Posts mit dem Label how Africa tries to build "his own democracy" werden angezeigt. Alle Posts anzeigen
Posts mit dem Label how Africa tries to build "his own democracy" werden angezeigt. Alle Posts anzeigen

Samstag, 29. August 2026

How Africa tries to build "his own democracy".

Since I am in Kenya, I look at this topic from Kenyan perspective. Kenya is one of the most impressive and at the same time more controversial examples of how Africa tries to build "his own democracy". What the Kenyan experience shows that Kenya is not a model of "imported democracy", but rather a mixed form - that is - universal institutions (elections, parliament, dishes) exist in beside in Kenya rooted Power mechanisms. Essential characteristics in Kenya are among other things, an ethnic politics instead of ideology. Political parties in Kenya are based on ethnic and regional blocks (Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, etc.) and not on content topics. Elections are often perceived as a "struggle of the ethnicity" and not as a free choice. The presidential system is equipped with a high power concentration. The Kenyan President has far-reaching powers, and the election winner often distributes key positions to allies, which enhances ethnic logic. The heritage of "Big Man" policy is clearly through Jomo Kenyatta over Uhuru Kenyatta to William Ruto - in Kenya, strong, charismatic leaders, often with family and clan-related Connections, the tradition. The Kenyan experience shows that "own democracy" means does not necessarily mean to give up elections, but adapt institutions to local circumstances: After the constitution of 2010, Kenya transferred significant powers to 47 districts. This is one of the most successful examples in Africa, how to relieve the central government and grant regions autonomy - a solution that takes into account the ethnic fragmentation of the country. According to the violent disputes after the 2007/08 elections (over 1,000 dead), Kenya introduced mechanisms to reconciliation and power division - not ideal, but effective - to prevent a repetition of this tragedy. In recent years (in particular by the youth movement against tax increases in 2024), Kenyans have become massively engaging in a mass of politically - not through parties, but by protests and bourgeois printing. This is a new, very "Kenyan" form of democratic participation. At the same time, Kenya's experience also illustrates the risks of this thesis, because "our democracy" can become the justification of the power concentration when "cultural peculiarities" are used to escape responsibility. An ethnically embossed approach in politics leads to instability, because every change of power in Kenya was accompanied by tensions and controversial results. Economic inequality and youth unemployment suggest to what extent "our democracy" actually improves the life of the majority. Kenya is perhaps the best example on the continent of the thesis of "our democracy": the country does not copy the West, but experiment with decentralization, reconciliation and civic engagement. At the same time, it also shows that "our" does not automatically mean "good" - it is a constant struggle between the adaptation of institutions and the protection of fundamental democratic guarantees. The Gen-Z movement 2024 in Kenya is one of the most important political breakdowns of the continent in recent years - and perfectly as an example of "Africa's own democracy" because it was completely independent of parties and established politicians. The trigger was the Finance Bill 2024, the controversial tax increases on everyday goods: gasoline, Internet data, menstruation products, bread, transfers and cars. The government wanted to take about 2.7 billion US dollars in addition to covering the budget deficit - partially on pressure from the International Monetary Fund. For the young generation was that of the drop, which brought the barrel to overflow, young people make up 75% of the population, but 68% of the unemployed - at an unemployment rate of 12%. The protests began on June 18, 2024 in Nairobi and quickly handled over 18 cities. What made this movement historically was your organizational form: Without parties and politicians that was a big advantage. The movement explicitly explicitly stated "dragonless", "trammless" and "Partilos" - a conscious break with the ethnic politics that the Kenyan democracy has been shaping for decades. Activists translated the bill in local languages, used KI tools to explain it, and lattered phone numbers of politicians to flood them with SMS. On June 25, protesting stormed the parliament, parts of the building burned. The police set tear gas, water windows, rubber carposses - and according to human rights organizations also sharp ammunition. On June 26, President William Ruto gradually gave the law - a rare, visible success of protest as a control mechanism. But the movement did not let up and now demanded the resignation of the president. On July 11, Ruto is surprisingly exposed to his entire cabinet - another success of the pressure. The young people presented a catalog of "unchreatbish" claims that go far beyond tax policy, the content called for the fight against corruption, dismissal corrupt official, disclosure of public debt, abolition of housing tax, end of violence and Kidnappungs against protesting and accounting for the demonstrators killed. What remains - one year after ... The movement shows a double-edged result: It is positive that she woke up the civil awareness, mobilized religion and society (religious leaders were behind the young people) and the public discourse steered permanently on living expenses, youth unemployment and police violence. Critical must be noted that only a few structural reforms have been reached, protests were also infiltrated by plunderers, and the economy (tourism, investor trust) suffered. The World Bank warned against consequences for growth. The Gen-Z movement is a prime example of how "Africa's own democracy" looks today - not by constitutions or parties, but through digital mobilization, civilian restlessness and the refusal to have capture from the political elite. She has shown that young Africans are by no means apolitical - but ready to occupy the road to request account. At the same time, she remains a movement without formal guidance, whose long-term political effect must still prove itself. https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/08/kenya-genz-protests-progress-tech-corruption https://www.csis.org/analysis/taking-charge-gen-z-leads-historic-protests-kenya https://www.csis.org/analysis/taking-charge-gen-z-leads-historic-protests-kenya https://www.aciafrica.org/news/11234/we-support-them-fully-kenyas-religious-leaders-on-gen-z-led-peaceful-protests-against-finance-bill-2024 https://kujenga-amani.ssrc.org/2024/12/17/framing-gen-z-protests-against-the-2024-finance-bill-in-kenya-a-linguistic-assessment-on-tiktok-2/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kenya_finance_bill_protests) https://www.theelephant.info/opinion/2024/07/02/the-gen-z-uprising-in-kenya/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kenya_finance_bill_protests https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kenya_finance_bill_protests https://www.dw.com/en/kenya-generation-z-protests-turn-deadly/a-69427981 -https: //thekenyatimes.com/latest-kenya-times-news/scars-of-2024-highlights-of-gen-z-protests-how-kenyas-economy-suffered/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kenya_finance_bill_protests https://thekenyatimes.com/latest-kenya-times-news/scars-of-2024-highlights-of-gen-z-protests-how-kenyas-economy-suffered/ https://thecontrapuntal.com/kenyas-gen-z-revolt/ https://www.theelephant.info/opinion/2024/07/02/the-gen-z-uprising-in-kenya/ https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/52547/gen-z-is-reshaping-kenyan-politic https://www.aciafrica.org/news/11234/we-support-them-fully-kenyas-religious-leaders-on-gen-z-led-peaceful-protests-against-finance-bill-2024 https://thekenyatimes.com/latest-kenya-times-news/scars-of-2024-highlights-of-gen-z-protests-how-kenyas-economy-suffered/) https://thekenyatimes.com/latest-kenya-times-news/scars-of-2024-highlights-of-gen-z-protests-how-kenyas-economy-suffered/