"No Coup Attempt in Burundi,” President Confirms

“No Coup Attempt in Burundi,” President Confirms

Reports of explosions, gunfire, and panic in the capital, Bujumbura, on the evening of March 31 circulated on social media, fueling rumors of a coup. However, official statements and several news sources indicate that it was an accident at a military facility and not a political coup. Three military facilities are located in the affected area, according to the same source. Around 6:00 p.m. local time (Central African Time), loud explosions and sustained gunfire were reported in neighborhoods of Bujumbura, particularly near Musaga. This triggered panic; some residents fled, and videos of explosions and chaos spread online. A munitions depot caught fire due to a short circuit, leading to secondary detonations of ammunition. This explains the loud explosions and gunfire. Some reports mentioned injuries, including prisoners in the central prison, but details remain limited. Several dozen people are reported to have died in the fire, according to media reports. The Burundian military and authorities immediately ruled out a coup and attributed the events to an accidental fire at an ammunition depot. President Évariste Ndayishimiye declared on social media that the situation was under control. Army spokesman Gaspard Baratuza confirmed this, stating that there was no security threat or mutiny. No ousted leaders, military coups, or factional infighting have been reported by credible sources. "I want to reassure you: The situation is under control," President Évariste Ndayishimiye stated on his social media channels. Authorities are urging the population to remain calm, and several embassies have advised their staff to avoid travel. Burundi is known for its political instability. A notable, failed coup attempt in 2015 against then-President Pierre Nkurunziza occurred amid protests against his third term. Previous warnings of planned attacks (e.g., for 2022) have also resurfaced, which can quickly lead to speculation during security incidents. Social media amplified unconfirmed claims of a "violent coup" or a "military invasion," often including old or inconsistent videos. These appear to have been refuted by reports from local media such as SOS Médias Burundi and international media on the ground. The situation is currently described as calm, with authorities emphasizing that they are in control. As with any current event in the region, information can change—so follow reliable sources such as AFP, Reuters, or local Burundian media to stay informed. According to the latest reports, no major international organizations (e.g., the African Union, the UN) have issued warnings of a coup.

Commercial flights to southwestern Somalia resumed

Commercial flights to southwestern Somalia have resumed after federal forces secured Baidoa: Local Media Baidoa is a major city in southwestern Somalia, serving as the capital of the Bay Region and the largest urban center in the southwestern state. It is known for its agricultural trade, vibrant markets, and role as a hub amid ongoing security and humanitarian challenges. A passenger plane landed at Baidoa Airport, carrying the presidential guard—the advance party for the delegation of Somali Parliament Speaker Aden Madobe, which arrived later. Reports of a mortar attack on Baidoa Airport, followed by a firefight, indicate a tense security situation in the region. The landing of such a plane carrying the presidential guard suggests a significant military or political movement, possibly related to the current security situation in the region. The arrival marks the beginning of a federal political transition after government forces seized control of the state capital, prompting President Abdiaziz Laftagareen to resign. According to a local travel industry representative, bookings began Monday evening, and airport operations have since resumed. Video: Madobe's Visit

The conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran has significant repercussions for Africa.

The conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran has significant repercussions for Africa.

It shapes the continent's geopolitical dynamics, intensifies competition for influence and resources, and impacts the region's security and economic development. It profoundly influences the geopolitical dynamics not only of the Middle East but of the entire Eurasian-African region—and thus indirectly of Africa itself, including the Horn of Africa and East Africa, where Kenya is geopolitically situated. These effects are evident in several key aspects. The conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran is becoming a catalyst in the struggle for influence in Africa. Iran is actively expanding its presence on the continent and attempting to strengthen economic and political ties, particularly in countries that the US or Israel consider strategically important. For decades, Iran has been systematically expanding its influence in Africa—especially in North, East, and West Africa—using a combination of diplomacy, economics, military presence, and ideological influence. Particularly since the 2000s, and increasingly following the nuclear negotiations and sanctions, this has become a strategic lever for breaking isolation and forging alternative alliances. Iran is seeking to increase trade with African countries by offering preferential terms and investing in energy, telecommunications, agriculture and other sectors. Iran sees opportunities in Africa for the export of technology, energy, and weapons, as well as access to raw materials such as minerals. This serves to break through international isolation and strengthen its presence in the Horn of Africa. In 2025, trade volume increased by 85% compared to 2024, with exports to 39 African countries. Summits such as the 2025 Iran-Africa Economic Summit and visits by high-level representatives underscore this priority. The focus is on countries in the Sahel and sub-Saharan regions, where Iran is expanding its military and religious networks. President Raisi traveled to African states in 2024 to strengthen partnerships. This could lead to competition for Africa's traditional economic partners, including the US and European countries. At the same time, the sanctions imposed on Iran sometimes prompt African states to seek alternative sources of support and to become more involved in global geopolitical power games. This is not entirely successful, however, because Africa is politically deeply divided: there is no unified "African" position on the Iran sanctions, and hardly any African state actively aligns itself with US or EU sanctions policies. There are no, or at most very few, African states that officially and actively support the US/EU sanctions system against Iran; most African governments: - emphasize the role of the UN, - avoid clear support for Western sanctions, - and in some cases even maintain close economic or military ties with Iran (e.g. in the areas of technology, military, religious networks). Iran supplies weapons to several African countries. Iranian weapons reach states such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Niger, Somalia, Burkina Faso, Mali, and others in the Sahel region and East Africa. Sudan uses Iranian weapons in its civil war, Ethiopia against opposition groups, and Niger buys drones for counterterrorism purposes. The United States and Israel, for their part, are actively involved in counterterrorism operations and strive to control strategically important regions, for example through the African Command (AFRICOM). This sometimes leads to increased tensions and conflicts in regions where the interests of these powers overlap. Conflicts can contribute to the formation or strengthening of informal alliances, such as the "Axis of Resistance," which includes countries that support Iran. At the same time, the US and Israel are striving for closer ties with African states that share their geopolitical or ideological positions, for example, in combating terrorism or promoting "democratic values." The promotion of democratic values in Africa is mainly carried out by Western actors such as Germany and the EU, who use political conditionality, sanctions and support for the opposition and civil society. External interventions increase the costs for authoritarian rulers, for example through sanctions against democracy, and strengthen public awareness through educational programs. Organizations like the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) promote democracy, the rule of law, and political dialogue in countries like Kenya through party work and media empowerment. Nevertheless, full democracies are often lacking, as African citizens prioritize national sovereignty and require context-sensitive models (e.g., consensus-based structures). The democratization process has slowed, with reversals in many states by those in power who want to extend their terms. Traditional values such as community and local authority do not always align with the Western liberal model, which is why universal principles (freedom, transparency) must be taught locally. Programs for young leaders and initiatives against human rights violations are considered promising. A reduction in US humanitarian aid, which sometimes occurs in the context of geopolitical shifts, could exacerbate poverty, health problems and educational deficits in Africa. A reduction in US humanitarian aid can indeed exacerbate poverty, health crises and educational deficits in Africa, especially when it is geopolitically motivated, as has been observed under the current Trump administration since 2025. Since January 2025, the US government under President Trump has made massive cuts to USAID and other aid programs, including approximately 83% of health projects in Africa. This affects countries such as Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and West Africa, where the World Food Programme (WFP) has had to suspend its deliveries. The cuts will lead to depleted food supplies by September 2025 in seven West and Central African countries, plunging millions into acute famine. Experts warn of a collapse of aid networks, which will exponentially increase poverty. Health systems are collapsing. Programs against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are severely hampered, with fears of millions of deaths by 2030. In Somalia, malnutrition is worsening due to a lack of nutrition programs. Fewer funded projects reduce access to education in crisis regions, as resources must be prioritized. This exacerbates social inequalities and hinders economic growth in the long term. The cuts reflect a US “America First” agenda that sacrifices multilateral aid, increasing dependence on the Global South and favoring other actors such as China. At the same time, soft power programs by Iran and Israel (for example via the agency MASHAV) aim to strengthen their image and influence through education and technology initiatives. At the same time, since the 1950s Israel has maintained an ambivalent but increasingly strategic relationship with Africa, in which military, technological, and diplomatic interests are closely intertwined. In public discourse, this influence is viewed partly as a development partnership and partly as "checkbook diplomacy" and an instrument for legitimizing Israeli policy on the international stage. Since the 1960s, Israel has been one of the most important suppliers of weapons, security equipment, and military training to large parts of Africa, from the Congo and Uganda to South Africa. Israel's involvement in Africa is not only driven by bilateral interests, but also places it at the center of the competing sphere of influence on the continent between Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states. Its proximity to key regions such as the Horn of Africa (e.g., Eritrea, Djibouti) and the eastern coast serves both to control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and to monitor routes used by Iranian and Islamic networks. Left-wing and anti-colonial analyses describe Israel's role in Africa as an "instrument of imperialism" that supports local elites while weakening Arab emancipation movements and the Palestinian cause. At the same time, it is argued that Israeli involvement in certain countries (including South Sudan, Cameroon, and Uganda) contributes to stabilizing authoritarian regimes and undermining international human rights standards. Africa exerts considerable influence in the United Nations and other international organizations. Africa's influence on the world stage has reached a new level in recent years – and especially now in 2026. It is no longer merely a symbolic presence, but a strategic and structural shift in power. The African Union's (AU) accession to the G20 marks a turning point in its journey to becoming a permanent member. This puts the continent directly at the table of key economic policymakers. 2026 is a pivotal year in this regard, as South Africa will be the first African nation to hold the G20 presidency, significantly shaping the agenda in line with the interests of the Global South. Africa is the most underrepresented continent in UN bodies, measured by population size and the issues addressed there. Under the banner of the "Ezulwini Consensus," the continent continues to demand two permanent seats with veto power. The pressure on the "P5" (the permanent members) to correct this historical injustice will be higher in 2026 than ever before. With 54 member states, African countries form the largest regional bloc in the UN General Assembly. Without African support, it is virtually impossible today to pass important resolutions (for example, on climate protection or global financial reforms). By 2026, the AfCFTA will have developed into one of the world's largest single markets. This gives African states enormous collective negotiating power vis-à-vis partners such as the EU, China, or the USA. They no longer act merely as supplicants, but as a unified economic area. In a multipolar world characterized by tensions between the West, China and Russia, many African states act as “geopolitical bridge builders” or “swing states”. Africa possesses critical raw materials (lithium, cobalt, copper) that are essential for the global energy transition. The continent is skillfully leveraging this to demand technology transfers and investments on more favorable terms. Despite its growing influence, there are internal hurdles: It remains a challenge to unite the 54 different national interests under the umbrella of the AU. Many countries are struggling with high interest rates and debt burdens, which in some cases restricts diplomatic room for maneuver. By 2026, Africa will be perceived less as a “problem region” and more as a “global actor” whose consent is essential for solving global crises (climate, security, finance). Within the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, Africa's influence is limited by its dependence on Western conditionality, which dictates structural adjustments and resource control. However, the AU is strengthening regional coordination on issues such as climate change and migration vis-à-vis the UN and EU. Africa strongly influences agenda topics such as peacekeeping, but decisions about the continent are made without a permanent African power, e.g. in Libya in 2011. Reforms are essential to maintain the credibility of the UN. Iran and Israel are seeking the support of African states in votes on key issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This could influence Africa's position in international discussions. Particularly relevant for Africa (and therefore also for East Africa/Kenya): The economic shockwaves are worrying. The Hormuz blockade and the disturbances in the Red Sea (Bab el-Mandeb caused by Houthi threats) are driving up global oil and gas prices. Many African countries with limited reserves (including import-dependent countries in East and North Africa) are facing fuel shortages, rationing, and rising inflation. Fertilizer exports from the region are also affected, jeopardizing food security. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are considered a new hotspot. The region is becoming an expanded battleground. Iran is using (or attempted to use) its influence in Sudan, Eritrea, or via the Houthis to exert pressure on shipping lanes. At the same time, Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE) and other actors (China, Russia, Turkey) are increasing their presence in ports and bases. This is accelerating the "Scramble for the Horn"—the competition for influence in Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia, Ethiopia, etc. US bases in the region (e.g., in Djibouti or Kenya) could become targets. Iran's diminishing but still existing influence in parts of Africa (e.g., arms deliveries to Sahel juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) could dwindle further—or shift into asymmetric threats. At the same time, a weakened Iran opens up opportunities for Gulf states and Western actors to expand their influence in Africa. Globally, the conflict is accelerating the trend towards multipolarity, as China and Russia position themselves as alternatives to US dominance, a trend signaled by BRICS-like initiatives (e.g., with South Africa). Europe and Asia are suffering from energy prices and supply chain disruptions. The conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran thus contributes to the geopolitical fragmentation of Africa and negatively impacts its economic development, security, and domestic politics. African countries, in turn, are using this situation to strengthen their influence, seek new partners, and establish a global balance of power.