Influence of ICC in Africa

The influence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Africa has been inconsistent and has changed significantly over time. Since its establishment in 2002, the ICC has exerted a profound and often polarizing influence on Africa. Although African states were among the court's first and strongest supporters, the relationship has deteriorated significantly over the last decade. Initially, the ICC enjoyed the support of many African states, but relations later deteriorated due to a number of political and legal problems. At the beginning of 2026, the influence of the ICC can be divided into three main areas: legal implications, political tensions, and the current wave of sovereignty movements. The influence of the ICC in Africa The ICC was initially perceived as an instrument for combating impunity. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, many African countries actively supported the creation of a permanent international court capable of holding those responsible for serious crimes accountable. Senegal was among the first states to ratify the Rome Statute (the ICC's founding document). Several African states independently submitted requests to the ICC Prosecutor to investigate crimes committed on their territory (for example, in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Uganda). The ICC and Kenya are closely linked through cases of post-election violence following the 2007 presidential election. Kenya acceded to the Rome Statute in 2005 and incorporated it into national law in 2009, but the ICC took over investigations when a local tribunal failed. Following the 2007/2008 unrest, which claimed over 1,100 lives and displaced 600,000 people, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted high-ranking politicians such as Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto for crimes against humanity. The African Union (AU) sharply criticized the ICC, particularly for indicting sitting heads of state, and demanded immunity under Article 27 of the Rome Statute. The proceedings against Kenyatta and Ruto began in 2013 but were discontinued due to lack of evidence and Kenya's lack of cooperation – Kenyatta in 2015, Ruto earlier. The Assembly of the Parties in The Hague adjusted procedural rules in 2013 to accommodate Kenya, but this did not resolve the AU-EU conflict. These cases intensified debates about the independence of the ICC and African skepticism towards Western justice. Kenya ultimately did not fully cooperate, which caused tensions with the AU and the EU. A significant part of the ICC's work concerns Africa. At times, most of the court's investigations involved cases on the African continent. This was due both to self-reporting by states and to UN Security Council resolutions (for example, in the case of Darfur in Sudan). Criticism and tensions Over time, attitudes towards the International Criminal Court (ICC) began to change in Africa. The main criticisms included: Allegations of selective justice. Many African heads of state and government, as well as organizations, including the African Union (AU), believed that the ICC unfairly targeted Africa. It was claimed that the court ignored crimes committed in other regions, particularly in countries with global influence (e.g., the United States, China, and Russia). Critics pointed out that over 70% of ICC cases involved Africans, while crimes committed by Western powers or their allies went unpunished. Issues of sovereignty. African states expressed dissatisfaction with the ICC's interference in their internal affairs. This was particularly true in cases where the court indicted sitting heads of state (for example, Omar al-Bashir in Sudan), which, according to the AU, could hinder the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Political bias. The ICC has been accused of becoming an instrument of "neocolonialism" and serving the interests of Western powers. Some believed the court was used to exert pressure on undesirable countries or heads of state. The “court of last resort,” the International Criminal Court (ICC), was designed to intervene only when national courts are “unwilling or unable” to bring charges. In Africa, this has had two significant consequences. Many countries (such as Kenya and Uganda) have adapted their national laws to the Rome Statute, thus creating national frameworks for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. For many victims of mass crimes – such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or the Central African Republic (CAR) – the ICC remains the only realistic hope for accountability when local systems are compromised by conflict or corruption. The debate about “bias” – that is the most significant influence of the ICC – lies in triggering a comprehensive continental debate about “selective justice”. For years, the ICC focused almost exclusively on African cases. This led the African Union (AU) to accuse the court of being a neocolonial instrument targeting African heads of state. The trials against sitting heads of state – most notably Omar al-Bashir (Sudan), Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto (Kenya) – marked a turning point. African governments began to unite against arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), arguing that peace and stability took precedence over international legal proceedings. Last year, the influence of the ICC entered a structural crisis, as several states moved from verbal criticism to actual withdrawal: In September 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their withdrawal from the ICC, describing it as an “instrument of neocolonialist oppression”. There are renewed efforts to persuade the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights to assume the role of international justice on the continent and to leave legal matters within African institutions. At the beginning of 2026, the ICC was in a crisis situation and was trying to prevent further withdrawals (such as Tanzania's) through diplomatic concessions, such as the possible appointment of further African judges to leadership positions. Problems arose with the enforcement of sentences. In some cases, convicted or acquitted individuals were unable to return to their home countries because no country was willing to accept them. This was perceived as a further injustice. Common causes include political interference, lack of cooperation between states, or obstacles to enforcement such as identity issues. Examples show that such cases have led to delays even after acquittal or release from prison. Common problems include political obstacles. States often refuse extradition or return, for example, by invoking immunity in the case of politicians like Netanyahu, where German authorities could hinder the execution of an ICC arrest warrant; obstacles to repatriation, such as unclear identity or countries of origin not issuing documents, which blocks the return of convicted individuals; and a lack of cooperation. Many states do not cooperate with the ICC, which complicates enforcement. In cases like Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé (both acquitted by the ICC), their return to Ivory Coast was delayed due to restrictions and political tensions, but they ultimately returned. For IS fighters from Europe, their home countries often block their return for trial or execution. Similarly, Hungary and Greece prevented returns due to systemic deficiencies. Dissatisfaction with the ICC has led to the emergence of alternative initiatives in Africa. For example, in 2014 the African Union proposed extending the jurisdiction of the African Court of Human Rights and Justice (through the Malabo Protocol) to include cases of genocide and war crimes. In 2025, the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger announced the establishment of the International Court of Human Rights and Justice in the Sahel (CPS-DH) as an alternative to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The “Malabo Protocol” (officially: Malabo Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights) is an international treaty of the African Union (AU), adopted in Malabo/Equatorial Guinea in 2014, which provides for the creation of an integrated African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights (ACJHR). The influence of the ICC in Africa is ambivalent: While the court has helped to bring perpetrators of serious crimes to justice, its work has also faced widespread criticism, leading to a loss of credibility and efforts to find regional alternatives. Relations between the ICC and African states remain complex and are dependent on political, legal, and historical factors.