Ethiopia's ancient Thanksgiving is for forgiveness and unit

Ethiopia's ancient Thanksgiving is for forgiveness and unit We have a very interesting topic here! There is an important nuance: there is no uniform, "nationwide" thanksgiving in Ethiopia, but it actually exists an outstanding example, which is often described exactly. The speech is from the irreecha festival of the oromo people. The Oromo (natural name OROMOO) are the largest ethnic group of Ethiopia and one of the largest peoples of Africa. They live mainly in the Oromia region in Ethiopia, but also in parts of Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. Around 33-40 million people; In Ethiopia, they provide about a third to 40% of the total population. Their language is the Afaan Oromoo (also called OroIfIs), an East Cuditant Language of the Afroasian Language Family; After talking numbers one of the most important languages of Africa. It is often referred to as "old Ethiopian Thanksgiving", and its core is actually characterized by the thoughts of reconciliation and unity.

Irreecha is celebrated at the end of the rainy season - about in October. For the Oromo, this is a time of the renewal of nature, because the rainfall ends, and the time of the rich harvest begins. People gather to thank the deity Waaqa for fertility, peace, health and a good harvest. But the meaning of the festival goes beyond the mere thanks for the gave earth. Before the actual celebration, the participants strive for reconciliation; They leave the risks, anger and mistrust behind. Here is the idea of forgiveness: the festival becomes a moment of spiritual cleaning and the restoration of human bonds. The great gathering as well as the common rituals, songs and dances also strengthen the feeling of unity. People from different clans and with different backgrounds feel on this day as part of a large whole. The celebrations often take place on holy lakes - for example at the Hora Finfinne in Addis Ababa or at the Hora Arsadi in Bishoftu. The participants wear colorful traditional clothes and bring fresh grasses and flowers. One of the symbolic rituals is dipping these herbs and flowers in water: this is a sign of the bondage of human, nature and a higher power as well as a symbol of life and renewal. Oldest and traditional fees (such as "Abba Gadaa") speak prayers. Irreeecha is closely linked to the Gadaa system - an old self-governmental system and cultural traditional work of the Oromo-Volkes, which is even recognized by UNESCO. The Ethiopian authorities see in the feast of great potential: his values - unity, national consensus and reconciliation - can benefit all the country. Therefore, special forums are held in which this ideas can be further developed in which these ideas can be discussed. In addition, there are initiatives to record IRREECHA in the list of UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage. The Oromo commit numerous holidays and memorial days that have been divided into three categories: traditional rites of Waaqeffanna religion, secular events and holidays of religions that the Oromo belongs today (Christianity and Islam). Here are the most important of this. Irreeecha - more than just a party The already mentioned Thanksgiving actually takes place twice a year: in autumn as "Irreecha Birraa" (in October, on the water) and in the spring as "Irreecha Arfaasaa" or "Irreeecha Malkaa" (in April). There is also a variant that is celebrated on hillcases: "irreeecha tulluu". In all these occasions, the same core content is the focus: Waaq (God) to thank as well as to ask peace and reconciliation. Ateetee - the "singing" festival of women, ... is a central institution in the traditional oromo society that a female deity or a female spirit, a ritual practice and a women led system for dispute resolution, for Prayers and social security. An independent and very characteristic tradition is "Ateetee", a ritual festival of Oromo women (especially with the Arsi). It is committed from different occasions: In order to ask for drought to prove rain to protect diseases, protect the right pregnant women and young mothers, to seek a good harvest or simply express pleasure. The women gather on the riverbank or under a sacred tree, sing "atteetee" songs and keep the ritual rod "sink" in their hands - a symbol of female strength and the right to respect. It is not only a feast, but also an instrument of justice: If someone was wrong, the women look up the house of the causer and sing there until a reconciliation and a reparation are achieved. In the region Shoa "Ateetee" is sometimes celebrated together with the Orthodox "Meschel" - firmly. Pilgrimage to Abbaa Mudaa, is considered a mediator between Waaqaa (the Creator) and the Oromo-People and as guardian and the Waaqaa Laws Guardians (Seera Waaqaa). Every eight years a large pilgrimage to Abbaa Mudaa takes place - the top priest of Waaqffanna. Pilgrims from all areas of Oromo are facing this holy site to receive blessing and anointing. Once this was both a religious as well as an event incidental event; Today, the festival "Irreecha" on the Arsadi Lake has largely taken over this role. Civil memorial days After the oromo calendar (where the day begins with sunset), secular memorial days are also committed: Ayyana Amajjii - January 1, New Year; More often than Ayyaana Amajjii is an annual cultural and political commemoration of the Oromo, which takes place on January 1 and symbolizes the freedom fight and resistance of the Oromo against oppression. Ayyaana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa (sometimes written Gabrummaa) is the Oromo Day of the Revolt against the submission, which committed annually on November 9th (Sadaasa 9 in the Oromo Calendar) becomes. The date marks the beginning of the fincila Diddaa Gabrummaa (FDG) - the "revolt against submission" - a mass protest movement, which started all oromia on November 9, 2005, after the Oromo Liberation Front (ABO / OLF) had called. On this day students, young people (organized later than Qeerroo organized), farmers and other social groups coordinated demonstrations against the rule of the Ethiopian Government, which denote Oromo nationalists as colonial rule (Gabrummaa). The FDG is regarded as a turning point in the nationalist discourse of the Oromo, which: Large parts of the Oromo Society were mobilized at continued protest. Put the organizational and emotional foundation for the later, even larger fincila Xumura Gabrummaa (FXG) protests from 2015. How is it observed? Name: Ayyaana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa means literally "Fest / Day of the Revolt against submission". It must first be clarified that there is no consistent proof that the Ethiopian government "all" oromo has been systematically and even thundered over centuries. But there are quite serious and repeated allegations and evidence that certain regime periods and political decisions have led to a marginalized, oppressive situation for many oromo. Here are some aspects that justify this criticism: Already under Kaiser Haile Selassie (1930-1974) there was strong centralization: the semi-autonomous status of many Oromo states was repealed. At the same time, the own language AFAAN OROMOO was officially limited - on the radio, at school, in dishes. Later, until about 1991, one was not allowed to write in Ethiopia in Oromo or produce literature. When Oromo protested for their rights - for example against land opinion without adequate compensation (as in the controversial "Addis Ababa Master Plan", the parts of Oromia in the capital inclusion) - these demonstrations were often laid in force. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch reported several times over excessive violence through security forces, arbitrary arrests, arrests without charge and even extrajudicial killings. The government used laws such as anti-terrorism proclamation to silence independent voices, journalists, activists or members of opposition parties (such as OFDM or OPC). Sometimes the existence of movements such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was taken as a reason to put the entire population under pressure. Many Oromo live in rural regions and are dependent on traditional ways of life (grain economy, agriculture). These were under pressure by state policy (eg by ignoring traditional rights of use in connection with development projects). However, it is important to emphasize that the situation has changed across different regimes. Following the introduction of ethnic federalism in 1992, Oromo had the opportunity to manage themselves in Oromia and develop their language and culture actively. The criticism comes not only from the outside, but also within the Oromo community that fights about its own rights and identity. More recently, other factors are added that exacerbate the situation - such as severe drought perdings that further burden the agricultural basis. There are quite serious evidence for oppression, but it would be simplifying to paint the whole picture only black and white. The reality is a complex network of historical, political and economic factors. In Oromo activist and diaspora travel, the day is marked with explanations, events and social media campaigns that remind of the history of the FDG and connect them with current struggles to land, language, political representation and self-determination. Ayyaana means "festival", "celebration" or "spirit / essence" on Afaan oromoo. Amajjii is the name of the first month in the traditional oromo calendar, which corresponds approximately to January. Ayyaana Amajjii means literally "Feast of Amajjii" or "New Year / Januarfest". Ayyaana Amajjii has been celebrating for more than 40 years than more than just a New Year. In the nationalist discourse of the Oromo it marks: One day in honor of the freedom fighters of the Oromo, who left their lives in the fight for liberation and self-determination. A symbol of strength, resilience and hope, formulated as "light over dark" and "freedom over suppression". A ritual reduction of a decisive act of resistance in the Oromo-liberation movement, which remains in memory of a much stronger opponent as a victory of some less bolds against a much stronger opponent In practice, the day of political and civil society groups of the Oromo (especially in the Diaspora) is used for: Commemorative events, speeches and cultural programs. Lighting amajjii torches or candles on hills or heights as a symbol of fight. Renewal of the confession to the rights, identity and political objectives of the Oromo. In addition to his political importance, Ayyaana Amajjii also acts as: An oromo New Year celebration marked the beginning of Amajjii in the Oromo Calendar. A moment of cultural expression: music, dance, poetry and storytelling, which strengthen the identity and history of Oromo Ayyana Guyyaa Gootaaa - April 15, Day of Oromo Martyr; This remembrance day goes back to a concrete event: On April 15, 1980, ten high-ranking leaders of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) - including the Secretary General Magarsaa Barii - in the Shinniigaa Desert (on the way to a diplomatic meeting in Somalia) captured and executed by Somali bandits. Her kidnappers had demanded Muslims and Christians should separate, with only the Muslims spared. The ten Oromo leaders rejected this, explained "We are first oromo" and died together. Since then, 15 April is celebrated as Guyyaa Gootata Oromoo (Day of Oromo Heroes) or Guyyaa Yaadannoo Goota Oromoo (Oromo-Martyr Train Day). The OLF National Council (Gumii Sabaa) officially sets the day in 1984 as a martyr remembrance day. The day is for several goals: Reminder of those oromo heroines and heroes who have sacrificed their lives for the restoration of oromo culture, identity and human dignity that were suppressed under Ethiopian colonialism. Recognition of the relationship between martyrium, bravery, patriotism and oromummaa (Oromo identity). Obligation to continue the struggle started by the martyrs to victory. Solidarity with the activists who are fighting today in Oromia. Awareness that oromo liberation requires heavy victims and serve the fallen as revolutionary role models. In the Oromo calendar begins a "day" at sunset, so all holidays start in the evening before the specified date. The remembrance day is committed by Oromo communities worldwide with commemoria, cultural events and political speeches. There is also a state guyyaa Gootaaa (HeroDag) in Ethiopia, which was originally laid on the 28th Bitootessa (March) and later on the 27th EBLA (April). This is a national Ethiopian holiday, while Ayyaana Guyyaa Gototaa specifically honors the Oromo martyrs and is monitored primarily by Oromo organizations and diasporage facilities. Ayyana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa - November 9, Day of uprising against the subjugation; The date marks the beginning of the fincila Diddaa Gabrummaa (FDG) - the "revolt against submission" - a mass protest movement, which started all oromia on November 9, 2005, after the Oromo Liberation Front (ABO / OLF) had called. On this day students, young people (organized later than Qeerroo organized), farmers and other social groups coordinated demonstrations against the rule of the Ethiopian Government, which denote Oromo nationalists as colonial rule (Gabrummaa). The FDG is regarded as a turning point in the nationalist discourse of the Oromo, which: Large parts of the Oromo Society were mobilized at continued protest. Put the organizational and emotional foundation for the later, even larger fincila Xumura Gabrummaa (FXG) protests from 2015. Ayyaana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa means literally "Fest / Day of the Revolt against submission". In Oromo activist and diaspora travel, the day is marked with explanations, events and social media campaigns that remind of the history of the FDG and connect them with current struggles to land, language, political representation and self-determination. Irreecha - end of September or early October; The date depends on astronomical observations. Religious holidays Since there are under the Oromo Christians, Muslims and supporters of traditional faith, they also celebrate the common festivals of their respective faiths - about Christmas, Easter, Eid Al-Fitr, Eid Al-Adha and others. The followers of the Waaqeffanna also commit their own, special day: Ekeraa in December. It is a commemoration of deceased relatives where bread, cheese with butter, beer and honey are served. Ceremonies of the GADAA system, is the traditional, democratically organized company and government system of the Oromo in the Horn of Africa, especially in Ethiopia. It regulates political, legal, social, economic and ritual affairs and was recognized by UNESCO in 2016 as an intangible cultural heritage of humanity. Finally, the Gadaa system itself determines the life rhythm: Every eight years, the power transfer takes place from an age group to the next, accompanied by large rites and celebrations. The fixed calendar of the Oromo is thus largely "integrated" in this old system. Swell https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/ethnic-and-cultural-studies/oromo-people https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/oromo_people https://advocacy4oromia.org/2021/11/04/genocidal-conquest-plunder-of-resources-and-dehumanization-of-the-oromo-in-ethiopia/ https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/ethiopia-civil-society-calls-upon-human-rights-council-investigate-government https://www.dw.com/en/hrw-scale-of-crackdown-on-ethiopias-oromo-unprecedented/a-19335562 https://minorityrights.org/communities/oromo https://ollaa.org/ethiopias-forgotten-crisis/ https://minorityrights.org/communities/oromo

The Oyo Kingdom and the Oyo Empire

The Oyo Kingdom and the Oyo Empire Often these terms are used synonym, but there is a fine difference, because that Oyo Kingdom (Kingdom Oyo) stands for the beginnings and the early phase, while the Oyo Empire (Reich Oyo) the time of bloom and massive Expansion designated. Oyo Kingdom, this is about the emergence of the state. According to the hearing of Yoruba, Oranmiyan (also oranyan) - a prince from the Kingdom of Ile-IFE and son of Oduduwas (he is the legendary founder and first divine king (Ooni) by Ile-IFE and the father of the people of the Yoruba in today's southwest Nigeria and in parts of Benin. He is worshiped both as a historical ruler, which is the classic IFE period (about 800-1100 AD) Initiated, as well as oriṣa (deity), which is associated with the creation and the kingship in the religion of Yoruba) - as a founder. The legend after the brothers was in dispute during a campaign against northern neighbors in dispute, and Oranmiyan's army proved to be too weak for an attack. A local chief in Bussa gave him a snake with a magical amulet and pointed him to follow her until she stopped and blown in the ground - there he should start the city. The place got the name Ajaka. Oranmiyan made Oyo to his kingdom and became the first OBA (ruler of Yoruba) titled Alaafin ("owner of the palace"). According to Oduduwa, various rulers followed on the throne of Ile-IFE; The traditional royal lists count today 51 Ooni (kings) of IFE, starting with Oduduwa as the first Ooni. 1. Oduduwa (founder) 2. Osangangan Obamakin 3. Ogun 4. Obalufon Gbogbodirin 5. Obalufon Alayemore 6.; oranmiyan 7. Ayetise 8. Lajamisan ... and on to the present 51. Ooni. Some sources emphasize that Oranmiyan, a son Oduduwas, as a fourth or sixth Ooni (depending on the count), returned the dynastic line to Oduduwa's bloodline; About his son Lajamisan, the later rulers resulted from the successor to the successor. The official count leads from Oduduwa to today's monarch Ooni Adeyye Eneritan Ogunwusi (Ojaja II), which has been governed since December 2015 and as 51. Ooni as well as "Arole Oduduwa" (Erbe of Oduduwas spiritual throne). Succession is traditionally reflected between several rulers (eg Giesi, Osinkola, Lafogido, OGBoru, Lisabi). Ajaka was overthrown - twice, which makes him the only Alaafin (king) of Oyo, who ruled twice. The first deduction took place after the death of his father Oranmiyan (Oranyan), the first OBA of Oyo, followed by Ajaka as Alaafin. His brother Shango, who was later worshiped as God of Thunder and Lightning, followed him. Ajaka was considered to be mild, he made his subcoats too many freedom and neglected the empected military assertiveness for the empire. That's why he was discontinued and replaced by his warrior brother Shango (Sango). According to Shango's end - there are no credible documents here, so in some versions its end by suicide / departure, but in others told by banishment - Ajaka was recalled. In his second government period, he is described as much harder, authoritarian and "warful". Ajaka's destiny illustrates a central principle of the early Oyo Empire, because the Alaafin had to demonstrate military strength and control over the provincial protectors, otherwise he was considered too weak, Easkonnten otherwise the royal monasteries (Oyo Mesi) for resignation or - in later practice - forcing the ritual suicide. Ajaka remains particularly memory because after a deduction, he climbed the throne again. Nothing stays as it is. The collapse was more of a creeping process than a sudden blow - a mixture of internal political decomposition and external invasion, which hovered over about 80 years. Here are the most important events in chronological order. Palace poster and a disturbed succession (1754-1796) The decay used early. In 1754, Gaha began to intrigue the Prime Minister of Oyo, together with the Oyo Mesi (the Council of State) to force successive Alaafins to the ritual suicide - between June and October 1754 alone met this Two rulers in a row. Alaafin Awonbioju sat 130 days on the throne, Labisi Just 17. Gaha's machinations were stopped in 1774 when Alaafin Abiodun finally let him. Abiodun then worsened the situation in other ways: he focused on economic development and coastal trade with Europeans, but neglected the army - that instrument with which the central government kept the provinces under control. In addition, he led unsuccessful campaigns against Borgu (1783) and Nupe (1789), where he lost numerous generals and soldiers. Awole, Afonja and the cleavage of Ilorin (1793-1817) The decisive turning joined Alaafin Awole, who murdered his father Abiodun and clarified the throne. He ordered his supreme military commander to attack the Aare-Ona-Kakanfo Afonja of Ilorin, ICEE-ILE - a place that Afonja was never allowed to attack under Eid - and then the market town Apomu, which belonged to Ile-IFE; This was taboo too. Afonja refused the first command; After plundering ApoMu - the execution of the second command - he marched on the capital and demanded Awoles Abdaktion. Awole then committed ritual suicide. This was followed by the chaos, a struggle for the throne, rulers who only had a few months in power, and an unoccupied throne from about 1797 to 1802. This power vacuum made it possible to have regional commands - everyone ahead of Afonja - to act as independent powers. Afonja then closed an alliance with Shehu Alimi, a Muslim scholars of the Fulani, as well as with the growing Muslim community of the region. In 1817 he released Ilorin from Oyo. The Sokoto Jihad and the cleavage of ILORIN (1804-1823) Here was struck from the outside. In 1804, Uzman initiated the Fodio of Sokoto from the Jihad of the Fulani; The movement spread south into the areas of Nupe and Ilorin, where the fines of the Fulani were already resident. A Sokoto-Jihad Inspired Uprising of Muslim Slaves in Ilorin in 1817 triggered a constitutional crisis and weakened the control of Oyo's over the region. In 1823, Afonja was killed by his former allies, and Ilorin fell to the caliphate of Sokoto. The loss of Ilorin was devastating: It was the northern Garrison Oyos, the checkpoint on the trade routes to Niger and - which was crucial - the source of supply for the cavalry horses from Nupe and Bariba on which the Military supremacy Oyos was based. The final military collapse (1823-1836) Ilorin then developed a base for robberies south. This was followed by a series of wars - the Ogele War (1823-24), the Mugbamugga War (1824) and the Wars of Kanla and Eleduwe (1825-26) - where the cavalry of Ilorin the armed forces Oyos repeatedly hit the escape and utilizing the fragmented command structure of the empire. Alaafin Oluewu came to live with these campaigns, and tributary chiefs began to subjugate Ilorin instead. Meanwhile, Dahomey claimed his independence in the West, and Oyo lost control of his trade routes to the coast. Around 1836 Fulani troops destroyed the capital Oyo-Ile, whereupon this was abandoned - the last alaafin died in the fight against the Armed Forces of Sokoto. The consequences The downfall triggered a massive resettlement wave of the Yoruba. Refugees moved south and founded a new capital in Ago Oja - today's New Oyo - as well as centers such as Ibadan and Ijaye; The EGBA in turn were pushed further to the south and founded 1830 AbeaKuta. The power vacuum unleashed a series of Yoruba civil wars that lasted up to about 1886. It is noteworthy that the sources date these events different. The cleavage of ilorin (1817) whose integration into the Sokoto caliphate (1823) and the destruction of oyo-ile (optionally 1835 or 1836) are the usual corner points; Depending on the view, however, the collapse as a whole is classified in the period between 1817 and 1836. The Oyo Empire Thus, the epoch is called the small kingdom developed into a mighty state. The heyday fell into the 17th and 18th centuries (about 1650-1750). What benefited this growth? For the trade advantageous geographical location was responsible for this; As well as the development of the cavalry - straight powerful riding troops formed the military main power, which allowed it to subdue neighbors. Structure of a multi-stage administration system, the core area (the metropolis OYO), the immediate dependent cities, the Egbado corridor (for connection to the coast) and Ajaland. During the time of the empire, Oyo subdued numerous other Yoruba states and expanded his influence on neighboring areas. For example, Oyo subdued the Kingdom of Dahomey after a series of campaigns (1724-1730, 1738-1748). Later, Oyo gained direct access to the sea over the dependent coastal state of Ajase (today's Porto Novo). The trade played an important role. Oyo acted as a mediator: It transported goods (including slaves) from the African hinterland to the coast, where they were taken over by European dealers. Due to the extent of this trade, the region even received the term "slave coast". To the major rulers of the Reich season counted Abiodun (about 1770-1789). He emerged victorious from a civil war, in which he crashed the powerful minister Gaha, who had actually ruled the land. Abiodun focused on the development of the economy and coastal trade. His focus on the economy of the military ultimately weakened the military potential of the center. Decline Over time, the empire was hollowed out by internal problems: dynastic disputes, palace stripes and failed military campus. Individual provinces began to split off. The neighbors also expressed pressure on foreign policy: in particular the expanding Islamic states in the north (especially the caliphate of Sokoto). As a result, the northern areas (for example, Ilorin) were conquered by the fulbe. The last Alaafin fell in 1836 in the fight against the armed forces of Sokoto, whereupon the old capital was abandoned. Later, the kingdom was recognized in a highly reduced form, with a new capital: ọyọ-ütìbà (Neu-Oyo). CITATIONS: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_rulers_of_the_yoruba_state_of_oyo adeyemi. - New Dawn Nigeria https://www.newdawnngr.com/2022/04/23/alafin-oyo-from-oranmiyan-to-lamidi-adyemi/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/oyo_empire https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ajaka https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/832945 https://www.nelocnews.com.ng/2026/07/history-of-alafin-of-oyo-empire-1210.html https://theafricanhistory.com/1549 https://www.wikiawand.com/en/articles/oyo_empire https://thinkafrica.net/oyo-empire/ https://human.libretexts.org/bookshelves/history/world_history/early_world d_civilizations_ (lumen) /11:_african_civilizations/11.16:_the_yoruba_states https://www.scribd.com/document/815393454/book-of-sango https://www.scribd.com/document/789479461/oyo-empire-wikipedia-1 https://encyclopedia.litcaf.com/culture/social-tradition/ajaka/ https://johnsonokunade.com/2020/03/the-history-of-old-oyo-empire-oyo-ile-and-past-alafin.html https://lasujournalofafricanstudies.org.ng/storage/publications/kuponu-1679244714.pdf

Freedom fighters never give up until they achieve their goal.

Tundu Lissu is a Tanzanian politician, lawyer, and activist who has become a prominent figure in the country's opposition. Here are the key facts about him—his biography is exceptionally eventful and dramatic.

He served as a Member of Parliament for the Singida East constituency (2010–2020). In January 2025, he was elected chairman of the CHADEMA party (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo—"Party for Democracy and Progress"), one of Tanzania's leading opposition forces. Previously, he headed the Tanganyika Law Society, the bar association for the country's mainland. He is known as a campaigner against corruption and an advocate for democracy and human rights. He frequently criticized the actions of the ruling party and demanded transparency and accountability from those in power. On September 7, 2017, unidentified individuals opened fire on Lissu’s vehicle in a parking lot near his parliamentary residence in Dodoma (Tanzania's capital). He sustained multiple gunshot wounds (to his abdomen, arm, and leg). Many opposition figures and international observers viewed the attack as politically motivated, given his confrontational stance toward the government. After receiving initial treatment at a local hospital, Lissu was transferred to Nairobi, Kenya; he subsequently underwent a lengthy rehabilitation process in Belgium. He spent around three years in Belgium receiving medical treatment. In July 2020, Lissu returned to Tanzania to run in the presidential election as the CHADEMA candidate. However, the election was marred by allegations of irregularities, and he was defeated. He later left the country temporarily once more but returned to his homeland for good in 2023. His political career was marked by further events, including renewed arrests—such as in 2024 on charges of incitement and high treason following a rally in Mbinga—and his exclusion from the 2025 election. While in detention, Lissu went on a hunger strike, demanding the right to attend court hearings in person rather than participating via video link. He also faced difficulties accessing his lawyers. Why Lissu matters Lissu became a symbol of resistance in Tanzania, particularly in light of the country's increasingly authoritarian political trends. He advocated for constitutional and political reforms, believing the nation needed a new order to prevent the repetition of past mistakes. When viewing the situation specifically through the lens of Lissu’s role, the key manifestations of this authoritarian trend and his response to them can be summarized as follows: - Restrictions on freedom of assembly and demonstration. Authorities repeatedly banned opposition rallies and arrested organizers. Lissu openly condemned this as the suppression of democracy and called for the repeal of restrictive laws. - Pressure on the media and control of information. Tanzania enforces strict media laws that hinder the work of independent publications; social media platforms and messaging services have been blocked. Lissu publicly criticized such measures as tools of censorship. - Legal and administrative pressure on the opposition. This includes arrests, charges of incitement and high treason, the disqualification of candidates, and difficulties in accessing legal counsel and court hearings. - Control over the electoral process. The opposition complained of electoral manipulation, A decisive turning point is associated with the presidency of John Magufuli (2015–2021): under his leadership, media laws were tightened, arrests of opposition figures increased, and public debate effectively ground to a halt. Some of these practices have continued under the current leadership, even though the tone has softened somewhat. For Lissu, this meant an ongoing confrontation with the state—ranging from parliamentary criticism to public advocacy for human rights.

Praise Aloikin Opoloje in Uganda arrested

Praise Aloikin Opoloje in Uganda arrested The police have confirmed the arrest of human rights activist Praise Aloikin Opoloje. Praise Aloikin Opoloje is a young Ugandan human rights defender, law student, and anti‑corruption activist who has become widely known for organizing peaceful protests—including a high‑profile “nude protest”—and for facing repeated arrests and detention as a result of her activism. Her full name is Aloikin Praise Opoloje (often styled “Praise Aloikin Opoloje”). She was born in 1999 in Pallisa district, eastern Uganda, into a peasant family; she has spoken about growing up seeing how corruption harms rural communities. She is a final‑year law student at Makerere University in Kampala; previously interned at Chapter Four Uganda as a legal trainee. She leads youth civic engagement through initiatives such as the "WeThePeople movement**, serves as Student Engagements Lead" at "OpenParly UG" (a youth parliamentary monitoring initiative), and volunteers with the "Dwona Initiative" on period poverty and misinformation. She is prominent because Opoloje rose to national and international attention in 2024–2025 through: - “March to Parliament” (July 2024). This is a youth‑led anti‑corruption demonstration demanding accountability over alleged misuse of public funds; she was among those arrested and later charged. - Kiteezi landfill protests in September 2024. After a landfill collapse killed dozens, she helped organize protests over government negligence; this led to further arrests and remand to Luzira Prison. - during the “Nude protest” in September 2024, she and two other women staged a topless/near‑nude street protest with “No Corruption” painted on their bodies, a tactic meant to shock authorities and the public into confronting systemic abuse. She reported experiencing physical and sexual violence during her arrests—including groping and strangulation by police officers, which is bad enough—and stated that she feared being killed or raped while in custody. She won the European Union’s annual award in Uganda for her courageous work on civil liberties, accountability, social justice, and anti‑corruption. She was named a finalist for this prestigious global human rights prize, recognized for mobilizing youth in peaceful protest against corruption and rights abuses. In late September 2026, Ugandan media reported that Opoloje was "taken into custody" after appearing at Namungoona Police Station; civil society groups initially alleged she was “abducted” by armed officers linked to military intelligence after she criticized the defence forces leadership online. Uganda Police later "confirmed she was in their custody" over allegations related to “social media misuse” and said she would be produced in court. Praise Aloikin Opoloje is a symbol of Uganda’s youth‑led, digitally amplified activism: a law student from a rural background who uses protests, social media, and civic education to challenge corruption and rights abuses—and who has paid a personal price through arrests, imprisonment, and ongoing legal cases, while gaining significant international recognition. Ihr Verschwinden vom Polizeirevier Namungoona hatte wenige Tage zuvor Besorgnis unter Aktivisten, Anwälten und Freunden ausgelöst. Polizeisprecher Kituuma Rusoke erklärte, Opoloje sei nicht entführt, sondern rechtmäßig festgenommen worden und befinde sich weiterhin in Polizeigewahrsam. Sie werde zu gegebener Zeit dem Gericht vorgeführt. Diese Klarstellung erfolgte im Anschluss an Berichte, wonach Opoloje auf das Polizeirevier vorgeladen und anschließend angeblich von bewaffneten Männern, die sich nicht auswiesen, abgeführt worden war. Polizei und Verteidigung hatten ihren Aufenthaltsort und ihren rechtlichen Status zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht öffentlich bestätigt. Ihre jüngste Festnahme erfolgte nach der Veröffentlichung eines Videos, in dem sie die Patriotische Liga Ugandas (PLU) und deren Vorsitzenden, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, kritisierte. Die Umstände des Videos und dessen Verbindung zu ihrer Festnahme wurden von Aktivisten diskutiert, die Polizei hat jedoch nicht öffentlich bestätigt, dass dies der direkte Grund für ihre Festnahme war. Die ugandische Anwaltskammer forderte unabhängig davon die sofortige Freilassung von Opoloje, während Anwälte und Menschenrechtsaktivisten Bedenken hinsichtlich der Umstände ihrer Inhaftierung äußerten und die Behörden aufforderten, über ihren Rechtsstatus und ihren Aufenthaltsort Rechenschaft abzulegen. Es gibt einige markante Beispiele, die zusammengenommen zeigen, wie die Jugend in Uganda Kreativität, Protest und digitale Werkzeuge miteinander verbindet. Das rote Barett. Dies ist wohl eines der bekanntesten Symbole. Es ist mit der „People Power“-Bewegung verknüpft, die von dem Politiker und ehemaligen Musiker Bobi Wine (Robert Kyagulanyi) angeführt wird. Für seine Anhänger wurde das Barett zu einem Zeichen des Widerstands und des Kampfes für Veränderungen. Die Behörden reagierten hart: Sie erklärten das rote Barett kurzerhand zur Militäruniform und verboten Zivilisten das Tragen unter Androhung von Verhaftung. Wine selbst kommentierte dies so: „Das ist ein Trick, um die Bedrohung für den autoritären Status quo im Keim zu ersticken. Aber ‚People Power‘ ist mehr als nur ein rotes Barett; wir kämpfen für die Zukunft Ugandas.“ Gelbe Schweine. Ein weiteres prägnantes Beispiel ist eine Aktion der Gruppe „Jobless Brotherhood“. Im Jahr 2014 brachten Aktivisten zwei gelb angemalte Ferkel ins Parlament – ​​Gelb ist die Farbe der Regierungspartei „National Resistance Movement“. Die Schweine symbolisierten die Gier und Korruption der Politiker, die öffentliche Gelder „verschlingen“. Später führte die Gruppe weitere ähnliche Aktionen durch – sie ließ beispielsweise Schweine frei, die in den Farben von Oppositionsparteien angemalt waren. Dieser visuelle, bisweilen schockierende Protest trug dazu bei, schnell die Aufmerksamkeit der Medien und der sozialen Netzwerke auf sich zu ziehen. Digitale Werkzeuge. Symbole an sich sind visuelle Elemente, doch ein wesentliches Merkmal des modernen ugandischen Jugendaktivismus ist die Art und Weise, wie digitale Plattformen ihn verstärken. Soziale Netzwerke (Facebook, Twitter) sind zu Instrumenten der schnellen Mobilisierung geworden: Über sie werden Proteste organisiert, politische Themen diskutiert sowie Online-Petitionen und Hashtag-Kampagnen gestartet. Das digitale Umfeld hat es den Bewegungen ermöglicht, über die lokale Ebene hinauszugehen, Unterstützung im In- und Ausland zu finden und alternative Informationskanäle abseits der staatlichen Medien zu schaffen. Zu den Initiativen, die den Schwerpunkt auf die Verbindung von Innovation und digitaler Kompetenz legen, gehört DOT Uganda (Digital Opportunity Trust Uganda) – eine Bewegung, die junge Menschen dabei unterstützt, digitale Fähigkeiten zur Lösung gesellschaftlicher Probleme zu entwickeln. Auch der „National Youth Innovation Day“ (NML Day), der am 5. Dezember begangen wird, ist eine Jugendinitiative, die darauf abzielt, Innovationen, digitale Kompetenzen und zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement zu fördern. Die politische Situation in Uganda Der Präsident Yoweri Museveni und seine Partei, die National Resistance Movement (NRM), sind seit Langem an der Macht. Die Opposition ist oft zersplittert, und es fällt ihr schwer, eine geschlossene Front zu bilden. Es gibt Einschränkungen für Zivilgesellschaft und Opposition. Die Behörden verabschieden Gesetze, die öffentliche politische Aktivitäten erschweren. So wurden beispielsweise Gesetzesentwürfe diskutiert, die eine strenge Kontrolle der ausländischen Finanzierung von Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) vorsehen und die Befugnisse von Beamten für Überprüfungen ohne richterlichen Beschluss erweitern. Zudem kommen weitere Instrumente zum Einsatz: das Wahlrecht, die Kontrolle über die Wahlkommissionen sowie der Einsatz von Sicherheitskräften zur Unterdrückung von Protesten. Dann gibt es Repressionen gegen einzelne Persönlichkeiten. Oppositionsführer, darunter Bobi Wine, sahen sich mit Strafverfahren, Festnahmen und anderen Formen von Druck konfrontiert. Der soziale Auslöser für Aktivismus war vor dem Hintergrund dieser politischen Realitäten reagieren junge Menschen besonders sensibel auf konkrete Probleme: hohe Jugendarbeitslosigkeit, Korruption und mangelnde Perspektiven. Daraus ergibt sich ein Paradoxon: Einerseits bieten digitale Instrumente der Jugend ein wirksames Mittel zur Selbstorganisation und um Aufmerksamkeit zu erregen; andererseits schaffen staatliche Kontrolle und repressive Gesetze ernsthafte Hürden für eine nachhaltige politische Arbeit. https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/three-outstanding-human-rights-defenders-recognised-with-the-2025-martin-ennals-award/ https://observer.ug/news/why-human-rights-defenders-chose-activist-aloikin-for-2025-eu-award/ https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/fear-outrage-as-human-rights-activist-praise-aloikin-abducted-from-police-station-5611178 https://observer.ug/news/aloikin-praise-opoloje-the-nude-protestor-what-drives-her/ https://www.pulse.ug/story/uganda-police-confirm-custody-praise-aloikin-2026092807440259070 https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/street-protests-return-to-wheel-amplify-social-media-activism-4750886 https://iwpr.net/global-voices/how-uganda-tried-silence-protest https://news-decoder.com/human-rights-are-not-just-for-those-in-power/ https://www.martinennalsaward.org/hrd/aloikin-praise-opoloje/ Remarks About President Museveni's Son https://saharareporters.com/2026/09/27/world-liberty-congress-seeks-answers-over-reported-detention-ugandan-activist-after

Zambia has announced that a transition from economic stabilization to growth for 2027-2029 is planned

The Ministry of Finance of Zambia has announced that a transition from economic stabilization to growth for 2027-2029 is planned.

According to the medium-term budget of the Ministry of Finance, Real GDP growth will increase to 6% in 2027, 7.5% in 2028 and 7.1% in 2029 in 2027 and 7.1% in 2029. Important economic vertices of this budget are: 1. Copper production: The flow rate is to exceed 2027 the trademark of 1 million tonnes and increase to 1.4 million tonnes by 2029. Zambia is one of the most important copper producers of Africa and is one of the top group worldwide. Production increased from about 825,513 tons in 2024 to 890,346 tonnes 2025 - an increase of around 8%. However, the country missed its goal of one million tonnes. In the first half of 2026, according to the Zambian mining ministry, 447,181.93 tons of copper were produced. These were only 0.45% more than in the first half of 2025; The development was thus well behind the political expectations. The different information for 2024 is apparently related to the statistics used and the reporting date: The Zambian EITI calls 822,824 tonnes, while later government information shows around 825,000 tonnes. There are several production sites that are operated by different companies. There is the First Quantum Minerals and Zccm-IH the Kansanshi operate. First Quantum Minerals Tribes the Sentinel alone. Barrick Gold operates the Lumwana. Copper Mines (KCM) operates the Konkola Miene. Mopani Copper Mines. Then there is still Lubambe and other medium-sized producers. Production growth 2025 was borne by KCM, Mopani, Kansanshi and Lubambe. In the first half of 2026, production at KCM rose significantly, while decays at NFCA, Chibuluma and Mopani slowed down the overall effect. As already reported, the government will initially strive for annual production to increase over a million tonnes and in the long term to three million tonnes up to 2031. This objective would be almost a tripling compared to the current level. Important projects are: - Kansanshi S3: Enlargement went to commercial production at the end of 2025; For 2026, about 175,000 to 205,000 tonnes are expected there. - Lumwana Super Pit: Barrick invests about 2 billion US dollars; The extended production is expected to start at the end of the first quarter 2028. - Mingomba: Kobold Metals and ZCCM-IH have started developing the project 2026. - Konkola: A new plant for processing residues should create additional capacities; In the long term, the company aims to increase to about 300,000 tonnes annually. There are also obstacles. The expansion is limited by several factors: - power supply; - sulfuric acid deficiency; - Investment needs; - fluctuating mining performance; Dependence on copper export. According to the US Geological Survey, 2024 accounted for about 3.6% of worldwide mining copper production on Zambia; The country was in place worldwide. Economic stability: progress in rescheduling, inflation control, exchange rate stability and foreign exchange reserve formation has strengthened the economic basis. Zambia is 2026 macreconomically much more stable than during the debt crisis, but not really crisis-proof. Growth, inflation, currency reserves and debt services have improved; At the same time, government debt, dependence on copper, electricity bottlenecks and climate risk remain significant weaknesses. Economic growth has recovered. For 2026, the forecasts are between about 4.3 and 5.8% depending on the source; The differences are explained by various assumptions about mining, agriculture and energy supply. Inflation has declined sharply. According to IMF, it was 6.8% in April 2026 and thus within the target corridor of the Zambian central bank of 6-8%. International reserves have improved and, in June 2026, were approximately $ 6.5 billion, compared to about $ 3 billion in 2021. Reduction of public debt has significantly reduced the annual debt service: from 2026, it should be approximately $ 900 million, instead of around $ 2.6 billion without rescheduling. Fiscal policy has been consolidated. According to Zambian information, the budget deficit sank from around 9% of GDP 2021 to about 3.8% 2025. The greatest risks for Zambia are further the high debt. The debt situation has improved, but remains tense. The World Bank estimates public debt for 2025 to about 93.4% of GDP; At the same time Zambia continues to be considered as a high degree of debt service and refinancing risks. Although the IMF assesses public debt as a fundamentally sustainable, the country continues to expand as a high risk of a renewed debt note. A permanent improvement depends on further budgetary discipline and compliance with the rescheduling agreements. In another factor of the risks is the dependence on copper. Copper is the most important export and foreign exchange bringer. A high copper price and rising production strengthen the economy; However, a decline in price or production losses would quickly be struggled to exchange rate, government revenue and investment. The government therefore sets an expansion of copper support, but this strategy alone makes the economy not sufficiently resistant. A broader development of agriculture, manufacturing industry, tourism and services remains necessary. The power supply is a big problem and the drought of recent years. Hydropower plays a central role in Zambia. Low water levels have burdened electricity production and thus mining, industry and households. The recovery of the economy is therefore strongly dependent on whether Zambia can diversify its energy supply and make it more reliable. The World Bank calls climate shocks, in particular drought, in addition to commodity prices and limited access to electricity than significant risks for growth. Finally, it can be said that Zambia is in a stabilization and recovery phase, but not in a completely secured prosperity development. Results, falling inflation and higher reserves are important progress. However, the country remains economically vulnerable because of the high residual debt, the strong copper dependency, the uncertain power supply and possible drought. The stability will therefore depend above all on whether the government preserves the budgetary discipline and transforms the revenue from the copper sector into a broader economic development. Investments: New mining projects, the exploration of mineral resources and increased investment should support growth. The World Bank identifies especially mining, solar energy, agribusiness and tourism as areas with high private investment potential. With appropriate reforms, there could be mobilized between 2025 and 2030 up to $ 21 billion to additional investments. The energy sector is strategically important for Zambia. The copper industry can only grow when sufficiently reliable electricity is available. Therefore, there are opportunities for solar parks, battery storage, mini grids, hybrid power plants and private power supply for mines. The World Bank explicitly recommends a diversification away from the strong dependence on hydropower and a stronger involvement of private investors. In agriculture, the chances are less only in the cultivation itself, but especially throughout the value chain: Irrigation and climate-resistant cultivation. Corn, soy, wheat and cotton processing. Cooling chains and warehouses. Animal husbandry, fishing and feed. Packaging and regional food marketing. The drought and climate risks make irrigation, water management and resistant cultivation methods to important investment fields. Further growth drivers: Agriculture, tourism, electricity generation and economic reforms should also promote growth. Long-term financing: The Government plans to introduce a 20-year-old termination to extend the interest rate curve to diversify financing and reduce refinancing risks. Citations: https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2026/zambia-says-zom25-copper-production-up-8-from-Previous-year https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-industry/2801-52339-zambi AS-2025-Copper Output Rises 8-Misses-1-million Ton Target https://news.metal.com/newscontent/104134711-sulphuric-acid-shortage-emersges-as-a-constraint-one-zambias-copper-growth https://news.metal.com/newscontent/104076089-zambia-copper-output-ri SES-Just-045-in-H1-2026-Despite-Stronger-KCM-AND-Kansanshi-Production https://zambiaeiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/zambia-eiti-2023-and-2024-report.pdf https://african-miningweek.com/news/zambias-3mt-annual-copper-target-hinges-power-infrastructure-bankable-projects-moore https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-industry/1809-59030-zambia---- Concola Signs 498-million-Plant Deal-To Support Copper Expansion https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/zambia https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2026-08/zambia-country-profile.pdf https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-27/zambia-restates-copper-ambition-after-posting-Record-Output https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/01/27/pr-26024-zambia-imf-ex Ecutive Board Completes Sixth Review Under-the-Extended Credit Facility https://www.lusakatimes.com/2026/06/30/imf-says-zambias-fiscal-pr Essures-Have Intensity Despite Gains-in Reserves-and Inflation / https://www.openzambia.com/economics/2026/8/28/zambias-annual-external-debt-service-to-Chall-To-us900m https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/zambia https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/c43b728b-7a60-42e2-8405-f9c00243aae1 https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2026/01/31/zambia-sixth-review Under-The-Extended Credit Facility Arrangement Request-For-A-Waiver-of-573534 https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099022026112 017141 / PDF / BOSIB-610FCDF7-3B98-4558-87D5-4D305A5FDF9A.pdf

Sergei Lavrov has called on the US to immediately release Maduro and his wife

Sergei Lavrov has called on the US to immediately release Maduro and his wife On September 26, 2026, during the General Debate at the 81st UN General Assembly in New York, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly demanded that the United States immediately free Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro*1) and his wife, Cilia Flores. Lavrov coolly stated that the US invasion of Venezuela earlier this year—which he said violated all norms, including basic moral principles—ended with the arrest of President Maduro and his wife, and their extrajudicial detention in a US prison. He added, We insist on the speediest possible release of the Venezuelan head of state and his wife, and that such incidents must not happen again in the future. Several media outlets reported that he called for their immediate or prompt release and stressed that similar incidents shouldn't be allowed to repeat. Reports summarizing Lavrov's speech add that, according to his account, Maduro and Flores were arrested on January 3, 2026, following a large-scale US attack on Venezuela. They were taken by a US Army special unit and transported to the States, where they are being held without trial. Other summaries note that they face charges in the US including conspiracy for narcoterrorism, cocaine smuggling, and possession of weapons and explosives. These points reflect Lavrov's public demands and his version of events presented at the UN; they aren't an independent confirmation of the underlying allegations. *1) Nicolás Maduro (born November 23, 1962) is a Venezuelan politician who has been president since 2013, succeeding Hugo Chávez. Maduro started out as a union activist and bus driver in Caracas. In the 90s, he joined Chávez's movement and was one of the founders of the Movement for the Fifth Republic. His political career moved quickly. Between 2000 and 2006, he was a member of the National Assembly and then its president. He served as Foreign Minister from 2006 to 2013, then as Vice President from 2012 to 2013. Since 2013, following Chávez's death, he has been President of Venezuela. Maduro positioned himself as continuing Chávez's course—the Bolivarian Revolution—focusing on social policy, anti-imperialism, and a stronger state role in the economy. During his time in office, Venezuela has faced deep economic collapse, hyperinflation, and shortages of goods. The situation was influenced by falling oil prices, structural economic problems, and international sanctions, especially from the US. The conflict between the government and the opposition intensified within the country. In 2019, there was an acute institutional crisis when Juan Guaidó declared himself interim president. This led to a situation of dual power, recognized differently by various groups of nations. Maduro built partnerships with states opposed to US influence, like Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. At the same time, relations with Western countries and some neighboring Latin American states remained tense. Regarding interest in political models, post-colonial processes, and the influence of external powers on national development (similar to discussions on Africa and neocolonialism), a similar logic can be seen in Venezuela's case. It involves the role of the resource economy (oil), the effects of sanctions and external pressure, and attempts to establish an alternative development model outside the Western mainstream. In early January 2026, American special forces, including Delta Force operators, conducted an operation on Venezuelan territory. On the early morning of January 3rd, they entered the residence in Caracas where Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were staying and forcibly removed them from the country. The couple was later transferred to the US. The operation took place on the sovereign territory of another state without its consent, which in itself raised questions about its legality under international law. During a court hearing in New York, Maduro explicitly stated he had been kidnapped and insisted on his immunity as a foreign head of state. His defense planned to challenge the legality of the arrest itself. Both in Venezuela and internationally, it was emphasized that kidnapping a sitting head of state sets a dangerous precedent that undermines international norms protecting the inviolability of leaders. The American side, however, interpreted the events differently. US authorities declared they acted within their powers based on intelligence information; they claimed it was an arrest, not a kidnapping. In the US, federal charges were filed against Maduro and his wife for conspiracy to commit narcoterrorism, conspiracy to import cocaine, and offenses related to weapons and explosive devices. Both pleaded not guilty. Sources: https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-s-lavrov-lays-out-demands-to-us-over-1790443184.html https://tass.com/politics/2193373 https://ground.news/article/russias-lavrov-calls-for-the-release-of-maduro https://ground.news/article/russian-foreign-minister-lavrov-urges-us-to-lift-blockade-of-cuba_31f885 https://m.vz.ru/news/2026/9/26/1455767.html published https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8987876 https://www.osnmedia.ru/politika/lavrov-s-tribuny-v-oon-potreboval-osvobozhdeniya-maduro-iz-pod-strazhi-v-ssha/amp/ https://x.com/telesurenglish/status/2103948984934965312 https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/lavrov-visunuv-ssha-vimogi-shchodo-maduro-1790440567.html

Why the expansion of the raw material industry can intensify poverty in Africa

Why the expansion of the raw material industry can intensify poverty in Africa This is actually one of the big questions. You can often expect that a boom in the raw materials sector automatically brings fast growth and pushes the poverty back. But the practice in Africa often shows the opposite often. I've gathered the most important reasons for this. That is not supposed to be a flat-rate conviction of the industry, but rather an overview of the risks that you simply have on the screen and must actively tackle. A big problem is the so-called "Dutch disease". If suddenly a lot of money flows through raw materials into the country, the own currency often gains great value. That sounds good first, but makes other economic sectors - such as agriculture or smaller industries - to expensive on the world market. The native producers can no longer keep up, must close, and jobs are lost. Exactly in these areas, poverty increases. As almost everywhere in capitalism, the profits are also unevenly distributed. Sure, the mining creates jobs, but often the require high qualifications that many locals do not even have. Ultimately, foreign companies, a small local elite or tensioner specialists benefit from the income, but not the broad community. This leaves the scissors between the arm and rich further. Then there are the problems with administration and corruption. Unfortunately, raw material revenues are often a goal for abuse. Gelder seize in the pockets of officials or managers rather than the expansion of infrastructure, schools or health care. Weak institutions, opaque contracts and missing controls make things worse. Especially in Africa, the environmental damage is enormous, and their consequences must be considered. The degradation often leads to the pollution of water, soil and air. This directly affects the livelihoods of people: fields become worse, fish, and the population becomes ill. It creates a kind of "poverty trap": Who is sick, can work less, but has rising healthcare costs and slips even deeper into misery. All this results in social vibrations. For raw material projects people are often relocated and lose land they have traditionally managed. The destroys of grown lifestyles and takes them the source of income. If there are still many foreign workers to move, the local infrastructure as housing or schools burdenes and ensures social tensions. In addition, the price volatility comes. The revenue from the raw material sector are extremely unstable; They drastically break when the world market prices fall. If a country depends heavily on, it immediately meets the state trunk and exactly the social programs that should actually protect the weakest. And where the quick money flows, the diversification is often forgotten. If the focus is only on raw materials, other economic sectors are underdeveloped. If the boom ends, the land is precarious because it lacks alternative jobs. To clarify that: that does not mean that the raw material sector can not help to fight poverty. There are cases as diamond promotion in Botswana, where a prudent management has really advanced development. But it is crucial to create mechanisms for risk minimization: transparency, investment in other branches and education, the involvement of the local population and clear environmental standards. So what would have to be done to relieve or prevent this possible poverty? In fact, the expansion of the raw material industry in Africa can bring profits, but also intensify poverty if you are not targeted. I have summarized the most important steps to help prevent this risk. At the top, transparency and control stands. You have to make sure that the revenue is managed openly. Initiatives such as EITI help to prevent mouse and corruption. When payments and revenue is disclosed, public attention creates and increases the responsibility of governments and companies. We need strong institutions and legal framework. Weak institutions invite to abuse. Effective laws and control mechanisms are needed - for example, to write off concessions fairly, to drive taxes correctly and to tackle illegal cash flows. Also important is to create the value creation locally. Instead of just exporting raw materials, one should try to process them on site. This creates new, better paid jobs, and more value remains in the country. Examples are oil refineries in Nigeria or the processing of cobalt in the Congo. The economic policy must be inclusive. The advantages may not only benefit a small elite. Governments can start programs for the qualification of the population so that more people can take the new jobs. It also needs measures such as social security systems to reduce inequalities. Environmental protection and social responsibility are essential. Harmful practices directly destroy the livelihoods of many people, especially in the country. Therefore, strict environmental regulations and the obligation to recultivate are necessary. Projects must be designed to protect the rights of local communities. A country can not only rely on a pillar, the economy needs to be diversified. Strategies should be geared towards promoting other sectors such as agriculture, craft or services. The African Free Trade Agreement is an important step for regional growth opportunities. At short notice, social protection programs can protect the most affected groups for price shocks while building education and infrastructure long-term. Some challenges can only be solved through international cooperation based on fair conditions. Another important note to the conclusion: It is not just a question of single steps, but you need a systemic approach. The measures should act in a total context - with strong institutions, clear objectives against inequality and an active involvement of the population. Sources: https://borgenproject.org/historical-resource-extraction/ https://www.academia.edu/31511225/regulating_extraction_in_africa_towards_a_framework_for_accountability_in_the_global https://www.rudn.ru/storage/media/science_dissertation/be4507bf-8b49-453d-9246-f45a5a8ae3e4/cj9c2ib25z7l6rgq2oa8n3qahawrpeopl8gvgd3z.pdf https://borgenproject.org/historical-resource-extraction/ https://belta.by/world/view/afrika-bolshe-ne-poterpit-kolonialnuju-model-ispolzovanija-svoih-prirodnyh-resursov-prezident-gany-802786-2026/ https://www.uncclearn.org/wp-content/uploads/library/eca18072016_sustainable_development_report_on_africa.pdf https://www.uneca.org/eca-events/sites/default/files/resources/documents/com2023/e_eca_coe_41_4_e-e_eca_cm_54_4_e.pdf https://mirec.mgimo.ru/upload/ckeditor/files/the-transition-of-africa-on-rails-of-sustainable-development-hurdles-and-prospects.pdf

Never eat black chickens in the Nyumba Nitu Forest in Tanzania.

Never eat black chickens in the Nyumba Nitu Forest in Tanzania. Why is this place as holy, and what do you have to do to get access? The Nyumba Nitu Forest in Tanzania (the forest is at the village of Mlevela, Ward Mdandu, in Wanging'ombe district, Njombe region (Southern Highlands), About 15 km from the city of Njombe) is considered holy because he is closely linked to the Bena's ethnic group with its culture, history and spiritual convictions. The main reasons are explained here - it's an interesting mix of myth, history and lively customs! "Nyumba Nitu" means "black house" or "dark house" on the Bena language. It refers to the dark caves in the forest. There is a legend that in these caves once black cows lived. While tribal wars (for example, against the Hehe or Sangu) or during the Maji-Maji uprising against the German colonial hostels threatened in the late 19th century, the Bena man searched for protection in these caves. From a simple hiding place was a place that was firmly anchored in the memory of the community. This is an interesting chapter of regional history! Between the Hehe, Sangu and Bena there were several tensions and armed clashes in the pre-colonial and early colonial time. I want to summarize a brief, what resulted. One of the former focuses was around the middle of the 19th century. Around 1860, the Hehe Chief Munyigumba started to unite the hover tribes. In the 1870s he attacked Sangu and crashed her chief of Merere. However, Merere returned later and could ward off the attacks in 1877. The conflicts had to do with territorial claims, the struggle for resources (such as land or cattle) and the pursuit of power domination. The Bena were geographically between the Hehe (northeast) and the Sangu (northwest). In earlier times, the Bena were subjected to Sangu: Sangu set their own relatives as chiefs in the Bena villages. When the hehe defeated the Sangu, they exchanged these chiefs against their own, the hehe kingdom. So the conflict was not only between two groups, but also had a layer of submission and detachment of local rule structures. The situation tightened when the Germans were active in the region. The colonial power strategically used the existing opposites: she castled alliances with the Bena and Sangu to counteract the Hehe. A well-known example: After the Hehe chief Mkwawa (the successor Munyigumbas) rebelled against German expansion policy, Governor Schele led an expedition. He reached the strongly fortified position of Mkwawa at Kalenga (west of Iringa). Later, the German officer Tom Prince shared the Hehe area: In the western part he set the Sangu chief Merere, in the eastern the brother Mkwawa, Mpangile. That should weaken the Hehe-Empire. However, this did not lead to permanent stability - Mpangile maintained secret contacts with Mkwawa, was then executed by the Germans, and then followed renewed restlessness and rebellion. So it was not a single, rigid conflict, but a braid of local power struggles, which were even more complex by the arrival of colonial power. The Germans used the existing tensions to pursue their own goals. The Maji-Maji uprising (1905-1907) was a great survey of the African population in German East Africa against German colonial rule. Since previously talked about tribal conflicts and the Holy Nyumba-Nitu Forest, it is important: this uprising combined many different ethnic groups - including Matumbi, Ngindo, Pare, Hehe and others - in a shared resistance, Although they often stood together in conflict. The causes of this uprising were mainly economical and political: The colonial administration demanded money taxes (eg head tax) and continued forced labor for infrastructure (roads, bridges). For many communities, that was incompatible with their traditional forms of economies. Large land areas were taken for European plantations (cotton, sisal), which complicated the use of farmland and pasture surfaces. Traditional chiefs were dismissed or abused as a leader of colonial policy, which destroyed trust and authority. The name "Maji-Maji" comes from the Swahili word "Maji" ("water"). The central idea was a spiritual protection power: - The Prophet Kinjikitile Ngwale from the Matumbi area spread the doctrine that a magical water ("Maji") would protect the insurgents against bullets - the balls would become water. - This idea enabled a superior mobilization: people of different groups felt connected by a common faith and rituals. This was also a reaction to colonial violence and degradation: the hope for a supernatural protection gave resistance in a militarily hopeless situation. Beginning of the uprising was in July 1905. The uprising broke out in the south of German East Africa, initially with the destruction of cotton fields. Thanks to networks (trade routes, relationships, drum communication), the uprising quickly reached for many regions. The German protective force used modern device (machine guns) and tactical superiority. An annoyed example is the attack on the station Mahenge, where hundreds of insurgents died. As a tactic of the "burned earth", the German fields and villages were deflined. The heaviest losses were not caused by direct struggle, but by mass hunger's groove followed by the military collapse. Kinjikitle was arrested and executed in 1905, but the resistance lasted until 1907, partly as small, local uprisings and partisan actions. Estimates expire from 75,000 to over 200,000 dead, especially by hunger and diseases. The military losses of insurgents were extremely high, which of the German troops relatively low. The German colonial power retained control, but the administration later became something "moderate": there were reforms to make economic exploitation less offensive and break less radically. In today's Tanzania historiography, the Maji-Maji uprising is an early example of Pan-African solidarity - not in the sense of a political movement, but as a broad alliance of different peoples against common oppression. Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, saw in the insurgents forerunners of the independence campaign. We have already written a lot about it. - Pan-Africanism and resistance. Maji-Maji is a historical example of how African communities organized across tribal boundaries to resist colonial violence - a root phenomenon for later liberation movements. - Holy places and local memory. In many regions where the uprising took place, places are still associated with remembrance culture - caves, villages, rivers serving as protected sites or meeting points. This is recalling the importance of the Nyumba Nitu-Forest as a safe, holy room. - Colonial violence and neo-colonial consequences. The uprising shows how military oppression, lapse and economic forced politics have left deep traces - topics that are relevant to your questions after overcoming neo-colonialism. For the Bena, the forest and the caves are a sacred place to get in touch with the ghosts of the ancestors. People visit him to carry out rituals, to give victims or ask for blessing. There are also saying that the holiness underline: for example, locals tell that attempts to burn the forest, not successed - the forest is intact again the next morning, as if ghosts have protected him. Also, stories are told about blood, which poured out of trees when someone tried to make a tree. To preserve the holiness of the place, strict rules apply. Visitors have to take off their shoes and do not wear a hat. Women who menstruise are traditionally not in the forest. It is believed that breaking these rules could bring danger or misfortune. Today, Bena-humans visit the Nyumba Nitu Forest to get their cultural identity and pass on their traditions. The forest is actively managed and protected by the local community. The forest is holy because he was not only a historical hiding place, but also the place where the connection to the ancestors and their own culture is getting alive. Sources: https://www.academia.edu/79821432/traditional_institutions_management_of_sacred_forests_in_tanzania_history_narratives_and_evidence_from_njombe_region_1880 https://www.dw.com/en/art-expo-preserves-tanzanias-indigenous-legends/g-59028730 https://ijrpr.com/uploads/v6issue11/ijrpr54981.pdf https://www.ajol.info/index.php/tjfnc/article/download/89391/78898 https://www.visittanzania.org/destinations-in-tanzania/njombe-regi https://www.academia.edu/143744070/a_history_of_the_sangu_based_upon_written_sources_and_prepared_for_mtwa_alfeo_mgandilwa_merere https://static.cambridge.org/content/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:article:s0021853797007123/resource/name/s002185379700712xa.pdf https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/bena-southwestern-tanzania https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/hehe_people https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/hehe_chiefdom https://static.cambridge.org/content/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:article:s0021853797007123/resource/name/s002185379700712xa.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/hehe_people https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/hehe_chiefdom)

Escalate the tensions in the Ethiopian region Tigray.

Escalate the tensions in the Ethiopian region Tigray. The conflict in Tigray * 1) (2020-2022) did not break from today to tomorrow; A whole chain of causes led to many years of tensions to concrete political measures. The Tigray region looks back on a long history of the fight for autonomy. Already in the 20th century, there were rising against the centralization of power * 2). The People's Official Front of Tigray (TPLF) was created as a force that defended the interests of the region. After the 1990s, Ethiopia developed into a federation of regions formed according to ethnic-linguistic criteria; The constitution also anchored the right of self-determination of the peoples. Under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed * 3), however, the balance shifted in favor of strengthening the central power, which worried regional elites. Tigray is a significant agricultural region. Experts point out that the fight for the control of resources and financial streams (including international aid levels) was one of the driving forces of the conflict. Abiy Ahmed, who came to power in 2018, initiated steps that were perceived by TPLF as an attempt to weaken the region and centralize power. Belonged to these steps: The exclusion of TPLF from the government coalition. Previously, TPLF had been a central force in the government coalition (revolutionary Democratic Front of Ethiopian Peoples, EPRDF). Abiy dissolved her and founded a new party - the "prosperity party) - who did not contribute the TPLF. Many in Tigray evaluated the decision to postpone the choice, as a step towards power inturpation. In response to the procedure of the Federal Government, the authorities organized his own elections of Tigray. The central government explained this for illegal, which strengthened the crisis. The leadership of the front feared, Abiy strive to completely eliminate them as a political force, withdraw the region the autonomy and to redistribute resources in favor of the central government. The immediate occasion for armed conflict was the events in November 2020. The defense forces of Tigray (the military wing of TPLF) attacked military bases of the Federal Army in the region. The government reacted with a military use. Inner regional divisions. Within the TPLF, a hardliner faction (under the guidance of Debresion Gebremichael) has gained influence, which also shaped the course of the conflict. Other actors were drawn in the conflict: Armed forces from the neighboring region Amhara supported the Federal Army, and also the role of Eritrea converted in the course of the conflict (first it was on the side of the central government, later on the side The TPLF). Even according to the 2022 * 4) Agreement, central questions remained unclear: how regional armed forces disarmed, enclosed to dispute disputes and displaced persons. Ultimately, the conflict was the result of a complex interplay of power fighting, worried about regional autonomy, economic interests and concrete policy decisions, which were perceived as a threat by the parties involved. In fact, the situation in the Tigray region (Ethiopia) has spilled dramatically in the last few days. I have summarized the most important information about the current events and the causes of the crisis. On September 23, 2026, the armed forces of the People's Official Front of Tigray (TPLF) started an offensive. They occupied several airports in Tigray, including Alula Abo Nega International Airport in the regional capital Mekele. As a result, Ethiopian Airlines introduced air traffic to the region. At the same time, the TPLF positions of the Central Government forces in the neighboring regions attacked Afar and Amhara. In Amhara, rebels aged together with the local armed movement "Fano" (Amhara Fano National Movement). In a declaration of Tigray's regional administration, the central government's measures were called "invasion" and their own approach as a "defense war". The Vice President of the TPLF, Amanuel Assefa, declared the news agency AFP, the situation has now become a "comprehensive war". Already on September 20, the TPLF announced the founding of a "coalition of the economies of Ethiopia for survival". This joined six other armed groups (including "Fano", the Oromo Liberation Army and others), with the aim of plungeing the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The escalation is the result of a long-term accumulation of problems. In 2022, the conflict parties signed the Pretoria Agreement, which completed the previous war (2020-2022). Nevertheless, many key issues remained unclear: the status of controversial areas (especially West Tigray, where thousands of people are expelled), the disarmament process, the return of refugees and security guarantees for the region. Observers threw abiy ahmed to have led the war with great hardness; Reports on atrocities, hunger as a war weapon and mass-free expulsions, considerable his image as a "Peace Nobel Prize winner" considerably. After 2022, the tensions were tightened within the party. In May 2026, under the leadership of Debetsion Gebremichael, a radical group resigned the Regional Council from the pre-war period and chose him to the President of Tigray, creating a competing power center. The authorities strive to restore a uniform military command structure, while TPLF is not ready to disarm without clear guarantees. Experts point to the role of Eritrea. Between the TPLF and Eritrea, there were heavy conflicts in the past, but now a tactical alliance ("Tsimdo") is abandoned. At the same time, the Ethiopian Central Government's interests in the Eritrean Port Assab (Ethiopia is a part of the country), which also heats the tensions. The greatest danger is that the local conflict over the Borden Tigrays takes out and further actors in the region. Experts warn: Should the conflict expand, this could lead to a more comprehensive war at the Horn of Africa - especially against the background of the already ongoing civil war in Sudan. The African Union has expressed its depth concern and called for immediate stop escalating measures as well as the resumption of direct negotiations under the Pretoria Agreement. The location is in progress and develops fast. There is a concrete danger that the Tigray War (2020-2022, approx. 600,000 tote) in a new, possibly still broader form - especially as a whole coalition of rebel groups is involved in different parts of the country. The leadership of the Tigray region declared that they are in a new war with the central government, after fighting in Tigray and two neighboring regions bounced out a four-year-old Peace Agreement. The outbreak of new battles is followed by increasing tensions between the two sides for months; The climax was the announcement of Sunday that the TPLF has concluded an alliance with six other armed groups from all ethiopia, with the aim of plungeing the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The situation remains dynamic; Therefore, it is important to pursue the official explanations of the conflict parties as well as the assessments of international mediators. @@@@@ * 1) Tigray is the northernmost regional state of Ethiopia. He borders in the north to Eritrea, in the west to Sudan, south to the AMHARA region and the East to the Afar region. The capital is Mekel; The region is mainly inhabited by Tigrayern whose main language is Tigrinya. Tigray is part of the historic north ethician highlands and includes significant sites such as Aksum - a former center of the Reich of Aksum and one of the most important religious and archaeological regions of Ethiopia. The population is a majority of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The People's Official Front of Tigray (TPLF) played a crucial role in the fall of the Ethiopian military government in 1991. Your leader Meles Zenawi then developed into the dominant political leadership Ethiopia until he died in 2012. * 2) The People's liberation front of Tigray (TPLF) led an armed fight against the socialist government in Addis Ababa - but these were events of the late 1970s and 1980s, not the conflict of the years 2020-2022. In 1974 there was a circumference in Ethiopia; The Derg-regime - a military-revolutionary Council under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam. It was a socialist dictatorship of Marxist-Leninist embossing, which operates a strict centralization, massive repressions and a policy of "resettlement" of the population. The TPLF was created as a rebel organization with the following goals: Liberation of the Tigray region from control by Addis Ababa; Fight against the Derg regime perceived as the oppressor of the region; Long term: Transformation of Ethiopia to federal principles. The beginning of the armed resistance was that TPLF began a guerrilla war in Tigray in the late 1970s. Their strategy was based on the support of the local population and control of rural areas. In 1989, TPLF worked together with other movements (especially the Eritrean People's liberal frown) the revolutionary democratic front of the Ethiopian peoples (EPRDF) - a coalition whose aim of the fall of the Derg-regime was. In 1991, the armed forces of EPRDF Addis Ababa took one, and the Mengistu regime crashed. Thereafter, the TPLF developed into one of the most important political forces in Ethiopia - a role that you hover until 2018. It is important not to mix these two different phases: 1978-1991: TPLF as insurgents against the socialist Derg regime; 2020-2022: TPLF as a regional political force in conflict with the Federal Government under Abiy Ahmed. * 3) Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Full Name: Abiy Ahmed Ali has been Prime Minister (Prime Minister) of the Democratic Federal Republic of Ethiopia since April 2, 2018. Kurzprofil - Born: 15th of August 1976 in Beshasha (Kaffa region), Ethiopia. - Party: Prosperity Party (prosperity party), previously leading role in the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) within the EPRDF coalition. - Office: April 2, 2018 as a fourth prime minister of the modern Federal Republic of Ethiopia. - Award: Nobel Peace Prize 2019 "for his efforts to meet peace and international cooperation, in particular for its crucial initiative to solve the border conflict with the neighboring country Eritrea" Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, after months of protests against the long-standing EPRDF government led to the resignation of his predecessor Hailemariam Desalegn. As the first national leader of Ethiopia, which attributes ethnically the Oromo - the largest but long under-represented population group - he was initially perceived as a possible "some" of the country. In his first endeavors he initiated far-reaching domestic reforms: - Termination of the 200-year-old "frozen" war condition with Eritrea (Peace Agreement 2018) - release of thousands of political prisoners [7] [9] - Release of the media center and approval forbidden opposition groups. - Appointment of women to half of the cabinet posts. These steps involved him internationally great sympathy and the Nobel Prize. Despite this conflict, he remained politically dominant: his Prosperity Party won the parliamentary elections 2021 and again 2026 with a large majority, with the choice of 2026 of security issues, limited opposition participation and missing elections in Sharing the North was overshadowed. At the same time persistent voltages are: - Internal ethnopolitan conflicts and regional riots. - Foreign policy tensions with neighboring states at the Horn of Africa. - Criticism of authoritarian tendencies and limitation of political freedoms. On the official government website he becomes "H.E. Abiy Ahmed Ali (PhD) "led, with academic degrees in Transformational Leadership, MBA and a PhD from the Institute for Peace and Security Studies of the Addis Ababa University. The leadership of the north ethiopian region Tigray declared on Wednesday, they are in a new war with the central government, after fighting in Tigray and two neighboring regions bounced out of a four-year-old peace agreement. * 4) On 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian Federal Government and the TPLF signed in Pretoria, South Africa, an agreement on the permanent attitude of hostilities (Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, COHA). Formally finished the Tigray War, who had cost about 600,000 people living since November 2020. The agreement was conveyed by the African Union (AU), supported by the USA. Chef subsidiaries was the former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. The most important content is: A military block. - Systematic, orderly disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (GDR) of Tigray Combat units (TDF) - handing over heavy weapons (tanks, artillery) to the federal army; lighter weapons should follow later - withdrawal of front lines in four zones; Reference of the Federal Army in the Tigray region - TDF should be converted in return to regional security / police forces Political block. - abolition of the classification of TPLF as a terrorist organization by the Ethiopian Parliament - Formation of an inclusive transitional management for Tigray to elections - Political dialogue about all controversial questions, in particular the territutes with the AMHARA region Humanitarian block. - Restoration of access to humanitarian aid and basic services - Termination of the siege / blockade of Tigray - Return of distributed persons (internally displaced persons) What was controversial - West and South Torray (Welkait, Raya): These areas were occupied during the war of Amharic forces. The agreement calls you "controversial areas" and refers to a solution according to the 1995 Constitution - but it leaves whether this is a return to Tigray or a referendum. This question remained unresolved. - Eritrea: The Eritrean Army (EDF) had fought on the part of the Federal Government, but was not involved in the negotiations. The agreement does not mention Eritrea, but speaks vague from "third forces". Eritreienche troops retired only partially and remained in border areas. - Amhara-Milizen (Fano): The Amharic special forces and Fano militias were not part of the agreement, but remained in areas that Tigray claims. The implementation and failure. In the first few months of the agreement, progress has been made: Humanitarian auxiliary supplies reached Tigray, political prisoners were released, a transitional management under Getachew Reda was used. But the central problems remained unsolved: - The controversial areas were not returned - Eritreienche and Amharic forces did not complete themselves completely - The disarming of TDF was not completed - Transitional management lost legitimacy In May 2025, TPLF set up its own countercurrency under Debetsion Gebremichael, and at the end of September 2025 escalated the situation again, as the defense forces of Tigray (TDF) military bases of the Federal Army Attacks. Observers now say clearly: The Pretoria agreement has failed. Sources: https://www.britannica.com/biography/abiy-hahmed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/abiy_ahmed https://www.pmo.gov.et/pm/ https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/abiy/facts/ https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz750q5e3w3o https://hoa.boell.org/en/2023/11/01/pretoria-agreement-tigray-one-year-after https://www.dw.com/de/warum-der-tigray-krieg-auf-das-horn-von-afrika-%c3%bcbergreifen-k%c3%b6nnte/a-79411552 https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%d0%9c%d0%b8%d1%80%d0%bd%d0%be%d0%b5_%d1%81%d0%be%d0%b3%d0%bb%d0%b0%d1%88%d0%b5%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%b5_%d0%bc%d0%b5%d0%b6%d0%b4%d1%83_%d0%ad%d1%84%d0%b8%d0%be%d0%bf%d0%b8%d0%b5%d0%b9_%d0%b8_%d0%a2%d1%8b%d0%b3%d1%80%d0%b0%d0%b5%d0%bc https://mg.co.za/2022-11-24-pretoria-deal-gives-ethiopia-a-chance-at-lasting-peace/ https://mg.co.za/2022-11-24-pretoria-deal-gives-ethiopia-a-chance-at-lasting-peace/ https://hoa.boell.org/en/2023/11/01/pretoria-agreement-tigray-one-year-after https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2022/12/18/ethiopias-winner-takes-all-politics-threatens-tigray-peace-deal/ https://kujenga-amani.ssrc.org/2024/03/20/ethiopias-pretoria-peace-agreement-and-the-fate-of-the-contested-areas/ https://hoa.boell.org/en/2023/11/01/pretoria-agreement-tigray-one-year-after https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ethiopia%e2%80%93tigray_peace_agreement

Will it be possible that Africa united, founded a pan-africa

Will it be possible that Africa united, founded a pan-africa? This possibility can actually become reality. Theoretically, such an idea is quite possible, and it relies on a strong historical and cultural foundation - just those believe in a common fate. In practice, however, the implementation is extremely difficult due to a number of serious obstacles to foreseeable time. The Pan-Africa movement has no single founder - it was created from the interaction of different actors in Africa and the Diaspora. But some personalities are considered central ways: - Henry Sylvester Williams organized the first Pan Africa Conference in London in 1900 and founded the African Association. He is considered one of the initiators of institutional Pan-Africa work. - W. E. B. You Bois significantly led the Pan Africa congresses of the early 20th centuries (u. A. 1919 in Paris) and shaped the political and intellectual direction of movement. - Early theoretical basics already laid thinkers such as Edward Blyden and Alexander Crummell with ideas for African self-determination and the exchange between Africa and the Diaspora. - In the phase of independence movements, Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) became a central political power of Pan-Africanism and demanded a closer political networking of the African states. The Pan-African movement emerged in response to fragmentation that the colonial age had brought with it. At the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885, boundaries were artificially drawn, causing historical, cultural and economic connections between the peoples. The Pan-Africanists saw in the unity a way to overcome this heritage: Together, it is easier to act against external influences (neo-colonialism) to develop a common economic strategy, sovereignty and cross-border problems (migration, Safety, climate change) solve. This idea was not just a buzzword. It led to the founding of organizations: first of the organization for African unity (OAU, 1963) and later the African Union (AU, 2002). The AU pursues concrete goals, namely to promote the political and socio-economic integration of the continent. Examples of steps in this direction are: The African Continental Free Trade Zone (AFCFTA) - a comprehensive initiative, which should make trade between the countries considerably easier and to boost industrialization. The protocol over the free passenger transport - a step towards degradation of internal barriers. The Agenda 2063 (* 1) - a strategic plan that formulates the vision of an integrated, wealthy and peaceful Africa. So the movement is not disappeared - it transforms and goes from purely symbolic appeals to concrete projects. Let's look at both sides. The colonial heritage and artificial limits are probably the basic problem. The colonial powers moved the boundaries in Africa, regardless of ethnic, linguistic or cultural conditions: some peoples were divided into different states, while others - without any similarities - were forced together within the same limits. As a result, many African states is difficult to develop a uniform national identity; In addition, a change of border is considered a dangerous precedent that could open the pandora's box. The next problem is the cultural and linguistic diversity. More than 2000 languages are spoken on the continent. Although the colonial languages (English, French, Portuguese) serve as working languages, but at the same time form a dividing line: Frankophone, Anglophone and Arabic-language countries tend to different cooperation models and are often rather in Competition to each other as in cooperation. Even within individual regions, linguistic heterogeneity makes it difficult to develop common political solutions. A jealous guards of the countries about sovereignty. Since acquiring their independence, the African states have defended their sovereignty extremely jealous - a principle that was already anchored in the Charter of the African Unity Organization (OAU) of 1963. The Charter of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) was adopted on May 25, 1963 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) at a conference of Heads of State and Government of 32 African States. The document is divided into article; I have summarized the essential points thematically: Foundation of the organization (Article I). The high parties are based on the organization for African unity. You belong to the African states of the mainland, Madagascar and the other islands in the environment of Africa. Objectives (Article II). These include: strengthening the unity and solidarity of the African states; The coordination of efforts to improve the living conditions of the peoples of the continent; the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; the elimination of all forms of colonialism in Africa; as well as the promotion of international cooperation taking into account the UN Charter and the general explanation of human rights. In order to achieve these goals, Member States undertaken to tailor their policies and diplomacy policy, economy (including transport and communication), education and culture, healthcare, science and technology, defense and safety. Principles (Article III). Member States are solemnly known for the following principles: sovereign equality of all members; Non-interference in the internal affairs of states; Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independent existence; peaceful settlement of disputes (by negotiating, mediation, mediation or arbitration); as well as the unconditional conviction of political murders and subversive activities by other states. Unrestricted commitment to complete exemption of still dependent African territories; Policy of block freedom. Membership (Article IV). Each independent and sovereign African country was a member of the organization. Rights and obligations (Article V). All Member States enjoyed equal rights and documents of the same duties. Article VI established the obligation of the Member States to strict the principles of Article III strictly. Organs of the organization (Article VII). The following organs were created to achieve the objectives of the OAU: The Conference of Heads of State and Government (Supreme Institution, which at least once a year), the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat and the Commission for Mediation, Schlichtung and Arbitration. Entry into force and other procedural questions. The Charter came into force after two-thirds of the signatory states had deposited their instruments of ratification at the Ethiopian Government. The original text was written in African languages as well as in English and French; All language versions were equally binding. In addition, the document contained regulations for leaving the organization: A state had to address a written notice to the Secretary General; After a year (if the communication was not withdrawn), the Charter lost its validity for this state. The founding of the OAU and their charters were a reaction to the wave of decolonization. The main objective was to bundle the forces of newly independent states to safeguard sovereignty, combat the remains of colonialism and neo-colonialism and coordinate development. The principles anchored in the Charter - especially sovereignty and non-intervention - coined significantly the approach of organization in international disputes. Later, the OAU continued to develop and was replaced in 2002 by the African Union (AU) - an organization with more pronounced economic and integrative objectives. The political elites are unwilling to assign powers to supranational bodies; The transfer of control over defense, foreign policy or household is perceived as a threat to its own power position. The ambitions of the head of state play a role: only a few are ready to voluntarily give a part of their power to a continental central instance. Furthermore, there are economic imbalances. The gradient between the countries is enormous. While states such as South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt have large economies, there are some of the poorest countries in the world in their neighborhood. The economies of most countries are geared to the raw material export, barely networked and complement only a little. Inner-continental trade is historically small, while trade barriers, duties and a poor infrastructure increase the exchange. In contrast to the European Union, where integration has led to a convergence of income, there is a risk of contrary development in Africa, because resources could drain the strongest actors and thus exacerbate inequality. Political instability and conflicts. Military Putsche (Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Sudan, Guinea), Civil Wars, Separatist movements and terrorism undermine trust between states and make it difficult to build institutions. Unregular change of power, "hereditary democracy" and weak state institutions lead to the fact that agreements of a government can be repealed from the following. Multiple memberships in integration alliance Many countries also include three to four regional economic communities (RECS) whose mandates overlap and sometimes contradict. This leads to a fragmentation of resources, for duplication of programs and lower incentives to deepen integration within the respective block. External influence Former colonial powers and new global actors (China, USA, Russia) true their influence through economic relations, military presence and political lobbying. The Maghreb States, for example, rather focus on trade in the EU as among each other and often occur on the European market as competitors. External powers also understand it to use border and ethnic conflicts to weaken regional solidarity. The transport network inside the continent is weakly expanded: the road density is low, there are only a few railway connections, and the energy supply is unstable. This makes it difficult to trade and mobility of people. Corruption also undermines governance and confidence in institutions. Missing support in the population Integration initiatives in Africa are largely from above - from politicians and technocrats - and are barely based on the support of the population. Without the inclusion of civil society, integration is perceived as an elitized project, which weakens its legitimacy and sustainability. The obstacles on the way to a unified state are less ideological than rather structural nature - these include historical trauma, economic inequality, political instability, as well as simply the lack of roads and a common language. Many experts agree that the path to unity does not lead to a political association "from above", but by gradually economic integration, the expansion of infrastructure and the development of human capital. Although anarchists were not the driving force of Panafricanism and did not give the sound in its central structures (such as the Pan-African congresses or the OAU), they undoubtedly played a considerable role - especially at the base and in concrete local fight. Here it is important to make a distinction right at the beginning. Pan-Africanism as an ideology focuses on the solidarity of all people of African descent - both on the continent and the diaspora - in the service of a common goal: liberation and unity. His story was marked by personalities such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah. Anarchists, on the other hand, considered the matter from a different angle: they sat on horizontal, non-hierarchical forms of self-organization, rejected the state as such and often practiced criticism of bureaucratic models (including certain forms of the Socialism). Anarchists and anarchosyndicalists actively organized in a number of countries (such as South Africa or Egypt) organized anarchists and anarchosyndicalists. They founded trade unions that were often internationally aligned and racial barriers through - an approach that covered directly with the anticolonial and Pan-African agenda. A striking example of this is the South African * Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union * (ICU): They spread anarchosyndicalistic ideas and fought for the rights of working ones, which is seamlessly in the general Insert liberation struggle. Anarchists often used in the conditions of colonial or post-colonial oppression for direct actions, self-defense of communities and the creation of alternative structures (such as cooperatives or mutual aid systems). Later, groups aroused, which consciously combined the panafricanism with other radical theories - including anarchism. For example, the "Anarkata" movement tries to develop an inclusive, anti-imperialist and ecologically oriented agenda by linking anarchism, black Marxism, black feminist theory and social ecology. Their goal is the liberation without the focus on the founding of a "Pan-African state" and without hierarchical structures. There were quite a tension fields, because the anarchist focus on the breaking of the state and the rejection of centralized power sometimes came into conflict with the objectives of the Pan-Africanists; These sometimes saw the need to create strong national or regional state structures in order to true the sovereignty and to enforce social reforms. Anarchism is thus a role, although a peripheral and specific: anarchists introduced ideas of direct democracy and anti-authoritarianism into the discourse, but did not shape the main flow of the movement. Communists and socialists actually played a significant role in the Pan-African movement, but they can not overvalue that - they were not their only or original "driving forces". Rather, they represented an important additional flow, especially at a certain phase. Many activists saw an instrument for the fight against colonialism and economic inequality in socialist and communist ideas. The Communist International (Comintern) linked the "national question" in the 1920s (including the liberation of Africa) directly with the worldwide struggle of the working class. This attracted those who were not only looking for an anticolonial but also to a socio-economic program. There were prominent personalities that stood at the interface of these two traditions. For example, George Padmore (from Trinidad) was actively involved in both Pan-African congresses and communist initiatives (including the International Conference Black Worker 1930 in Hamburg). Also werve.e.b. You Bois, who is often referred to as a "father of Pan-Africanism", maintained connections to communist circles. In South Africa, the Communist Party worked closely with the African National Congress (ANC), and some ANC executives (such as Nelson Mandela) were a member of the Communist Party. Socialists and communists often organized workers, founded trade unions and operated agitation in industrial centers (for example, in the gold mines of South Africa); This overcut directly with the anticolonial fight. Not all Panafricans shared the radical revolutionary tactic of the Communists. Many put on a gradual decolonization or the nation state or stressed cultural and racial solidarity rather than just the class struggle. Sometimes there were tensions. For example, the hidden influence of Communists within the ANC in the 1950s led to a cleavage: the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe broke away from the movement; His followers demanded more autonomy and turned to the dominance of communist elements. During and after the Second World War, the official line of the USSR seemed: The focus shifted on the fight against fascism, which transformed anticolonial aspirations temporarily into the background. This prompted many Pan Africans to rethink their relationship to communist movement and to strive for greater independence. Communists and socialists made a significant contribution by bringing a socio-economic agenda in Pan-Africanism and mobilized the workers' masses. Nevertheless, the Pan-African movement remained broad and diverse; There was also other currents (nationalist, religious, liberals), which sometimes went their own ways. Therefore, it is more apt not to talk about that the movement was supported exclusively by them, but that they formed an important part of the left wing of the movement in a certain historical phase. I would say that a "unified Africa" is less one goal than a process. It is about the gradual deepening of cooperation in different areas: economy, security, culture and education. The central challenge is currently to implement the ideas of Pan-Africanism in practice and to align it more strongly on the actual needs of the people. The civil society, the youth and the economy - and not only governments - can play a crucial role. So there is the possibility, but depends on how successful the continent can overcome these hurdles and find a balance between the general and the particular. * 1) The Agenda 2063 is the long-term strategic framework of the African Union - often under the motto "The Africa we want" (The Africa WE Want), which (2013-2063)) For inclusive, sustainable development, continental integration and a stronger role of Africa in world events. Agenda 2063 was adopted on 31 January 2015 at the 24th Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Addis Ababa. It emerged from the knowledge of African executives that the continent after decades in which the focus under the OAU was on the decolonization and the termination of apartheid, a new development agenda, which is aligned. Required from Panafricanism and an "African Renaissance". The Agenda 2063 is divided into seven aspirations, which include specific objectives and center of priority: 1. A wealthy Africa on the basis of inclusive growth and sustainable development. High standard of living; Elimination of poverty and hunger; Jobs and decent work; Social protection; Modern, livable habitats and basic care. 2. An integrated continent, politically constructed and based on Pan-African ideals. Depth regional and continental integration; Free movement for persons and goods; Strengthened regional economic communities; Long-term political unity. 3. An Africa of good governance, democracy, human rights, justice and the rule of law. Effective, accountable institutions; Participatory politics; Anti-corruption; Strong, development-oriented states. 4. A peaceful and safe Africa. Conflict prevention and solution; Reform of the security sector; "To silence the weapons"; Resistance to extremism and organized crime. 5. An Africa with strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and Ethii. Promoting African languages, arts and cultural heritage as well as a narrative of African Renaissance. 6. A developing agenda borne by the people, especially for women and adolescents. Equality of the sexes; Strengthening youth; Use of demographic change as a dividend instead of risk. 7. Africa as a strong, a small and influential global actor. Coordinated positions in multilateral forums; More fairer rules for world trade and finance; Klimagerechtigkeit; Strategic autonomy. [5] [6] As part of these objectives, the Agenda 2063 identifies 20 specific objectives and the accredited priority areas (eg revolution in education and competence development; Health and diet; Industrialization and value added; Modern agriculture; Blue economy / Sea economy; Climesilicity; Infrastructure and regional networking). The implementation takes place in ten-year plans (Tyips). - First Tyip (2014-2023): Focus on the creation of basics (infrastructure, agriculture, education, health, governance, peace and security). [2] [14] - Second Tyip (2024-2033): Currently in the implementation; It includes ambitious "Moonshot" goals for every priority area to speed up progress and to ensure better coordination with the UN goals for sustainable development (SDGS). The agenda 2063 and the SDGs are explicitly linked together: Many goals of the Agenda 2063 correspond directly to the targets of SDGs (eg poverty, hunger, health, education, decent work, cities, climate, oceans). Agenda 2063, however, complements this by continent-specific priorities such as political integration, free movement and strategic positioning of Africa at a global scale. Analyzes from the mid-2020s are progress in areas such as infrastructure, certain health and education indicators as well as regional trade structures, but also point to persistent challenges: poverty and inequality, deficiencies in government, Conflicts, debt load and uneven industrialization. Both critics and advocates emphasize that the success of the coherence of national politics, financing (including the implementation of AFCFTA and the mobilization of their own resources) as well as stronger coordination mechanisms within the AU Depends.