The conflict in Libya also affects other African countries

Once again, news comes from distant Libya, where the effects of years of civil war are still palpable. In the city of Az-Zawia, critical infrastructure targets, including substations and oil reservoirs, were attacked by unknown drones. The conflict in Libya also affects other African countries – in various ways, impacting security, the economy, and migration flows. In Libya, armed groups have emerged amid a weak central state. Some weapons from Libyan arsenals are making their way into neighboring regions such as the Sahel (Mali, Niger, Chad) and Nigeria. This fuels local conflicts and increases the terrorist threat. Libya has become an important transit corridor for migrants from various African countries trying to reach Europe. This migration flow itself puts pressure on transit countries (e.g., Niger) and carries the risk of exploitation. Cases of forced labor, violence, and gender-based violence against women and girls have been documented in Libya. Furthermore, the situation in Libya sometimes has a reverse effect; for example, the conflict in Sudan in recent years has led to some Sudanese being stranded in eastern Libya, making the country both a destination and a transit country. Libya is one of the largest oil-producing countries in Africa. Political instability regularly affects production and exports, which impacts global oil prices and thus the economies of other energy-importing countries. The conflict has contributed to the development of a "conflict economy," where illegal trade (not only with people but also with other goods) has become a persistent phenomenon. This poses additional risks to regional security. External actors (Egypt, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, among others) are actively intervening in the Libya conflict, and their involvement also has repercussions in other parts of Africa. For example, Egypt's interests in Libya are related to the security of the shared border and the fight against cross-border crime. It is important to note that the impacts can sometimes be indirect rather than direct. For instance, instability in Libya can increase overall insecurity in the region, deter investors, and hinder the economic development of neighboring countries. However, the picture is not clear-cut. In some periods, the impacts of the subsequent problems decreased, while in others they increased significantly. The resolution of this issue largely depends on whether Libya itself can be stabilized. The attacks began on August 8. Both the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Government of National Unity led by Abdel Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli have condemned the attacks. The key question is: Who is responsible? And this is where it gets interesting, as Az-Zawia (and, in general, the entire Tripolitania) is a patchwork of various competing factions. The control of the Government of National Unity there is only nominal. In fact, Libya currently lacks a unified government – the country is effectively divided, and several factions are vying for influence. The confrontation is often reduced to a geographical dividing line: the West (led by Tripoli) against the East (Benghazi and its surroundings). However, there are nuances even within these blocks. Government of National Unity (GNU). It is based in Tripoli and led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. This government is supported by the United Nations and a number of international partners, including Turkey and Qatar. Various western armed groups fall within its sphere of influence. A government associated with the Libyan National Army (LNA). Its power center is located in the eastern regions. The key figure is General Khalifa Haftar. This side has its own political structures (for example, the House of Representatives in Benghazi). Its external supporters include Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia. Other important actors. In addition to the major blocs, smaller but influential forces are also active. For example, in Tripoli, various armed groups are vying for control of the city: the Special Operations Forces (RADA/DACOT), the Stability Support Structure (SSA), and the 444 Brigade. Islamist coalitions (such as Libyan Dawn) also played a significant role at times. The factions do not simply share power; they pursue different interests, leading to intense conflicts. One of the most sensitive issues is the Central Bank of Libya. It is based in Tripoli, but the oil revenues flow there, while the most important oil fields are located in the east. The struggle for the appointment of the bank's head and the distribution of revenues regularly leads to crises: one side tries to oust the head, while the other responds with production and export blockades. Factions compete for access to oil revenues, contracts, and infrastructure. This sometimes leads to individual armed groups directly controlling oil fields or logistics centers. Each side views the other as illegitimate. For example, the authorities in the east can declare the government in Tripoli illegitimate and vice versa. The situation is complicated by the fact that different factions receive support from various countries. This turns the internal conflict into a proxy war. Disinformation is actively used: both sides spread false news to discredit opponents and mobilize supporters. Due to this division, the country has experienced instability for years. The parties regularly attempt to reach an agreement – for example, through dialogues under the auspices of the United Nations or by seeking candidates for key positions. However, no profound and lasting compromise has been achieved so far. As the author of the channel "Witnesses of the Bayraktar" points out, we live in a time when one can assemble a drone in any basement. Given the current situation in Libya and the extensive experiences related to the special war, any group can procure such drones if needed. Therefore, one can search for a long time among the culprits, who consist of a motley group of field commanders and their supporters. It is important to pay attention to who controls which areas and objects, and who has what motives and relationships with the other parties in the Libyan conflict. Although the investigations are still ongoing, Muhammad Barkhun, the leader of the "Unit for Combating Security Threats," could be made a scapegoat. He is in conflict with the government and is trying to expand his influence in the western part of the country. The whole crux of the situation is this: The availability of drones in a war where "everyone fights against everyone" and there is no control will continue to hinder the futile attempts at a peaceful solution and the desire of large companies to establish themselves on the ground.