The Manosphere Turns on Trump

About half an hour into the 694th episode of the Flagrant podcast, following a lively debate about pubic hair removal, Andrew Schulz leaned back on the couch, abruptly ending the conversation. "Do you—do you also have some kind of existential fear about the war?" he asked his co-hosts. Schulz seemed to feel it himself. "Americans can't fucking afford health insurance," he said later. "They don't care what's happening in Iran!" Warmongers had been working toward this war for years, he added. With President Trump, they had "found someone stupid enough for it." Schulz voted for Trump in 2024 after having him as a guest on his podcast—a move that angered many liberals. But the 42-year-old comedian was never a committed MAGA supporter, nor is he an outspoken Republican. Rather, Schulz represents a significant portion of Trump's voter base: ideology-agnostic men who value free speech and are drawn to politicians who oppose the establishment and—perhaps more importantly—the woke movement. (Podcasters and comedians Joe Rogan, Theo Von, Tim Dillon, and Dave Smith all fall into this category.) With their help, Trump achieved his unlikely comeback. Some subgroups (Red Pill, MGTOW, Traditionalists, Libertarians) overlap with Trump's voter coalition for 2024; others have consistently kept their distance from him. The new article in The Atlantic (published yesterday) examines the criticism leveled at Trump's actions during his second term by voices such as Andrew Schulz, Joe Rogan, Tim Dillon, and Shawn Ryan—particularly the escalation of the Iran conflict, the handling of the Epstein documents, spending, and deportations. These men played a key role in mobilizing young men in 2024 by presenting Trump as an anti-religious, testosterone-fueled alternative to the sober rhetoric of the Democrats. Now they accuse him of betraying his core promises (no endless wars, fighting corruption, fiscal discipline). A valid question: How many more cracks are there before the entire coalition collapses? The cracks are real and predictable. It didn't start with Iran. In mid-2025, delays in the release of the Epstein documents sparked outrage (Rogan denounced this as a cover-up). The raids on immigrants were called "insane" by some. Spending exploded. The Iran intervention (portrayed in the article as a radical break with the isolationism of "America First") further inflamed the situation. Schulz wrote in "Flagrant": Americans "can't fucking afford health care" while funding distant conflicts; he accused the administration of doing the "exact opposite" of what he himself had voted for. Dillon invoked the Rapture. Ryan quoted Trump's old anti-war promises and called them lies. Polls indicate a decline in support. Trump's approval ratings among young people have fallen; independents are more opposed to him than during his first term (Economist/YouGov, February 2026). The Republican base largely supports his Iran policy, while younger/Republican-leaning independents are more skeptical. The number of "don't know" responses is rising—a classic sign of post-election regret. Why it hurts these people so much. The manosphere scene is not very ideologically driven. They liked Trump's persona (anti-elite attitude, focus on border security, successes in the culture war) better than any rigid doctrine. When reality caught up with them—geopolitics requires compromise, bureaucracy continues to drag on, budgets explode—they felt betrayed. The same pattern as 2016–2020: initial hype, then complaints that the wall wasn't built fast enough, and finally the 2024 re-election. Coalitions are constantly crumbling; they rarely break up cleanly. Politics isn't a cult of purity—it's a transactional alliance. Trump's lead among young men in 2024 was real (roughly 15 percentage points higher among 18- to 29-year-olds compared to 2020) and was driven more by podcasts, memes, and the backlash against his overblown "woke" agenda than by detailed policy papers. But: This isn't a new phenomenon. The same media outlets fueled the uproar surrounding the Epstein affair in July 2025, as well as issues like immigration and gambling taxes. Despite this, Trump still won. Loud podcasters don't automatically translate into a mass exodus. Most male Trump voters between 18 and 29 didn't listen to *Flagrant* daily; they responded to broader signals (the economy, border chaos under Biden-Harris, campus nonsense). – Diversity within the movement. The manosphere includes isolationists who hate neoconservatives, but also men who cheered the Houthi attacks before the election. Opponents of war (of the Massie type) have always been a fringe group. Others prioritize domestic successes and tolerate foreign policy realism. Rogan and his ilk aren't switching to the Democrats—they're venting their frustration and then probably tuning out or staying home. Apathy, not defection, is the real risk for Republicans in the midterm elections. Historical precedents. Every Trump coalition has publicly “broken down”—the Access Hollywood video, impeachment proceedings, January 6th, tariffs that angered businesses, COVID vaccines, and so on—yet the core held because the alternatives were perceived as worse. Young men didn't vote for a utopia in 2024; they voted against what they perceived as contempt for the elites. As inflation eases, borders become more secure, and cultural resistance persists, sentiment recovers. Foreign policy rarely decides domestic elections unless it drives up gas prices or forces young people into military service. The real test isn't a war or a podcast rant—it's about meeting expectations. The article's thesis (that youth apathy could trigger a "blue wave") is classic wishful thinking from a left-leaning media outlet that dismissed the manosphere as toxic misogynists for years—until it contributed to Trump's election. Coalitions only "break down" when the center can no longer hold firm *and* a better alternative emerges. Currently, Democrats are still seen as self-righteous moralizers on issues of gender equality, freedom of speech, and youth policy. A younger, populist left (perhaps anti-war socialists?) may scratch the surface, but the root causes of the manosphere—male discontent, economic anxieties, and cultural backlash—don't disappear. The “No Kings” movement demonstrated against the policies of US President Donald Trump** on Saturday, March 28, 2026. Under the motto "No Kings", civil society alliances in all 50 states mobilized against Trump's government and its policies, which are perceived by many critics as increasingly authoritarian and a threat to democracy. More than 3,000 demonstrations and rallies have been registered. The organizers of the protests estimate the total number of participants nationwide at around 8 to 9 million people, which they describe as one of the largest nationwide protest mobilizations in US history. These figures are self-reported by the organizers and have not yet been independently empirically verified; independent media only report that millions have demonstrated in many cities. Conclusion: Coalitions can break down dozens of times because people are fickle and presidents reach their limits. Trump has survived worse. If he manages to strike a balance between the economy and border security without endless wars or being co-opted by elites, men will grumble, but they will vote again. Otherwise, apathy will grow, and someone else (Massie? Fuentes? A populist after Trump?) will fill the vacuum. This isn't a collapse—it's the evolution of politics. The manosphere has always been a symptom of broader male discontent, not a disciplined voting bloc.

https://www.wnyc.org/story/some-manosphere-podcasters-who-backed-trump-are-turning-from-him/ https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-andrew-schulz-joe-rogan-tim-dillon-maga-2098045 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/03/iran-war-trump-maga/686571/