Samstag, 31. Oktober 2026
We elect thieves, PLO Lumumba
"We elect thieves. We elect hyenas to take care of goats, and when the goats are consumed, we wonder why," said PLO Lumumba—whose full name is Patrick Loch Otieno Lumumba—a Kenyan lawyer, professor of public law, anti-corruption campaigner, and prominent Pan-Africanist speaker. He is best known for his powerful speeches on African self-reliance, governance, and the decolonization of African institutions.
Voters (principals) transfer power to representatives (agents) whose incentives may deviate from the public interest. The image of the "hyena guarding the goats" perfectly illustrates the absurdity of expecting restraint from self-serving actors without effective checks and balances.
When voters lack information, are subjected to targeted disinformation, or prefer short-term gratification to responsible long-term policies, they can indeed “choose thieves” – and then be surprised when actual theft occurs.
Sometimes the system itself encourages exploitative behavior – for example, through campaign financing mechanisms, gerrymandering, or the influence of special interest groups on regulatory authorities ("regulatory capture"). Even well-intentioned voters are then often faced with only a selection of poor options.
This is a poignant, bitter metaphor for the problem of trusting in power – when people elect those who only pursue their own interests and then wonder about the consequences.
What is the underlying message here? This statement is cynical, yet it has a basis.
When Lumumba says, "We elect thieves," it is a criticism of corruption and the dishonesty of politicians.
When he says, "Hyenas supposed to look after goats," he's using an image to describe a fundamentally flawed choice: A hyena won't protect the goats, it will eat them. The issue, therefore, is appointing people to positions of power whose interests are diametrically opposed to those of society.
The problem of accountability and the “election of the hyenas.” In a number of sub-Saharan countries, elections are often not perceived as an effective instrument for controlling power, but rather as a ritual in which voters have little influence. This includes the phenomenon of “electoral authoritarianism”: While formal elections take place, genuine alternatives and mechanisms for accountability are largely undermined.
Corruption and the “eaten goats.” Corruption in public tenders, the embezzlement of public funds, and the opaque distribution of revenues from the raw materials sector (an issue you also raised) lead to resources that should actually benefit society simply “disappearing.” Therein lies the bitter irony of the expression: While society expresses outrage at the consequences, the root cause lies in the incentive structure of those in power.
Then the evaluation. “If the goats were eaten, we wonder why that happened,” is an ironic allusion to the fact that society apparently does not connect the outcome of things with its original choice.
This phenomenon is not limited to Africa. Europeans are lagging behind in this regard.
Let's pursue this further. The economic consequences are predictable. When institutions are weak and control over power is minimal, this has a direct impact on the economy: Inflation rises, the investment climate deteriorates, and GDP growth slows. The "goats" aren't just "eaten"—their absence is directly reflected in macroeconomic indicators.
And then there's the historical dimension: the legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism. Overcoming neocolonialism—in this sense, the metaphor also works on a deeper level. Many critics point out that political and economic models inherited from the colonial era create structures in which elites profit from the status quo—and not from genuine development. This is also the source of the feeling: "We're letting the hyenas guard the goats."
The contrast to examples of responsible leadership: Against this backdrop of skepticism, individual examples stand out in which leaders have actually acted in the interest of society. The story of Theresa Kachindamoto (which you asked about) is one such example: It shows how a local leader can act contrary to the "hyena logic" and defend vulnerable groups – in her case, girls who were saved from early marriage.
Examples that help illustrate the metaphor:
Scandals in public contracts and infrastructure projects: In various countries across the continent, reports regularly surface about inflated cost estimates, "favored" contractors, and projects that benefit only a small circle of people instead of the general population.
Revenues from raw materials and the “resource curse”: In countries with a large resource sector (whose impact on poverty you asked about), revenues from oil, gas, or minerals often do not lead to sustainable development. Instead, they end up in the pockets of the elites or are spent in opaque ways, while poverty and inequality persist.
Local contrasts: Paradoxically, at the local level – for example, in communities – far more transparent and accountable mechanisms often function. These include, for instance, traditional councils, women's cooperatives, or projects promoting entrepreneurial skills – such as those in Mozambique, which were financed from the Viennese budget. This shows that the problem does not lie with the "people," but rather with how incentives are structured at the state level.
Alternative formulations of this idea among African thinkers.
Steve Bi wrote extensively about how oppression destroys self-identity and dignity. He emphasized the importance of people determining their own futures – which is a kind of response to the metaphor: Don't let "hyenas" define what is valuable to you.
In pan-African discourse, the idea often arises that liberation means not only political independence, but also control over resources and decision-making processes. True "protection of the goats" therefore consists of economic and political sovereignty.
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Where the metaphor reaches its limits:
Unlike hyenas, elected officials are subject to constitutions, courts, a free press, opposition parties, and (in principle) the voters. The actual purpose of institutional design is to make exploitative behavior costly. When these safeguards erode, the metaphor holds true; when they function, however, it becomes too fatalistic.
The term "we" is problematic: electoral majorities are coalitions, not monolithic blocs. Many voters certainly expect exploitation and vote accordingly – however, they are often outvoted or structurally disadvantaged. The blanket use of "we" can obscure who actually benefits from the respective constellation.
Not all politicians are "predators": The power of the metaphor lies in its absoluteness, but the political system also includes people who genuinely feel committed to the common good. A cynicism that blurs this distinction can be self-perpetuating: If everyone assumes that politicians are inherently thieves, honest candidates suffer a credibility disadvantage.
The underlying question is: Does the problem lie with the people we elect, or with the structure that makes exploitative behavior seem rational? The metaphor suggests the former (poor electoral choices), but the approach that actually offers room for action is the latter: It is a matter of shaping institutions—through transparency, control mechanisms, fair competition in elections, and independent courts—that make the "hyena's" calculations unprofitable, regardless of who wins the election.
Voters can be deliberately influenced through disinformation, fake content, deepfakes, targeted advertising or campaigns.
This is manipulation of the information environment – not automatically manipulation of the vote count. Election authorities therefore warn particularly against hybrid threats and disinformation, but see no way to alter the ballot boxes in these.
It is certainly a disturbing diagnosis, but an incomplete approach to a solution. The goats don't just need better protection against hyenas; they need fences, herders, and a system where guarding is more profitable than eating.
Freitag, 30. Oktober 2026
Africa Summit Moscow
Russia-Africa Summit concludes with around 150 agreements signed
A total of approximately 150 documents—including trade contracts and agreements between media outlets—were signed on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Summit, the Kremlin announced.
These include 53 intergovernmental and interdepartmental documents, a military cooperation agreement between the Russian and South Sudanese defense ministries, and cooperation agreements between Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, and relevant authorities in Rwanda, Togo, and Uganda.
It is important to clarify that this figure encompasses not only intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements (of which there were 53) but also various other documents, such as trade contracts and agreements between educational institutions, news agencies, and commercial organizations.
Specific areas covered by the signed documents include:
Education, medicine, trade, transport, and agriculture;
Sanitary and epidemiological welfare, as well as customs matters;
Military cooperation (for example, the agreement between the Russian and South Sudanese defense ministries);
Collaboration between Rosatom and relevant departments in several countries (Rwanda, Togo, and Uganda);
An action plan for the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, extending through 2029;
Declarations—including one regarding cooperation on the civilian application of artificial intelligence technologies.
At the concluding joint press conference—held alongside the Chairperson of the African Union and other heads of state and government—Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that the agreements reached will be implemented systematically, supported by long-term cooperation mechanisms.
2026-10-31
Ugandan Ghetto Kids are in Moscow
The Ugandan Ghetto Kids, famous for dancing with Shakira during the 2026 World Cup final, took over Moscow for the Russia-Africa Media Forum.
The children’s dance group "Ghetto Kids" from Uganda actually visited Moscow.
The children arrived at the end of October 2026 to take part in the "Russia–Africa" Media Forum, which was held from October 26 to 29. The forum was part of the third "Russia–Africa" summit, and the "Ghetto Kids" were included in its cultural program.
The children explored Moscow and filmed videos. Particularly memorable are the clips showing them dancing in Red Square. They also performed against the backdrop of the skyscrapers in the "Moscow City" business district. To highlight the cultural exchange, the participants wore traditional Russian fur hats with earflaps—some even featuring the RT logo. They actively shared their performances and excursions on social media.
The "Ghetto Kids" already have international experience. Shortly before their trip to Moscow, they performed alongside the singer Shakira (as well as the Nigerian artist Burna Boy) at the closing ceremony of the 2026 FIFA World Cup. At the time, Shakira specifically highlighted the children's talent and the potential of young people from disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Sonntag, 25. Oktober 2026
Fighting in Moyale. Ethiopia. Kenya
Figthing in border town Moyale
MoyLe is a border town. Kenya lies on one side of the border, Ethiopia on the other. Therefore, gunfire and casualties sometimes affect both sides.
When did this happen? There have been several such episodes in different years. For example, in August and September 2013, clashes broke out between clans (between the communities of Gabra, Burji, and Borana) in the Moyal district (Kenya). There were shootings, people died, and many lost their homes.
One of the most high-profile incidents occurred on March 10, 2018, when Ethiopian security forces conducted an operation in Moyale (on the Ethiopian side of the border). According to various sources, between 9 and 13 people were killed, and about two dozen others were injured. Ethiopian authorities stated that it was a mistake, that the military had been misled by false information about the presence of Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) fighters in the area, and had inadvertently opened fire on civilians. Many residents fled in fear across the border to Moyale, Kenya.
What began as a dispute over the raising of a flag of the Somali regional state in the town of Moyale and culminated in the killing of a 13-year-old girl on October 18, has escalated into ongoing fighting, with security forces from the Oromia and Somali regions exchanging heavy weapons.
The conflict escalated into fighting between forces from Oromia and the Somali region. Bullets also reached the Kenyan side. For example, it was reported that a local woman was accidentally hit in the neck by a bullet. Hundreds of Ethiopians panicked and crossed the border into Kenya.
The trigger for the conflict is apparently the Somali flag, because a Somali resident of Moyale, who had fled with his family to the Ilu area of Moyale, Kenya, rejected the accusations of the Oromia side, but confirmed that the flag dispute was of central importance to the conflict.
On the morning of October 22nd, forces from the Borana side opened fire on the population; they prevented people from raising the Somali flag.
It was further claimed that Borana forces burned down the homes of Somali residents (Garre community) as well as offices and various signs after the fighting began.
Transport in Moyale has come to a complete standstill. Dozens of civilians, especially women and children, have fled the town, while eyewitnesses and residents on both sides reported that numerous houses have been burned down.
The latest clashes followed days of escalating tensions after 13-year-old Diqqoo Jaataan Aagaa was killed in a shootout on October 18, during a dispute over the opening of a new administrative office of the Somali regional government and the raising of the flag.
Why does this happen?
The reasons are usually complex:
- Ethnic tensions. Various communities (Oromo, Somali and others) live in the region, and in the past there have been tensions between them over land, resources or political issues.
- Operations by security forces. Sometimes the military or police conduct raids against armed groups, and due to intelligence failures or tense situations, civilians come under fire.
Cross-border character.
Because the city is divided by a border, a local conflict on one side can easily affect the other.
- The situation in this region is truly unstable, and such incidents occur regularly.
@AllAfrica
Montag, 19. Oktober 2026
IMF and Africa
The IMF is the International Monetary Fund – a specialized agency of the United Nations based in Washington, D.C., that promotes the stability of the global monetary and financial system. It was established in Bretton Woods in 1944 and began operations in 1947; it currently has 191 member states.
The main tasks of the IMF are
- monitoring. It analyzes the economic, monetary and financial policies of its member countries as well as global risks and makes recommendations.
- It provides crisis loans. In cases of acute balance of payments or foreign exchange problems, it can grant members temporary financial assistance – usually with economic policy conditions.
He provides consulting and training. He offers technical support to countries in building institutional and economic policy capacities.
He supports global cooperation. He promotes exchange rate stability, international trade, and economic stability.
The funds come primarily from the quotas of the member states; these also largely determine the voting rights. The USA is the largest shareholder with 17.4 percent, followed by Japan (6.5 percent), China (6.4 percent) and Germany (5.6 percent).
The IMF is governed by the Board of Governors, comprised of all member states, and the Executive Board, which handles day-to-day operations. Kristalina Georgieva has served as Managing Director since 2019.
Of course, there is also criticism of the IMF.
IMF programs are frequently criticized because loan conditions can require measures such as budget cuts, tax reforms, or structural adjustments. Critics argue that this exerts too much influence on the economic policies of debtor countries, while proponents emphasize that the conditions are intended to ensure repayment capacity and macroeconomic stability.
How the IMF views sub-Saharan Africa. The Fund regularly analyzes the region, publishing reports such as the "Regional Economic Outlook" that provide forecasts, assess risks, and offer recommendations. The key points from the most recent data (including the October 2026 update) are summarized here.
In its latest update, the IMF forecasts growth of around 4.5% for the region – both for 2026 and 2027. Positive factors include the adaptation of global supply chains, strong export earnings in some countries, and reforms already implemented.
The top performers in GDP growth in recent years have included:
Ethiopia – approximately 9.8% in 2025.
Rwanda – approximately 9.4%.
Zimbabwe – approximately 8.1%.
Benin – approximately 8.1%.
Guinea – approximately 7.5%.
Niger – approximately 7.0%.
Senegal – approximately 6.7%.
Ivory Coast – approximately 6.0%.
Democratic Republic of Congo – approximately 6.5% (in 2024; a slowdown is expected for 2025).
Where growth is weaker or there is a decline.
Caution is advised here: Even if growth slows, this does not necessarily mean a crisis. Sometimes it is the result of a high starting level or structural problems. An actual decline, however, is a worrying signal.
Equatorial Guinea – a decline of approximately 5.9% is projected for 2025. One reason for this is the volatility of oil prices, on which the country's economy is heavily dependent.
Nigeria – while there is growth, it is significantly more subdued than in the region's leading economies (around 3.2–4.1% in recent years). This growth is hampered by high interest rates, inflation, and dependence on the oil sector.
South Africa – here too, growth is rather subdued. The economy is under pressure from factors such as high unemployment, energy problems, and global economic challenges.
However, there are nuances hidden behind this figure: In some countries, growth is slowing down (especially where the economy is less dependent on raw materials), while in others it remains stable thanks to resource-intensive sectors.
Countries that successfully expand not only the raw materials sector but also other sectors (such as the service sector, agriculture, or industry) generally experience more stable growth.
Which challenges the fund highlights
The region continues to be affected by global events – such as the conflict in the Middle East.
In many countries, interest payments on debt remain high, foreign exchange reserves are low, and the inflow of external aid is decreasing. This limits the scope for action in the event of new crises.
In some countries, inflation remains persistent; it must be combated in a targeted manner.
South Sudan. Inflation is one of the highest in the world – it was around 41.6% in July 2026.
Madagascar. There is also a very sharp price increase here.
Sierra Leone. Here too, inflation shows a sustained upward trend.
Ethiopia. Inflation in the country has accelerated significantly (estimates suggest it was around 15.1% in 2025).
Mali and Burkina Faso. These countries also experienced an increase in inflation in 2026.
Even with rising GDP, profits are unequally distributed, and poverty is not decreasing quickly enough.
Countries that depend heavily on the export of raw materials are vulnerable to price fluctuations.
The IMF recommends the following.
To strengthen resilience and seize opportunities, the IMF advises countries in the region to do the following:
Tax revenues should be increased – this creates fiscal leeway for investments and social programs.
Strategies should be developed to reduce risks and make debt servicing more efficient.
The private sector should be promoted, the economy diversified, and investments made in infrastructure and human capital.
This ensures that growth is inclusive and does not exacerbate social tensions.
For example, revenues from raw materials – in times of high prices – could be set aside to be used in economic downturns.
Expansion of intraregional trade: This opens up additional growth opportunities.
The IMF does not limit itself to analysis, but also offers practical support: It provides loans for reforms, offers technical assistance, and works with governments on concrete programs. Since 2020, the IMF has provided almost US$69 billion to the region.
The assessments consistently point to the high level of uncertainty: Downside risks – such as a tightening of global financing conditions – remain considerable.
Sonntag, 18. Oktober 2026
Kenya confirms four new Ebola cases
Kenya confirms four new Ebola cases; total rises to seven, with one death reported – Ministry of Health.
On Saturday, the Ministry of Health reported four new cases, including three healthcare workers who had treated the initial patient, as well as a male relative of the patient. The strain involved is the Bundibugyo virus.
First case: A 40-year-old Kenyan man had been ill for about a month while in the Congo. He traveled by land to Uganda, flew to Nairobi on October 3, and passed away on October 5. The case was officially confirmed on October 6.
Second case (October 14): A 39-year-old relative who was already in quarantine.
Third case (October 16): A 65-year-old relative, also in quarantine.
Cases four through seven (October 17): Three healthcare workers, aged 29, 35, and 32, along with a male relative who had been in quarantine since October 6.
According to the Director General for Health, Patrick Amoth, the Ministry had previously confirmed a third Ebola case in Kenya: a 65-year-old woman who is a close relative of the first two individuals affected.
Amoth stated that she had been in quarantine since October 6, after developing symptoms such as fever, a sore throat, and general malaise. Because the diagnosis was made early, she was able to receive supportive medical treatment; her condition is improving.
Kenya has intensified contact tracing, quarantine measures, screening at airports and border crossings, and protocols for infection prevention. Authorities were able to locate 127 of the 130 identified contacts and place them under quarantine.
On Monday, Kenya classified Ebola as a dangerous epidemic disease under the Public Health Act and issued new regulations governing, among other things, surveillance, investigation, isolation, quarantine, and the handling of suspected cases.
The outbreak in the Congo is considered the largest to date, with more than 9,000 cases and 4,400 deaths reported there. According to the WHO, Kenya is the fourth country to report confirmed cases of the Bundibugyo strain.
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/kenya-confirms-four-new-ebola-cases-bringing-total-number-seven-2026-10-17
https://www.afro.who.int/countries/kenya/news
https://www.dw.com/en/how-prepared-is-kenya-for-an-ebola-outbreak/a-79668144?maca=en-rss-en-all-1573-xml-mrss
https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/16/kenya-confirms-third-ebola-case-as-health-officials-race-to-contain-outbreak
Mittwoch, 14. Oktober 2026
Umoja Village in Kenya Where Only Women Are Living
Umoja Village illage in Kenya Where Only Women Are Living
There is actually such a village! I want to tell about Umoja - a settlement in the north of Kenya (district of Samburu, it is named after the people living there. The capital of County is Maralal. In County, 2019 lived 310,327 people 20,182,5 km². The County is one of the most driest areas of Kenya, people live mainly of nomadic livestock), in which only women live. The name means "unit" on Swahili.
The village was founded in 1990. Initiator was Rebecca Lolosoli, a woman from the people of Samburu. Together with her, 14 more women started this project. Many of the founders had experienced serious violence: rape, among other things through British soldiers, domestic violence and forced marriage, partly at very young years; In addition, they had become victims of female genital mutilation (FGM). In their home communities, they were often hunted out of the house or sweated further. Umoja became a safe place for you to start a new life.
Rape:
The topic is very difficult and affects numerous people. I will report objectively about the allegations raised against British soldiers in Samburu (Kenya).
Women from the Samburu community (as well as neighboring communities such as the Maasai, Rendille and Turkana) complained of years of sexual violence through soldiers of the British Army. The allegations related to the presence of British troops in the region - especially in connection with the British Army Training Unit Kenya (Batuk), which was stationed for training exercises.
There are concrete examples and descriptions from the testimonies of those affected:
In a devastating incident in October 1997 in Archer's Post, 30 women were raped - partly threatened with a knife, some in their own houses (Manyattas).
Others reported that they were attacked while holding water, collect wood or livestock.
Another serious aspect: Many women were pregnant by soldiers and then left. The children who emerged from it lived in great poverty and came to stigmatization in their community. Some of those affected presented their children to the Kenyan Investigation Committee to emphasize allegations.
How was it reacted?
Police reports, medical reports, confirmations by chiefs. Some cases were also taken to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (a Kenyan Commission on the Enlightenment of Injustice Between 1963 and 2008).
In the early 2000s, a civil law procedure was initiated in London - represented by the British lawyer Martyn Day.
The British side reacted partially. Thus, the Ministry of Defense in 2007 referred to the 2,187 lawsuits and explained, there was no reliable evidence for a single reproach. The Royal Military Police initiated a three-year internal study and concluded that the allegations had no basis. Criticism of this investigation there is of course. Some observers had that important evidence (such as DNA tests on children identified as possible descendants of soldiers) were not performed.
Later, a committee of the Kenyan Parliament (Committee on Defense, Intelligence and Foreign Relations) examined the allegations. The report confirmed that there are "disturbing trends sexual misconduct", and criticized that many cases were dismissed or dismissed in local authorities - so the victims remained clear access to justice.
What consequences did that have for the victims? The affected ones suffered not only among the physical and mental trauma. Many were emphasized or even sold in their community. The situation for the children emerging from these rape was also extremely difficult.
Genital mutilation:
The practice of female genital mutilation continues to continue in Kenya despite strict laws numerous girls and women. The topic can be summarized:
1. Legal situation and development
In Kenya, FGM was punished by the law Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act in 2011.
Nationwide, the quota has fallen sharply - from about 38% in 1998 to about 15% in girls and women aged 15 to 49 years (according to the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey).
Despite the prohibition, practice in some rural regions and ethnic communities (u. A. Somali, Samburu, Kisii, Maasai) will continue in hidden.
2. Reasons and social pressure
FGM traditionally applies in some communities as a transition ritus of the girl's girls'
Unimpropied girls often experience exclusion or social stigmatization in traditionally embossed locations, as circumcision is considered prior to marriage.
Often the intervention goes hand in hand with a subsequent marriage minor girl.
3. Health and psychological consequences
The affected victims often suffer from severe short and long-term physical and psychological damage:
Strong bleeding, infection, chronic pain, menstruation complications and significant risks and pregnancy risks.
This follows traumata, anxiety, depression and the loss of physical well-being.
4. Measures and protection for those affected
In vulnerable regions, detection houses and boarding house provide protection against imminent mutilation and early marriage.
Many initiatives rely on symbolic celebrations for the transition to adulthood that can do without physical damage.
Local NGOs are increasingly binding community leaders, men and women on site to effect a sustainable rethinking in social structures.
Domestic violence:
Domestic violence against women in Kenya is a widespread and complex problem. I have summarized the most important facts - from statistics about causes to struggle to fight against it.
According to the demographic and health study (DHS) of 2022, 33.9% of Kenyan women already report on physical violence, and 13% of sexual violence. Another view of the data: The WHO estimates the life-time prevalence of intimate partner violence in women in Kenya to about 38% - this is 1.4 times higher than the global average (27%).
It is extremely important to know that the dark figure is high. Many cases are not reported because women are afraid not to be believed or to fear social owling. Example: The Africa Data Hub data network documented around 500 femicides between 2016 and 2023 (deadly violence due to sex), but the actual number is probably significantly higher. In about 75% of these cases, the perpetrators came from the closest environment - husbands, friends, family members.
How is the violence expressed?
It manifests itself in different forms:
- Physical violence (strokes, beating)
- Sexual violence (forced, coercive actions)
- Emotional violence (insults, control behavior, isolation)
- economic violence (control over finance, refusal of entertainment).
Particularly affected are women at the age of 25 to 49 years who live in a monogamous or polygamen marriage, as well as those who live the widowed, divorced or separately.
The causes are a nobody.
The reasons are manifold and interact with each other:
- deeply rooted cultural standards and patriarchy. In many parts of Kenya, ideas prevail that the man occupies the dominant role in the relationship and may meet certain decisions alone. These standards are sometimes internalized by women themselves.
- Alcohol and financial burdens. Alcohol consumption and economic stressors (eg unemployment, poverty) can increase the risk of violence.
- Missing effective protection mechanisms. Even if laws exist, their implementation is often prevented. Women are sometimes exposed to questionable allegations in ads ("What did you do themselves?"), And corruption in the police or courts worsens the problem.
- Early exposure. If a woman in childhood has already experienced violence (eg by a father), the risk increases to later get into a violent relationship later.
Today, about 37 women and more than 200 children live in the village. It was created an infrastructure for daily life and personal development:
In the school, not only reading and writing is taught, but also teaching women's rights - thus the next generation grows up with an understanding of gender equality.
The women go to craft activities; They manufacture traditional pearl jewelry and other handicrafts that sell them to tourists. In addition, the village operates a campsite for safaris in the Samburu reserve. The revenues made coming to the residents benefit.
Important decisions are taken together. For consultations there is a special place - the "tree of speech" ("Tree of Speech"). There every woman - regardless of age or status - has the same say.
The residents do not reject their culture completely. They carry traditional clothes and preserve language as well as customs that do not cause damage. However, from harmful traditions (such as female genital mutilation / FGM), they take distance.
An interesting detail: Men's stay in the village is not prohibited in principle - so the children of the residents can bring their fathers. However, access is denied access to foreign men. Although women occasionally go to relationships with men from outside, they do not subordinate them and do not take marriage with them. In addition, women can engage men for certain work, such as for the hats of the cattle.
Umodja is not just an idyllic place. Sides of neighboring communities in which patriarchal structures are strongly pronounced, the women sometimes oppose hostility. In addition, the village has to fight with economic difficulties.
The women of Umodja were able to make progress in the question of land rights. In the culture of Samburu, land is usually in community ownership, and all decisions are made by men. Women could not own the country still own right. However, the residents of Umodja acquire a property with their savings and donations, which is located a few kilometers from the village. For a long time she used this country informal, which made it prone to disputes with neighbors. In 2021, they requested a joint land title, whose examination was passed through the district government. Should this title be granted, this would guarantee the women and their daughters a cross-consuming security - something that was not planned in traditional systems.
The example of Umodja has inspired other communities. Later, former residents founded another Frauendorf: Unity Village. In addition, women from Umoja visit neighboring communities to talk about the importance of women's rights in terms of land and property.
Video: Umoja Village in Kenya Where Men Are Banned!
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the standard when women maintain violence against women
How can Africa recover control of his own history
How can Africa recover control of his own history
If one speaks that Africa has lost the "control" over its history is meant that his past was described for a long time from a strange point of view. Colonial powers, missionaries and Western science ignored or distorted local traditions and played down the achievements of pre-colonial societies. The "recovery of control" is not a single task, but a whole bundle of measures.
The recovery can be carried out under the following conditions:
One of the most direct way is the change of the curricula. It is important to include the history of pre-colonial states (for example Mali, Aksum, Benin) into the school and higher education programs and to explore local knowledge systems and oral traditions - rather than supporting European sources. The focus on "local heroes" and for certain peoples significant events helps to develop their own historical identity. The movement for decolonization of education gains momentum. For example, protests such as #rhodesmustfall in South Africa has caused many universities to rethink their teaching content.
It is important to support African historians, archaeologists and anthropologists so that they can explore the past with resort to their own methods and sources (oral traditions, artifacts, local languages). This helps to create a narrative "out of the inside" instead of looking at the story through the glasses of an external eye-catching angle.
Much historical knowledge is not stored in written sources, but in oral traditions - in stories, songs and rituals. The systematic cooperation with the carriers of these traditions as well as their recording and interpretation are an important part of this process. In addition, the colonial archives must be recalated. One should not only look for the "official" version, but also after the votes of resistance and documents of local communities.
It is not enough to complement African themes only; Rather, it has to be consciously analyzed, as colonialism rewritten the story. Which events have been concealed? Which narrative were promoted? How did artificial limits that tore ethnic and cultural connections? The understanding of the mechanisms of this transcript process is the first step to a more balanced history image.
History does not exist in the airplier room. It should be considered in the context of anthropology, sociology and economics to show the complexity of the past - not only politics, but also everyday, trade, cultural exchange and technological achievements.
It should be part of global debates on the historical memory, but at the same time defend the right to determine the topics as discussed. It is important to avoid neo-colonial practices in which western researchers or foundations specify which projects have priority.
Film, literature, museum exhibitions and digital projects are effective instruments to make their own history and awaken the interest of young people.
Of course, this is a complex and lengthy process. On this way there are obstacles: resource deficiency, resistance of conservative forces and persistent influence from the outside in certain areas. But the gradual work in these directions already shows initial successes. More and more African countries and academic communities seek to recall the right to write their own story.
If there is talk of successful decolonization movements in Africa, there are usually different scenarios: some countries acquired their independence through negotiations, while others had to lead an armed struggle.
Ghana (1957). The country often applies as a "pioneer" of decolonization in Subsahara Africa. The leader of the movement, Kwame Nkrumah, built up the Convention People's Party (CPP), which achieved electoral successes, even as an Nkrumah was imprisoned. Finally, the gold coast (as the country was said then) in 1957 under the name Ghana an independent state. Decisive here was the focus on non-violent methods - political campaigns, boycotts and cooperation with the colonial authorities. The example of Ghanas inspired many other countries of the continent.
Algeria (1962). Here, however, the path went differently. A comprehensive and bloody armed fight. The independence war began in 1954 and developed into a lengthy conflict. Finally, France recognized the sovereignty of Algeria in 1962. This example shows that armed resistance could be an effective means in view of the hard resistance of the colonial power.
The countries of the "annual Africa" (1960). This year, as a time of mass-like independence to independence in history, one of the history: equal to 17 states in Central and West Africa became sovereign. Among other things, the Congo, Nigeria, Cameroon, the Senegal and Chad belonged to them belonged to them. This is illustrated as after the Second World War of general pressure on the colonial powers and as the solidarity between different African movements accelerated the process.
Portuguese colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde). Again, the decolonization of lengthy armed conflicts was accompanied - the Portuguese colonial war. The independence of these countries was reached in 1975, after the political regime change in Portugal itself.
Zimbabwe (1980) and Namibia (1990). These examples come from a later phase. In Zimbabwe (then Südrhodesia), a guerrilla movement set the regime of the White Minority under pressure, and in 1980, representatives of the local population reached power. Namibia, which was under the control of South Africa for a long time, gained independence in 1990.
South Africa (1994). The end of apartheid and the election victory Nelson Mandelas are also part of the comprehensive decolonization process, which aimed to overcome systemic racist inequality and to return political control to the local population.
It is important that success does not always mean a stable and flourishing state immediately. Many countries faced independence with major challenges confronted - from economic difficulties to political crises. However, the movements for sovereignty and right to self-determination can undoubtedly consider successfully if one considers the main objective: political independence.
Montag, 12. Oktober 2026
The Ethiopian Eritreagan Border Conflict. Why the conflict is.
The Ethiopian Eritreagan Border Conflict. Why the conflict is.
The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is difficult and has not only a single cause, it is a braid of historical, political and even psychological factors.
For a long time, in the Ethiopian historiography (among other things during the rule of Haile Selassie), Eritrea was an inseparable component of Ethiopia, because the peoples shared history, religion And culture, in addition, Eritrea was the natural "access to the sea" for Ethiopia. Even after independence Eritrea in 1993, this view was not completely disappeared in Ethiopia and again and again occurred. On the other hand, in Eritrea, the many years of independence struggle was still vividly remembered, and one was not ready to engage in ideas of a "reunification".
The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia took place from May 1998 to June 2000.
The immediate shutter was a controversial area. The shutter button was a border dispute around the village Badme. According to independence Eritrea in 1993, the exact border was not officially set in many places. That led to always small clashes. On May 6, 1998, there was a shootout near Badme: Eritrease soldiers came into the area controlled by Ethiopia and met local militias and security police. The discussion escalated quickly. For both sides he had gained a symbolic meaning, because control was perceived as a question of national pride and sovereignty. There are some analysts towards a paradox: For many border areas, there were not even clear limits set by cards, which already formed the breeding ground for disputes.
On May 13, 1998, Ethiopia mobilized its troops and stated that it was defending his sovereignty if Eritrea did not retreat. The battles spread to several fronts. Both sides invested great resources in militarization. They built their armies, procured new weapons and put on extensive trenches along the border.
Various international mediation attempts failed first. An initiative of the United States and Rwandas in May 1998 suggested that both sides should retire their troops to the positions they had before 6 May. Eritrea leaned.
In February 1999, Ethiopia succeeded in recovering Badme and parts of the surrounding area. Then Eritrea canceled the rejection and explained that it accepts the OAU peace frame. However, Ethiopia first rejected and continued the offensive.
On December 12, 2000, both countries signed a peace agreement in Algiers. As part of the Agreement, the Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) was founded, which should set a final borderline.
In December 2005, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in The Hague. The Commission noted that Eritrea has triggered the conflict by taking an invasive approach without the previous armed attack of Ethiopia. Thus, the attack could not be seen as a justified self-defense after international law. The Commission also committed Eritrea to pay Ethiopia compensation.
The war had a serious impact, it can be spread from about 100,000 dead. There are also thousands of civilians that were distributed within the countries. In addition, Ethiopia deported about 77,000 Eritreer, while Eritrea had about 70,000 Ethiopians. The key components of the infrastructure Eritrea were destroyed.
Mutual mistrust and political differences. Already before the border conflict passed between the movements, which later led to independence eritrea (eritreitarian popular frown EPP), and Ethiopian forces (for example, the People's Official Front of Tigray - TPLF) Differences regarding the military strategy and ideology. Even after independence, this mistrust remained: the parties suspected each other to intervene in the internal affairs of each other, and supported opposition groups.
Although the peace agreement was signed, the conflict was not completely solved. Ethiopia leaned for a long time to physically demarcate the final borderline recommended by the EEBC (for example, by establishing borderline), which eritrea frustrated.
Only in 2018, there was a turning point, Ethiopia explained that there will be Badme to Eritrea. This was followed by a summit meeting, in which a new demarcation of the border and the resumption of diplomatic relations have been agreed.
After independence, even a free trade between the countries developed. Over time, however, voltages occurred. Eritrea strive to diversify its economic relations, while in Ethiopia sometimes the view was expressed, the young Eritrea was economically weak and dependent on the resources of his neighbor.
The question of access to the sea, that is a difficult question. This is one of the most explosive current factors. After 1993, Ethiopia had lost his access to the Red Sea. In Ethiopian politics, restoration of access to the coast (including the Eritrean Harbor Assab) became the topic of political rhetoric. In Eritrea, this was perceived as a direct threat of sovereignty.
The tensions were also influenced by other local problems; Disputes around the Nile water and the fight of different external actors to influence in the region.
In addition, the executives of both countries sometimes used these conflicts to mobilize support in their own country.
It should be noted that in 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea officially ended the state of war - the heads of state and government of both countries showed political will and signed an agreement. Nevertheless, it continues to be at individual incidents on the border, since the deeper tensions and mutual mistrust are not completely disappeared.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/eritrean%e2%80%93ethiopian_war
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/eritrean%e2%80%93ethiopian_border_conflict
https://sovereignlimits.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/04/eri_eth_web.jpg
https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/eritrea-ethiopia-land
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/eritrean%e2%80%93ethiopian_war
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/eritrean-ethiopian_war
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/eritrea.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/timeline_of_the_eritrean%e2%80%93ethiopian_war
https://journals.openedition.org/cea/384
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/eritrean-ethiopian_war
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_eritrean_invasion_of_ethiopia
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/192869/2015a64_web.pdf
Freitag, 9. Oktober 2026
Rwanda’s economy
The picture presented by Rwanda’s economy is truly interesting: it involves both successes and challenges.
Since 2006, Rwanda has experienced a period of steady growth and has emerged as one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. While growth rates generally fluctuated between 6% and 9% over the years, the COVID-19 pandemic caused a slump; GDP contracted by 2.5% in 2020. However, the economy rebounded strongly, with growth reaching around 9.4% in 2025. Forecasts for 2026 and 2027 stand at approximately 7.5% and 7.4%, respectively.
What has driven this growth?
One factor is the development of the service sector. It is now the largest economic sector, accounting for around 53% of GDP. Areas such as finance, trade, transport, communications, and tourism have all seen expansion.
Then there have been—and continue to be—investments and reforms. The government has actively courted investors by offering attractive incentives, such as a zero percent corporate tax rate for certain companies.
Rwanda has managed to recover from crisis. The country had to overcome the aftermath of the 1994 genocide and the ensuing instability; gradual stabilization laid the foundation for further development.
Are there any notable features?
Some experts highlight an important point: studies (such as those in the *Review of African Political Economy*) suggest that the population's actual prosperity may not have kept pace with GDP figures. For instance, average household consumption stagnated after 2005, even though GDP per capita was rising. This is an occasion to take a closer look not only at macroeconomic data but also at social indicators.
Factors that could dampen future growth include:
the political environment (the country has effectively been a one-party state since 1994);
tensions in relations with the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Yet, there are positive developments. Driven by growth in industry—including construction and manufacturing—as well as in the services and agricultural sectors, the country has recorded strong economic growth despite various challenges, Central Bank Governor Soraya Hakuziyaremye announced on Thursday.
📊 Economic growth by sector:
• 15.5% – Industry
• 7.4% – Services
• 5.9% – Agriculture
The Central Bank forecasts GDP growth of 7.8% for 2026 but warned that the ongoing conflict in the Middle East could disrupt international trade, drive up transport and production costs, and weaken foreign demand.
Conclusion:
Overall, the trend is positive: Rwanda is experiencing dynamic growth and focusing on services and investment. However, for sustainable and inclusive development, it is important to address structural challenges and monitor how this growth impacts the lives of the general population.
Dienstag, 6. Oktober 2026
Wazakendo attack in South - Kivu
In response to rebel attacks targeting their positions and the civilian population, the #Wazalendo*1) have just seized control of the town of #Shanje, the village of #Gasenda, and the Bukumba hills in the #Kalehe territory (South Kivu province) following fierce fighting.
The M23 rebels—allied with #Rwanda—are currently in a disorganized retreat toward Byonde, while other units are moving toward #Numbi.
*1) There are serious allegations and documented cases of crimes involving certain Wazalendo groups. However, the term does not refer to a unified organization but rather a loose alliance of various armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Swahili, "Wazalendo" roughly translates to "patriots."
What crimes are alleged?
Human rights organizations and UN bodies report, among other things:
killings and extrajudicial executions;
torture, beatings, and arbitrary detention;
looting and extortion of the population;
sexual violence and gang rape;
abductions;
recruitment and use of child soldiers;
ethnically motivated attacks, particularly against Banyamulenge civilians.
Amnesty International has documented cases in which both Wazalendo and M23 fighters committed serious human rights violations. Some of these acts could constitute war crimes under international humanitarian law.
Why are they supported despite this?
Some Wazalendo groups are fighting alongside the Congolese army (FARDC) against the M23 rebellion. The government therefore views them as local allies or self-defense groups. This support reportedly encompassed weapons, logistics, or political backing.
This gives rise to a significant problem: the state employs armed groups against the M23 but apparently lacks sufficient control over them in all areas. Consequently, groups officially acting as "patriots" can simultaneously plunder or attack the civilian population. The UN and human rights organizations are therefore warning of impunity and a further escalation of the conflict.
FRANCE PERPETRATED A MASSACRE OF AFRICAN SOLDIERS
FRANCE PERPETRATED A MASSACRE OF AFRICAN SOLDIERS
On December 1, 1944, French colonial troops killed more than 400 Senegalese soldiers who had fought for their colonial power, France, during the Second World War.
Why were they killed? They were demanding their back pay. These were men who had fought for France—only to be massacred by the very country they had served.
This is a painful chapter in history. It concerns the Thiaroye massacre of December 1, 1944.
In November 1944, around 1,300 soldiers of the *Tirailleurs sénégalais* ("Senegalese Tirailleurs") returned to the Thiaroye military camp (near Dakar, the capital of French West Africa). Many of them had previously fought for France in the Second World War, had been held in German captivity, and were now awaiting demobilization and the payments due to them.
However, conditions in the camp were poor, and there were difficulties regarding payment: colonial authorities delayed the disbursement of funds, and the soldiers lost a portion of the money when exchanging French francs for the local currency (the precursor to the CFA franc). Resentment grew, and on December 1, the soldiers gathered peacefully to assert their claims.
In response, French colonial troops opened fire—including the 1st and 7th Regiments of the Senegalese Tirailleurs, units of the National Gendarmerie, and the 6th Colonial Artillery Regiment; an M3 Stuart light tank was also deployed. Estimates suggest that between 70 and 400 people lost their lives. Most historians today (such as Armelle Mabon) estimate the most likely death toll to be between 300 and 400. However, many researchers and relatives of the victims emphasize that the soldiers were largely unarmed and that the French troops' actions were premeditated—the goal was not merely to suppress the protest but to demonstrate strength so as not to jeopardize the colonial order. The official French account initially spoke only of the "suppression of an armed mutiny," yet declassified military documents support the theory of a deliberate massacre.
For a long time, France cited an understated death toll; officially, there was talk of only 35 fatalities. It was not until November 2014 that French President François Hollande acknowledged at a commemoration ceremony that there had been at least 70 victims, describing the events as "simply appalling and intolerable." In 2024, marking the tragedy's 80th anniversary, a commission was established at Senegal's initiative to produce a "White Paper" (a report) on the case. The report concluded that the shootings had been carefully planned and dismissed the official figure of 35 victims as contradictory and demonstrably incorrect. Furthermore, as part of the report's preparation, archaeologists from Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar conducted excavations at the burial site and discovered the remains of seven individuals—an important step toward more accurately determining the total number of victims.
For decades, the truth was denied and covered up.
On November 29, 2024, France officially recognized the killings at Thiaroye as a massacre. They fought for France, but instead of paying them,
France repaid them with bullets.
In Senegal, August 23rd is observed as a national day of remembrance for the Senegalese Tirailleurs (*Tirailleurs sénégalais*).
This event has left a deep mark on Senegal's collective memory and continues to influence relations between the two countries to this day.
The current Senegalese president is a French puppet...
...to France and return in disgrace.
#AfricaTheFreeland #Thiaroye #Senegal #France #ColonialCrimes
Samstag, 3. Oktober 2026
Thirty billion flow into Africa, but more than two hundred billions flow from Africa every year
The Ghanaian President John Mahama brought it to the point:
"Thirty billion flow into Africa, but more than two hundred billions flow from Africa every year. If we speak of a world order, which is directed against Africa, then we mean exactly that. "
This statement describes the extent of the "net capital outflow" from Africa. Around 30 billion US dollars are added to the continent (such as foreign direct investment, development assistance or reversals of migrants), while more than 200 billion are driven annually.
Where do these numbers come from? Such estimates usually take into account different streams.
There are profits and dividends transnational companies. Income from raw material production, energy projects and other major projects in Africa are often transferred to low tax territories or in the home countries of investors.
And again and again there are the illegal financial currents. These include practices such as the undervaluation of goods in customs declarations, apparent transactions, money laundering, etc. Studies, there is a significant part of the outflow at exactly these channels.
Legal capital transfers, including foreign debt payments, revenue recourditions, transactions of financial institutions as well as savings and investments of wealthy individuals outside the continent.
The transfer prizes are a big one. Companies artificially rely on the value of raw materials export from Africa to pay less taxes in the conveyor countries and book more profits abroad.
On which sources are the estimates?
Such calculations are published, for example, from the following organizations:
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference for Trade and Development) - in reports on investment and capital flows.
Global Financial Integrity - This organization has made extensive work in the estimation of illegal financial streams by country and region. The African Development Bank and UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) provide regional analysis on balance of payments, investments and fiscal policy.
The difference between inflows and outflows is not merely a "budget deficit", but a structural problem: In view of the high financing requirement for development, Africa acts in fact as a net creditors of the global economy.
On the edge of the UN General Assembly in New York, Mahama, Africa declared forced to record loans to interest rates, which are eight times higher than in the rest of the world. This is exactly where the debt trap will begin.
He keyred the numbers as follows:
- About 90 billion dollars are lost through manipulated commercial bills and offsetting prices.
- Around 80 billion dollars flow into debt service.
- Another $ 40 billion is attributable to risk premiums.
While development aid for Africa has broken into only $ 30 billion, more than $ 200 billion flow from the continent per year.
Mahama's Embassy was unmistakable: Africa does not need charity, but a fairer system that no longer removes the resources to the continent.
This is a very concise formulation: it shifts the focus of the "help" towards the systemic causes, due to which Africa resources and capital loses.
If there is a talk that Africa does not require charity, but a fair system, are usually meant several levels:
Funding projects generate profits, but a significant part of the income flows through offsetting prices, preferential contracts and offshore constructions from the continent. A fair system is characterized by the fact that much of the revenue remains in the funding countries and benefits development.
Contracts for funding and export must be transparent and take into account the interests of the host country. These include the fight against tax avoidance and the return of funds from illegal financial streams.
Often, African countries export raw materials at relatively low prices and import finished products at higher prices. Justice means equal competitive conditions as well as access to technologies and knowledge.
Many discussions about "Help" are associated with problems of foreign debt: The system must exclude debt traps and ensure that recorded loans actually serve developed and not the operation of old liabilities.
How does this related to the factory drainage?
The figures - 30 billion inflow compared to 200 billion outflow - clarify that "help" and investment alone can not compensate for structural outflows. Even if you increased the charity, this would not solve the problem because the system continues to absorb resources faster than you will flow.
Which approaches to the system change are proposed?
The following ideas are discussed at the political and scientific level:
Strengthening fiscal sovereignty: national tax authorities, exchange of tax information, combat aggressive tax planning.
Transparency of contracts and revenue: Disclosure of payments of companies to governments, standards such as EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative).
Regional integration and joint negotiation positions: so that countries can negotiate at eye level with investors and trading partners.
Development of own financial markets and institutions: In order to remain part of the savings and investments on the continent and finances local projects.
I have already reported on topics such as neocolonialism and reducing dependency of Africa from external assistance, because this logic works directly: it is about the redistribution of power and winning in the global economy, not to simply "give more money".
Ethiopia's ancient Thanksgiving is for forgiveness and unit
Ethiopia's ancient Thanksgiving is for forgiveness and unit
We have a very interesting topic here! There is an important nuance: there is no uniform, "nationwide" thanksgiving in Ethiopia, but it actually exists an outstanding example, which is often described exactly. The speech is from the irreecha festival of the oromo people. The Oromo (natural name OROMOO) are the largest ethnic group of Ethiopia and one of the largest peoples of Africa. They live mainly in the Oromia region in Ethiopia, but also in parts of Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. Around 33-40 million people; In Ethiopia, they provide about a third to 40% of the total population. Their language is the Afaan Oromoo (also called OroIfIs), an East Cuditant Language of the Afroasian Language Family; After talking numbers one of the most important languages of Africa.
It is often referred to as "old Ethiopian Thanksgiving", and its core is actually characterized by the thoughts of reconciliation and unity.
Irreecha is celebrated at the end of the rainy season - about in October. For the Oromo, this is a time of the renewal of nature, because the rainfall ends, and the time of the rich harvest begins. People gather to thank the deity Waaqa for fertility, peace, health and a good harvest.
But the meaning of the festival goes beyond the mere thanks for the gave earth. Before the actual celebration, the participants strive for reconciliation; They leave the risks, anger and mistrust behind. Here is the idea of forgiveness: the festival becomes a moment of spiritual cleaning and the restoration of human bonds. The great gathering as well as the common rituals, songs and dances also strengthen the feeling of unity. People from different clans and with different backgrounds feel on this day as part of a large whole.
The celebrations often take place on holy lakes - for example at the Hora Finfinne in Addis Ababa or at the Hora Arsadi in Bishoftu. The participants wear colorful traditional clothes and bring fresh grasses and flowers. One of the symbolic rituals is dipping these herbs and flowers in water: this is a sign of the bondage of human, nature and a higher power as well as a symbol of life and renewal. Oldest and traditional fees (such as "Abba Gadaa") speak prayers.
Irreeecha is closely linked to the Gadaa system - an old self-governmental system and cultural traditional work of the Oromo-Volkes, which is even recognized by UNESCO. The Ethiopian authorities see in the feast of great potential: his values - unity, national consensus and reconciliation - can benefit all the country. Therefore, special forums are held in which this ideas can be further developed in which these ideas can be discussed. In addition, there are initiatives to record IRREECHA in the list of UNESCO's intangible cultural heritage.
The Oromo commit numerous holidays and memorial days that have been divided into three categories: traditional rites of Waaqeffanna religion, secular events and holidays of religions that the Oromo belongs today (Christianity and Islam). Here are the most important of this.
Irreeecha - more than just a party
The already mentioned Thanksgiving actually takes place twice a year: in autumn as "Irreecha Birraa" (in October, on the water) and in the spring as "Irreecha Arfaasaa" or "Irreeecha Malkaa" (in April). There is also a variant that is celebrated on hillcases: "irreeecha tulluu". In all these occasions, the same core content is the focus: Waaq (God) to thank as well as to ask peace and reconciliation.
Ateetee - the "singing" festival of women, ... is a central institution in the traditional oromo society that a female deity or a female spirit, a ritual practice and a women led system for dispute resolution, for Prayers and social security.
An independent and very characteristic tradition is "Ateetee", a ritual festival of Oromo women (especially with the Arsi). It is committed from different occasions: In order to ask for drought to prove rain to protect diseases, protect the right pregnant women and young mothers, to seek a good harvest or simply express pleasure. The women gather on the riverbank or under a sacred tree, sing "atteetee" songs and keep the ritual rod "sink" in their hands - a symbol of female strength and the right to respect.
It is not only a feast, but also an instrument of justice: If someone was wrong, the women look up the house of the causer and sing there until a reconciliation and a reparation are achieved. In the region Shoa "Ateetee" is sometimes celebrated together with the Orthodox "Meschel" - firmly.
Pilgrimage to Abbaa Mudaa, is considered a mediator between Waaqaa (the Creator) and the Oromo-People and as guardian and the Waaqaa Laws Guardians (Seera Waaqaa).
Every eight years a large pilgrimage to Abbaa Mudaa takes place - the top priest of Waaqffanna. Pilgrims from all areas of Oromo are facing this holy site to receive blessing and anointing. Once this was both a religious as well as an event incidental event; Today, the festival "Irreecha" on the Arsadi Lake has largely taken over this role.
Civil memorial days
After the oromo calendar (where the day begins with sunset), secular memorial days are also committed:
Ayyana Amajjii - January 1, New Year; More often than Ayyaana Amajjii is an annual cultural and political commemoration of the Oromo, which takes place on January 1 and symbolizes the freedom fight and resistance of the Oromo against oppression.
Ayyaana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa (sometimes written Gabrummaa) is the Oromo Day of the Revolt against the submission, which committed annually on November 9th (Sadaasa 9 in the Oromo Calendar) becomes.
The date marks the beginning of the fincila Diddaa Gabrummaa (FDG) - the "revolt against submission" - a mass protest movement, which started all oromia on November 9, 2005, after the Oromo Liberation Front (ABO / OLF) had called. On this day students, young people (organized later than Qeerroo organized), farmers and other social groups coordinated demonstrations against the rule of the Ethiopian Government, which denote Oromo nationalists as colonial rule (Gabrummaa).
The FDG is regarded as a turning point in the nationalist discourse of the Oromo, which:
Large parts of the Oromo Society were mobilized at continued protest.
Put the organizational and emotional foundation for the later, even larger fincila Xumura Gabrummaa (FXG) protests from 2015.
How is it observed?
Name: Ayyaana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa means literally "Fest / Day of the Revolt against submission".
It must first be clarified that there is no consistent proof that the Ethiopian government "all" oromo has been systematically and even thundered over centuries. But there are quite serious and repeated allegations and evidence that certain regime periods and political decisions have led to a marginalized, oppressive situation for many oromo.
Here are some aspects that justify this criticism:
Already under Kaiser Haile Selassie (1930-1974) there was strong centralization: the semi-autonomous status of many Oromo states was repealed. At the same time, the own language AFAAN OROMOO was officially limited - on the radio, at school, in dishes. Later, until about 1991, one was not allowed to write in Ethiopia in Oromo or produce literature.
When Oromo protested for their rights - for example against land opinion without adequate compensation (as in the controversial "Addis Ababa Master Plan", the parts of Oromia in the capital inclusion) - these demonstrations were often laid in force. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch reported several times over excessive violence through security forces, arbitrary arrests, arrests without charge and even extrajudicial killings.
The government used laws such as anti-terrorism proclamation to silence independent voices, journalists, activists or members of opposition parties (such as OFDM or OPC). Sometimes the existence of movements such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was taken as a reason to put the entire population under pressure.
Many Oromo live in rural regions and are dependent on traditional ways of life (grain economy, agriculture). These were under pressure by state policy (eg by ignoring traditional rights of use in connection with development projects).
However, it is important to emphasize that the situation has changed across different regimes. Following the introduction of ethnic federalism in 1992, Oromo had the opportunity to manage themselves in Oromia and develop their language and culture actively.
The criticism comes not only from the outside, but also within the Oromo community that fights about its own rights and identity.
More recently, other factors are added that exacerbate the situation - such as severe drought perdings that further burden the agricultural basis.
There are quite serious evidence for oppression, but it would be simplifying to paint the whole picture only black and white. The reality is a complex network of historical, political and economic factors.
In Oromo activist and diaspora travel, the day is marked with explanations, events and social media campaigns that remind of the history of the FDG and connect them with current struggles to land, language, political representation and self-determination.
Ayyaana means "festival", "celebration" or "spirit / essence" on Afaan oromoo. Amajjii is the name of the first month in the traditional oromo calendar, which corresponds approximately to January.
Ayyaana Amajjii means literally "Feast of Amajjii" or "New Year / Januarfest".
Ayyaana Amajjii has been celebrating for more than 40 years than more than just a New Year. In the nationalist discourse of the Oromo it marks:
One day in honor of the freedom fighters of the Oromo, who left their lives in the fight for liberation and self-determination.
A symbol of strength, resilience and hope, formulated as "light over dark" and "freedom over suppression".
A ritual reduction of a decisive act of resistance in the Oromo-liberation movement, which remains in memory of a much stronger opponent as a victory of some less bolds against a much stronger opponent
In practice, the day of political and civil society groups of the Oromo (especially in the Diaspora) is used for:
Commemorative events, speeches and cultural programs.
Lighting amajjii torches or candles on hills or heights as a symbol of fight.
Renewal of the confession to the rights, identity and political objectives of the Oromo.
In addition to his political importance, Ayyaana Amajjii also acts as:
An oromo New Year celebration marked the beginning of Amajjii in the Oromo Calendar.
A moment of cultural expression: music, dance, poetry and storytelling, which strengthen the identity and history of Oromo
Ayyana Guyyaa Gootaaa - April 15, Day of Oromo Martyr; This remembrance day goes back to a concrete event: On April 15, 1980, ten high-ranking leaders of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) - including the Secretary General Magarsaa Barii - in the Shinniigaa Desert (on the way to a diplomatic meeting in Somalia) captured and executed by Somali bandits. Her kidnappers had demanded Muslims and Christians should separate, with only the Muslims spared. The ten Oromo leaders rejected this, explained "We are first oromo" and died together.
Since then, 15 April is celebrated as Guyyaa Gootata Oromoo (Day of Oromo Heroes) or Guyyaa Yaadannoo Goota Oromoo (Oromo-Martyr Train Day). The OLF National Council (Gumii Sabaa) officially sets the day in 1984 as a martyr remembrance day.
The day is for several goals:
Reminder of those oromo heroines and heroes who have sacrificed their lives for the restoration of oromo culture, identity and human dignity that were suppressed under Ethiopian colonialism.
Recognition of the relationship between martyrium, bravery, patriotism and oromummaa (Oromo identity).
Obligation to continue the struggle started by the martyrs to victory.
Solidarity with the activists who are fighting today in Oromia.
Awareness that oromo liberation requires heavy victims and serve the fallen as revolutionary role models.
In the Oromo calendar begins a "day" at sunset, so all holidays start in the evening before the specified date. The remembrance day is committed by Oromo communities worldwide with commemoria, cultural events and political speeches.
There is also a state guyyaa Gootaaa (HeroDag) in Ethiopia, which was originally laid on the 28th Bitootessa (March) and later on the 27th EBLA (April). This is a national Ethiopian holiday, while Ayyaana Guyyaa Gototaa specifically honors the Oromo martyrs and is monitored primarily by Oromo organizations and diasporage facilities.
Ayyana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa - November 9, Day of uprising against the subjugation;
The date marks the beginning of the fincila Diddaa Gabrummaa (FDG) - the "revolt against submission" - a mass protest movement, which started all oromia on November 9, 2005, after the Oromo Liberation Front (ABO / OLF) had called. On this day students, young people (organized later than Qeerroo organized), farmers and other social groups coordinated demonstrations against the rule of the Ethiopian Government, which denote Oromo nationalists as colonial rule (Gabrummaa).
The FDG is regarded as a turning point in the nationalist discourse of the Oromo, which:
Large parts of the Oromo Society were mobilized at continued protest.
Put the organizational and emotional foundation for the later, even larger fincila Xumura Gabrummaa (FXG) protests from 2015.
Ayyaana Fincila Diddaa Garbummaa means literally "Fest / Day of the Revolt against submission".
In Oromo activist and diaspora travel, the day is marked with explanations, events and social media campaigns that remind of the history of the FDG and connect them with current struggles to land, language, political representation and self-determination.
Irreecha - end of September or early October; The date depends on astronomical observations.
Religious holidays
Since there are under the Oromo Christians, Muslims and supporters of traditional faith, they also celebrate the common festivals of their respective faiths - about Christmas, Easter, Eid Al-Fitr, Eid Al-Adha and others. The followers of the Waaqeffanna also commit their own, special day: Ekeraa in December. It is a commemoration of deceased relatives where bread, cheese with butter, beer and honey are served.
Ceremonies of the GADAA system, is the traditional, democratically organized company and government system of the Oromo in the Horn of Africa, especially in Ethiopia. It regulates political, legal, social, economic and ritual affairs and was recognized by UNESCO in 2016 as an intangible cultural heritage of humanity.
Finally, the Gadaa system itself determines the life rhythm: Every eight years, the power transfer takes place from an age group to the next, accompanied by large rites and celebrations. The fixed calendar of the Oromo is thus largely "integrated" in this old system.
Swell
https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/ethnic-and-cultural-studies/oromo-people
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/oromo_people
https://advocacy4oromia.org/2021/11/04/genocidal-conquest-plunder-of-resources-and-dehumanization-of-the-oromo-in-ethiopia/
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/ethiopia-civil-society-calls-upon-human-rights-council-investigate-government
https://www.dw.com/en/hrw-scale-of-crackdown-on-ethiopias-oromo-unprecedented/a-19335562
https://minorityrights.org/communities/oromo
https://ollaa.org/ethiopias-forgotten-crisis/
https://minorityrights.org/communities/oromo
Freitag, 2. Oktober 2026
The Oyo Kingdom and the Oyo Empire
The Oyo Kingdom and the Oyo Empire
Often these terms are used synonym, but there is a fine difference, because that Oyo Kingdom (Kingdom Oyo) stands for the beginnings and the early phase, while the Oyo Empire (Reich Oyo) the time of bloom and massive Expansion designated.
Oyo Kingdom, this is about the emergence of the state.
According to the hearing of Yoruba, Oranmiyan (also oranyan) - a prince from the Kingdom of Ile-IFE and son of Oduduwas (he is the legendary founder and first divine king (Ooni) by Ile-IFE and the father of the people of the Yoruba in today's southwest Nigeria and in parts of Benin. He is worshiped both as a historical ruler, which is the classic IFE period (about 800-1100 AD) Initiated, as well as oriṣa (deity), which is associated with the creation and the kingship in the religion of Yoruba) - as a founder. The legend after the brothers was in dispute during a campaign against northern neighbors in dispute, and Oranmiyan's army proved to be too weak for an attack. A local chief in Bussa gave him a snake with a magical amulet and pointed him to follow her until she stopped and blown in the ground - there he should start the city. The place got the name Ajaka. Oranmiyan made Oyo to his kingdom and became the first OBA (ruler of Yoruba) titled Alaafin ("owner of the palace").
According to Oduduwa, various rulers followed on the throne of Ile-IFE; The traditional royal lists count today 51 Ooni (kings) of IFE, starting with Oduduwa as the first Ooni.
1. Oduduwa (founder)
2. Osangangan Obamakin
3. Ogun
4. Obalufon Gbogbodirin
5. Obalufon Alayemore
6.; oranmiyan
7. Ayetise
8. Lajamisan
... and on to the present 51. Ooni.
Some sources emphasize that Oranmiyan, a son Oduduwas, as a fourth or sixth Ooni (depending on the count), returned the dynastic line to Oduduwa's bloodline; About his son Lajamisan, the later rulers resulted from the successor to the successor.
The official count leads from Oduduwa to today's monarch Ooni Adeyye Eneritan Ogunwusi (Ojaja II), which has been governed since December 2015 and as 51. Ooni as well as "Arole Oduduwa" (Erbe of Oduduwas spiritual throne). Succession is traditionally reflected between several rulers (eg Giesi, Osinkola, Lafogido, OGBoru, Lisabi).
Ajaka was overthrown - twice, which makes him the only Alaafin (king) of Oyo, who ruled twice.
The first deduction took place after the death of his father Oranmiyan (Oranyan), the first OBA of Oyo, followed by Ajaka as Alaafin. His brother Shango, who was later worshiped as God of Thunder and Lightning, followed him. Ajaka was considered to be mild, he made his subcoats too many freedom and neglected the empected military assertiveness for the empire. That's why he was discontinued and replaced by his warrior brother Shango (Sango).
According to Shango's end - there are no credible documents here, so in some versions its end by suicide / departure, but in others told by banishment - Ajaka was recalled. In his second government period, he is described as much harder, authoritarian and "warful".
Ajaka's destiny illustrates a central principle of the early Oyo Empire, because the Alaafin had to demonstrate military strength and control over the provincial protectors, otherwise he was considered too weak, Easkonnten otherwise the royal monasteries (Oyo Mesi) for resignation or - in later practice - forcing the ritual suicide. Ajaka remains particularly memory because after a deduction, he climbed the throne again.
Nothing stays as it is. The collapse was more of a creeping process than a sudden blow - a mixture of internal political decomposition and external invasion, which hovered over about 80 years. Here are the most important events in chronological order.
Palace poster and a disturbed succession (1754-1796)
The decay used early. In 1754, Gaha began to intrigue the Prime Minister of Oyo, together with the Oyo Mesi (the Council of State) to force successive Alaafins to the ritual suicide - between June and October 1754 alone met this Two rulers in a row. Alaafin Awonbioju sat 130 days on the throne, Labisi Just 17. Gaha's machinations were stopped in 1774 when Alaafin Abiodun finally let him.
Abiodun then worsened the situation in other ways: he focused on economic development and coastal trade with Europeans, but neglected the army - that instrument with which the central government kept the provinces under control. In addition, he led unsuccessful campaigns against Borgu (1783) and Nupe (1789), where he lost numerous generals and soldiers.
Awole, Afonja and the cleavage of Ilorin (1793-1817)
The decisive turning joined Alaafin Awole, who murdered his father Abiodun and clarified the throne. He ordered his supreme military commander to attack the Aare-Ona-Kakanfo Afonja of Ilorin, ICEE-ILE - a place that Afonja was never allowed to attack under Eid - and then the market town Apomu, which belonged to Ile-IFE; This was taboo too.
Afonja refused the first command; After plundering ApoMu - the execution of the second command - he marched on the capital and demanded Awoles Abdaktion. Awole then committed ritual suicide. This was followed by the chaos, a struggle for the throne, rulers who only had a few months in power, and an unoccupied throne from about 1797 to 1802. This power vacuum made it possible to have regional commands - everyone ahead of Afonja - to act as independent powers.
Afonja then closed an alliance with Shehu Alimi, a Muslim scholars of the Fulani, as well as with the growing Muslim community of the region. In 1817 he released Ilorin from Oyo.
The Sokoto Jihad and the cleavage of ILORIN (1804-1823)
Here was struck from the outside. In 1804, Uzman initiated the Fodio of Sokoto from the Jihad of the Fulani; The movement spread south into the areas of Nupe and Ilorin, where the fines of the Fulani were already resident. A Sokoto-Jihad Inspired Uprising of Muslim Slaves in Ilorin in 1817 triggered a constitutional crisis and weakened the control of Oyo's over the region.
In 1823, Afonja was killed by his former allies, and Ilorin fell to the caliphate of Sokoto. The loss of Ilorin was devastating: It was the northern Garrison Oyos, the checkpoint on the trade routes to Niger and - which was crucial - the source of supply for the cavalry horses from Nupe and Bariba on which the Military supremacy Oyos was based.
The final military collapse (1823-1836)
Ilorin then developed a base for robberies south. This was followed by a series of wars - the Ogele War (1823-24), the Mugbamugga War (1824) and the Wars of Kanla and Eleduwe (1825-26) - where the cavalry of Ilorin the armed forces Oyos repeatedly hit the escape and utilizing the fragmented command structure of the empire. Alaafin Oluewu came to live with these campaigns, and tributary chiefs began to subjugate Ilorin instead.
Meanwhile, Dahomey claimed his independence in the West, and Oyo lost control of his trade routes to the coast. Around 1836 Fulani troops destroyed the capital Oyo-Ile, whereupon this was abandoned - the last alaafin died in the fight against the Armed Forces of Sokoto.
The consequences
The downfall triggered a massive resettlement wave of the Yoruba. Refugees moved south and founded a new capital in Ago Oja - today's New Oyo - as well as centers such as Ibadan and Ijaye; The EGBA in turn were pushed further to the south and founded 1830 AbeaKuta. The power vacuum unleashed a series of Yoruba civil wars that lasted up to about 1886.
It is noteworthy that the sources date these events different. The cleavage of ilorin (1817) whose integration into the Sokoto caliphate (1823) and the destruction of oyo-ile (optionally 1835 or 1836) are the usual corner points; Depending on the view, however, the collapse as a whole is classified in the period between 1817 and 1836.
The Oyo Empire
Thus, the epoch is called the small kingdom developed into a mighty state. The heyday fell into the 17th and 18th centuries (about 1650-1750).
What benefited this growth?
For the trade advantageous geographical location was responsible for this; As well as the development of the cavalry - straight powerful riding troops formed the military main power, which allowed it to subdue neighbors.
Structure of a multi-stage administration system, the core area (the metropolis OYO), the immediate dependent cities, the Egbado corridor (for connection to the coast) and Ajaland.
During the time of the empire, Oyo subdued numerous other Yoruba states and expanded his influence on neighboring areas. For example, Oyo subdued the Kingdom of Dahomey after a series of campaigns (1724-1730, 1738-1748). Later, Oyo gained direct access to the sea over the dependent coastal state of Ajase (today's Porto Novo).
The trade played an important role. Oyo acted as a mediator: It transported goods (including slaves) from the African hinterland to the coast, where they were taken over by European dealers. Due to the extent of this trade, the region even received the term "slave coast".
To the major rulers of the Reich season counted Abiodun (about 1770-1789). He emerged victorious from a civil war, in which he crashed the powerful minister Gaha, who had actually ruled the land. Abiodun focused on the development of the economy and coastal trade. His focus on the economy of the military ultimately weakened the military potential of the center.
Decline
Over time, the empire was hollowed out by internal problems: dynastic disputes, palace stripes and failed military campus. Individual provinces began to split off. The neighbors also expressed pressure on foreign policy: in particular the expanding Islamic states in the north (especially the caliphate of Sokoto). As a result, the northern areas (for example, Ilorin) were conquered by the fulbe. The last Alaafin fell in 1836 in the fight against the armed forces of Sokoto, whereupon the old capital was abandoned. Later, the kingdom was recognized in a highly reduced form, with a new capital: ọyọ-ütìbà (Neu-Oyo).
CITATIONS: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_rulers_of_the_yoruba_state_of_oyo adeyemi. - New Dawn Nigeria https://www.newdawnngr.com/2022/04/23/alafin-oyo-from-oranmiyan-to-lamidi-adyemi/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/oyo_empire https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ajaka https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/832945 https://www.nelocnews.com.ng/2026/07/history-of-alafin-of-oyo-empire-1210.html
https://theafricanhistory.com/1549 https://www.wikiawand.com/en/articles/oyo_empire https://thinkafrica.net/oyo-empire/ https://human.libretexts.org/bookshelves/history/world_history/early_world d_civilizations_ (lumen) /11:_african_civilizations/11.16:_the_yoruba_states https://www.scribd.com/document/815393454/book-of-sango https://www.scribd.com/document/789479461/oyo-empire-wikipedia-1 https://encyclopedia.litcaf.com/culture/social-tradition/ajaka/ https://johnsonokunade.com/2020/03/the-history-of-old-oyo-empire-oyo-ile-and-past-alafin.html https://lasujournalofafricanstudies.org.ng/storage/publications/kuponu-1679244714.pdf
Donnerstag, 1. Oktober 2026
Freedom fighters never give up until they achieve their goal.
Tundu Lissu is a Tanzanian politician, lawyer, and activist who has become a prominent figure in the country's opposition. Here are the key facts about him—his biography is exceptionally eventful and dramatic.
He served as a Member of Parliament for the Singida East constituency (2010–2020). In January 2025, he was elected chairman of the CHADEMA party (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo—"Party for Democracy and Progress"), one of Tanzania's leading opposition forces.
Previously, he headed the Tanganyika Law Society, the bar association for the country's mainland.
He is known as a campaigner against corruption and an advocate for democracy and human rights. He frequently criticized the actions of the ruling party and demanded transparency and accountability from those in power.
On September 7, 2017, unidentified individuals opened fire on Lissu’s vehicle in a parking lot near his parliamentary residence in Dodoma (Tanzania's capital). He sustained multiple gunshot wounds (to his abdomen, arm, and leg). Many opposition figures and international observers viewed the attack as politically motivated, given his confrontational stance toward the government. After receiving initial treatment at a local hospital, Lissu was transferred to Nairobi, Kenya; he subsequently underwent a lengthy rehabilitation process in Belgium.
He spent around three years in Belgium receiving medical treatment. In July 2020, Lissu returned to Tanzania to run in the presidential election as the CHADEMA candidate. However, the election was marred by allegations of irregularities, and he was defeated. He later left the country temporarily once more but returned to his homeland for good in 2023.
His political career was marked by further events, including renewed arrests—such as in 2024 on charges of incitement and high treason following a rally in Mbinga—and his exclusion from the 2025 election. While in detention, Lissu went on a hunger strike, demanding the right to attend court hearings in person rather than participating via video link. He also faced difficulties accessing his lawyers.
Why Lissu matters
Lissu became a symbol of resistance in Tanzania, particularly in light of the country's increasingly authoritarian political trends. He advocated for constitutional and political reforms, believing the nation needed a new order to prevent the repetition of past mistakes.
When viewing the situation specifically through the lens of Lissu’s role, the key manifestations of this authoritarian trend and his response to them can be summarized as follows:
- Restrictions on freedom of assembly and demonstration. Authorities repeatedly banned opposition rallies and arrested organizers. Lissu openly condemned this as the suppression of democracy and called for the repeal of restrictive laws.
- Pressure on the media and control of information. Tanzania enforces strict media laws that hinder the work of independent publications; social media platforms and messaging services have been blocked. Lissu publicly criticized such measures as tools of censorship.
- Legal and administrative pressure on the opposition. This includes arrests, charges of incitement and high treason, the disqualification of candidates, and difficulties in accessing legal counsel and court hearings.
- Control over the electoral process. The opposition complained of electoral manipulation,
A decisive turning point is associated with the presidency of John Magufuli (2015–2021): under his leadership, media laws were tightened, arrests of opposition figures increased, and public debate effectively ground to a halt. Some of these practices have continued under the current leadership, even though the tone has softened somewhat. For Lissu, this meant an ongoing confrontation with the state—ranging from parliamentary criticism to public advocacy for human rights.
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