Dienstag, 17. November 2026

The Monroe -Doctrin and Africa

It must be clearly and clearly stated that Africa does not belong to the Monroe doctrine.
The Monroe doctrine of 1823 was an instrument for the Western hemisphere right from the start. She explained America to the zone in which European powers were not allowed to establish new colonies and were not allowed to intervene - in return, the US promised to hold out from European affairs. Africa does not appear in the original text; The Doctrine for Latin America and the Caribbean (Roosevelt-Corollary 1904, Cubra Crise 1962, Reagan in Central America) was valid for Latin America and the Caribbean. A historical, doctrinary connection to Africa is simply not. Why are the two topics discussed together: the "Donroe" turning since 2025 Since November / December 2025, the topic has a new topicality. Trump's National Security Strategy (NSS) officially explains the Monroe doctrine back to the guiding principle: the US wants to "restore" predominance in the western hemispheria room and non-hemispheric competitors - is above all China - Keep away from strategically important objects there ("Trump Corollary"). The new National Defense Strategy of 2026 calls priority No. 1 the western hemispheria room, from Arctic to South America, and China only second. After use in Venezuela in January 2026 Trump baptized the thing itself on "Donroe Doctrine". This has a direct consequence for Africa - as a "blank space": Africa is the lowest regional priority of the Second Trump Government, according to analyzes - the strategic weight is clearly at the hemisphere, Indo-Pacific and domestic policy. The US has closed the USAd and propagates a "trade instead of help" course; China's trade in Africa was 2024 at almost $ 300 billion and the EU and China now offer duty-free market access. Critics warn exactly that's what's back to the hemisphere, leaving Europe Russia, the Golf Iran - "and the rest of China. The Monroe logic was originally defensive-demarcating ("You stay out there, we mix ourselves here in it"); Trump's version is read from observers as a preliminary stage to division of the world in spheres of influence. What makes Washington actually in Africa Africa policy is not equal to zero, but "selectively and transactionally": only those countries with critical minerals (copper, cobalt, lithium, rare earth), raw material access and power demonstration include - for example a selection Summit in July 2025 with Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania and Senegal, or the US-mediated peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, coupled to Western Billions investments. Everywhere the same driver lurks: the competition with Beijing about minerals and influence. The conclusion looks like this. Historically, there is no connection. At present, the Monroe doctrine is revived as a symbol of the US strategic self-restriction on its own hemisphere - and that's exactly where the Africa problem is. The real question is not whether the doctrine includes Africa (does not do it), but whether the retreat from the rest of the world leaves a vacuum that fill China and Russia. Representatives of the strategy call honestly "flexible realism"; Critics call it a historical mistake, the former Monroe supporters would never intend. Here we want to get in one aspect about the role of Africoms and the competition to China. And that's actually the core if you want to understand the current situation. Africom is only the visible military peak, while the real competition with China has long been held in other fields. What Africom is and how it works Africom (United States Africa Command) is one of the Eleven integrated Fights Commands of the Ministry of Defense, has its headquarters in Stuttgart (Kelley Barracks) and has been active since October 2008. His area of responsibility includes the whole continent except Egypt (which is at CENTCOM) and includes military relations with 53 African states. Interesting is the self-description, because the commander calls Africom a "3D organization" - "Diplomacy, Development, Defense". So the command consciously coordinates with Foreign Ministry and USAID, not only with the military. In Practice, the scissors still depend on, because every civil servant working on Africa policy will come several military members, and in many embassies, the defenseattachés exceed the number of diplomats. The actual operational work runs over three channels: - Counterrorism, especially drone inserts and special operations: Against Al-Shabaab and Isis-Somalia at the Horn of Africa, against Boko Haram / Isis-Westselahel on Chadsee. In Somalia alone, it was up to 2023 more than 315 confirmed drone strokes; The Legal Cover for this is the AUMF authorization of 2001. - Training and equipment of local armed forces ("African LED, US enabled"), including secret "127e" programs that involved US troops in direct fighting. - a network of bases with two qualities: permanent locations ("enduring footprint") like Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and half-permanent "Lily Pads" in Niger, Tunisia, Uganda, Kenya. Camp Lemonnier is the strategic anchor, here around 4,000 US staff, starting platform for operations at the Horn of Africa and outpost on the BAB Al Mandab, is one of the closest straits in the world. The turning under Trump is less presence, more "Burden Sharing" Since 2025, the impact direction is another. Secretary-General Langley (until mid-2025 commander, then Dagvin Anderson took over) announced public, African states should take more responsibility for their own safety - the retreat fits in Trump's priority for domestic safety and A slimmer US military appearance abroad. In addition, a deep cut - 2025 there were plans for reorganization that Africom was factory down and integrating Africa into a command with America - explicitly as part of the shift to the Indo-Pacific. Critics warn that creates a strategic vacuum that could fill China and Russia in the Sahel. Anderson but is pursued in parallel two lines: counter-radicalism via training and equipment programs continues, and China is explicitly named as the subject of the curb - at the same time the command "innovative mechanisms" of cooperation wants to use and cooperate Pragmatic with cut slip rules. In such a situation, China usually pursues a pragmatic approach. While Western States (US, EU, France) often publicly condemn and impose sanctions, China consistently focuses on maintaining industrial relations with new military regimes - in the service of its own economic and strategic interests. A crucial factor is the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, which officially proclaims China as a guideline of its Africa policy. Beijing does not depend on cooperation from compliance with democratic standards; Rather, it is ready to work with any reigning government to implement joint projects - such as the expansion of infrastructure, raw material production or promoting trade. For military regimes, this is an important support. Western partners return their relationships, China fills the resulting vacuum through financial and technical support. Praxisbeispiele: After the overturnation in Niger (2023), China did not break the relationships. On the contrary, the State Group China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) granted the Junta a loan (totaling approximately $ 400 million) to help financing - among other things in exchange for oil supplies. This was factually a support of the regime, at a time in which regional organizations (Ecowas, African Union) imposed sanctions against the country. In Mali and Burkina Faso, Chinese companies have strengthened their activities: investment agreements were signed, for example in the areas of solar energy or raw material reduction (gold, copper, nickel). However, the situation should not be idealized. Such a pragmatism has its price: Political risks arise: In African countries, part of the company feels close relations with China as a reinforcement foreign influence. This can undermine the legitimacy of both the respective regime and the Chinese presence. The model is often based on preferred loans, which the recipient country can not always repay. This carries the risk of "debt traps" and leads to assets (approximately ports or raw materials) under the control of Chinese companies. Occasionally it comes to conflicts in the implementation. Thus, the military Junta in Niger in 2025 temporarily exhibited Chinese executives - the reason was disputes on salary distribution and compliance with local work design. And what about other actors? Sometimes other actors - such as Russia or some Gulf States - also pursue - a similar pragmatic course. However, compared to the West, the Chinese approach is particularly characterized by its systematic readiness to work together with unstable regimes. In short, China rather relies on the principle of "business as usual" in such situations, while western partners tend to focus on political conditions and the impact on democracy. The China competition includes three levels Here it will be exciting because the competition logic differs per level. 1. Military. China opened his first foreign base in 2017 - just in Djibouti, just a few kilometers from Camp Lemonnier. Formally, the basis for logistics, anti-piracy and UN mandates; Satellite pictures show that ships could dock on the pier ships to the size of aircraft carriers. When the dispute over the Doraleeh container terminal to a nationalization in favor of the Doraleeh container terminal, the then Africom boss Waldhauser warned against "significant consequences": China could be the US Controlling post-schollinies at the port. Since 2008, Chinese naval flotflops and training programs for thousands of African officers have come since 2008. 2. Economical and infrastructural. This is the actual battlefield - and here Africom is largely the wrong instrument. China has joined the Focac Summit 2024 a package of around € 51 billion (loans, investments, development aid, predominantly in Yuan) and offered 53 African states duty-free access to the Chinese market. Trading China Africa was around € 283 billion in 2023 and has risen more than twenty times since 2000. The US answer to China's "Belt and Road" is called Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment - the most prominent project is the "Lobito Corridor", the railway connection from the copper belt (DR Congo, Zambia) to the Angolan Atlantic Hafen Lobito, funded by USA, EU and G7. The paradox is that the railroad helps less against China's dominance than it sounds. Around 80 percent of the Copper Mines in the Congo include Chinese companies, and the refinement runs anyway almost completely in China - 72 percent of the world-renowned lithium and 68 percent of the cobalt come from there. The first test freight through the Lobito corridor did not go to Europe 2023, but to China. The USA has therefore set up our own "Task Force" for strategic minerals, in which diplomats, financiers and military work together - the TschiSekedi meeting with Africom boss Anderson in Kinshasa was a part of this Mineral strategy. 3. Normative and diplomatic. China connects with Focac and the "Global Initiative" (Security, Development, Civilization) has its own standards corridor and organized with African states common positions in multilateral forums - this is a direct challenge to the US role as a preferred diplomatic partner. The quality "We can never beat China in the money", by the way, does not come from critics, but literally from an Africom officer. The central asymmetry is in the heart, because here is often overlooked: Africom can not always lead to economic competition with China, because his mandate and budget come from defense logic. The US offer security as Public Good - which use African governments, but do not want to pay for it. China offers trade, train stations, ports, loans and jobs - which urgently need African governments. This explains why even in the US-funded Lobito corridor benefit Chinese operator, and why the Sahel realignment, such as the excerpt from Niger, China and Russia find a simple connection. At the same time, the Chinese-friendly narrative is not uncritical, China's trade in Africa is strong asymmetrical (exports to Africa outweighing clearly), raw material dependence remains, and African governments are required to provide more value added Place and more balanced trading structures - such as President Ramaphosa compared to Xi Jinping directly. African states are increasingly seeing themselves as actors with their own power of action, not as objects of block confrontation - US official stresses themselves, you do not force anyone to the page choice. The conclusion is that Africom remains the most important military instrument of the US in Africa - especially as a counter-terror and drone platform - but the actual power competition with China plays on rails, ports and refineries. The 2025 downgrading of Africom has tightened the paradox. 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