Samstag, 28. Februar 2026
Ruto's Campaign and the United Opposition
Ruto's campaign for a single term enters Nakuru County with determination to remove Ruto from office in 2027.
The United Opposition reaffirmed its resolve to remove President William Ruto from office in 2027 after its candidates suffered defeats in the by-elections won by the ruling United Democratic Alliance (UDA).
The United Democratic Alliance (UDA) has nominated candidates for all four contested seats in the February 26, 2026, by-elections in Isiolo South, West Kabras (Kakamega), Evurore, and Muminji (Embu). These by-elections included one constituency seat and three ward seats in the County Assembly.
UDA candidate in Isiolo South Constituency (constituency seat) - Mohamed Tubi (also known as Tubi Jnr or Mohamed Tubi).
In West Kabras Ward (Kakamega County) - Elphas Kainanga Shalakha
In Evurore Ward (Embu County) - Duncan Mukang’u Jnr (also Duncan Mukang’u or Duncan Muratia)
In Muminji Ward (Embu County) - Peterson Njeru Njiru (also Weche)
The election results show that the UDA won all four seats. Tubi Mohamed Tubi won in Isiolo South with 7,352 votes against his sister Bina Tubi (Jubilee). Elphas Kainanga Shalakha won West Kabras with 3,317 votes. The candidates in Embu also secured victories.
Opposition leaders, headed by Rigathi Gachagua, demonstrated their strength during a stop in Mahiu Mahiu, Nakuru County, drawing a large crowd to their rally.
The opposition emphasized that the by-election results would not slow their momentum. and the campaign for Ruto's re-election remains on track.
This could credibly demonstrate to the opposition group that it can mobilize supporters, even though the recent election results paint a different picture at the ballot box.
Ruto's campaign for a re-election continues after his defeat in the by-election - wantam.
Martha Karua, chairwoman of the People's Liberation Party, called on citizens to register to vote and emphasized that the by-elections were not representative of the outcome of the presidential election.
The chairman of the Wiper Party, Kalonzo Musyoka, reiterated the call for unity and stressed that the opposition has the necessary votes to challenge the ruling party.
Fred Matiangi, deputy chairman of the Jubilee Party and former education minister, criticized the government's performance and called on citizens to take action.
Justin Muturi, chairman of the Democratic Party (DP) and former attorney general, cited corruption and human rights violations as reasons for supporting the Opposition:
The UDA candidates won all four contested seats in the districts of Isiolo, Kakamega, and Embu, demonstrating continued voter support for the ruling party.
Newspapers such as The East African reported that the opposition put up no serious fight and that the UDA's victories were therefore relatively uncontested.
Freitag, 27. Februar 2026
Gold Mining in Migori County, Kenya
Donnerstag, 26. Februar 2026
Rachel Athieno - a pan-African storytelling - EduCinema Initiative in Uganda
Africa's development depends on narrative and interpretive sovereignty, says one expert.
Development fails when lived narratives are ignored. AfricanCurrents spoke with Rachel Athieno, a pan-African storytelling strategist and founder of the EduCinema Initiative in Uganda, about 
the power of storytelling in development and why Africans should co-create their stories.
The EduCinema Initiative is a Ugandan organization founded by Rachel Athieno that uses film education to promote pan-African narratives. The initiative aims to make African perspectives and traditional viewpoints visible through strategic storytelling and to effect real social change beyond metrics. It strengthens public affairs and intermedial practices at the intersection of film and oral storytelling traditions in East Africa. EduCinema is committed to promoting African stories that enrich global discourse and supports educational projects with film-based approaches. Storno positions herself as a pan-African storytelling strategist who promotes African narratives to effect real change beyond mere metrics.
Rachel Athieno works as a public affairs enthusiast and CEO of the EduCinema Initiative in Uganda. The initiative uses film education to strengthen pan-African perspectives and bring traditional African viewpoints into global discourse.
She emphasizes the need for genuine visibility for African issues and is committed to strategic narrative education. In February 2026, she spoke with Sputnik Africa about pan-African strategies.
For decades, Africa's development was measured by Western indicators that drowned out the continent's own voice. Now, policymakers and strategists are reclaiming the power to tell its stories. But why is it so important who tells Africa's stories?
Montag, 23. Februar 2026
Burkina Faso's fight against Malaria
The years 2024 and 2025 mark a critical phase in the fight against malaria in Burkina Faso. While the international community and local actors continue their efforts to contain the disease, the available data reveal a complex and evolving trend in malaria cases. This period has been characterized by a dynamic landscape, where progress in some regions has been overshadowed by persistent challenges in others.
In the early months of 2024, initial reports indicated a degree of stability in the number of reported malaria cases, which could be interpreted as a sign of the continued effectiveness of prevention campaigns, such as the distribution of mosquito nets and the application of insecticides. However, these positive developments have been impacted by climatic changes and seasonal fluctuations, which are known to favor breeding grounds for Anopheles mosquitoes, the vectors of the parasite.
In the first months of 2024, initial reports showed a degree of stability in the number of reported malaria cases, which could be interpreted as a sign of the continued effectiveness of prevention campaigns, such as the distribution of mosquito nets and the application of insecticides. Particularly in rural and underserved areas where access to health services is limited, disease control efforts remained insufficient to fully contain the spread. The increase in refugee flows due to displacement and conflict further exacerbated the situation in certain regions, as overpopulation and a lack of sanitation increased the risk of disease transmission.
As 2025 progressed, the data became more complex. While some regions continued to make progress in reducing the disease burden, cases increased again in other areas. This underscores the need for a flexible and adapted strategy tailored to the specific geographic and socioeconomic conditions of each region. The resistance of malaria parasites to conventional drugs also poses a growing threat and necessitates ongoing research and the development of new treatment approaches.
The challenges Burkina Faso faced in the fight against malaria in 2024 and 2025 were multifaceted. These range from the effects of climate change and its close link to mosquito populations, to the logistical and financial hurdles in implementing prevention and treatment strategies, to the socioeconomic factors that influence the population's vulnerability. Ongoing monitoring, strengthening health systems, and promoting community participation remain essential for successfully combating malaria in Burkina Faso in the long term.
The total number of malaria cases in the country decreased from 10,805,020 in 2024 to 7,329,278 in 2025. This marks a significant reversal of the trend observed between 2020 and 2024, as the Ministry of Health of Burkina Faso announced in a statement.
The following measures contributed to this turnaround:
Free malaria vaccination, available in all 70 health districts since August 2025;
National campaign to distribute nearly 15 million free, insecticide-treated, next-generation mosquito nets;
Seasonal chemoprevention (administration of a curative dose of malaria medication) over five months during the peak transmission season for nearly 4.9 million children under five years of age;
Intermittent preventive treatment for pregnant women;
Strengthening early detection and improving case management.
The elimination of malaria in Burkina Faso by 2030 is now the declared goal of the government.
Rwanda and Tshisekedi
Rwanda and Tshisekedi
Following the visit of Jean-Luc Habyarimana (the son of former Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, who ruled from 1973 until his death in 1994, he has recently become politically active and, from exile in Kinshasa, has launched a program advocating for democracy and reforms in Rwanda).
He is one of eight children of Juvénal Habyarimana and Agathe Kanziga. Often referred to as the second-born son, he has spent much of his life in France. His father's 1973 coup against Grégoire Kayibanda shifted power to northern Rwanda and deepened regional divisions, which later fueled ethnic tensions. Critics link his recent activities to "genocidal statism," pointing to his family's flight during the 1994 genocide.
In early 2026, he visited Kinshasa, where he was in was received in Kigali as part of talks about regime change. He presented a manifesto promising human rights and political reforms. On his account, he commemorates his father's plane crash on April 6, 1994, and describes it as a decisive loss. Rwandan commentators advise him to first prove his leadership qualities at the local level before harboring presidential ambitions)
, the son of former Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, in Kinshasa. President Tshisekedi (is the current President of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo was born on June 13, 1963, in Kinshasa and has been President of the country since January 24, 2019. He is the son of opposition politician Étienne Tshisekedi and took over the leadership of the UDPS (Union for Democracy and the Progrès Social) reportedly welcomed further opponents of President Kagame (Paul Kagame has been President of Rwanda since 2000. He led the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the fight against the genocide regime and stopped the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994. Born in Rwanda in 1957, Kagame fled persecution as a child into exile in Uganda, where he fought alongside Yoweri Museveni. In 1990, he took over leadership of the RPF and brought victory in 1994, paving the way for his political career. Under Kagame, Rwanda experienced a strong economic recovery, with a focus on reconciliation, women's empowerment, technology, and combating corruption. He was AU President in 2018 and Commonwealth Chair from 2022 to 2024. Critics accuse him of authoritarian rule, suppressing opposition, and enabling constitutional amendments to extend his power until 2034. Tensions with the DRC over M23 rebels (exist since 2022). According to some sources, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa (is a former Rwandan lieutenant general and a key figure in the country's post-genocide military and political history. Born around 1958–1962, he grew up in Uganda and co-founded the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1988. From 1994 to 2002, Nyamwasa was Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army and headed military intelligence during this time. A close ally of President Paul Kagame, he played a key role in the RPF's takeover of power after the 1994 genocide and led operations in the First Congo War to prosecute Hutu perpetrators. In 2010, following tensions with Kagame, Nyamwasa resigned as ambassador to India and fled to South Africa. He co-founded the Rwandan National Congress (RNC), an exiled political party. Opposition group that criticized Kagame's regime for corruption and authoritarianism. On June 19, 2010, Nyamwasa survived a gunshot wound to the abdomen in Johannesburg; his condition stabilized after surgery. Rwanda accused him and Patrick Karegeya (who was killed in 2014) of planning grenade attacks in Kigali. Kigali accuses Nyamwasa of terrorism and endangering national security, linking him to militias such as the FDLR; he denies this and claims persecution. Some sources claim he was involved in the 1994 assassination of President Habyarimana) and other exiled Rwandan opposition figures such as Théogène Rudasingwa (a prominent Rwandan figure known for his work as a physician, former diplomat, and political activist. Born on February 2, 1961, he is a trained physician and spent much of his youth as a refugee. During and after the 1994 events in Rwanda, he became involved with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), serving as a field doctor, liaison officer, member of the executive committee, and finally as general secretary. After the RPF seized power, he held high-ranking positions in the post-genocide government: Rwanda's ambassador to the United States (1996–1999), and chief of staff to President Paul Kagame (2000–2004). He later became a vocal critic of President Kagame and the Rwandan government at the time, accusing them of He denounced authoritarianism, human rights violations, and other injustices. He went into exile and co-founded opposition groups such as the Rwandan National Congress (RNC) and related initiatives advocating for democracy, justice, reconciliation, coming to terms with the past, and healing in Rwanda. Rudasingwa is also an educator and institution builder. He founded the East African Meta-University (EAMU) and was involved in social enterprises aimed at improving the health, livelihoods, and well-being, particularly of women and children. He is the author of books, including works on coming to terms with Rwandan trauma and promoting compassion, and speaks regularly on topics such as intergenerational trauma, democracy, and regional issues in the Great Lakes region. He remains active as an intellectual and advocate, frequently writing open letters (e.g., criticizing development aid to Rwanda or addressing them directly to President Kagame) and participating in interviews and discussions about the Rwandan political landscape. Recent mentions place him Rwandan opposition figures in exile. Unconfirmed reports from regional conversations suggest possible diplomatic or opposition contacts with the Democratic Republic of Congo), David Himbara (is a Rwandan-Canadian educator, author, and former senior advisor to Rwandan President Paul Kagame. He is known for his work in socio-economic development and his later criticism of the Rwandan government. Himbara was Kagame's personal secretary from 2000 to 2002 and subsequently head of the Strategy and Policy Department in the Presidential Office from 2006 to 2009. During this time, he was instrumental in the establishment of the Rwanda Development Board (RDB), of which he was the first chairman, and improved Rwanda's ranking in the World Bank's Doing Business Index from 143rd to 67th place) and Gerald Kahima are expected in Kinshasa shortly. Is this a strategy or rather a provocation by Tshisekedi? It looks like Tshisekedi is planning something. AS is difficult to predict. What is certain is that this information—should it be confirmed—will further exacerbate the already tense situation between the two sides.
https://thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Congolese--citizens--will--not--know--peace--until--Kinshasa--stops--hiding--behind--Rwanda_2037
Sonntag, 22. Februar 2026
France's diplomacy with weapons in Africa
France's diplomacy with weapons in Africa
France's historical role in Africa is multifaceted. Its role includes colonization, decolonization, and maintaining postcolonial relations. France was one of the leading European colonial powers in Africa, and its influence on the continent is still felt today, although it has changed considerably.
France's colonization of Africa was not a spontaneous decision, but a project pursued over decades – especially in the 19th century – that arose from a mix of ambition, economic greed and a deeply rooted sense of mission.
France arrived in Africa in the 17th century, but the main phase of its colonial expansion took place in the 19th century. In 1830, France invaded Algeria. As part of the "Scramble for Africa," France secured territories in West and Equatorial Africa and established protectorates in Tunisia and Morocco before the First World War. After the war, parts of German Togo and Cameroon were annexed to France as League of Nations mandates.
After the defeat against Prussia in the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71) and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, French self-confidence was shattered. Colonial expansion was intended to restore national honor. France wanted to prove that it was still a world power. A race (the so-called Scramble for Africa) with Great Britain ensued. Whoever possessed more land had more leverage at the negotiating table of the world powers.
France needed resources to keep pace with its rapid industrialization. Africa offered access to valuable goods such as ores, rubber, cocoa, palm oil, and later, peanuts. The colonies served as closed markets where French manufactured goods could be sold without foreign competition.
This was the moral justification for imperialism. The French were convinced that their culture, language, and form of government were the most "progressive" in the world. They saw it as the "duty" of the "superior races" (as the politician Jules Ferry put it in 1885) to civilize the "inferior races." Unlike the British (who ruled more indirectly), France wanted to make Africans into "black French" (assimilation).
The conquest of Algeria, and later Tunisia and Morocco, was intended to turn the Mediterranean into a "French lake." Africa served as a reservoir of soldiers. The so-called Tirailleurs sénégalais (Senegal riflemen) later became an important pillar of the French military in both World Wars.
From a European perspective at the time, these motives often sounded "logical" or even "humanitarian," but in reality led to massive exploitation, destruction of local structures, and decades of oppression of the African population.
In 1930, French Africa comprised French West Africa; French Equatorial Africa; Maghreb territories (western North Africa); islands in the Indian Ocean (Madagascar, Réunion, Comoros); and Djibouti on the Horn of Africa.
In its colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, France primarily viewed the territories as sources of raw materials, while in the Maghreb (especially in Algeria) a settler model of colonization was pursued. Colonial policy included the assimilation of the indigenous population, the spread of the French language and Christianity, and the exploitation of natural resources.
After the Second World War, independence movements intensified in the French colonies in Africa. In 1958, following a constitutional referendum, almost all of sub-Saharan Africa declared its desire for independence. In 1960, 14 French colonies in West and Equatorial Africa, as well as Madagascar, gained their independence.
Previously, in October 1958, France had adopted a new constitution under which the members of the French Union could become part of the French Community and subsequently gain independence. All African colonies except Guinea accepted this plan.
The path to independence was difficult for some African countries, as it varied greatly. While some countries fought harsh and bloody wars of independence, others achieved their sovereignty through comparatively peaceful means, including negotiations and referendums.
In some French colonies, resistance to colonial rule escalated into open, armed conflicts.
By far the most famous and bloodiest war of independence against France took place in Algeria. The Algerian War (1954-1962) was fought by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and was characterized by extreme brutality and the widespread use of torture by the French military. The war ended in 1962 with Algeria's independence, after more than half a million people (estimates even go as high as 1.5 million) had lost their lives.
The liberation struggle in Cameroon is often referred to as the "forgotten war." The Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) launched an armed uprising against the French administration as early as 1955. The conflict continued with great brutality even after Cameroon's official independence from France in 1960 and lasted until the early 1970s.
The Madagascan uprising of 1947 was another tragic chapter. A nationwide revolt against French colonial rule was brutally suppressed by the French army within a few months. The death toll is estimated at between 10,000 and 100,000.
Then there are countries with a more peaceful transition.
The majority of French colonies in Africa achieved their independence in the 1950s and 1960s without a widespread war.
Tunisia and Morocco gained their independence in 1956. Although there were nationalist movements and periods of armed resistance there as well, decolonization was largely deadly compared to Algeria.
France arrived in Africa in the 17th century, but the main phase of its colonial expansion took place in the 19th century. In 1830, France invaded Algeria. As part of the "Scramble for Africa," France secured territories in West and Equatorial Africa and established protectorates in Tunisia and Morocco before the First World War. After the war, parts of German Togo and Cameroon were annexed to France as League of Nations mandates.
There was systematic economic exploitation through colonial pacts that granted France preferential rights to raw materials, but current developments show a decline in French influence in the region. After the independence of former colonies like Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, France controlled access to mineral resources such as uranium, gold, and oil through the so-called colonial pact, demanding pre-emption rights and reserves within the CFA franc zone. French corporations took over mines and refineries, while African states often received only minimal revenue and had to borrow money at high interest rates. This led to accusations of neocolonialism under the term "Françafrique."
In 1958, Guinea exercised its right to vote in a referendum against the new French constitution and membership in the "French Community" (Communauté française). Guinea thus became the first French colony in sub-Saharan Africa to gain immediate and complete independence, but in return, it had to accept an immediate and complete withdrawal of all French support and investment.
The 14 French colonies that gained independence in 1960, a year considered the "Year of Africa." A total of 14 former French colonies in West and Central Africa became independent that year. Here is the list:
Country Date of Independence 1960
Cameroon (despite the armed struggle) January 1st
Togo, April 27
Madagascar (despite the 1947 uprising) June 26
Benin (formerly Dahomey) 1 August
Niger, August 3
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) 5 August
Ivory Coast, August 7
Chad, August 11
Central African Republic, August 13
Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) August 15
Gabon, August 17
Senegal, August 20
Mali, September 22
Mauritania, November 28
The history of the decolonization of Africa from France is complex. While countries like Algeria, Cameroon, and Madagascar had to wage an extremely brutal and protracted armed struggle, most other colonies achieved independence through a more diplomatic process in the context of the global political situation in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Despite independence, France retained considerable influence in its former colonies. A system of relationships known as Françafrique emerged. This concept describes a network of formal and informal ties between France and its former colonies, encompassing political, economic, military, and cultural aspects.
France retained control over the economies of many countries, for example through the CFA franc currency system, which pegged the currencies of its former colonies to the French franc and later to the euro.
France concluded military cooperation treaties with the newly independent states, thereby committing itself to maintaining stability in the region. French officers frequently held key positions in the armies of the former colonies. Paris often intervened in African countries to protect its citizens, suppress uprisings, prevent coups, or support certain leaders.
Traditional areas of activity are West and Central Africa. Countries where France has historically had a military presence or sent advisors.
In Ivory Coast, French trainers worked to improve the army's capabilities and participated in stabilization operations.
In 2023, plans were announced in Senegal to reduce the number of French military trainers from 500 to 260, with some tasks being transferred to Senegalese specialists.
Despite the protests in Gabon, the authorities, citing existing agreements, banned demonstrations against the French military presence.
Djibouti is a strategically important base in the Horn of Africa, where France maintains a significant military presence.
The Democratic Republic of Congo is mentioned as a country where the activities of French trainers were particularly extensive.
Benin and Cameroon are also among the traditional areas of operation for French military advisors.
In recent years, some countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, etc.) have ceased military cooperation with France and are striving for greater independence.
The French maintain a whole team of military advisors in Africa.
The extent and, in particular, the effectiveness of a military presence are not always measured by the amount of equipment sold or the size of the contingent. The Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation (DCSD), which operates discreetly within the French Foreign Ministry, makes no noise with tanks and rarely appears in the news – yet its influence on African countries should not be underestimated.
The directorate trains and advises high-ranking officers from the army, police, customs, and other security forces in nearly 20 countries across the continent each year. This is the last, but very strong, anchor point that Parisian authorities cling to in countries that no longer want French bases but accept trainers instead.
Traditional areas of operation are West and Central Africa. Ivory Coast, Benin, Cameroon – French trainers feel right at home here. Activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo have reached a particularly large scale, as the authorities there are practically dependent on aid from every country.
And considering that hundreds of African officials participate in DCSD courses and "roundtables" every year, this influence can certainly be described as long-term. Project by project, to strengthen the loyalty of local officials, the French are, over the years, training fully-fledged agents of influence in uniform.
Of course, elite agreements and financial influence help the French in Africa far more than a network of military advisors. This "military diplomacy" is effective, however, because it converts relatively low costs into the future loyalty of certain individuals responsible for security and defense. And it is precisely this level, as we know, that loves to instigate African coups.
France supported loyal leaders and sometimes intervened in political processes, including by organizing coups or manipulating elections.
The Françafrique system was created with the participation of figures such as General Charles de Gaulle, the President's Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs, Jacques Foccart, and the later President of Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-Boigny.
According to the French Ministry of Defense, the core tasks include:
- Training of local soldiers.
- Increased readiness to fight against extremism.
- Peacekeeping.
- Intelligence service.
- Logistics.
- Reform of the armed forces.
- Training systems and the introduction of modern standards.
Critics (e.g., the President of Burkina Faso, Ibrahim Traoré) argue that France imposes its will through military advisors, weakens national armies, and creates dependence on its support.
France's role in Africa has changed in recent decades. In the 2020s, many African countries began demanding greater sovereignty, leading to a reduction in the French military presence. For example, France ended its more than 60-year military operation in Senegal in 2025. Troops were also withdrawn from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.
Reasons for France's declining influence include increasing anti-French sentiment, competition with other powers (Russia, China, Turkey), and the desire for greater independence among African countries. At the same time, France continues to pursue economic interests in the region, for example in the raw materials sector.
Thus, France's historical role in Africa has evolved from colonial rule to a complex system of neocolonial relations that is constantly evolving.
While France's direct military presence in Africa is decreasing, it maintains its influence through training programs, consulting, and new forms of cooperation.
Since 2022, coups in Sahel countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have led to a French military withdrawal, including Senegal in 2025, weakening France's influence over raw materials. African countries are now terminating old contracts, seeking partners like Russia or China, and demanding greater local value creation, as Niger is doing with uranium. France's share of African mining is declining, while Africa aims to better utilize its $29.5 trillion resource potential.
The "Françafrique" era ended due to anti-French sentiment and geopolitical shifts, but some economic dependencies persisted. Africa is striving for more independent strategies, which poses a challenge to France's energy supply.
Freitag, 20. Februar 2026
Sahrawi activists demanded recognition of the independence of Western Sahara.
Among Trump's last acts in office was the recognition of Morocco's illegal occupation of Western Sahara. Biden did not reverse this decision. Now it's Trump's turn again. The Sahrawi people are stubbornly refusing to have their future dictated from abroad.
Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario Front negotiated in Madrid, under US leadership, about the future of Western Sahara. Rabat presented a new autonomy plan (40 pages) for the former Spanish colony, which is more substantial than the previous one. Despite pressure from Massad Boulos, Donald Trump's envoy, the Sahrawi people and their Algerian backers refuse to relinquish the self-determination agreed upon 35 years ago.
The meetings took place on February 8 and 9, 2026, at the US Embassy in Madrid and were held in secret. Representatives from Morocco, Algeria, the Polisario Front, and Mauritania participated in the talks, which were led by US officials including Massad Boulos and UN envoy Staffan de Mistura. Algeria and Mauritania participated as observers.
The talks are based on UN Resolution 2797, which recognizes Morocco's autonomy plan as a serious basis for a solution. Morocco presented an expanded version of its 2007 autonomy plan to strengthen its sovereignty over Western Sahara. The goal is a political framework agreement to be reached in Washington by May 2026.
The negotiations mark the first direct contact since the diplomatic rupture between Morocco and Algeria in 2021 and are intended to lead to a final agreement under US pressure. Despite Algerian support for a self-determination referendum, Washington is pushing for the autonomy plan.
Morocco currently controls approximately 80% of Western Sahara, which it has claimed as part of its territory since 1975, while the Polisario Front fights for the independence of the entire territory and controls about 20%. In 2020, under President Trump, the US recognized Moroccan sovereignty in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel, and reaffirmed this position in 2025/2026, including UN resolutions and mineral agreements. This is a matter of diplomatic recognition of control.
In 2020, Morocco unilaterally expanded its claimed maritime zones, extending its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf to the waters off Western Sahara. Since Western Sahara is a separate territory from Morocco, these maritime claims are not internationally recognized and lack any legal basis.
Recent developments, such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of February 4, 2026, concerning critical minerals, and UN Security Council resolutions (October/November 2025), strengthen Morocco's position strategically and economically without ignoring the rights of the Sahrawi people under international law—the UN continues to call for negotiations. Algeria and the Polisario Front criticize this as one-sided.
The US is supporting Morocco in its efforts to force the Sahrawi people to cede 80% of their land to Moroccan control.
The US has its eye on minerals in occupied Western Sahara, Western Sahara Resource Watch
Western Sahara: Resistance is growing in Africa's last colony, Jacobi
Donnerstag, 19. Februar 2026
Clash between Ruto and Uhuru in Addis Ababa
Clash in Addis Ababa: Mediation Attempts to Reconcile Ruto and Uhuru
A clash occurred in Addis Ababa between Kenyan President William Ruto and former President Uhuru Kenyatta during a mediation effort. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had convened the meeting to reconcile the two leaders and revive the stalled peace talks in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The meeting took place behind closed doors on the sidelines of the 39th African Union (AU) Summit in mid-February 2026. It was intended to end hostilities and revitalize negotiations in the DRC—to which Uhuru Kenyatta reports under AU headquarters. Instead, it degenerated into a heated exchange.
The meeting was a high-stakes intervention initiated by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and other regional leaders. The goal was to reconcile the two Kenyan presidents, whose personal animosity, according to an African Union study, represented the biggest structural obstacle to peace efforts in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
There was palpable bitterness in the room. The accused reportedly confronted his predecessor with evidence that, he claimed, proved Uhuru was undermining his government. He linked Uhuru to the Generation Z revolts of 2024 and the resurgence of the opposition coalition Azimio.
Uhuru's response was to deny these accusations, but countered that his government had not treated him with the dignity and protocol befitting a former head of state. He argued that political opposition was not the same as subversion.
Even the official communications surrounding the meeting highlighted the rift. A photo of the two leaders with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was released by Uhuru's team, but President Ruto's official channels conspicuously omitted it—a single, blatant oversight that spoke volumes.
This feud is more than just a personal dispute; it has directly undermined Kenya's role as a neutral mediator in the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Uhuru is a member of the mediation body of the AU, the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This role requires smooth communication with Ruto's government. Instead, diplomatic dialogue has ground to a halt, jeopardizing peace efforts in a region already mired in a humanitarian catastrophe.
The root cause lies in a broken political agreement. Ruto served as Uhuru's deputy for ten years, reportedly with the understanding that Uhuru would support his succession. Instead, in 2022, Uhuru supported Raila Odinga, and the wounds have yet to heal. Since his resignation, Uhuru has remained active, supporting opposition leaders for the 2027 elections, which Ruto's camp views as a coordinated political insurrection.
The failed mediation has left the region in a precarious position. As one diplomat put it, "Africa cannot afford to have its most experienced mediator nation paralyzed by a personal feud. The Democratic Republic of Congo is bleeding. Kenya is embroiled in disputes."
Abiy Ahmed intervened directly, acting as arbiter amid accusations and violations of diplomatic protocol.
Their conflict has paralyzed peace efforts in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and damaged Kenya's regional diplomatic standing.
https://www.facebook.com/groups/2593621180772599/posts/3892778674190170
Clash in Addis: Inside mediation efforts to reconcile Ruto and Uhuru, nation Africa
39th Ordinary Session of AU Summit: William Ruto Meets Uhuru in Ethiopia as Kenya Politics Heat Up, tuko.co.ke
Kenya's IMF Dilemma
Kenya's IMF Dilemma
While Nairobi considers a new IMF loan to address its mounting debt, Budget Controller Margaret Nyakang'o (Kenya's Budget Controller, a key civil service position she has held since December 2019) recently warned against over-reliance on external financing, which could jeopardize national political autonomy.
The debate reflects a broader African challenge: how to ensure stability without relinquishing control over economic direction.
In Kenya, stability can be achieved despite IMF pressure through institutionalized reforms such as tax base expansion and state-owned enterprise restructuring, without relinquishing full control.
Similarly, in the EAC, regional financing is stabilized by compelling contributions through national policies for infrastructure and integration.
Kenya faces the complex challenge of balancing IMF loans with domestic economic pressures and public discontent. The “IMF dilemma” stems from the stringent loan conditions, which on the one hand fuel protests, but on the other hand jeopardize debt sustainability.
Under President Kenyatta, Kenya secured a $3.9 billion IMF program in 2021 to manage its debt following the shocks of COVID-19 and climate change. The conditions included tax increases, subsidy cuts, and spending reductions, all aimed at achieving a balanced budget. Staggered disbursements, such as $941 million in early 2024, were made possible. This helped avert a $2 billion Eurobond default in June 2024.
The IMF-backed 2024 fiscal law, intended to raise $2.7 billion to cover the budget deficit, triggered deadly protests against regressive taxes that disproportionately impacted the poor. At the same time, concerns about corruption persisted. It was argued that the IMF's conditions were prioritized. Creditors thus exacerbated inequality over economic growth in a cycle of loans and austerity measures. Given the political risks ahead of 2027, Kenya suspended the program review and sought new, comprehensive negotiations in light of these impending political risks.
In mid-2025, after failing to meet its targets, Kenya requested a follow-up program. Repayments of US$561 million were imminent. Despite reforms, corruption persists and jeopardizes the continuity of lending. Analysts view the conditions for fiscal consolidation as uncertain and fear that financial assistance could be delayed until the end of 2026.
Kenya is currently in a complex dilemma with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The country needs financial support to stabilize its economy and manage its high debt burden, but faces intense domestic political pressure to reject the stringent austerity measures attached to the loan.
Kenya is not simply continuing its old program. The government has officially applied for a new loan program and abandoned the previous one, which had expired. The ninth review under the old $3.6 billion facility will not take place. Talks on this new agreement began in late 2025 with a visit by IMF representatives to Kenya to assess the economic situation and draft a new reform agenda.
The conflict boils down to a clash between financial necessity and social stability:
Following the withdrawal of the controversial 2024 Finance Act, Kenya faces a substantial national debt (almost 70% of GDP) and a large budget deficit.
An IMF agreement is considered crucial to securing further financing options (such as a $750 million World Bank credit line) and bolstering market confidence. The government has also been actively managing its debt through the refinancing of Eurobonds and the restructuring of Chinese loans.
The IMF's traditional measures are facing strong resistance. Budget Director Margaret Nyakang'o publicly warned against allowing Kenya to be "puppets" and blindly adopting IMF programs, as this could lead to damaging austerity policies.
Negotiations are deadlocked on several issues. There are differing views on fiscal consolidation versus growth. The IMF is urging Kenya to increase revenues and reduce spending. However, the Budget Office warns that excessive fiscal consolidation could harm household prosperity and stifle economic growth.
Then there's governance and trust. The IMF is calling for improved governance and transparency to restore public confidence. This comes after public outrage over corruption and the perception that the elite are evading taxes while the burden falls on the shoulders of ordinary citizens.
The credibility of the budget is questionable. Kenya is struggling with revenue shortfalls and has failed to meet previous IMF requirements. The new budget proposes increased spending in the run-up to the elections, which contradicts the IMF's recommendations for fiscal consolidation. Furthermore, there are concerns about new, off-budget financing instruments that could circumvent parliamentary oversight.
Ramadan and drought in Kenya
This year's Ramadan, which is expected to begin today (February 18) or tomorrow, is taking place at a time when large parts of Kenya are suffering from drought.
Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar and is observed by Muslims worldwide as a holy month of fasting. It commemorates the first revelation of the Quran to the Prophet Muhammad and is one of the five pillars of Islam.
Mohamed Abdulkadir, Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council of Kenya (SUPKEM), Lamu branch, stated that fasting during periods of acute water shortage often causes health problems and can lead to dizziness and even loss of consciousness, especially when combined with the intense heat caused by the drought.
Mr. Mahmoud Ahmed, a Muslim religious leader, emphasized that the drought is accompanied by intense heat, further increasing the risk of dehydration.
The drought in Kenya worsened dramatically at the beginning of 2026. Following the failure of the short rainy season at the end of 2025, millions of people are suffering from acute food shortages, and the government has launched extensive relief efforts.
This year is experiencing a record drought. The drought is due to the absence of the short rainy season from October to December 2025, which in many areas was the driest since 1981. Rainfall reached only 30-60% of the usual amount, exacerbating the situation in many places.
Counties affected by the drought include Mandera, Turkana, Wajir, Garissa, Marsabit, Isiolo, Kajiado, Kilifi, Kwale, Tana River, and parts of Lamu.
The situation is particularly critical in the "alert" phases in Mandera, Wajir, Kwale, and Kilifi, while 12 other counties are in the "alert" phase.
The number of people affected rose from 2.1 million in January to 3.3 million in February 2026 and could reach 3.6 million by June.
Over 810,000 children and 104,000 pregnant/breastfeeding women are suffering from acute malnutrition. Contaminated water is also increasing the incidence of diseases such as typhus.
Then there is the existential crisis that arises when livestock die. This is particularly hard on livestock farming communities. In Wajir, animal carcasses are a common sight, as pastures and water sources have completely dried up. This is leading to an economic catastrophe: the value of weakened animals has plummeted – goats that used to fetch up to 12,000 shillings now bring in only 600 shillings.
In Turkana, residents report an unprecedented crisis. Families depend on gathering wild fruits, but even these are becoming increasingly scarce. The drought is also exacerbating conflicts over scarce resources, as demonstrated by a fatal attack in Turkana.
The government has allocated a budget of 4.1 billion shillings and is coordinating emergency relief efforts with the Kenya Red Cross and the UN.
However, the biggest problem is funding. Aid supplies are only sufficient for two to three weeks, and cuts in international funding, including from the US, are forcing organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP) to reduce their support.
This is a recurring pattern. The current crisis is not an isolated incident but part of a worrying trend. Scientists attribute the more frequent and intense droughts to climate change. The cycles are shortening: once occurring every 20 years, they are now almost an annual phenomenon.
The underlying cause could be that Kenya's geography makes the country vulnerable, as 83% of its land area is arid or semi-arid. Arid and semi-arid regions are characterized by low rainfall, although there are significant differences in rainfall amounts and vegetation. Arid areas receive less than 250 mm of rainfall per year, while semi-arid zones receive 250–500 mm.
Long-term solutions could include sustainable projects, such as the construction of sand dams, in addition to emergency aid. These dams store water in the sand and supply communities like Kitui year-round, even during droughts.
Viongozi wasihi misaada imiminike kwa Waislamu maeneo kame msimu huu wa mfungo, taifa leo
Mittwoch, 18. Februar 2026
Gachagua alleges killer squad sent to kill
Rigathi Gachagua, Kenya's former vice president, claimed that President William Ruto had a "hit squad" assassinate him on January 25, 2026, during a chaotic church service at the Witima ACK Church in Othaya.
The Witima ACK Church refers to the Anglican congregation of the Church of Kenya (ACK) in Witima, Othaya, Nyeri County, Kenya.
Former Vice President Rigathi Gachagua linked President William Ruto to a sinister conspiracy after a Sunday church service descended into chaos.
What happened?
The incident occurred during a Sunday service. Gachagua stated that state security forces used live ammunition and tear gas and locked worshippers inside the church. Videos showed panic, smoke, and a girl unconscious. Gachagua's vehicles were reportedly set on fire. He called for prayers for survival live on television and described the attack as targeted violence, not a measure to disperse a crowd.
Political reactions were swift.
Kalonzo Musyoka condemned the attack as a violation of the constitution in a sacred space and blamed Inspector General Douglas Kanja. Interior Minister Kipchumba Murkomen ordered an investigation into the violence. Gachagua, leader of the Democracy for Citizens (DCP) party, linked it to previous allegedly “state-sponsored” incidents and announced a large rally in Othaya, supported by figures such as Martha Karua.
Similar claims had surfaced previously, for example in May 2025, when Gachagua alleged that a state commando was planning to poison him or stage his arrest for murder. These allegations exacerbated tensions in Kenyan politics, though they remained unconfirmed until the end of January 2026.
https://www.pulse.co.ke/story/gachagua-alleges-killer-squad-sent-to-kill-him-as-kalonzo-condemns-chaos-2026012509590680321
Dienstag, 17. Februar 2026
William Ruto has called a special summit of the East African Community
Kenyan President William Ruto has called a special summit of the East African Community 
(EAC) as the eight-nation bloc grapples with a funding shortfall of US$89.37 million, severely straining its institutions and raising new questions about the future of regional integration.
The summit, scheduled for March 7 in Arusha, marks the first formal meeting of the EAC's top decision-making body in over a year. Leaders are expected to discuss a new funding formula and agree on spending rationalization measures as the mounting arrears from partner states continue to hamper core activities.
As of January 31, 2026, the EAC's outstanding contributions totaled US$89,372,865.
The EAC's arrears: Democratic Republic of Congo - US$27 million;
Burundi - US$22.7 million;
South Sudan owes US$21.8 million;
Somalia owes US$10.5 million;
Rwanda owes US$5.2 million; and
Uganda owes US$1.1 million.
The financial crisis has crippled several institutions, including the East African Legislative Assembly, the East African Court of Justice, and the Inter-University Council of East Africa, which owes US$18.4 million.
The EAC has a budget shortfall of over US$89 million, as only a few countries, such as Kenya and Tanzania, are paying their dues in full; Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan are lagging behind. This leads to internal loans (e.g., US$660,000 for EALA meetings) and dependence on development partners (38% of the budget). The consequences are halted projects, unpaid salaries, and restricted operations.
The EAC has a budget shortfall of over US$89 million, as only a few countries, such as Kenya and Tanzania, are paying in full; Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan are lagging behind. The funds in the EAC budget (approximately USD 109 million for 2025/2026) are primarily allocated to regional integration, institutions, and infrastructure.
The majority of the funds (approximately USD 63 million, or 62%) go to EAC bodies such as the Secretariat (USD 55 million), EALA (USD 20.5 million), and the Court of Justice, to strengthen their capacities. Priorities include regional integration (USD 17.9 million), monetary union (USD 9.4 million), customs union (USD 7.3 million), infrastructure/digitalization (USD 6.9 million), and peace/security (USD 5 million).
In a letter, Alex Obatre, Secretary of the House of Representatives, warned of “significant liquidity problems due to delayed remittances from partner states,” noting that only 38 percent of the approved budget had been received by the beginning of February.
https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/east-africa-faces-dollar89m-funding-crisis-as-kenyas-ruto-calls-for-emergency-leaders/nfd4pqv https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/east-africa-faces-dollar89m-funding-crisis-as-kenyas-ruto-calls-for-emergency-leaders/nfd4pqv https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/east-africa-news/eac-borrows-660-960-internally-to-finance-operations-amid-budget-crisis-5065748 https://www.burunditimes.com/understanding-the-eac-2025-26-financial-year-budget-breakdown/
Montag, 16. Februar 2026
Kenyan airport workers are on strike
Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA), also known as Nairobi International Airport (NBO), serves as Kenya's main international gateway. Located in the suburb of Embakasi, approximately 18 km southeast of Nairobi's city center, it is East Africa's busiest air traffic hub, handling both passenger and cargo traffic.
On February 16, 2026, a strike took place at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) in Nairobi due to a labor dispute between the Kenya Aviation Workers Union (KAWU) and the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA). The strike began on February 16 after a seven-day notice period provided by the KAWU. The union is demanding the resignation of the KAA board and the proper implementation of collective bargaining agreements.
The strike resulted in flight cancellations and disruptions. Passengers are advised to check their flight status and monitor official communication channels for updates.
The Kenya Civil Aviation Authority has activated its flight operations maintenance measures to ensure the continued availability of critical air safety and traffic control functions.
A court had temporarily suspended the strike, but the union launched it anyway; negotiations are ongoing, and no resolution has been reported as of February 17.
Kenya’s Airport Workers Threaten Strike: JKIA Faces Turbulence Ahead, medium
William Ruto 's Masterclass in Politics and Economy
This is an opinion piece by Lewis Ngunyi (a Kenyan political analyst, strategist, and commentator known for his outspoken views on governance, elections, and leadership in Kenya), published in the Daily Nation on February 13, 2026.
The article criticizes President William Ruto's handling of political maneuvers, particularly in connection with the attempted expulsion (and subsequent reinstatement) of Edwin Sifuna as Secretary-General of the ODM (Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), a major center-left party in Kenya focused on social democracy, good governance, and decentralized prosperity, led by Raila Odinga. It emerged in 2005 from a grassroots movement against constitutional amendments and played a key role in the Kenyan elections).
The political maneuvering surrounding Edwin Sifuna, the Nairobi senator and ODM Secretary-General, revolves around his recent expulsion attempt by the ODM National Executive Committee (NEC) and the subsequent legal blockade.
The conflict stems from the ODM-NEC's decision on February 11, 2026, in Mombasa, to remove Sifuna as Secretary-General, citing disciplinary violations, breaches of protocol, and undermining of party leadership.
Sifuna viewed this as a violation of the party constitution and natural justice, as he was given no opportunity to defend himself; he also criticized internal plans to support President Ruto.
The political maneuvering and the reasons behind his removal were the result of accumulated tensions. Sifuna publicly questioned the leadership's legitimacy, issued contradictory coalition messages, and was suspected of being too lenient towards pro-Ruto figures. This was done strategically before coalition negotiations and elections to ensure a unified message and consolidate internal power.
Public petitions and predictions from senior party members signaled consensus.
Sifuna was reinstated by the courts, but on February 12, 2026, the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal (PPDT) halted the reinstatement by emergency order; publication was suspended until the hearing on February 26.
Sifuna thus remains in office for the time being and emphasizes his loyalty to ODM and Raila Odinga.
The article's main points are that Ngunyi argues that Ruto employs tactics that appear clever in controlled environments (such as board meetings or negotiations with the elite) but backfire dramatically in public.
Specifically, Ngunyi states that the attempt to remove Sifuna—which is seen as evidence of Ruto's influence within the broad governing coalition that includes ODM—has backfired. And instead of silencing a vocal critic (Sifuna had repeatedly spoken out against aspects of Ruto's administration and the coalition), he increased Sifuna's name recognition.
Sifuna has achieved martyr status, particularly among younger voters and Generation Z, and turned an internal ODM issue into a nationwide symbol of resistance against Ruto.
This fits a pattern in which Ruto confuses "engagement" (bringing opponents into the fold through deals) with genuine "control," prioritizing short-term suppression of the opposition over long-term stability. The result: It fuels discontent in the streets rather than political containment.
This episode is reminiscent of earlier criticisms of Ruto's decisions, such as the 2024 impeachment of former Vice President Rigathi Gachagua, which also increased Gachagua's name recognition and the opposition's popularity rather than diminishing it.
Ruto's government has repeatedly faced accusations of strategic errors that have strengthened the opposition:
Specifically, the broad coalition government with the ODM (formed after the 2024 protests and the withdrawal of the Finance Bill) is cited. While it aimed for political stabilization, it created internal tensions because figures like Sifuna refused to fully support Ruto's re-election ambitions for 2027.
Recent events, such as Sifuna's rally in Kitengela (February 15, 2026), drew large crowds chanting anti-Ruto slogans ("One term only"). The police use of tear gas reinforced the perception of repression.
Critics see this as self-inflicted problems, as the early buying of the opposition created space for new votes against Ruto; attempts to silence critics often lead to their destruction.
A similar phrase to "master class" can also be found in other analyses (e.g., on foreign policy missteps or the handling of domestic protests), but Ngunyi's article best addresses your question.
Essentially, the "master class" is ironic sarcasm: Ruto's maneuvers may appear like clever chess, but ultimately they hand his opponents powerful pieces. Whether this weakens his voter base in the run-up to the 2027 elections is currently a much-debated question in Kenya.
And now we come to another masterclass.
The phrase “Ruto’s Masterclass in Economic Mismanagement” reflects the sarcastic undertone of current Kenyan discussions and opinion pieces, in which critics ironically refer to President William Ruto’s economic policies as a “masterclass” in failure, much like the earlier criticism of his political miscalculations. It is not a direct headline in a major media outlet (unlike Lewis Ngunyi’s political article), but it captures the widespread frustration in February 2026 over high living costs, debt burdens, perceived corruption, and unfulfilled promises from the grassroots.
Critics portray Ruto’s actions as a series of self-sabotaging measures that, while stabilizing macroeconomic indicators (e.g., the strength of the shilling, declining inflation), do so at the expense of the lives of ordinary Kenyans.
This is because there is exploding national debt and unsustainable borrowing. Kenya's debt burden remains crushing (over 10 billion Kenyan shillings have been added in recent years, mainly inherited from previous governments, but also continued under Ruto). Debt servicing consumes massive portions of revenue and restricts spending on essential goods. Social services and subsidies are financed through further debt and taxes, creating a "costly, unsustainable social economy" instead of structural growth.
The cost of living crisis and the betrayal of small businesses are also pressing concerns. The "Basic Agenda" promised improvements for small traders, farmers, and the informal workforce, but many see it as nothing more than empty promises. Everyday problems include skyrocketing prices, stagnant incomes, and the despair etched on the faces of Kenyans. Programs such as youth funds (e.g., NYOTA) or previous disbursements (e.g., for motorcycle taxis and sewing machines) are criticized as wasteful PR stunts that flood saturated sectors, injecting funds into industries rather than supporting manufacturing or agricultural processing.
And as always and everywhere, corruption and mismanagement scandals are recurring themes, including bribery in fertilizer subsidies, inflated contracts, counterfeit inputs (e.g., fertilizer mixed with sand), and wasteful spending (e.g., billions spent on software and hospitals while the facilities deteriorate, private jets amidst crises). Kenya's low ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index (around 30 out of 100 in recent reports) fuels the claim that the economy only benefits Ruto and his cronies, with billions lost annually to corruption.
The unfulfilled promises and selective successes are highlighted during opposition campaign tours, which focus on repression, broken promises (e.g., projects in northern Kenya), and the economic consequences of geopolitical maneuvering. The government counters with stabilized economic figures, youth programs, and infrastructure projects. Critics, however, accuse her of gaslighting – reframing mistakes, blaming a predecessor or external factors, or resorting to short-term populism.
In public discourse, the term "master class" is often used sarcastically to describe alleged blatant plunder, brazen impunity, or grandiose rhetoric that contradicts harsh reality. Examples include accusations of taxing the poor to protect the powerful while simultaneously preaching diligence and perseverance.
Of course, there are the counterarguments from the government/Ruto's supporters, who emphasize stabilization (e.g., lower inflation, recovery of the Kenyan shilling), reject the "failing state" narrative as sabotage, and highlight initiatives such as tax exemptions for low-income earners (under 30,000 KSh), youth funds, and investments in northern Kenya (roads, electricity supply, drought relief). She presents difficult decisions as necessary for long-term growth and dismisses the opposition's narratives as a distortion of reality.
In mid-February 2026, this narrative intensifies amid political demonstrations, security incidents, and opposition actions in western Kenya—linking economic difficulties to widespread discontent in the lead-up to 2027. The crucial question is whether the overall economic gains will benefit the general population or trigger further unrest.
https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/blogs/ruto-s-masterclass-in-political-miscalculation-5358684
Sonntag, 15. Februar 2026
The Disappearance of Critics in Africa
Samstag, 14. Februar 2026
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was buried
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi
was buried today in Bani Walid, a Gaddafi stronghold.
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (25 June 1972 – 3 February 2026) was the second son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and for many years his most prominent political heir.
He was widely regarded as the regime's de facto number two from roughly 2000 to 2011, despite never holding a formal state office.
He acted as a key intermediary with Western governments, especially in the negotiations through which Libya abandoned its weapons of mass destruction program in 2002–2003, helping pave the way for lifting sanctions.
Educated partly in the UK (including studies at the London School of Economics), he was promoted abroad as a modernizing, pro‑reform face of the regime, even as core structures of authoritarian rule remained intact.
Saif al‑Islam played a central role in talks that led Libya to renounce its nuclear and other WMD programs, which significantly improved relations with Western states.
He hosted peace talks between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Tripoli; these contributed to a 2001 agreement later incorporated into the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 2014.
He floated various political ideas, including the “Isratine” one‑state proposal for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, framed as a single secular state.
During the 2011 Libyan uprising, he publicly backed his father’s hard‑line response, warned of “rivers of blood,” and said the regime would fight “until the last man, the last woman, the last bullet.”
In June 2011, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for him on charges of crimes against humanity (murder and persecution) linked to the violent repression of protests.
He was captured later in 2011 near Zintan while trying to flee after his father's fall and was held there by local brigades who refused to hand him over to Tripoli or the ICC.
In 2015, a Tripoli court sentenced him to death in absentia for war‑crimes‑related charges stemming from the crackdown on protesters, a verdict not recognized by his Zintani captors.
Saif al‑Islam was released in 2017 in an amnesty declared by authorities in the east, after years of detention in Zintan.
From exile or semi‑clandestine locations inside Libya, he periodically issued statements, criticized both NATO and the ICC, and argued that the 2011 intervention had destroyed the Libyan state.
He tried to re‑enter politics, including moves to stand in the repeatedly delayed presidential elections, positioning himself as a figure who could restore order and negotiate among rival camps.
In 2022, through his lawyer, he circulated written proposals for resolving Libya's crisis: urgent inclusive elections under a neutral authority, or alternatively, a collective withdrawal of all current figures (including himself) from the electoral process to allow “new faces” to emerge.
On February 3, 2026, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was killed at age 53 in or near Zintan, southwest of Tripoli, according to Libyan officials and prosecutorial statements.
Reports indicate he was shot at his residence by masked gunmen who disabled security cameras; his office described it as a “cowardly and treacherous assassination,” while family accounts differed on the exact location (with his sister claiming he died near the Algerian border).
Libyan prosecutors have opened an investigation and dispatched forensic teams, but as of early February 2026, no clear, publicly confirmed motive or perpetrator has been identified.
In recent years, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi posed a threat, particularly to certain power groups in Libya—and that is precisely why they feared him and his potential return to politics.
In recent years, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was a threat, especially to certain power groups in Libya—and that is precisely why they feared him and his potential return to politics.
Reports indicate he was shot at his residence by masked gunmen who disabled security cameras; his office described it as a “cowardly and treacherous assassination,” while family accounts differed on the exact location (with his sister claiming he died near the Algerian border).
Libyan prosecutors have opened an investigation and dispatched forensic teams, but as of early February 2026, no clear, publicly confirmed motive or perpetrator has been identified. Specifically, the following groups/individuals were particularly afraid of him or saw him as a threat:
First, there is Khalifa Haftar (and his family/the LNA's eastern power bloc). Haftar was considered one of the main players who feared Saif as a potentially strong competitor in elections. Some reports and posts explicitly stated: "Haftar was afraid of the competition."
Then there is the government in Tripoli (Government of National Unity/GNU under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah and allies). His announced candidacy in 2021 and his continued popularity among segments of the population (especially among people fed up with the chaos since 2011) made him an existential threat to the status quo powers in the west.
Many militias and post-2011 elites (especially in western Libya, Zintan, Misrata, etc.) also held this view. These groups benefited from the overthrow of the Gaddafi family in 2011 and feared that Saif al-Islam, with his name, symbolic value, and potential Gaddafi loyalists (the "Greens" / Popular Front), could win elections or at least act as a kingmaker.
Not to be forgotten are parts of the West (especially the USA, France, and Great Britain). Pro-Gaddafi circles and some analyses claim that Western powers feared a resurgent, unified Libya under someone like Saif – because that would have made it more difficult for them to exert influence and further fragment the country.
So, the people who feared Saif al-Islam the most were precisely those who have been in power or seized positions of power since 2011 – especially Haftar, Dbeibah, and the western Libyan militias/elites. They feared less his military power (which was very limited after 2011) than his political symbolic value and the possibility that he could garner a large number of votes in fair elections.
Interestingly, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was shot dead in Zintan on February 3, 2026 – just a few days before the current date. Many observers see this as proof that someone took the fear of his return seriously and acted preventively. Who exactly was behind it remains officially unclear to this day.
Tens of thousands of people paid their respects in endless columns. His brother Saadi called it the "funeral of the century."
Fifteen years after the destruction of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by NATO bombing, most Libyans still mourn Gaddafi's socialism.
Fifteen years after his father's assassination, Libyans paid their last respects to their fallen son, who died fighting to reunify the country devastated by NATO.
Does this look like the funeral of a “hated son of a dictator”?
You won't see these numbers at the funerals of NATO leaders. The Libyan people loved Muammar Gaddafi, they loved Saif, and they yearn for the golden age of their country, when housing, medicine, electricity, education, and food were generously subsidized.
NATO destroyed Libya because Gaddafi dared to be self-sufficient and refuse to be enslaved by the imperialist West.
Saif was murdered because he wanted to return Libya to this mission!
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp37g4xgkxdo https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/3/saif-al-islam-gaddafi-son-of-former-leader-killed-in-libya https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saif_al-Islam_Gaddafi https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/04/saif-al-islam-gaddafi-son-of-ex-libyan-leader-killed-say-officials https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/3/who-was-libyas-saif-al-islam-gaddafi https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/10/why-did-saif-al-islam-gaddafi-have-to-die https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Saif_al-Islam_Gaddafi
https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases/saif-alislam-gaddafi https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saif_al-Islam_al-Gaddafi
Freitag, 13. Februar 2026
Border between Kenya and Somalia is to be reopened
After 15 years, the border between Kenya and Somalia is to be reopened
in April, according to President William Ruto. This was announced in a resolution by the Kenyan National Security Council.
The border between Kenya and Somalia is a land and sea border approximately 682 to 684 kilometers long, shaped by colonial treaties and making headlines in recent years primarily due to security concerns.
The border's course dates back to the colonial era. Its current form was largely determined by an Anglo-Italian treaty of 1924, which came into effect after the First World War. At that time, the United Kingdom ceded the region of Oltregiuba (also known as Jubaland), west of the Juba River, to Italy, which annexed its colony of Italian Somaliland in 1926. With the independence of Somalia in 1960 and Kenya in 1963, this colonial border became an international border between two sovereign states.
The border was closed in 2011 due to escalating attacks by al-Shabaab, cross-border kidnappings, and Kenya's military intervention in Somalia.
In a report, Jaware M., CEO of Triple The Impact Center of Governance and Public Engagement, argues that the decision may be politically motivated. He links it to the climate surrounding the 2027 re-elections and persistent concerns about alleged irregularities in the voter registration of non-Kenyans.
Critics also doubt whether the security issues that led to the closure—including the 2015 terrorist attack on Garissa University—have been fully resolved.
Reopening the border presents both opportunities and risks. While the government portrays it as a security policy decision, skeptics suspect political calculations behind it. Ultimately, its success will depend on transparency, security measures, and public trust.
April will mark more than just a reopening—it will be a test of intentions.
Kenya–Somalia border to reopen in April after 15 years,Daily Trust
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