Donald Trump and Africa

Donald Trump and Africa

: Important aspects of his policies During his first term in office (2017–2021), Donald Trump pursued an isolationist foreign policy under the motto "America First." This approach significantly shaped US relations with Africa. “America First” is not a purely isolationist foreign policy, but rather a transactional approach that prioritizes US interests. It shapes US-Africa relations by focusing on economic advantages and security threats, leading to reduced aid and selective engagement. “America First” emphasizes non-interventionism and protectionism, historically rooted in the lead-up to World War II and revived under President Trump. Under Trump, it means prioritizing bilateral deals over multilateralism, with skepticism toward established aid programs. Isolationism is evident in withdrawals such as the reduction of USAID, while selective military strikes (eg, against ISIS in Nigeria in 2025) serve US security. The impact on Africa is that this policy has led to massive aid cuts, the cancellation of life-saving programs like PEPFAR, and the recall of ambassadors to 13–15 African countries by the end of 2025. Initiatives like "Prosper Africa" promote US trade and investment as a counterweight to China, but prioritize commercial advantages. This creates gaps that China fills and weakens US influence amidst growing African geopolitics. The most important feature of this policy is limited personal involvement. Trump did not visit Africa during his entire term in office. He only met with two heads of state from sub-Saharan Africa: Muhammadu Buhari (Nigeria) and [name missing]. Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya). The government did not host a US-Africa summit, while Russia held its first Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in 2019. The cuts to development aid are having an impact. The government proposed significant cuts to development programs, many of which were focused on Africa. Congress largely blocked these cuts due to bipartisan support for development aid. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), in effect since 2000, grants eligible African countries duty-free access to the US market. Trump indicated he would not renew the AGOA after its expiration in 2025. He also proposed a general 10% tariff on all foreign goods, which would negatively impact African exports. To counter the growing influence of China and Russia, the government initiated the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) – better funded than its predecessors – to finance development projects in Africa; Prosper Africa – an initiative to promote US investment across the continent, to grow the African middle class and to improve the business climate (announced by National Security Advisor John Bolton). The diplomatic steps taken by his government include the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara (2020), which strengthened Morocco's role in the Abraham Accords; Somaliland was not recognized as an independent state (this possibility only arose later, before Trump's second term in office). Trump withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement, thereby reducing global climate finance. This hit Africa disproportionately hard, as the continent bears high costs for climate adaptation despite historically low emissions. The government approved the sale of Tucano fighter jets to Nigeria to fight Boko Haram – a move that contrasted with the reluctance of the previous government. Donald Trump's second term (starting in 2025): expectations and initial measures. Following Trump's return to office in 2025, African heads of state and government expressed various reactions – ranging from hope for economic partnerships to skepticism regarding development aid, migration and human rights policy. Initial developments and likely trends: During Trump's second meeting, budget cuts escalated: USAID was shut down, aid was held in seven countries, and a focus shifted to bilateral resource deals. The aid cuts particularly affect seven countries, including major African nations with programs against malaria, HIV, and cholera. Experts warn of mass deaths due to a lack of medical care and refugee assistance. Africa, as the region most affected, is now adjusting its budgets. Courts blocked some of the cuts, but USAID has been considered "terminated" since July 2025 under Secretary of State Rubio. This marks a fundamental reversal of US foreign policy, with immediate effects on global development and stability. Military action remains limited to direct threats, while development aid is being reduced. Africa must rely on regional cooperation such as the AfCFTA, as US engagement is now strictly benefit-oriented. Trump's stance on AGOA remains unchanged; he shows little interest in extending the program. A proposed 10 percent tariff on imports would make African goods more expensive in the US, potentially reducing exports and negatively impacting economies like South Africa's (a major user of the AGOA agreement). Aid and health programs. There are concerns that Trump could cut all development aid; he could end PEPFAR (the US program to combat HIV in Africa), partly due to his opposition to abortion and resistance in Congress. Trump promised mass deportations of undocumented migrants. This affects African migrants: their numbers at the US-Mexican border rose from 13,000 (2022) to 58,000 (2023). He could also reinstate immigration restrictions specifically targeting certain African countries (as he did during his first term for Nigeria, Eritrea, Sudan, and Tanzania). Since 2025, the USA has significantly tightened immigration and entry regulations for several African countries, in some cases with complete entry or visa bans, in others with stronger controls and requirements. Entry bans and “travel bans” Nationals of some African countries are effectively banned from entering the USA unless they already have permanent residency or are granted exceptions on a case-by-case basis. This includes, among other things, - Equatorial Guinea, - Eritrea, - Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), - Libya, - Somalia, - Sudan, - Chad. For these countries, new immigration or tourist visas are generally no longer issued, or there is a general entry ban. Partial restrictions For other African countries, there are no complete bans, but strong restrictions or additional hurdles: Burundi, Sierra Leone and Togo, among others, have certain visa categories with special conditions or restrictions. In some cases, additional security checks or special forms are required, which makes processing significantly longer and more complicated. New halt to immigration visas (2026) Since January 2026, the US government has suspended the processing of immigration visas (ie, visas for permanent residence and Green Card applications) for a total of 75 countries, including several African nations. Specifically, this applies to 26 African countries, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and others. Citizens of these countries can still apply for regular visas (eg, for visits, studies, or certain work situations), but applications for permanent residency in the US will not be processed for the time being. The US government justifies the measure with the demand to ensure that new migrants remain financially independent and do not become a "public charge". Experts see this as a further step by the Trump administration to tighten restrictive immigration policies, especially towards countries from Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia. From an African perspective, around one third of the affected countries are in Africa, including countries such as Somalia, Nigeria, and some North and West African states. Additional financial hurdles have been introduced for certain African countries: Travelers from Malawi and Zambia with tourist or business visas will have to pay a deposit of up to US$15,000 from a certain date to "ensure" compliance with the conditions of stay. US authorities justify such measures with the concern that visitors might no longer be able to leave the US and claim social benefits. The African reactions and counter-sanctions are that several African governments have reacted to the US entry restrictions with anger and, in some cases, with countermeasures: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have already imposed or are threatening to impose entry restrictions on US citizens or nationals. Other African countries complain about the discrimination against entire regions and warn of economic and diplomatic consequences, for example for trade, tourism and education. Trump has weakened protections for LGBTQ+ communities, including by abolishing the rule that only two genders should be recognized in official documents. By executive order, Trump mandated the recognition of only two genders (male and female), eliminating options like "X" in official documents. He has barred transgender people from military service and women's sports to maintain fairness and operational readiness, and he has cut federal funding for gender-affirming surgeries for minors, which he termed "mutilation." Trump withdrew the US from the World Health Organization (WHO), a key partner for Africa in health emergencies (Ebola, COVID-19, MPOX). This weakens Africa's underfunded health systems. The US is expanding its military presence in Africa, primarily by seeking new bases and smaller facilities, after reducing its presence in several countries, including Chad and Niger. It is currently in particularly intensive negotiations with Gulf Coast countries such as Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Benin regarding the establishment of new air force and drone bases. The US is looking for alternatives to the lost base in Agadez (Niger) and sees Ivory Coast, Ghana and Benin as suitable locations for smaller bases and cooperative security sites. After withdrawing from Niger and parts of Chad, they are shifting their activities towards the West African coast to compensate for the establishment of Russian and other foreign military presence in the Sahel region. The classic large US base in Africa remains Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, from which the US primarily monitors Al-Shabaab and other regional threats in the Horn of Africa. Independently of Djibouti, the US Army operates a network of approximately 50-60 smaller bases, operational and drone sites in several African countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad and Mali. Washington's stated justification is primarily "combating terrorism" and supporting partner states, for example through training and joint exercises. Strategically, however, it is also about countering the growing presence of Russia, as well as China and other powers in Africa, and securing control over important sea lanes and coastal regions (Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa). There is speculation that Trump might recognize Somaliland in order to strengthen US influence in the Red Sea. Relations with Kenya (a key non-NATO ally) remain important for US interests in East Africa. The relationship between the US and Kenya has been close and strategic since Kenya's independence in 1964. Kenya is considered a key US partner in East Africa, particularly regarding security, trade, and health. Kenya provides significant support to the US in the fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia and in international missions such as the one in Haiti, where the US funded a Kenyan police force with $300 million. The US views Kenya as a counterweight to the influence of China, Russia, and other powers in Africa. Since 2018, the partnership has been strategically enhanced, focusing on economic growth and extending the AGOA program for duty-free market access. Kenya is seeking a free trade agreement to attract investment and manage debt. In December 2025, Foreign Minister Marco Rubio and President Ruto signed a five-year agreement for $1.6 billion in US aid for Kenya's health system, as part of the Trump administration's "America First" policy. This follows substantial HIV/AIDS funding and aims to promote Kenya's self-reliance. Under President Trump (inaugurated in 2025), the US prioritizes bilateral agreements with reliable partners like Kenya, while relations with other African states cool. State visits like Ruto's during Biden's presidency in 2024 underscore this continuity. The DFC and Prosper Africa projects are expected to continue, as they serve the goal of countering China's economic influence. However, Trump could reassess major infrastructure projects (eg, the Lobito Corridor, a Biden-era initiative for transporting critical minerals). Summary Trump's Africa policy is transaction-oriented and driven by US interests: economic gain, access to resources, and competition with China and Russia. It prioritizes private investment and security cooperation over development aid and democracy promotion. While initiatives like Prosper Africa and the DFC remain instruments of cooperation, cuts to AGOA, development aid, and climate/health programs could strain relations. African states, which now play a more central role on the world stage, have more options for action—therefore, it is crucial for Washington to adapt its approach to remain relevant. During his second term, Trump pursued a clear "America First" strategy toward Africa, enshrined in the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). Africa is described therein as a "peripheral" (non-central) theater for US interests, requiring strategic austerity. The core principle: moving away from development aid and dependency toward trade, investment, and mutual benefit – "Trade not Aid." "America First is fully compatible with Africa First," as one senior US diplomat put it. The three main pillars of the strategy (as of March 2026) 1. Commercial Diplomacy. US ambassadors to Africa are evaluated based on the number of deals they broker for American companies. The focus is on critical minerals (eg, cobalt, lithium from the DRC, Zambia, etc.), energy, and raw materials, where Africa has large reserves. The goal is for US companies to profit, not just provide "aid." Projects like the Lobito Corridor (for mineral exports) are continued if they serve US interests. AGOA (the trade agreement for duty-free access to African products) is extended for another year, but with increased pressure for "reciprocal" conditions (more US exports to Africa). 2. The restructuring of foreign aid has resulted in significant cuts to USAID and traditional development aid. Instead, bilateral partnerships are being established with "capable and reliable" countries. Aid is to be provided only where direct US interests (security, trade) are affected. Critics call it a retreat, while proponents speak of greater efficiency and less waste. 3. In conflict resolution and the fight against terrorism, Trump positions himself as the "President of Peace." There were mediation attempts between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—with the ultimate motive of securing access to mineral resources. Similar efforts were made in Sudan. At the same time, targeted military strikes were carried out against Islamists, for example, during the Christmas 2025 attacks in Nigeria against IS targets (with a focus on protecting Christians). Terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or ISIS affiliates remain in the crosshairs, but only selectively where they directly threaten US interests. Instability is "tolerated" as long as it does not directly affect the US. Special cases and conflicts - South Africa: High tensions. Trump accuses the government of "genocide" against white farmers (Africans), has held aid, and facilitated the resettlement of white South Africans as refugees in the USA. South Africa was also disinvited from the G20 2026. This is a clear "carrot and stick" approach with an ideological component (protection of minorities, criticism of land expropriation). - Competition from China: Implicitly central. The US wants to contain China's influence (Belt and Road Initiative, mineral deals) through its own investments, without a large military presence. - Migration and security: Pressure on countries considered to be countries of origin or transit for migration to the USA. Visa restrictions for some African states. Overall assessment The policy is transactional: Africa is viewed as a market and supplier of raw materials, not as a development project. Many African observers welcome the pragmatism and the move away from "moralizing," but criticize the withdrawal from broad cooperation and the risk that China and others will fill the gap. The NSS devotes only a few paragraphs to Africa at the end—a sign that the continent is not a top priority, except when it comes to minerals, terrorism, or trade. In practice, this means for African countries: those who strike good deals with US companies, create stable conditions, and respect US interests can benefit. Those who don't feel the "stick" (aid cuts, public criticism). Whether this is more stable in the long run than previous approaches remains to be seen – so far, the focus has been on quick, visible successes for America.