The International Criminal Court (ICC) is controlled by the powerful and only targets Africans

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is controlled by the powerful and only targets Africans The Iternational Criminal Court (ICC) should investigate many leading figures, but it does not, said Gnaka Lagoke, associate professor of history and Pan-African studies at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania. “Many of those brought before the ICC are Africans, including Laurent Gbagbo, who spent eight years before the International Criminal Court only to be acquitted in the end.” The question is valid! I would say: Not directly controlled, but some powerful individuals do exert influence over the ICC through various mechanisms, which undermines its independence. It is not about an open command structure, but about indirect pressure possibilities. Important points are, - Veto power in the UN Security Council. The ICC can only investigate a situation that has not been reported by a state itself if the UN Security Council refers it to the ICC. However, any of the five permanent members (P5: USA, China, Russia, United Kingdom, France) can veto it. This means: A state can block a conflict or crime from even being brought before the court – especially when it comes to crimes committed by a P5 state or its allies. A well-known example: The USA used the veto to prevent a resolution that would have subjected UN peacekeepers to the ICC (Resolution 1422, 2002). - Funding. The ICC is primarily funded by the member states, and the contributions are based on the size of a state's economy. Some observers fear that large, economically strong states can exert indirect pressure through their financial involvement – for example, by threatening cuts if the ICC undertakes investigations that do not suit them. - Political pressure and non-cooperation. Power political actors may attempt to obstruct investigations: they refuse to question witnesses, provide evidence, or extradite suspects. This significantly restricts the ICC, as its work is hardly possible without the cooperation of states. Sometimes, public campaigns are also launched to damage the court's reputation. - Perception of bias. Another point: The ICC is repeatedly accused of targeting certain regions (especially African countries) in a one-sided manner. This leads many African states to suspect that the court is a tool of Western powers. Although the ICC itself claims to operate based on legal criteria (such as the severity of the crime), such perceptions contribute to the erosion of trust. However, the ICC also has mechanisms to minimize these influences. The judges, the prosecutor, and the secretariat are elected or appointed according to strict rules enshrined in the Rome Statute to ensure their independence. The prosecutor has the responsibility for investigations under the statute and must act in a manner that upholds impartiality. In short, the ICC is not an independent institution completely free from political influence. The distribution of power in the international community allows states with significant political or economic power to exert influence through indirect means. This leads to accusations of political influence and selective justice. However, there are also clear legal barriers intended to protect independence. The challenge lies in constantly maintaining this balancing act. It is difficult to say that Africans unreservedly trust the International Criminal Court (ICC). The attitude towards it is rather mixed: in some places there is hope, while in others there is persistent distrust. The ICC has influence in Africa, but the situation is complex, and trust is ambivalent. The ICC plays a role, particularly in cases of serious human rights violations, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. When a country experiences widespread conflict, the court can initiate investigations – this draws attention to the issues and sometimes gives victims a chance for justice. For example, there have been investigations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and the Central African Republic. However, there are also limitations that reduce its effectiveness. The ICC does not have its own police force. To arrest a suspect, a member state must detain them. And not all African states cooperate actively in this way. It is often criticized that the court primarily focuses on African countries while similar crimes in other regions go unaddressed. This fuels the perception that the ICC is an instrument of Western interests and not an impartial body. In protracted conflicts, collecting irrefutable evidence can be extremely difficult. Precisely because of these factors, many people in Africa have developed a skeptical attitude. Historical memories and narratives suggesting that Western institutions act in the interest of their own countries and not of Africans reinforce the skepticism. When investigations drag on and there are no effective convictions or releases of perpetrators, this undermines trust in the system. In some countries, authorities themselves reject the jurisdiction of the ICC, seeing it as a threat to their sovereignty. However, it is important not to generalize. In certain cases – when the court actually makes progress, supports local initiatives, or works closely with civil society – trust can be higher. The influence of the ICC in Africa is significant, but it is constrained by structural and political factors. The attitude of Africans towards it ranges from hope for justice to deep skepticism due to perceived bias and ineffectiveness. Therefore, the question of trust cannot be answered with a simple yes or no, but rather is an ongoing dialogue about how the Court's work can be made more transparent, inclusive, and better aligned with the actual needs of the continent. https://rectimark.com/the-icc-prosecutors-role/ https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/icc-prosecutor-tapped-external-panel-to-review-evidence--is-that-even-allowed https://www.eurasiareview.com/13042025-the-politics-of-the-international-criminal-court-analysis/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/387429523_THE_EFFECTIVENESS_OF_THE_INTERNATIONAL_CRIMINAL_COURT_IN_ADDRESSING_WAR_CRIMES_AND_CRIMES_AGAINST_HUMANITY https://fondfbr.ru/en/articles/icc-political-weapon-en/ https://www.e-ir.info/2018/09/16/selective-justice-and-persecution-the-african-view-of-the-icc-unsc-relationship/ https://advopulse.com/challenges-faced-by-the-icc/ https://worldjurisprudence.com/transitional-justice-and-icc/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382207595_The_Role_and_Impact_of_the_International_Criminal_Court_in_Global_Justice https://www.eurasiareview.com/13042025-the-politics-of-the-international-criminal-court-analysis/) https://www.academia.edu/7693712/ICC_AND_UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_IN_PROMOTING_CRIMINAL_JUSTICE_SYSTEMS https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-as-an-institution/the-power-of-the-veto-0-40/the-veto-and-the-icc-in-the-security-council.html https://www.eurasiareview.com/13042025-the-politics-of-the-international-criminal-court-analysis/ https://www.e-ir.info/2018/09/16/selective-justice-and-persecution-the-african-view-of-the-icc-unsc-relationship/ https://www.eurasiareview.com/13042025-the-politics-of-the-international-criminal-court-analysis/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382207595_The_Role_and_Impact_of_the_International_Criminal_Court_in_Global_Justice https://www.eurasiareview.com/13042025-the-politics-of-the-international-criminal-court-analysis/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382207595_The_Role_and_Impact_of_the_International_Criminal_Court_in_Global_Justice https://rectimark.com/the-icc-prosecutors-role/) https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/icc-prosecutor-tapped-external-panel-to-review-evidence--is-that-even-allowed https://advopulse.com/challenges-faced-by-the-icc/ https://worldjurisprudence.com/transitional-justice-and-icc/

Remembering Abune Petros

Abune Petros (born Haile Maryam, ca. 1882/1892 – executed on July 29, 1936) was an Ethiopian Orthodox bishop and martyr, remembered as a central spiritual figure in the resistance against the occupation of Ethiopia by fascist Italy.

Petros was born into a farming family in Fiche (Selale, northern Shewa) and entered Ethiopian Orthodox monastic life at a young age, where he took the name Abba Haile Mariam (“Abba Haile Mariam” - “Father (Abba) ‘Power of the Holy Mary’” or freely: “The Reverend whose name means ‘Power of Mary’”). After serving as abbot in monasteries such as Debre Menkirat in Wolaita and St. Mary at Lake Zeway, he was appointed in 1928 as one of the first native Ethiopian bishops – a milestone in the church's departure from exclusive Egyptian (Coptic) episcopal leadership. Under the episcopal name Abune Petros, he became the bishop of Wollo and Eastern Ethiopia, based in Dessie. There, he was known for his pastoral care, preaching, and teaching in Central and Eastern Ethiopia. When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935/36, Abune Petros accompanied Emperor Haile Selassie to the front and provided pastoral support to soldiers and civilians. Witnessing the use of chemical weapons and massacres, he ordered prayers and fasting in his churches and began to publicly condemn colonialism, atrocities, and the occupation. He rejected offers from Italian authorities and even some church leaders to recognize King Vittorio Emanuele as “Emperor of Ethiopia,” insisting that only the legitimate Ethiopian government and Haile Selassie could be recognized. Italy had colonies in Eritrea and Somalia since the late 19th century and aimed for a coherent colony called "Africa Orientale Italiana," which was also supposed to include Ethiopia (Abyssinia). After the heavy Italian defeat at Adua in 1896, Ethiopia remained one of the few formally independent states in Africa and became a symbol of African sovereignty. Mussolini linked the attack on Ethiopia with the vision of a new Roman-Fascist Empire and a "place in the sun" for Italy to secure the status of a great power. This was the last major colonial conquest war, fought with massive violence and modern weapons – including poison gas – and it formally ended in 1941 with the expulsion of the Italians by British-Ethiopian troops. Abune Petros was arrested after collaborating with resistance forces in the northern provinces of Shewa and Wollo and was brought to a public show trial in Addis Ababa. On July 29, 1936, he was executed by a firing squad in his bishop's robes in a public square (near Arada/Central Addis Ababa) in front of a gathered crowd of Ethiopians and Italian officers. Before his death, he delivered a final speech condemning the invasion, blessing the people, and pronouncing a curse on the people and the land of Ethiopia should they ever voluntarily submit to foreign rule – a formulation that later became a strong symbol of anti-colonial patriotism. Particularly well-known is the passage of his speech in which he refers to the occupiers as true "bandits" and the resistance fighters as patriots striving for freedom. A central recorded wording states, in essence: The fascists are the true bandits because they came from afar to violently occupy a peaceful country. The patriots are people who wanted freedom from the terror rule of fascism. He asks God to give the people in Ethiopia the strength to never capitulate before the fascist army and its violence. Additionally, his words to the Italian officers are recorded: He could not accept the ultimate demand to legitimize the occupation because "the cry of my countrymen, who died from your poison gas and your terror machine," prevents his conscience from doing so. How could he stand before God if he silently closed his eyes to such a crime? After the liberation of Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie ordered the establishment of a monument for Abune Petros at the site of his execution in Addis Ababa. This monument remains an important place of remembrance for the resistance to this day. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church later canonized him as a martyr and saint, and a monastery was named after him in his hometown of Fiche. His story and his last words inspired literary and artistic works, including poems by Tsegaye Gabre-Medhin, and he is widely regarded as a symbol of unwavering faith, national dignity, and Ethiopia's anti-fascist struggle. The Ethiopian state and government-affiliated media often portray Abune Petros as a national martyr who stands for the unity and sovereignty of Ethiopia against foreign aggression. His name and image appear in textbooks, memorial events, and national narratives about the struggle against fascism, often alongside other patriots from the occupation period. In this official culture of remembrance, his religious role is emphasized, but politically framed in a way that highlights loyalty to the state and the defense of the state order. Thus, Abune Petros serves as a figure of identity, linking historical willingness to sacrifice with present-day loyalty to the state. At the same time, opposition actors, particularly from broader circles (such as those close to Fano), utilize the figure of Abune Petros to legitimize current struggles against government policies perceived as "oppressive." In media contributions and political commentary, his name is often directly linked to current conflicts over violence, repression, or centralization, so that his martyrdom serves as a historical precedent for morally justified resistance. In these discourses, Abune Petros appears less as a state-integrated national hero and more as a spiritual accuser against injustice in general – whether this injustice comes from foreign occupiers or from his own government. This makes him a symbolic figure with which today's opposition movements can historically "extend" themselves and position themselves within a continuity of resistance. Abune Petros had biographical connections to regions such as Wollo and played an important role in the patriotic resistance there. In regional discourses, he is therefore sometimes emphasized as a "local" martyr to profile local identity and victim history against the national meta-narrative. Such regional appropriations can increasingly connect the national figure with ethnopolitical interpretations – for example, as evidence that certain regions or groups have bled particularly for the defense of the country. This embeds his memory in internal Ethiopian negotiations around recognition, marginalization, and historical justice. Quotes: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abune_Petros https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/culture_society/the-ethiopian-genocide-and-the-rise-of-abune-petros/ https://www.facebook.com/ethiopiansforconstitutionalmonarchy/posts/in-memory-of-the-martyrdom-of-abune-petros-bishop-of-wollo-who-was-gunned-down-8/808028978129572/ https://x.com/RisingEthiopia/status/1950285271905280224 https://www.youtube.com/watchv=lSL0E9NpYuc https://medium.com/@tinabelayw/two-legends-one-legacy-remembering-abune-petros-through-tsegayes-poetic-soul-066a7c821b79

A map of Africa provided by the US government was incorrectly labeled

A map of Africa provided by the US government was incorrectly labeled

during a State Department presentation at a global conference, causing a stir among attendees. Reuters reviewed a video of the presentation at the AIDS 2026 conference in Rio de Janeiro. The erroneous map appeared roughly halfway through a presentation about the State Department's new health agreements. Reuters analysis revealed that the map image included in the presentation featured an AI watermark, indicating it was created using OpenAI tools. The State Department stated it took "full responsibility" for the confusion and that the map was created by a team member who hastily altered the slides before the event. The map, used during a presentation on new health agreements, contained serious geographical errors. For example, Nigeria (a coastal state in West Africa) was depicted as a landlocked country in the Sahara. The US currently maintains several hundred troops in Nigeria. Mozambique, located in southeastern Africa, was mistakenly placed in the Horn of Africa, while Ivory Coast in West Africa was moved to the other side of the continent. The speaker was Jeff Graham, the top US health official for PEPFAR. The error sparked online criticism; one expert remarked that whoever made it “didn’t know where the countries of Africa are and didn’t bother to double-check their work.” Source: US government map of Africa mislabels every country at global conference, Reuters

“African countries always bear the brunt of the decisions made by international institutions,

“African countries always bear the brunt of the decisions made by international institutions,” said a Tanzanian political analyst. A US federal court has ordered South Sudan and the Bank of South Sudan to pay $1.02 billion to the Qatar National Bank. The court was enforcing an international arbitration ruling on unpaid war loans. The ruling is based on a loan agreement signed in 2018 during the South Sudanese civil war and includes the outstanding principal, interest, and legal fees. Leonard Chakupewa Soza stated that some countries use their legal systems and laws to further their own interests. “[…] Africa’s ability to defend itself in such matters remains limited.” He also noted that institutions like the International Criminal Court (ICC) face accusations of bias in handling cases, particularly when comparing African cases with those from other regions. Leonard Chakupewa Soza “At the same time, these large countries themselves need to review how they handle such cases, given the numerous complaints.” This is a central point in the debate on global inequality, because legal systems and treaties are often designed to protect the interests of more powerful actors—and this can put African states in a weaker negotiating position. This directly relates to my previous topics: from the Bretton Woods institutions to commodity agreements and pan-African counter-strategies like the PASAI Summit. Contracts with “stability clauses.” In commodity and infrastructure projects, countries often agree that taxes or regulations for the investor will remain unchanged for years. This protects the investor but simultaneously blocks reforms; even if a country later wants to introduce higher taxes, it cannot because of such clauses. Arbitration tribunals in foreign jurisdictions. Many investment contracts stipulate that disputes are not to be decided in national courts but in international arbitration (e.g., ICS under ICSID). The procedures are expensive, complex, and often governed by languages ​​and legal traditions unfamiliar to African states. This reduces their negotiating power. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and patent rights. International agreements (such as the WTO's TRIPS Agreement) strictly protect patents. For Africa, this can mean that medicines, seeds, or technologies remain more expensive because local production or imitation is restricted. Trade and investment agreements with asymmetric rules. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are often one-sided: they grant investors strong rights but leave states little room for regulation (environment, labor law, taxes). Transfer price manipulation. Large corporations exploit legal structures within a group to shift profits to low-tax countries. As a result, they often pay less tax in Africa, even though they extract raw materials or sell goods there. These mechanisms are not a modern invention. They build upon old patterns: Law and administration were structured in such a way as to ensure the outflow of resources and export orientation. Today, similar purposes are served by modern contracts and arbitration clauses. As research on the Bretton Woods institutions has already shown (in a previous report), loans were often tied to reforms that narrowed the scope for independent economic policy. This conditionality continues to have an impact today and limits what African countries can decide for themselves. The rules that determine prices for raw materials and imports are often set in institutions where African voices are underrepresented. This, in turn, affects how much money remains for education, health, or infrastructure. The Pan-African Free Trade Area aims to better integrate African markets so that they are less dependent on asymmetric bilateral agreements. Some countries are revising BITs, negotiating clearer clauses on taxes and environmental standards, and building their own legal capacities. Common positions on trade and investment issues (similar to the pan-African efforts you researched for the PASAI Summit) are intended to prevent individual countries from being forced into weaker agreements in isolation. Disclosure of contracts, digital monitoring of supply chains, and improved tax governance are intended to curb abuses (e.g., transfer price manipulation). @https://www.state.gov/report/custom/e7fc9ab3a4

Generation Z and Realpolitik in Kenya

Generation Z and Realpolitik in Kenya

Generation Z in Kenya has truly achieved remarkable feats – and it is very diverse! Generation Z must not reject Realpolitik in such a way that it leaves actual power to those who understand it best and can exploit it for their own benefit. However, it must not allow itself to be drawn into the very transactional politics it originally rebelled against. This is the fine line the movement must walk. It must not continue the politics that the presidents have enforced. The country needs a change, not a continuation of this capitalist politics. Gen Z became well-known in 2024 when it led protests against the controversial finance law. Young people used social media (TikTok, X, Instagram, WhatsApp) as a platform: They mobilized quickly, documented grievances in real-time, and shaped public discourse beyond state media. The movement went beyond a single issue: Activists addressed corruption, economic inequality, and the government's lack of transparency. Ultimately, the protests led to a symbolic victory: President William Ruto withdrew the law and called for dialogue. It is also important that these protests demonstrated the professionalization of civic engagement. Professionals also participated in the activism: lawyers formed teams to support detainees, medical professionals organized first aid stations, and graphic designers created infographics on constitutional rights. Generation Z organized clean-up campaigns and addressed climate change through digital platforms. An Infotrak survey from 2024 even named Generation Z as Kenya's most celebrated heroes – respondents appreciated their contribution to social justice and technological solutions. Young people are actively using technologies in various fields. An impressive example comes from agriculture: James Mwangi from Nakuru County began using drones to monitor the condition of crops. This helped optimize irrigation and fertilization, increase yields, and reduce resource losses. A group of students from Nairobi developed the mobile app Agri-Connect. It connects farmers with the market: sellers can list their products, prices, and availability, allowing them to find buyers directly and eliminate intermediaries to achieve a fairer price. Alice Wairimu from Kiambu County founded the startup Green Hands. It trains local farmers in sustainable farming methods. Furthermore, Generation Z demonstrates entrepreneurial spirit in other areas. Many turn hobbies or skills into professions, using social media (Instagram, TikTok) as platforms and messaging apps for sales and management. The work approach of Generation Z is also changing the corporate world. Young employees bring IT, social media, and innovative problem-solving skills to companies, thereby increasing their efficiency. Companies are forced to adapt their strategies: strengthening online presence, introducing flexible work models, and considering the values of young people (e.g., the importance of mental health). She made topics like taxes, corruption, police brutality, and public arrogance everyday conversation topics. A generation that was dismissed as online-savvy, distracted, or apolitical instead organized, educated itself, and mobilized with remarkable speed. The successes of Generation Z show that young people in Kenya can combine technological competence with social responsibility. They not only respond to problems but also seek systemic solutions – from digital tools to new business models to civic engagement. Of course, there are challenges along the way (such as bureaucratic hurdles for startups or the risk of financial missteps during growth), but the mere existence of such initiatives is already changing the landscape of the country. However, as Kenya approaches the parliamentary elections in 2027, the question of whether the country can transform protests into political power becomes increasingly difficult – in an electoral environment characterized by a beleaguered incumbent, a fragmented opposition, and a political class that is remarkably good at absorbing anger without necessarily changing. The protests against the 2024 Finance Bill marked a turning point, as it was never just about taxes. The law became a symbol of broader frustration. Young people rejected a political culture in which citizens are repeatedly asked to be victims while those in power seem immune to the consequences of their decisions. The anger was directed at finances, but also at morality. It was about the cost of living, but equally about the cost of being ignored. Generation Z in Kenya has real political potential in the 2027 elections. However, whether this translates into significant influence depends on various factors. It is estimated that over 14 million members of Generation Z will be eligible to vote in 2027. Together with Millennials (ages 18-34), their total number reaches 17.8 million. This is a significant force that could surpass traditional regional voter blocs. Young people have already demonstrated their political awareness. The protest wave of 2024 showed that Generation Z is ready to take to the streets to demand systemic changes: anti-corruption, job creation, and government transparency. They actively use digital platforms for mobilization, political education, and monitoring government actions. Many young Kenyans are beginning to prioritize concrete issues (economy, governance, justice) over ethnic affiliation, which has long been the main feature of Kenyan politics. This could undermine the old model of "ethnic arithmetic." Candidates and parties are already actively courting young voters. They are launching registration campaigns, promising support for young candidates, and incorporating key points important to Generation Z into their election programs. Independent initiatives have also emerged, such as the "New Generation Aspirants" (NGA) movement, which aims to replace the old political elite. According to the clearest descriptions, the NGA is a movement of young political hopefuls whose goal is to establish a new political course for Kenya and strengthen the involvement of young people in governance. One report states that it brings together candidates from local to presidential levels, while another report mentions that it aims to solidify youth voting before 2027. Generation Z is not a homogeneous group. Differences in education, experience, and specific interests may lead to the voices of young voters being spread across multiple candidates, weakening their overall influence. The movement does not yet have a unified, central structure or recognized leaders. Analysts point out that young people need to agree on common ideals rather than merely expressing their dissatisfaction in order to truly influence the election outcome. The political elite may attempt to "tame" youth activism through symbolic roles, positions, or one-time rewards to neutralize the critical potential of the movement. Not all young people are eligible to vote. Reasons for this include a lack of awareness, apathy due to political disillusionment, and practical difficulties (transportation, long lines at polling places). There is skepticism about the integrity of the entire electoral process (e.g., doubts about the work of the IEBC election commission), which could also affect voter turnout. According to analysts, 2027 could be a turning point, but the outcome depends on whether Generation Z can translate its numerical superiority into organized action. High voter turnout, unity on specific programs (e.g., unemployment, education reform, independent review of national debt) – and young people are fundamentally changing the political landscape and pushing parties towards a more responsible course. Fragmentation, low voter turnout, or successful co-optation – the status quo remains, and the potential of the generation remains untapped. Generation Z has the potential to become a key force, but the main task now is to translate activism into a sustainable political strategy. President William Ruto seems to understand this difference better than many of his critics. His political problem is serious, but not insurmountable. He faces the anger of a young population that feels betrayed by the gap between electoral promises and lived hardship. He continues to encounter discontent over taxes, unemployment, corruption, police violence, and the handling of protests. The slogan "One Term Only" expresses something real: the desire to punish the abuse of power. The relationship between William Ruto and Generation Z in Kenya is truly interesting – it is ambivalent. On one hand, the president is actively trying to win the support of young people, while on the other hand, there is significant distrust and even conflict between them. Ruto has launched programs for young people, projects for skills development, access to financing for businesses (such as the Nyota project), and digital platforms like "Kuna Form," which facilitate young entrepreneurs' participation in public tenders. Analysts see this as a strategic move: the president wants to present himself as a leader who cares about the concerns of the youth, thereby strengthening his base ahead of the 2027 elections. After the protests of 2024, Ruto publicly praised the courage of young people who had peacefully expressed their demands. He stated that the government was ready to work with them to address their issues. During the protests, different sources reported varying numbers: the Kenyan Human Rights Commission counted 39 deaths between June 18 and July 1, 2024, while the president at that time spoke of 19 deaths. For the particularly intense protest day on June 25, 2024, later assessments report at least 50 to over 60 deaths in total related to the nationwide demonstrations. The gap between promises and reality is wide and growing. Many young Kenyans feel that despite loud announcements, insufficient progress has been made in addressing key issues (unemployment, rising prices, corruption). Therefore, the protests continued. Young people demanded systemic changes, independent investigations, and a review of national debt. Some activists do not believe that a dialogue with the government will lead to real change, and fear that the president's initiatives merely serve to "tame" youth activism and neutralize the critical potential of the movements. Young people often advocate for radical reforms and reject "business as usual," while the Ruto government operates within the existing system, leading to tensions. For Ruto, young people are an important voter group for which he fights. However, due to the ongoing discrepancy between words and actions, the relationships remain difficult. A key question for the future: Will the government be able to turn concrete initiatives into tangible results that meet the central needs of Generation Z, or will tensions only increase? This is the realpolitik of the incumbent. Ruto does not need the support of all young Kenyans. He needs a sufficient fragmentation of the opposition, enough voter fatigue, enough regional negotiations, and enough uncertainty about the alternatives. Kenyan elections are not won solely by fluctuations in mood. They are decided by coalitions, voter turnout, candidates, campaign helpers, funding, local networks, consistent communication, and voter protection. Therefore, a weakened incumbent can still win if the opposition is more fragmented than the discontent directed against him. @the elephant, Gen Z and the Realpolitik of Kenyas 2027 Election Read more at: https://www.theelephant.info/analysis/2026/07/29/gen-z-and-the-realpolitik-of-kenyas-2027-election/ The Elephant - African analysis, opinion and investigation

Dinosaur bird seen in Uganda

Last November, a Ugandan tour guide captured a stunning photograph of a giant, prehistoric-looking shoebill that had landed on a tour boat. The rarely seen "dinosaur bird" was photographed from such an unusual angle that it made the tourists standing right next to the boat appear tiny. The bird in Uganda is the shoebill (Balaeniceps rex), a large marsh bird whose massive beak and posture strongly resemble a prehistoric "dinosaur bird." This marsh bird lives in the wetlands of East Africa, including Uganda, and is considered rare and endangered. The rarely seen shoebill flies past the tourists. Innocent Muhumuza's photo went viral, and tourism boomed as many people wanted to see a shoebill for themselves. Shoebills live in the swamps of East and Central Africa, and their population is declining; estimates suggest there are only 3,300 to 5,000 individuals left. A video has been circulating in several German-language media outlets showing a giant shoebill landing on the railing of a tourist boat during a boat trip in Uganda. The reports describe it as a "dinosaur-like" or "dino-like" bird because its appearance strongly resembles prehistoric pterosaurs. The shoebill, with its size, slow movements, and massive, shoe-shaped beak, resembles a "living dinosaur." This metaphor is explicitly used in the press; one article refers to a "bird from prehistoric times, amidst life jackets and selfie sticks" in the Ugandan swamps. On Sunday, Muhumuza shared the accompanying photo as part of a video showing a shoebill flying over the Mabamba Swamp. (Most encounters These events occur when the birds are lurking there, hunting for fish and small reptiles. (Luring.) https://home.1und1.de/magazine/wissen/tiere/dinosaurieraehnlich-riesiger-vogel-landet-tourboot-afrika-41589832 https://www.burschenschaft-asslar.de/02-12-2025/164614-dinosaurierartiger-vogel-landet-auf-einem-touristenboot-in-uganda/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TkHPqHFxmUo https://de.nachrichten.yahoo.com/riesiger-dino%C3%A4hnlicher-vogel-landet-touristenboot-121727750.html https://www.hna.de/welt/riesiger-dino-vogel-landet-auf-boot-direkt-neben-touristen-wuerde-ohnmaechtig-werden-94037011.html

After 60 years of waiting: Pô-Kapro Dam completed

After 60 years of waiting: Pô-Kapro Dam in Burkina Faso completed in just eight months Burkina Faso has inaugurated the long-awaited Pô-Kapro Dam in Nahouri Province. The project was first proposed in the 1960s and, under President Ibrahim Traoré, was completed in just eight months. The Pô-Kapro Dam is located near Pô in the Nazinon Region of Nahouri Province in southern Burkina Faso. It features a dam almost 700 meters long. Its storage capacity is approximately 1.0–1.1 million cubic meters of water (figures vary slightly depending on the source, but are within this range). Sixty years of promises have been fulfilled, and it was completed in just eight months. The Pô-Kapro Dam is located near Pô in the Nazinon Region of Nahouri Province in southern Burkina Faso. The local population and successive governments had discussed or promised the construction of a dam in Pô since the 1960s, but the project remained unrealized for decades. Under the government of Traoré, the project was revived after local authorities raised it again in 2023. Construction itself took approximately eight months. Work began in early 2026, and the dam was inaugurated at the end of July 2026. The dam is intended to supply the surrounding communities with drinking water, thus combating chronic water scarcity. It is explicitly presented as part of a national strategy for water management and food sovereignty/self-sufficiency. The authorities highlight three main uses: irrigated agriculture, fish farming, and job creation in the rural area surrounding the reservoir. In government communications, the dam is linked to a broader effort to reduce dependence on food imports and development aid by strengthening domestic production. Traoré emphasizes the importance of such reservoirs so that young people can pursue meaningful employment by working full-time in agriculture and fish farming, instead of remaining underemployed or migrating. This dam has both a political and a symbolic dimension. State-run and pro-government media present the rapid completion as proof of a new, more decisive leadership style under Traoré, contrasting it with decades of unfulfilled promises. The inauguration is portrayed as a "long-awaited" or "very much-desired" project that will finally benefit the people of Nahouri. Pan-African media and media advocating for the sovereignty of African states explicitly question whether such infrastructure and food security strategies could serve as a model for African self-reliance instead of dependence on development aid. For a researcher in the field of African politics and development, this dam can be interpreted as follows: A concrete milestone in the broader restructuring of Burkina Faso's political economy under military rule. A case study of rural development, characterized by narratives of sovereignty and a move away from dependency, with water infrastructure at its core. A symbolic project: A local demand that had existed since the early post-war period has finally been met, serving to portray the current regime as more responsive and effective than its predecessors. Legitimize Sources: Citations: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PcBpd-QDrus https://en.sputniknews.africa/20260726/1087831881.html https://burkina-faso.news-pravda.com/en/world/2026/07/27/7536-amp.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZISIJWQ oYU https://www.terangatimesn.com/Burkina-Faso-Le-Capitaine-Ibrahim-TRAORE-inaugure-le-barrage-strategique-de-Po-Kapro_a6658.html https://africapresse.com/burkina-faso-ibrahim-traore-inaugure-un-barrage-de-plus-dun-million-de-m%C2%B3-a-po-kapro/

Exchange of fire between the Russian-African Corps and al-Qaeda in Mali

Mali has been experiencing a severe crisis since 2012, triggered by a Tuareg uprising in the north, which was exploited by various jihadist groups. This led to the collapse of state control in large parts of the country. See the video: https://photos.app.goo.gl/LzsKmppaeKBYuAMa7 Jihadist groups are active in large parts of the country, particularly in the north and parts of the center. These groups, including Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and other groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIS, regularly carry out attacks on the military, police, and civilian population. There have been, and continue to be, regular firefights between the Russian Afrika Korps (Africa Corps, successor to the Wagner Group and subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense) and the al-Qaeda-affiliated group JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) in Mali – often in conjunction with or parallel to attacks by the Tuareg separatist group FLA (Front de Libération de l’Azawad). On July 26, 2026, a firefight took place in the Niono area (Ségou region, north of Haj Wéré). An Afrika Korps unit, together with Malian soldiers (FAMa), was conducting search and reconnaissance operations and encountered a JNIM group. The Afrika Korps reported the elimination of eight “terrorists” and the capture of a heavy machine gun, nine assault rifles, ammunition, communications equipment, and other supplies. It released videos and photos of the incident. The JNIM, conversely, claimed to have repelled a Russian advance and released its own videos showing allegedly abandoned motorcycles and bloodstains. Both sides claim victory – typical of such asymmetric conflicts in the Sahel. The fighting is part of an ongoing escalation: - Large-scale coordinated offensive by the JNIM and FLA against several cities (including Bamako/Kati, Gao, Kidal, and Sévaré). Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camara was killed. The Afrika Korps withdrew from Kidal (according to its own statements, together with Malian troops and after negotiations); the rebels declared the city "liberated." Russia spoke of repelling a coup attempt and heavy losses among the attackers; independent reports describe a humiliating retreat with abandoned equipment and a downed helicopter. Renewed coordinated attacks began on July 4. Fighting took place around the strategically important city of Anéfis (between Kidal and Gao). Convoys carrying Malian and Russian fighters (sometimes over 200 Russians + 100 Malians) were repeatedly ambushes, including at Tabankort/Tabrichat. Reports speak of dozens of Malian soldiers killed (sometimes 50 or more in an attack on July 18), destroyed vehicles, and prisoners taken. The Afrika Korps and the Malian army reported the recapture of Anéfis and heavy losses among the attackers; the JNIM/FLA claimed successes and the downing of helicopters. Niger provided air support at times. The Afrika Korps (approximately 1,500–2,000 troops in Mali) supports the military junta in the fight against jihadist and separatist groups after the withdrawal of France and the UN. The cooperation between the JNIM and FLA is pragmatic (common enemy), despite ideological differences. Losses and successes are presented very differently by both sides and are difficult to verify independently. The Afrika Korps (approximately 1,500–2,000 troops in Mali) supports the military junta in the fight against jihadist and separatist groups after the withdrawal of France and the UN. Since 2020, there have been several military coups that have further destabilized the political situation. The transitional government faces the challenge of both combating terrorism and enabling a return to democratic order. The UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA remains on the ground, albeit only in an administrative capacity to promote stability, but it is repeatedly targeted by attacks. France has also significantly reduced its military presence, which is impacting the security situation. This situation needs to be further dismantled. MINUSMA has a mixed record – with some successes, but overall a rather limited success, or in the eyes of many (especially the Malian junta), a failure. The UN Security Council decided on its withdrawal in 2023, and the mission formally ended on December 31, 2023; a liquidation phase for the disposal of personnel and equipment followed. ... The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by the UN Security Council in 2013, following the 2012 outbreak of a Tuareg rebellion and jihadist groups (including AQIM affiliates) that had largely taken control of northern Mali and threatened Bamako. France initially intervened militarily with Operation Serval (later Barkhane); MINUSMA was tasked with overseeing the transition to stabilization. MINUSMA's mandate included: - Stabilization - Support for the political process - Protection of the civilian population - Promotion of human rights - Election support. The UN peacekeepers were permitted to act robustly, but not primarily to engage in offensive combat against jihadists like a combat force. With up to approximately 15,000 soldiers and police officers, the mission became one of the largest and most expensive UN missions, and simultaneously the deadliest in recent decades (over 300 peacekeepers killed, primarily by IEDs, ambushes, and attacks by JNIM and other groups). Violence perpetrated by jihadist groups and intercommunal conflicts increased overall from around 2016/17 and spread to the central region. MINUSMA was unable to halt this spread. Protection of the civilian population remained limited – often ineffective outside the direct reach of bases and patrols. No “peace that could be maintained”: asymmetric warfare, IEDs, mobile attacks. Following the coups of 2020/2021, relations with the military junta deteriorated dramatically. Bamako accused the mission of ineffectiveness, interference, and escalating tensions, restricted freedom of movement and flights, and demanded its immediate withdrawal in June 2023. Mismatch in expectations: Many Malian citizens and the government wanted more aggressive counterterrorism operations, for which MINUSMA was neither mandated nor equipped. High costs and losses with limited strategic results. The UN Security Council terminated the mandate in June 2023; the withdrawal was completed by the end of December 2023. Afterwards, the Malian army and Russian forces (initially Wagner, then Afrika Korps) assumed the main role – with similarly mixed to negative results regarding security. In an extremely difficult environment (vast territory, weak state, multiple armed actors, no genuine peace process), MINUSMA made some stabilization and political contributions and prevented worse outcomes. However, it did not resolve the core conflict or sustainably improve the security situation. Many observers describe the mission as a partial success with significant limitations, or even a failure to achieve its strategic goals – primarily because the political will of the Malian authorities was lacking in later years, and the mission operated in an environment devoid of genuine peace. The ongoing fighting has led to massive displacement. Many people are dependent on humanitarian aid, as infrastructure and access to basic services are often limited. The insecurity in Mali is having a negative impact on neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger, where similar jihadist activities are taking place. https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/05/11/russias-setback-in-mali-intelligence-failures-strategic-limits-and-the-future-of-moscows-africa-project/

Burkina Faso and the war against terrorism

Over 74% of Burkina Faso's territory has been "recovered, pacified, and secured": Minister The percentage of controlled territory within the country increased from 73.56% in December 2025 to 74.53% as of June 30, 2026, declared Célestin Simporé, Burkina Faso's Minister of War and Patriotic Defense. "There is no part of our territory that our defense and security forces cannot reach. We can go anywhere, and we do," he emphasized. These advances have facilitated the gradual return of the population and public administration to the recaptured areas, the minister highlighted. It is one of the most intense and deadly conflicts in the Sahel. Since around 2015, the country has been a target for jihadist groups, primarily the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (formerly ISGS, now often referred to as ISSP/IS Sahel). The military junta under Captain Ibrahim Traoré is pursuing an uncompromising "total war" strategy. Official reports speak of progress in recapturing territory: Large-scale military operations are regularly reported. A major offensive in late June/early July 2026 was particularly highlighted. Following coordinated attacks on positions in Gayéri, Solhan, and Sebba (East and Northeast Burkina Faso), the National Armed Forces (FAN) and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP) reported the neutralization of over 400 terrorists. Hundreds of motorcycles, weapons, and communication equipment were captured. At the same time, there were losses on the ground (at least three soldiers in this operation) and further serious attacks, such as the one in early July that left dozens of soldiers and VDPs dead. The justice system is also taking active measures: In the first half of 2026, 76 terrorism cases involving 97 defendants were tried – resulting in several life sentences, long prison terms, and asset confiscations. Despite the reported successes, the situation remains fragile. JNIM continues to carry out complex attacks, including on bases and in more urban areas. The violence has immense humanitarian consequences (hundreds of thousands to over 2 million internally displaced persons in previous years). Independent observers (e.g., Crisis Group, ACLED) point out that this is a war of attrition and that the progress made by the state is often overestimated. Furthermore, there are allegations of serious human rights violations by security forces and VDPs. JNIM continues to carry out complex attacks, including on bases and in more urban areas. Burkina Faso was, at times in 2023/2024, the country with the highest number of terrorism-related deaths worldwide. The violence is spreading to the coastal states of West Africa (Benin, Togo, etc.).

Haile Selassie: How Ethiopia’s Emperor Shaped Africa’s History

Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974, is one of the most flamboyant and controversial figures in modern African history. His long reign encompassed a period of colonial expansion, African independence, and the rise of Pan-Africanism. The most famous episode that immortalized Selassie's name was his 1936 speech before the League of Nations, in which he denounced Fascist Italy's aggression against Ethiopia. Fascist Italy's aggression against Ethiopia was Mussolini's illegal war of aggression against the Ethiopian Empire, which began on October 3, 1935, and ended in 1936 with the occupation of Addis Ababa. Since Fascism came to power in 1922, Italy had been preparing for war both propaganda-wise and militarily, developing Eritrea and Somaliland as staging grounds. Mussolini wanted to secure Ethiopia as a colony and enforce Italy's claim to a new empire. Italy attacked with overwhelming force without a declaration of war, advancing from Eritrea and other bases. Despite Ethiopian resistance, the Italians occupied Addis Ababa in May 1936. The war was characterized by extreme violence, particularly the use of poison gas against soldiers and civilians. Sources describe it as a colonial war of conquest and annihilation with very high civilian casualties. Selassie's speech became a powerful symbol of the struggle against colonialism and inspired many. Despite the occupation, Ethiopia was eventually liberated under his leadership (in exile). During his rule, Selassie implemented numerous measures to modernize Ethiopia. He established schools and hospitals, developed infrastructure, and promoted the national economy. However, these reforms were often insufficient to overcome the country's deep social and economic fragmentation. Haile Selassie was a passionate advocate for African unity. He actively supported independence movements and played a key role in the founding of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) in 1963, headquartered in Addis Ababa. His vision of a united Africa significantly shaped the continent's political landscape. For many Rastafarians worldwide, Selassie was revered like a god. This spiritual connection lent him additional weight and authority, particularly within the African diaspora. He became a symbol of hope, spiritual rebirth, and an authentic African identity. Despite his international prestige, Selassie's domestic political position was less secure. His rule was characterized by authoritarianism, the preservation of feudal structures, and growing social inequality. A famine in Woldo Province in the early 1970s, which many felt had been neglected by him, undermined his authority and contributed to his downfall. In 1974, after decades of rule, Haile Selassie was overthrown in a military coup known as the Derg. He died shortly after his arrest under unclear circumstances. The legacy of Haile Selassie I is complex and multifaceted. He remains a symbol of resistance against colonialism, African unification, and cultural pride. At the same time, his authoritarian rule and his failure to address the country's profound social problems have been criticized. Nevertheless, his influence on the emergence of modern Africa, the idea of ​​Pan-Africanism, and the spiritual self-determination of many Africans and their descendants worldwide is undeniable.

Ethiopia-South Sudan border region receives US$9.3 million for solar water project

Ethiopia-South Sudan border region receives US$9.3 million for solar water project Climate-Resilient Water for Food Project: The Climate-Resilient Water for Food (W4F) project is a multinational initiative with a budget of US$9.3 million, approved by the African Development Fund (AfDF) in July 2026. Its goal is to strengthen climate resilience and food security in Ethiopia and South Sudan. The project supports vulnerable communities in the Gambella region of Ethiopia and the Unity State of South Sudan – areas affected by severe flooding, drought, and displacement. It aims to ensure a reliable water supply and increase the agricultural productivity of over 100,000 farmers. The project comprises two core components: - Construction/renovation of seven solar-powered water systems to provide clean drinking water for approximately 80,000 people, along with the implementation of flood control measures and new sanitation facilities. - Training of over 100,000 farmers in drought-resistant crops and agroforestry; provision of improved seeds, advisory services, and demonstration farms. The project focuses on women and youth: Women lead local water management committees and constitute the majority of participating farmers. Around 19,300 young people receive training in agricultural skills and entrepreneurship. This initiative promotes cross-border cooperation between Ethiopia and South Sudan to jointly develop solutions for addressing shared climate risks. https://www.channelafrica.co.za/channelafrica/news/adf-approves-9-3-million-for-climate-resilience-project-in-ethiopia-s-sudan/ https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_9263465 https://solarquarter.com/2026/07/23/african-development-fund-approves-9-3-million-climate-and-solar-water-project-for-ethiopia-and-south-sudan/ https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-10/

The division of the Africans and their failure to build a strong unity have exposed them to exploitation.

The division of the Africans and their failure to build a strong unity have exposed them to exploitation. The thesis that the fragmentation of Africa weakens its position is central to many analyses of the continent's economic and political history – and it directly connects to the themes previously examined by Ren, from pan-African initiatives to external influences and historical power structures. How division has historically enabled exploitation The colonial "divide and rule" tactics deliberately created or deepened divisions within the colonized societies to stabilize their own rule. The colonial powers deliberately weakened existing political systems and stoked rivalries to facilitate their control. The core of the logic is to split a potentially resistant population into several competing groups so that they cannot organize collectively against the colonial power. Existing social, ethnic, religious, or regional differences are politically charged, legally fixed, and administratively reinforced. The colonial powers drew borders without regard for ethnic, linguistic, or economic realities, thus creating states with deep internal tensions. In Africa, European powers combined the dismantling of pre-colonial structures with newly created administrative borders, different legal regimes, and the introduction of taxes and forced labor, which intensified social inequalities and local rivalries. This legacy continues to impair coordination and political coherence to this day. The colonial powers fragmented the markets and created weak regional integration. Small national markets and high trade barriers between neighboring countries limit economies of scale and make it difficult to build competitive processing and production industries. This forces many economies to export raw materials under less favorable conditions. The colonial powers have indeed consciously and unconsciously fragmented the markets on the continent – that is, split them – and this has sustainably influenced the economic development of Africa. Arbitrary borders were drawn. At the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) and in the subsequent "Scramble for Africa," the European powers drew borders. What was previously a cohesive economic area (for example, trade routes between different African societies) was suddenly interrupted by state borders. This destroyed already existing local and regional market chains. The colonial powers were interested in aligning the infrastructure for export. Roads, railways, and ports were primarily built to direct raw materials (ores, timber, agricultural products) from the interior to coastal export – not to connect African regions with each other. This hindered internal trade flows: it was difficult and expensive to transport goods within Africa for processing or resale there. The colonial powers aimed for the colonies to serve as suppliers of raw materials and as markets for industrial products from the metropolis. They promoted monopolies and concessionary models that hindered local businesses and prevented competition. Many local production chains were dismantled: for example, iron was no longer processed for local tools but exported raw. This led to the breakdown of connections between different economic sectors (agriculture, crafts, industry). The competition between the European powers resulted in trade barriers being erected between the individual colonies. Each colony was managed independently and had its own regulations, further fragmenting the continental market. The consequences of this policy are lasting: - The internal markets remained small and fragmented, making it difficult to develop a strong, diversified industry. - Many African countries remained heavily dependent on the export of raw materials, exposing them to volatile global prices. - The political and economic boundaries that remained after colonialism continue to contribute to the difficulty of regional cooperation and the formation of large, integrated markets on the continent. In summary, the colonial powers created a system that hindered the economic integration of Africa – instead, the continent was divided into loosely connected, export-oriented sectors. This is an important part of the legacy that many African countries still struggle with today. Many countries still heavily depend on a few raw materials (minerals, oil, agricultural raw materials). This makes the economy vulnerable to price fluctuations in global markets. Because the infrastructure and industry were often geared towards export, there are often insufficient capacities today to process raw materials locally. This means that the highest profits are generated outside of Africa, while wages in extraction remain relatively low. Historically, trade routes were oriented towards the coasts and the metropolises. Today, intra-African trade is often still lower than trade with non-African markets – although there are initiatives like the AfCFTA to change this. When countries compete individually for foreign investment or development aid, they often lower taxes, relax regulations, or make concessions that weaken their negotiating power. This dynamic can lead to a "race to the bottom," where external actors reap the main benefits instead of supporting local communities. This is a central mechanism that sustainably shapes the economic situation of many African countries, as states compete for foreign investments or development aid, trying to attract investors with special "sweeteners." This is part of a "search for returns" for capital, but it has profound consequences—and is closely linked to historical patterns, from colonial trade structures to Bretton Woods and pan-African counter-strategies. Many countries lower the corporate tax rate or grant tax holidays (often 5–10 years) to encourage companies to settle here. Special Economic Zones often offer zero taxes, duty-free import of machinery, and reduced regulation. When several countries compete for the same investment, the offers become increasingly generous: additional infrastructure, subsidies, simplified permits. The costs of this strategy are enormous. Tax revenues are one of the most important sources of income for education, health, and infrastructure. When large companies pay virtually no taxes, there is a lack of money for public services. Often, the activity remains "extractive," meaning that raw materials are mined and exported without much value being created locally. This reinforces exactly the patterns that were already addressed in the article "Africa must create value." Local companies that do not receive tax exemptions often cannot compete with international firms that have such privileges. This weakens the domestic economy. If the main growth strategy relies on attracting foreign money with tax incentives, the economy becomes vulnerable to capital flight when global conditions change. There is a historical continuity from the colonial period to the present day. This dynamic is not a creation of the present but a continuation of deep structures: Back then - during the colonial period - markets and infrastructure were designed to transport raw materials as quickly and cheaply as possible. Today, this often happens through investment models, as companies are expected to export raw materials or agricultural products as efficiently as possible, without much value creation on-site. The role of Bretton Woods institutions (in another article) and structural adjustment programs has pushed many countries to shrink the state and become "investment-friendly" - often resulting in lower taxes and reduced regulations. When countries negotiate individually, they have less leverage. This is exactly the point where initiatives like the PASAI summit or the AfCFTA come into play, as together they can negotiate better framework conditions and prevent a "race to the bottom" in taxes and standards. Here are some exemplary approaches to change this dynamic. If African countries agree on common standards for investment incentives, they can prevent underbidding against each other. Instead of "tax exemption for all," countries can tie incentives to local value creation, employment, technology transfer, or environmental standards. By improving tax administration, combating transfer pricing manipulations, and strengthening regional cooperation, dependence on tax reductions can be reduced. Joint contracts and rules (e.g., within the framework of the AfCFTA or specific raw material alliances) can increase the negotiating power of individual countries. This directly addresses my earlier articles - which can be read here - on the role of France and the European influence on the African economy, the impact of the Bretton Woods institutions, and pan-African attempts to overcome these structures. Three impressive examples have been selected to illustrate how this "competition mechanism" works and its consequences. I will analyze each case for clarification. Copper in Zambia Zambia is one of the largest copper producers in Africa, and the government is actively seeking investments in this sector. To attract investors, the government is introducing targeted incentives: A dividend exemption for companies with mining permits will tax the dividends paid at 0%. The depreciation incentives here can allow for 25% of the investment costs (buildings, railways, equipment) to be depreciated. Duty-free import for investors, who can import capital goods and machinery duty-free. Target zones are special economic zones (such as the Multi-Facility Economic Zone) that offer additional incentives for projects in priority sectors (mining and processing): reduced profit taxes, dividends, and export duties for a period of at least 10 years. What has this brought? These measures have indeed stimulated capital inflows. After the reforms of 2022-2023, major projects (such as the expansion of Kansanshi and investments from CNMC) were realized in the sector. However, there is also a downside, as the extensive incentives cost the state significant amounts. For example, a company (Mopani) with a revenue of nearly 6 billion US dollars paid only about 28 million US dollars in profit taxes over eight years until 2021. This diminishes state revenues needed for social programs. Furthermore, there is a risk that the incentives could lead to tax evasion or profit shifting abroad. 2. Oil in Nigeria Nigeria, one of the largest oil producers in Africa, is also actively leveraging tax incentives to attract foreign investments. Following the passage of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA, 2021), authorities began offering more transparent and comprehensive incentive packages. These include: - Tax exemptions for operators of certain projects (especially in the gas infrastructure sector) receive a long-term tax deferral (up to 10 years). - Tax credits for companies, which can claim tax credits for exploration costs in new regions, the development of gas infrastructure, or the use of renewable energies. - Exemptions from the hydrocarbon tax, which is reduced or eliminated for new deepwater projects, and an exemption from import duties is granted for equipment. - Investors in strategic projects are guaranteed that the tax conditions will not change arbitrarily during the project duration. - The terms of production sharing contracts (PSCs) are being revised to balance the profit distribution between the state and companies. The result? These measures have contributed to the revitalization of the sector: In recent years, Nigeria has attracted significant investments in deepwater and gas projects. However, public opinion on these incentive packages is divided: Some consider the incentives too generous and fear that this could lead to a loss of state revenues that could be used for infrastructure development or social programs. 3, Cacao in Ghana In Ghana, one of the world's leading cocoa producers, the government is also focusing on targeted incentives, but with an important distinction: the emphasis is not only on the export of raw materials but also on processing. - Newly established companies in the agricultural processing sector (including those related to cocoa) receive tax benefits – for example, for five years. - Companies that settle in special zones (Tema, Takoradi, Kumasi) and export at least 70% of their production benefit from various advantages: a corporate tax exemption for the first ten years and duty-free import of machinery and raw materials. - The government goes even further: for example, the state-owned company CMC sells cocoa beans at a discount (up to 20%, and for small beans even up to 40% or more) to facilitate access to raw materials. What has this led to? Although these measures have attracted investments in domestic cocoa processing, there is a paradox: the incentive structure is export-oriented. To benefit from the free trade zone, companies are forced to export the majority of their production abroad. At the same time, barriers have been created for the domestic market (for example, for chocolate production in Ghana), such as a very high tax rate (60%) on domestic sales. As a result, the country has fewer opportunities to promote domestic consumption and create added value in the local economy. External influence through bilateral relationships: Powerful external actors can exploit differences between African states to promote their own interests, whether in trade, security, or resource extraction. This reflects some of the dynamics examined in an article regarding France's role in Africa and broader geopolitical patterns. The pan-African response and its challenges Pan-Africanism has long viewed unity as a means for dignity, sovereignty, and economic strength. Key efforts include: From early intellectual and political movements to modern forums like the African Union and events such as the previously examined PASAI summit, the goal has always been to coordinate positions and strengthen the common voice. The AfCFTA, which aims to create a unified market across the continent, seeks to reduce intra-African trade barriers and strengthen regional value chains – thereby directly addressing the issue of fragmentation. Common rules for certification, customs, and investments could help African countries operate from a stronger negotiating position and build larger industrial clusters. However, the implementation is inconsistent; differences in economic strength, political priorities, and capacities continue to complicate coordination. Historical and contemporary examples: My research on powerful African queens and kingdoms (such as the Kingdom of Benin, the resistance of Nzinga, and the queens of Kush) shows that strong, centralized, or well-coordinated communities were able to withstand external pressure and control trade routes. The erosion of such centers during the slave trade and colonization made many regions more vulnerable. The Cold War era and the pressure from debt and structural adjustment measures (related to the institutions studied at Bretton Woods) often led African states to be driven in different directions. This weakened regional solidarity and prioritized short-term survival over long-term strategic unity. Fragmentation can influence how countries manage natural resources and negotiate contracts. A unified or at least coordinated stance could improve the conditions for processing, technology transfer, and local value creation. Unity as a strategy to reduce exploitation Stronger unity does not mean uniformity, but coordinated action in key areas: Common positions on critical minerals, agriculture, or energy could shift the balance of power in negotiations. Joint investments in transport, energy, and processing facilities can achieve economies of scale that individual countries could not afford alone. Standards for environmental protection, labor rights, and profit distribution can prevent ruinous competition and ensure that the development benefits the local population. Coordinated approaches against cross-border threats and corruption can secure economic gains and improve the business climate. Sources NIH, Potential for Upgrading in Financialised Agri-food Chains: The Case of Ghanaian Cocoa HTTPS://ACC RA street journal.com/2025/09/13/外地-incentives-in-Ghana-2025-WHO-qualifies- stabilization-how-to-benefit/ Embassy of the Republic of Ghana, Investment Incentives ResearchGate, The Impact of Petroleum Tax Incentives on Foreign Direct Investment Inflow: Evidence from Nigeria BusinessFront, How Nigeria plans to use new tax reforms to unlock oil and gas investment Academia.edu, THE IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA OIL AND GAS https://global tax Justice.org/news/Zambia S-copper-amid-him-and-energy-transition-ah-new-dawn-foru-mining-or-repeating-passat-mistakes/

Africa Must Create Added Value

Africa Must Create Added Value The idea that Africa must enhance its natural resources and strengthen its economic position is a central theme in development debates—and connects to many of the issues already discussed, such as trade, external influences, and historical economic structures. Why is value creation important? Africa is rich in raw materials (minerals, oil, agricultural products), but currently exports a large portion of the continent unprocessed or in low-grade form. This means that the majority of the profits are taken elsewhere. Processing, manufacturing, and branding take place outside of Africa, so the highest margins go to other economies. And this means it is vulnerable to price fluctuations. Commodity prices fluctuate wildly; without diversification and value creation, economies face major shocks. This leads to limited job creation. The resource industry is capital-intensive and employs relatively few people compared to the manufacturing and processing sectors. What “creating added value” actually means in practice It encompasses several layers: The processing of raw materials. The transformation of cocoa beans into chocolate, cotton into textiles, crude oil into fuels and petrochemicals, and ores into metals. The shift from exporting minerals to producing batteries, electronics, or vehicles. The processing of crops into packaged foods, oils, beverages, or pharmaceutical ingredients. The development of storage capacities, cold chains, quality certifications, and traceability so that African products can succeed in international markets. The integration of branding, design, and technology to transform raw materials into differentiated products. The following structural problems hinder value creation: Inadequate electricity supply and inadequate transport and port infrastructure increase costs and reduce the competitiveness of production. Small national markets and trade barriers between countries limit economies of scale. High capital costs and limited access to long-term investments for factories and processing facilities. The technical and business expertise required for processing and quality control is often in short supply. Unpredictable regulations, complex customs procedures, and inconsistent enforcement discourage investment. Historical and current trade and financial frameworks (including those associated with the Bretton Woods institutions, which you have already considered in the context of fuel prices) can influence trading conditions in a way that favors raw material extraction over processing. This ties in with our earlier interest in the impact of Bretton Woods: Macroeconomic policies, debt conditions, and trade rules can affect countries' capacity to invest in the manufacturing sector. Many African countries and regional organizations are already working on this. Specifically, they are working on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The goal is to boost intra-African trade and create larger markets for manufactured goods. They are also working on national industrialization strategies. Several countries are pursuing strategies focused on agricultural processing, textiles, raw material processing, and automotive assembly. Special economic zones and industrial parks were also discussed. These are intended to attract investment and create industry-specific clusters. Regional value chains need to be improved, for example, through regional centers for leather, textiles, or food processing, which would involve several countries. Historical texts on colonial legacies, external influences (such as the role of France), and political transitions are relevant here (see the article). The colonial economic structure is often based on the export of raw materials and the import of finished goods—a pattern that persisted even after independence. Historically, trade conditions and debt have limited investment in industrial infrastructure. Foreign investment sometimes prioritizes the extraction and export of raw materials over local processing. Pan-African initiatives aim to change these dynamics by strengthening regional coordination and partnerships with domestic and continental capital. Strategies that could help Africa generate more added value include strengthening regional integration, reducing trade barriers, harmonizing standards, and investing in cross-border infrastructure. Investments should be directed towards upstream and downstream industries. Linking mining and metallurgy, agriculture and food processing, and raw materials and manufacturing is crucial. Expanding technical and vocational education to train skilled workers and engineers for processing and industry is essential. Stable, long-term industrial policies are also necessary. Tax incentives, research and development support, and procurement rules that favor local processing should be combined. Promoting public-private partnerships is also important. Governments, local businesses, and international partners should be brought together to finance processing facilities and logistics.

Vampire on the loose!

There's a rather strange story that unfolded in Ruiru, Kenya, about 30 km north of Nairobi. Now, sheer fear grips Ruiru after reports circulated about a man attacking and biting locals at night. Social media claims, widely shared, that several incidents have occurred in the Oj estate, the prison, and surrounding neighborhoods. Since mid-July, local and tabloid media have been reporting on a man who attacks and bites people at night; he is explicitly described as a "vampire." Reports mention multiple incidents in specific estates (including Oj and Prison), CCTV footage, and social media posts, further fueling the residents' fear. According to one resident, people initially dismissed the reports as rumors before more incidents came to light. The concerned resident urged security forces to intervene before the situation escalates. The expression “naked fear” hits the nail on the head: it refers to a very concrete urban insecurity (nights, poorly lit streets, weak police presence) that is intensified and emotionalized by the vampire narrative. From a cultural studies perspective, such vampire motifs are classic ciphers for fear of anonymous violence, loss of control, and a state perceived as absent or ineffective. In many regions of Kenya, Christian and Muslim piety coexist with older spiritual cosmologies in which ancestors, spirits, and witches are real, active agents. Missionary and colonial discourses have long labeled these practices as “the work of the devil,” but the symbolic power of curses, blessings, and witchcraft has remained very much present in everyday life—even among educated, urban circles. Reports from coastal regions (Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale) and the Kisii area show that the fear of witchcraft has concrete, life-threatening consequences, such as lynchings. Older people are often accused of witchcraft because accusations are intertwined with inheritance disputes, land conflicts, and family tensions; being publicly labeled a "witch" is, in effect, a death sentence. Witchcraft is a crime under Kenyan law, which makes it easier for relatives to instrumentalize accusations, while the police and courts often only half-heartedly prosecute attacks against alleged witches. Estimates show that in some districts, a high percentage of murders are linked to accusations of witchcraft, demonstrating the strong interplay between fear and violence. Alongside the fear of "traditional" witchcraft, there has recently been a massive fear of destructive Christian sects and free churches, exacerbated by cases like the mass suicide of a cult group in Shakahola that left hundreds dead. Religious communities are fueled by the concern that charismatic preachers engage in occult or extremist practices behind a Christian facade, thereby manipulating believers. For villagers, ghosts or curses often seem more plausible than abstract concepts like "structural poverty" or "poor infrastructure," for example, when accidents are attributed to angry spirits rather than road conditions. The fear of curses, ghosts, and witches functions as a form of social regulation: it disciplines behavior, reinforces the authority of older generations—and is simultaneously turned against these older generations by younger, economically motivated actors. Analytically, Kenya's current "landscape of fear" can be interpreted as an overlap of several layers: the colonial construction of the "irrational African," neoliberal insecurity, religious competition, and intra-family land and inheritance conflicts. @https://www.kenyan-post.com/2026/07/vampire-on-loose-cctv-footage-captures.html @https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/witchdoctors-in-kenia-medizin-und-magie-100.html @https://www.n-tv.de/panorama/Kenianer-toeten-Hexen-article269895.html @https://www.n-tv.de/panorama/In-Kenia-ist-die-Angst-vor-Freikirchen-zurueck-article25726961.html?utm_source=perplexity

CONMAT (Strengthening Conflict Management and Transformation Studies in Africa)

CONMAT (Strengthening Conflict Management and Transformation Studies in Africa).

Campus Vienna University of Applied Sciences is coordinating the Erasmus+ project CONMAT (Strengthening Conflict Management and Transformation Studies in Africa). Together with universities in Ghana, Rwanda, and Spain, new teaching and learning concepts for conflict management and peace education will be developed by the end of 2027. The project is funded by the European Union's Erasmus+ program and aims to strengthen higher education in Ghana and Rwanda in the long term. At the same time, it seeks to intensify academic exchange between European and African universities. CONMAT is an Erasmus+ Capacity Building in Higher Education project (2025–2027) that aims to strengthen teaching and research capacities in conflict management and transformation studies at selected African universities in Ghana and Rwanda, in cooperation with European partners in Austria and Spain. The main purpose of CONMAT (“Strengthening Conflict Management and Transformation Studies in Africa”) is to enhance the institutional and pedagogical capacity of African partner universities to teach, research, and train practitioners in conflict management and transformation. It focuses on equipping both staff and students with analytical tools, critical reflection skills, and practical methodologies for understanding conflict dynamics and designing sustainable peacebuilding strategies in African contexts. More concretely, CONMAT seeks to: - Strengthen existing curricula in conflict management/peace studies at the partner institutions, aligning them with contemporary scholarship and regional needs - Provide structured training for academic staff (train‑the‑trainer) to improve teaching methods, including online and practice-oriented pedagogy in conflict studies. - Foster critical, cross-cultural, and gender-sensitive perspectives on conflict and peace processes in Africa. 1. Vienna is home to renowned universities and research centers specializing in peace and conflict studies, such as the University of Vienna and the Vienna School of International Studies. These offer advanced degree programs in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and international relations. 2. Vienna is a diplomatic center and the headquarters of numerous international organizations, including the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other institutions concerned with conflict prevention and resolution in Africa and worldwide. 3. These programs often integrate political science, international law, anthropology, and security studies, providing comprehensive insights into the causes, dynamics, and solutions to African conflicts. 4. Global and regional focus: Academic programs and research centers in Vienna emphasize understanding regional conflicts in Africa, such as civil wars, political instability, resource conflicts, and ethnic tensions. They empower students and researchers to develop effective management strategies. 5. A conflict management degree in Vienna can make a significant contribution. Capacity building in African countries through the training of local and international experts, policymakers, and mediators. 6. Vienna's international environment fosters collaboration between academics, diplomats, NGOs, and African representatives and supports innovative approaches to conflict resolution. The project links four African universities with two European institutions. African partners (Ghana and Rwanda): - Simon Diedong Dombo University of Business and Integrated Development Studies (UBIDS), Ghana. - University of Ghana Business School (UGBS), Ghana. - Protestant University of Rwanda (PUR), Rwanda. - University of Rwanda. European partners: - University of Applied Sciences FH Campus Wien, Austria (coordinating role). - Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain.[1][2][5] The cooperation is framed as North–South and South–South academic collaboration, with activities rotating between Ghana, Rwanda, Austria, and Spain. CONMAT is co‑funded by the European Union under the Erasmus+ Capacity Building in Higher Education scheme.[2][5][7] The project runs from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2027, giving a three‑year window for curriculum reform, staff development, joint teaching, and dissemination. Within Erasmus+ CBHE logic, the project is designed as a capacity-building intervention in higher education systems in partner countries, addressing both institutional teaching capacity and the broader policy need for conflict management expertise. CONMAT combines curricular development, digital learning, and field-based training. Major activities include: - Curriculum development and internationalisation: updating and expanding conflict management/peace studies modules, integrating international literature and comparative perspectives, and embedding them into degree programmes at the African partner universities. - Joint digital and multimedia courses: delivery of Collaborative Online International Learning (COIL) courses on conflict studies to mixed cohorts across the partner institutions, with emphasis on participatory video techniques as a learning and research tool. - International field schools: intensive field schools such as the 2026 Wa (Ghana) field school hosted by UBIDS, which combined theoretical sessions with practical exercises for staff and students on conflict analysis, teaching methodologies, and peacebuilding.[3] The pedagogical approach includes: - Train‑the‑trainer tracks for higher education staff focusing on teaching conflict studies, online pedagogy, and case-based learning. - Student tracks that focus on conflict analysis, conflict resolution and transformation, and peacebuilding methodologies, with attention to everyday political negotiation and urban violence. The project’s teaching and training content covers a wide range of conflict and peace topics relevant to African political contexts. The project also stresses cross-cultural, intercultural, and gender-specific perspectives, acknowledging that conflict experiences and participation are structured by gender and cultural identities in African societies. According to Campus Wien University, students and faculty will be better prepared in the future to analyze conflicts, guide transformation processes, and develop sustainable solutions. Project leader Johannes Maerk emphasizes that universities can combine academic knowledge with social responsibility and thus make an important contribution to peace education.

Paul Kagame (Rwanda) bursts into tears in broad daylight.

Paul Kagame bursts into tears in broad daylight.

Kagame says: “When I talk about the events in Minembwe, the United States tells me: ‘Shut up, it’s none of your business!’” Paul Kagame then bursts into tears in broad daylight. What was Kagame talking about? Minembwe is a high-altitude village in the Hauts Plateaux of the Fizi Territory in South Kivu, in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Historically, it was a core area of ​​the Banyamulenge community and various Mai-Mai groups. The lines of conflict run along local land and belonging issues (discourse about the Banyamulenge as “étrangers”), combined with regional intervention (Burundian and allegedly Rwandan actors) and the national confrontation over M23/AFC. Minembwe Recent events in Minembwe have been marked by intense fighting between FARDC forces (some with Burundian support and Wazalendo militias) and the local Banyamulenge self-defense group Twirwaneho, which cooperates with AFC/M23, as well as massive drone bombings resulting in significant civilian casualties. At the same time, a long-term cycle of violence and displacement continues, which has been affecting the Banyamulenge population on the Minembwe highlands for years. Farmers have been fighting the Banyamulenge people in particular on the Minembwe highlands for years. From 2025/26 onward, fighting intensified around Minembwe-Centre and surrounding villages such as Kakenge, Lunundu, Kitavi, Tuoko, and Kawera: FARDC, the Burundian Army, and Wazalendo militias attempted to encircle Twirwaneho/AFC-M23 positions, leading to multiple village fires and renewed displacement. A planned ceasefire in February 2026 effectively failed; despite government officials announcing a "goal of recapturing central Minembwe," fighting and offensives by both sides continued. Drone attacks and the humanitarian situation. Since the beginning of 2026, there have been increasing reports of the systematic use of combat drones against populated areas of the Minembwe plateaus, particularly in Mikenke and Gakenke. According to AFC/M23, at least seven people were killed and over twenty injured at the end of March when kamikaze drones bombed densely populated areas considered strongholds for Banyamulenge defense forces. Humanitarian organizations and local actors describe an already alarming situation, exacerbated by the drone attacks and ongoing fighting, with continued displacement, destroyed villages, and severely restricted access for aid. And let's not forget the Ebola epidemic! Currently, South Kivu (including the Minembwe health district) is experiencing part of the 17th Ebola outbreak in the DRC, but Minembwe itself is primarily affected indirectly because the combination of war and epidemic severely hampers aid delivery and monitoring. As of mid-July 2026, South Kivu was considered a province with confirmed cases according to WHO/CDC and national data, but had not registered any new cases for over 42 days and was close to officially declaring the epidemic over at the provincial level. The ongoing epidemic was officially declared the 17th Ebola outbreak in the DRC on May 15, 2026; the cause is the Bundibugyo Ebola virus. The outbreak originated in the Mongbwalu Health Zone (Ituri) and spread from there to Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, affecting a total of 38 health zones. By mid-June, the DRC had reported 896 laboratory-confirmed cases and 232 deaths, while Uganda had an additional 19 confirmed cases and one probable fatal infection, epidemiologically linked to transmission in the DRC. The WHO characterizes the situation as rapidly escalating, with ongoing transmission and significant challenges due to security, population mobility, and limited health infrastructure.