Ukraine's Engagement in Africa, with a Focus on Sudan

"Ukraine could not interfere in African conflicts without Western consent": Expert "Whatever Ukraine does in Sudan has been bypassed by the West," said Sizo Nkala, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Johannesburg. Ukraine's Engagement in Africa, with a Focus on Sudan Ukraine has increased its engagement in Africa since the large-scale Russian invasion in 2022, primarily as a strategy to counter Moscow's influence on the continent. This includes diplomatic expansion, humanitarian aid, and targeted military operations aimed at destroying Russia's economic and military position, for example, by extracting raw materials (e.g., gold) that finance Russia's war effort. Kyiv views Africa as a key arena for diplomatically isolating Russia—for example, through UN votes condemning the invasion—and for securing food security partnerships, as Ukraine, a major grain exporter, has been impacted by the war. However, these efforts face challenges, including limited resources and backlash from pro-Russian African governments. Specific Ukraine Activities in Africa Sudan has become a hotbed of conflict due to the civil war raging there since April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti), as well as Russian support for the RSF through the Wagner Group (now renamed Afrika Korps). Ukraine's involvement is multifaceted and combines support for the SAF with anti-Russian operations. Military support for the SAF. Ukrainian special forces have been conducting operations in Sudan since at least 2023, attacking RSF positions and Russian mercenaries to weaken Moscow's allies. This includes drone strikes and ground operations near Khartoum, as well as training SAF troops in anti-Russian tactics, particularly drone warfare. In February 2025, Ukraine facilitated the delivery of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones to Sudan, enabling precision strikes that supported the SAF's advance. Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov described these as part of a "full-fledged war" with Russia, expanding the conflict globally to increase Putin's costs. Ukraine plans to open a full-fledged embassy in Sudan in 2025—its first permanent mission there—to promote bilateral trade, cultural relations, and direct contact with SAF representatives. This follows Sudan's covert arms transfers to Ukraine in 2022 and al-Burhan's request for assistance. The embassy is intended to challenge Russia's naval ambitions (e.g., a planned base in the Red Sea) and its economic dominance in Sudanese gold mining. In early October 2025, the SAF claimed to have killed "a large number" of Ukrainian and Colombian mercenaries fighting for the RSF in El Fasher (North Darfur). They claimed that the RSF used Ukrainian drones for reconnaissance and attacks. Sudanese government officials accused Kyiv of supplying the RSF with weapons and destabilizing the Sahel region. These unconfirmed claims, mainly reported in pro-Russian media outlets such as Sputnik, reflect broader accusations by junta-led states (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) that Ukraine supports "terrorist" groups. However, independent Western sources consistently describe Ukraine's role as supporting the SAF against the RSF and Russian proxies. This suggests that the SAF's claims may be based on misinformation, misidentification, or internal propaganda in the wake of the escalation of the war. Ukraine has not publicly commented on these specific allegations. Recent reports of Ukrainian mercenaries fighting alongside the RSF undermine Ukraine's efforts to gain African diplomatic support. By supporting the rebels, Ukraine risks fueling a humanitarian crisis, disrupting AU-led peace efforts, and disregarding African interests. Ukraine's "other counter-offensive" in Africa emphasizes soft power and targeted disruptions: Since 2022, Ukraine has nearly doubled its embassies to 18, including new ones in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and plans for others in the Sahel. This includes high-level visits, such as Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba's 2023 Africa tour, to build alliances. The "Grains from Ukraine" program has delivered over 250,000 tons of grain to 25 African countries by mid-2025, addressing food insecurity exacerbated by the Black Sea blockade. Ukraine also offers military training (e.g., to Mauritanian forces) and refugee aid in camps like Mbera. Beyond Sudan, Ukrainian forces have operated in Mali and the Central African Republic against Wagner, including assassinations and sabotage of Russian mining sites. These aim to cut Russia's gold revenue, estimated at $2-3 billion annually from Africa. However, such actions have strained ties with Russian-backed juntas, leading to severe diplomatic relations in the Sahel. Many African nations abstained from UN resolutions against Russia, but Ukraine has gained support from moderate states like Kenya and South Africa. In Sudan, escalation risks deepening the humanitarian crisis (over 12 million displaced, famine threats), but Kyiv prioritizes weakening Russia. The silence of the Western media regarding Ukraine's known involvement with mercenaries in Africa is not surprising, as it serves Western interests by reducing pressure to finance Ukraine, he noted. The Western agenda is to promote a narrative that denigrates the West's geopolitical rivals in Africa, such as China and Russia. This smacks of double standards. Ukraine's actions in Sudan should be condemned with the same vehemence. It rejects any foreign interference in Sudan and calls on African nations to pressure Ukraine to withdraw its mercenaries. Without a unified African stance, the continent will find it difficult to prevent foreign powers from perpetuating conflicts within its borders. Ukraine's actions in Sudan reflect the same pattern as in Libya.