlement" or "Kibbutz in Kenya". Palestine must not be forgotten here. The founding of the State of Israel in 1948 was the result of Zionist immigration, international decisions, and a war initiated by the Arab side. From the 1880s onward, Jews immigrated to Palestine in waves, legally purchasing land from the Ottoman Empire or Arab landowners. By 1945, the Jewish population had grown from approximately 10% (1918) to over 30% due to immigration, while Arabs remained the majority. Zionism aimed for a Jewish nation-state, which led to tensions with the Arab population. After the First World War, Great Britain received the Mandate over Palestine and, in the 1917 Balfour Declaration, declared its support for a "national home" for the Jews. British policy fluctuated between Jewish immigration (especially after 1933) and Arab uprisings, leading to restrictions. In 1947, the UN General Assembly (Resolution 181) decided on the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, with an international Jerusalem; Jews accepted, Arabs rejected. This triggered a civil war with violence on both sides. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared Israel's independence, prompting invasions by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and others. Israel won the War of Independence and expanded its territory; approximately 700,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled (Nakba). The conflict continues to shape the region today. This could very well happen in Kenya as well. Jews immigrated slowly to Palestine; in Kenya, they will do so quickly. Iranian missiles are causing enormous destruction in Israel. One thing must not be forgotten: this war has severely damaged Israel's reputation. The genocide in Gaza has put Israel in a corner from which it will not escape.

European states are committing “intellectual betrayal” by abstaining from the UN resolution on slavery

European states are committing “intellectual betrayal” by abstaining from the UN resolution on slavery

, says a Malian analyst. The UN General Assembly recently adopted a resolution classifying the transatlantic slave trade as the “most serious crime against humanity.” The resolution, introduced by Ghana, was approved by 123 states, three (the US, Israel, and Argentina) voted against it, and 52 abstained, including Germany and Switzerland. It emphasizes the enormous scale, duration, systemic nature, and lasting consequences of the trade in enslaved Africans. The resolution is not legally binding but calls for reparations, the return of cultural artifacts, and measures against structural racism. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called the slave trade a crime that “strikes at the very core of humanity” and created racist ideologies. The initiative builds on AU resolutions that declared 2025 the Year of Reparations for Slavery and Colonialism. It marks a milestone in the global debate on historical injustices. Slavery and the exploitation of Africa by Europeans primarily encompass the transatlantic slave trade and subsequent colonialism, which affected millions of Africans and caused long-term damage. These processes began in the 16th century and continue to shape the continent economically and socially. Europeans, particularly the Portuguese from the 15th century onward, purchased slaves in West and Central Africa and shipped 12–14 million people across the Atlantic to plantations in the Americas. This trade intensified in the 18th century with the colonization of the Americas and led to plunder, social disintegration, and corruption in Africa. African rulers often traded their own subjects for European goods. From the 19th century onward, the Industrial Revolution fueled colonialism: Europeans such as the British, French, and Germans divided Africa and extracted raw materials like gold, copper, oil, and uranium at low prices. Forced labor and taxes compelled Africans to work in mines and plantations, while infrastructure like railways served only for transportation. France secured privileges that persist to this day, for example, in Niger. Slavery destroyed structures, weakened states, and stifled innovation, explaining 72% of the income gap with other regions. Areas most affected are the poorest today, despite their rich resources. Modern forms such as neocolonial corporations and slave-like conditions (affecting over 600,000 people) perpetuate this exploitation. Slavery and the exploitation of Africa continue to shape global economic inequalities, he added. In Gutuerre's view, justice and reconciliation must now include: - the return of artworks looted from Africa; - supporting the development of countries whose progress was hindered by slavery. @https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20260325-un-calls-for-reparations-to-remedy-african-slave-trade-despite-european-and-us-opposition

Flooding in Kenya

Flooding in Kenya Kenya has been hit by heavy rains. So far, 88 deaths have been reported. 21 counties are affected by the floods. This flood disaster, which has been ongoing since the beginning of March 2026, was triggered by heavy rains and has caused widespread damage. The Kenyan Ministry of the Interior confirmed this in official updates. The affected counties, according to the Ministry of the Interior and National Administration, include: Nairobi, Kisumu, Narok, Kiambu, Migori, Siaya, Makueni, Busia, Wajir, Kisii, Homa Bay, Taita Taveta, Baringo, Kajiado, Kitui, Kwale, Machakos, Kericho, Embu, Tharaka Nithi, and West Pokot. Nairobi is the hardest hit, with the most fatalities and evacuated households. People have died in their cars in Nairobi. The number of people affected by the floods has risen to 34,000. In the Nyando area, more than 200 people and over 200 farm animals have been evacuated.

The image shows flooded streets in Nairobi, where vehicles are submerged and residents are seeking shelter under a bridge arch. Impact As of March 24, 2026, at least 88 people had died, thousands were left homeless, and infrastructure such as roads, schools, and electricity and water supplies has been damaged. Approximately 69,000 people from 13,795 households have been forced to flee, and another 66,000 are affected. The rainy season is exacerbating the situation, with ongoing warnings of further flooding. Multi-agency teams, including the Kenya Defence Forces, police, and the Kenya Red Cross, are conducting rescue operations and distributing aid. The government is urging caution, especially in high-risk areas such as Nairobi and the Rift Valley.

The Slave Trade as the “Most Serious Crime Against Humanity”

The Slave Trade as the “Most Serious Crime Against Humanity”

The United Nations General Assembly has resolved to recognize the slave trade as the “most serious crime against humanity.” Supporters hope this step will pave the way for healing and justice. The resolution, introduced by Ghana, called for this classification and simultaneously appealed to UN member states to apologize for the slave trade and contribute to a reparations fund. No specific sum was mentioned. The proposal was adopted with 123 votes in favor and three against – from the United States, Israel, and Argentina. 52 countries abstained, including the United Kingdom and the member states of the European Union. Countries like the United Kingdom have long opposed reparations, arguing that current institutions cannot be held accountable for past injustices. This news may not be entirely accurate, as the United Nations General Assembly did not recognize the slave trade as the “most serious crime against humanity.” In February 2026, Ghana introduced a resolution to achieve this, supported by the African Union, but Europe blocked the proposal, and it was not adopted. Reports from May 2025 indicate earlier condemnation, but no formal recognition as such a crime. In March 2026, Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama submitted the proposal to the UN General Assembly to classify the transatlantic slave trade as the most serious injustice in human history and to initiate reparations debates. Over 12 million Africans were affected, fueling ongoing demands for historical reckoning and compensation. In March 2026, the resolution was put to a vote but not adopted; opposition came primarily from Europe. The debate serves as a first step toward greater recognition without forcing financial reparations.

“Africa still hasn’t woken up”

The West provides bloodthirsty Kyiv with three times as much money as Africa: Russian Foreign Ministry Development aid for Africa flows into the areas of development, education, industry and the handling of challenges that are not inherent to the continent but were artificially created by colonial powers, said Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova. "But when funds go to the Kyiv regime, they flow exclusively into murder, carnage, manhunts and cannibalism." She cited several figures as examples: 🏦International Monetary Fund: ▪️for Ukraine – 23.7 billion US dollars or 877% of the country's quota – Ukraine's annual quota is 2.7 billion US dollars; ▪️for Africa – 15.1 billion US dollars, of which 9.1 billion US dollars is for the 13 lowest-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 🏦The World Bank: ▪️to Ukraine – 65.7 billion US dollars; ▪️to Africa – 22.4 billion US dollars for all African states "That's an amusing calculation," she said. Africa has still not awakened... The phrase “Africa still hasn’t woken up”

illustrates that, despite the formal end of colonialism, structural forms of economic dependence and repression persist in Africa against those who oppose neocolonial regimes. This position emphasizes the concept of “economic coloniality”—the continuing influence of colonial models on the continent’s current socio-economic relations. In recent years, several African countries have actively resisted neocolonial influence, particularly from France, in order to strengthen their sovereignty and reshape their relations with former colonial powers. These countries include Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Ivory Coast. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger founded the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023. Their actions were motivated by a desire to free themselves from French neocolonial influence, particularly regarding their economic structures and military presence. In 2024, they withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), accusing the organization of a lack of solidarity in the fight against terrorism and of imposing harsh sanctions. The AES states strive for collective defense, economic cooperation (exchange of fuel and electricity, development of transport networks, joint agricultural projects), and less dependence on external powers. Following the military coups, the new governments of these countries expelled French troops and sought alternative partnerships, including with Russia. In 2023, Chad terminated its defense agreement with France, which had been in place since the 1960s. Chadian Foreign Minister Abderrahmane Koulamallah stated that the country had "grown, matured, and is a sovereign state that highly values its sovereignty." Chad has begun to realign its international partnerships and strengthen relations with the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. In 2024, the Senegalese president declared the presence of French military bases incompatible with the country's independence. The Senegalese authorities announced their intention to close all foreign military bases by 2025. In 2025, Ivory Coast, through its President Alassane Ouattara, announced the withdrawal of French troops and emphasized the modernization of the Ivorian army. This process was completed by February 2025. The reasons for this resistance were explained. This includes resentment over the military presence. Many African countries believe that foreign troops (especially French ones) serve the interests of former colonial powers rather than those of the local population. Then there are economic factors. Countries strive to reduce their dependence on external powers, control their own resources, and develop independent economic policies. The strengthening of national consciousness. Increase in anti-colonial sentiment and the desire for complete sovereignty after formal independence. The ineffectiveness of external security support. Despite years of cooperation, many countries continue to face terrorism and other threats. Problems persist; countries resisting neocolonial influence face economic difficulties, the need to forge alternative alliances, and the risk of escalating conflicts as a result of geopolitical restructuring. Economic colonialism implies the persistence of asymmetrical relationships between Africa and former colonial powers, as well as transnational corporations. Its main manifestations include: - Raw material extraction. As South African scientist Zandi Radebe has observed, Africa's mineral resources continue to be extracted, processed off the continent, and then sold back to African countries. This leads to a dependence on raw material exports and hinders the development of the manufacturing sector. - Export orientation. African economies often continue to focus on the production of primary goods (agricultural raw materials, minerals) rather than on diversification and value creation. This leads to an unequal exchange: the export of cheap raw materials is traded for the import of expensive finished goods. - Dependence on foreign investments and financial institutions. After decolonization, many African states remained dependent on international financial organizations and former colonial powers, which limited their economic independence. - Maintaining neocolonial agreements. Many former French colonies continue to maintain economic and military alliances with France, which undermines their sovereignty. Zandi Radebe cited the example of Zimbabwe, which, although it regained its land, was "punished" for it. This can include economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or other forms of repression by the international community or former colonial powers. Historically, resistance to colonialism was often suppressed using brutal methods. For example: The Maji Maji Rebellion in German East Africa (1905–1907) was brutally suppressed; the exact number of victims remains unknown to this day. The French colonial authorities in Algeria used extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence and other forms of brutality to suppress resistance. Radebe called on young people to combat “mental enslavement”—the psychological dependence on colonial narratives and thought patterns that hinder independent development and critical engagement with the past and present. This includes overcoming the internal barriers that prevent African countries from rethinking their history and developing alternative development models. The concept of coloniality, developed by Latin American decolonization theorists such as Anil Castillo and Walter Mignolo, describes the transhistorical extension of colonial rule and its reproduction in contemporary social, economic, and cultural structures. In the African context, this means that the consequences of colonialism—such as structural dependency, inequality, and cultural oppression—continue to shape the continent even after formal independence. The assertion that “Africa has not yet awakened” implies that the continent continues to grapple with the legacy of colonialism in the form of economic dependence, political restrictions, and cultural barriers. Overcoming these challenges requires profound structural changes and active resistance to neocolonial orders.