The RIF War (1921-1926) and the Republic of RIF

The RIF War (1921-1926) and the Republic of RIF At the beginning of the 20th century, Spain and France created influence spheres in Morocco as part of the 20012 sparkling contracts. Spain controlled the northern zone, including the RIF mountain. The colonial rule brought high tax burdens, agricultural confiscations and the compulsory military service, which stood out the trunks of the RIF area on wide resistance. The Berber tribes (Amazigh-tribes) are North Moroccos, which are in the context of the RIFWRIG (1921-1926) under the leadership of ABD El-Crimea (Mohammed Ben Abdelkrim El- Khattabi, about 1882-1963, was a Moroccan Amazigh - often referred to as Berber - and political and military leader, who in the north of the Spanish and French colonial rule in the north of the Spanish and French colonial rule Laid out. He is one of the important personalities of the anticolonial history of the 20th century. Born in Ajdir in the RIF mountains, he was initially as a teacher, judge and journalist in the Spanish colonial system Active. Later, he opposite the Spanish expansion after experiencing colonial oppression and detention) against the Spanish and later French colonial rule. Aith Waryaghar (or Beni Urriaguel) - one of the most influential trunks in the region; From him ABD El-Crimea came. They occupied strategically important areas and formed the core of resistance. Garelli (or Gharyan) and neighboring mountain groups - they were actively involved in the fighting, especially in the first war years after the defeat of the Spaniard at Anoual (1921). Ibeshri and other strains of the eastern and central RIF - they supported the RIF republic and involved in the organization of defense, supplement and mobilization. In the broader sense, other Berber communities of the RIF joined the Alliance, often linked by reluctance and contractual relations: The alliance system was not only based on ethnicity, but also on traditional mutual assistance agreements (in the BERBERTRADITION: TYPE DEVICES OF TYPE * AMSSAL *). It is important to understand that a "trunk" in RIF is not a monolithic unit, but a complex network of clans, sisters and local communities with a flexible alliance system. In the 1920s, these compounds allowed rapid creation of a uniform military and administrative structure of the RIF republic: Cold trees (* JMAA *), local judges and brokers who helped coordinate the actions between the different groups. In every bigger tribe, there were their own field commander, which underdended the General Staff Abd El Crims. A system of relationships and neighborhood obligations made it possible to quickly set up troops and ensure their food supply and accommodation in the mountains. The majority of these tribes spoke the RIF dialect of the Treifit (Tarifit), which still forms a significant component of the cultural identity of the region today. However, the political identity during the war years was not based solely on ethnic affiliation, but above all on the common goal: the resistance to colonial rule. In 1921, local leader collided under the leadership of ABD El-Crimea (Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Karim Al-Khattabi). After a serious Spanish defeat in the Battle of Annual in July 1921. In fact, the defeat of the Spanish army was in the Battle of Annual (Span. "Desastre de Annual") in July 1921 one of the most serious in the history of the modern Spanish army. The battle took place on July 22, 1921 at Annual (in the northeast of Spanish-Morocco) during the RIFWRIG. Spanish troops met on Berber Rif tribes under the command of Abd El-Crimea. The Spanish army began an offensive of the already occupied coastal areas in the interior. The Commander of the Eastern War Show Place, General Manuel Fernández Silvestre, acted as self-powered: he had the direct consent of King Alfon's XIII. Receive (among other things, from the desire to celebrate the victory on the day of Saint James - the Protective Patron of the Spanish Army), but not informed his immediate supervisor, General Berenguer. The Spaniards were in difficult mountains that was hard to defend. The troops had to fight with significant supply problems. During the retreat, the army came to chaos: many soldiers fled without resistance. As a result of the retreat, the Spaniard lost about 80% of its armed forces (by death, miss or capture). Silvestre self-committed - suicide according to the popular version. Later, the remaining armed forces returned to the attached base Monte Arruit. There they were crashed and cut off by the water and replenishment supply; Finally, the garrison capitulated on the 9th of August.

The consequences were blatant military losses. According to official information provided by the Cortes, the number of fallen Spanish soldiers (including the colonial troops) amounted to 13.192. In addition, enormous quantities of equipment were lost: thousands of rifles, carabiners, muskets and machine guns as well as artillery contactors, horses, mules and large ammunition stocks. The defeat triggered a heavy domestic crisis. Opposition politicians used the situation to criticize both the army and king. This undermines confidence in the monarchy. Spain was forced to fundamentally reconsider his approach to managing the RIF region. In addition, the Spaniards even asked the French for help in the fight against the uprising of ABD El-Crimea. Historians point out that the shock was one of the factors about the defeat of Annual, which ultimately became a military dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923) and later to the fall of the monarchy and the exclusion of the second Spanish Republic (1931) led. Some researchers draw a direct line from this defeat to the events of the Civil War from 1936 to 1939. In response to the defeat, the Spanish authorities handled drastic measures, including propaganda and - like sources - the use of chemical weapons (especially Al HaceEMA). In Spanish historiography, this event is firmly linked to the term "disaster of Annual" - a term underlined the extent and the painful effect of the defeat for national self-image. Based on this victory, ABD El-Crims exclaimed the Republic of RIF, an independent state with its own administration and its own laws. For about five years (1921-1926), the armed forces of RIF led a very effective guerrilla war against the Spaniards and - from 1925 - also against the French. The RIF fighters used the mountainous terrain for rests and retreated in inaccessible areas. Abd El Crimea made a central guidance and political legitimacy. Received Spanish weapons (rifles, machine guns, artillery) awarded them a firepower that went far beyond the usual tribal media. Strong support from the population and a disciplined organization enabled persistent fighting. The conflict developed into one of the most important anticolonial resistors of the interwar period and is often given as an example of a successful asymmetric war against a colonial power - at least for a certain amount of time. The leaf turned when France started a coordinated offensive in the years 1925 and 1926 on the side of Spain. In 1925, France actively engaged in the Rifrieg - a turning point of the conflict. Until 1925, France was largely waiting. But the situation changed. In April 1925, ABD El-Crims, the leader of the Rif-Berber, launched an offensive against French positions in the Ouergha Valley. Within two and a half months, RIF units 48 of the 66 French outposts destroyed in the region. There was the acute danger that the insurgents interrupt important connection paths (such as the Railway Railway Fès-Tétouan) and advancing on large cities such as Fès or Taza. Residents of some border regions of the French protectorate supported the RIF insurgents by providing them with food and ammunition. The French authorities attempted to prevent this support, which also reinforced the call for harder measures. First, Louis-Hubert-Gonzalve Lyautey was commander-in-chief of French armed forces in Morocco. He refused a close military cooperation with Spain and preferred a more cautious policy. However, due to failures and the fear of a large-area uprising he was replaced. His successor was Marshal Philippe Pétain. Under his command, France set a joint operation with Spain. In June and July 1925, French and Spanish delegations in Madrid led negotiations and closed a military pact against the RIF republic. In the fall, the allies started a large-scale impact: Spanish troops landed in the bay of Alhucemas (September 8), while the French army under the command of Pétain from the south attacked. On September 7, a bridgehead was built at Djebel Amekran - a strategic position known as ABD El-Crims "Eaglehorst"; She was taken on 22 September. For the first time, the French side continued chemical warfare fabrics against the RIF units - first chlorophilizer (that since the end of 1918 stored in Morocco), later, on request of the commands phosgene and mustard gas from the motherland Built. The insurgents had neither protective equipment nor via aircraft guns, which made them vulnerable to air raids and the use of chemical weapons. The United French-Spanish armed forces had a significant superiority with regard to troop strength and technical equipment. Although the RIF units made desperate resistance, they could no longer with this pressure. The turning in the war was clearly different.

At the same time, France and Spain in the fall of 1925 led secret negotiations with RIF-Kabylen - these failed, since the demands ABD El Crimians (including the recognition of the independence of the RIF republic) for allies were unacceptable. The war ended in 1926: On May 27, ABD El Crimea resulted in the French authorities. He and his closest familiar were banished to the island of Réunion. Individual resistance nests were only eliminated later; The Spanish troops declared their protectorate finally until July 1927 for "pounds". The year 1925 marked the transition from the involvement for active participation - and ultimately it was the alliance with Spain, which decided the outcome of the conflict. Would you like to learn more about the tactics of the RIF guerrilla or how exactly the landing was organized at Al Haceima? Conclusion. It revealed weaknesses of European colonial armies and showed, like local leadership and the grounds, to encounter industrialized armed forces. It inspired other anti-colonial movements throughout Africa and Asia. It changed the French and Spanish colonial strategies and led to greater direct control and massive militarization in their North African territories. Here are some comments to Philippe Pétain. Philippe Pétain (1856-1951) was a French military leader and statesman whose reputation was characterized by two very different aspects. On the one hand, he was considered hero of the First World War and, on the other hand, as a head of the collaborating Vichy regime during World War II. To complete the picture, other crucial moments are also to be called. Pétain became a national hero through the defense of Verdun in 1916. His tactics were based on the rotation of the troops, a continuous supply of the "Holy Street" (Voie Sacrée) and the massive use of artillery. The motto of that time was: "You will not get through" (ILS Ne Passont PAS). Pétain was considered one of the most important military authorities of France and advocated a defense strategy and the construction of fortifications (which was later associated with the Maginot Line). According to the defeat of France in 1940, the 84-year-old Pétain was appointed head of state of the unoccupied part of the country. His regime collaborates with Nazi Germany; After the war, Pétain was sentenced to death due to high treason, but the penalty converted into lifelong detention. He died in 1951. Historians and the public argue to him today, since in his biography two incompatible role images meet, on the one hand the efficient, pragmatic and popular commander, who preserved the army in a critical moment before the collapse (and 1917 Muters not only completed by repressions, but also by improved service conditions); On the other hand, the political leaders who used cooperation with the occupiers and supported repressive measures. In the context of colonial wars as the Rifrieg, another facet is added: Pétain embodies the transition to the transition to harder, centralized and technologically "crushing" methods of warfare in the colonies. (